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LEGITIMACYANDTHE 130ST-COMMUNIST HUNGARIAN 
POLITICAL CHANGE 
ABSTRACT 
Legitimacy is a key but a-changing concept in political science. It has evolved 
in parallcl with the changing political realities throughout history. In the current 
political environment. legitimacy of a political order depends on its approval by 
people tit the LIOniestic level. However, this domestic approval has to be 
sustained by an international approval. an attribute underlined especially during 
tile Cold War era. Latin American crises of legitimacy and tile more recent East 
European crises ollegitimacy provide conacte examples for this. 
I lungary. as one ol'the East European countries which underwent the post- 
C0111111LIlliSt systemic transformation faces a renewcd crisis of legitimacy. The 
grounds ol' legitimation have changed in comparison with the grounds or 
legitimation 01, tile ancien I-egime. especially under tile Uddrist rule. This 
thesis analyses the UdArist attempts at legitimation, and then focuses on tile 
post-coninlunist system in I lungary to compare it with the ancicn regime in 
search ot' the answer to tile question what has ehanged during the 
transilormation. This study flocuscs on legitimacy with its domcstic and 
intanational dynamics. taking into consideration the systemic, institutional, 
and social changes in tile post-communist era. It concludes that a conibination 
ol'political. economic and social improvements will ensure the new system*s 
legitimate status in both donle%tic and international arcnas. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ON LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY 
1. ON THE SUBJECT MATTER, METHODOLOGY, AND TERMINOLOGY 
OF THE THESIS 
I lie lolliming thesis is to focus on Ific subject orlegitimacy and legifinuilloff 
in Ilic jvlitical transrorniation of Ilic llungarian political systcm from the 
I Itingarian Revolution to Ilic post-communist cm I'lic main concepts to bc 
inwhed in Ilic discussions arc legitimury. legitimallon and denwrothation. 
Legitimacy is n concept uhich has a broad spcoruin or rucanings. Basically. it 
is undmituid in the social scienccs as -Ilic nonnativc %mlidity oran ordcr..... a 
matter or lx: licr by the prticipants - actors. "I and thcrerorc is an clement or 
hiteractimi bemccri the actors ora plitical system Ilic concept oriegia, "t, c). 
ol'an order. ho%%c%-cr. is not txm-d on sanctions. but on the acceptancc or this 
pKilitical order 1)), the actors. that. at the largcst. includes citi7cns. According to 
Max WeN. -r. the idea or iegitimac). oran order dcivnds on virlue of irmlition. 
.f 
ht legality. new rour 1) jvs t-114-t-tval, laith. vislue-rationalfii1th. or on a hvli, - 
that dclonc it ix)lilical order as lcgilimatc arc also to tv seen as Irmlitiallill. 
charimmale. phil-rathmal. and legal-rational methods orgaining legifintocy. 
I lmw% er. these rour criteria underlying the ieginmac). or a ix)litical order may 
not be lotally applicable to thc FwAtern l? hw for thc stpciall%l syment workcd 
2 
under differcm principics than thc capitalist-fiberal splent. As ncCcSsilics 
arose. the Weberian systcn, or classification has been allcrcd and arrangcd in 
accor&mcc %%ith the jvculiarilics of ollicr statc sysicnis. hfichacl G. Iludson 
motlified it in his rcscurch on the Arab statcs and on the clucstion or thcir 
It-gitimot-j-. Jan Ilakulski argued about thc hardships. ir not the impossibility to 
apply these primipics onto the Sovict-tyrv socictics2. David Bectharn 11irst, 
mentiolled the illcompalibi lily bct%%ccn the two ix)litical orders and licncc thc 
dill'crence in issues or iegitinwQ. it, these 1%, 03. and then proposed a new 
approach it) Iegithnucy in order to explain thc de%clopincrits in the Fast 
Furolvan context since Ilic rcvolutions; or 19894. Again. John Williams 
devOolvil -in international upproach to the issue or lcgitimacy and legitimation 
in his %%ork'. This study will rocus on the line rollo%%cd by the llakulski- 
I approach to the matter or legitimacy as its inctlimlological 
patlcrn. 
In addition to dill1crcm understandings or the concept or legitimacy. there arc 
also dilTercncv-s in the ivrccption or the concept or legitimacy. A political 
order may Iv legitimate in the qcs or either the rcginic's sup1wiers. or a 
social clas%. or the majority or the ivopic %%ho live in that given country. The 
same order may tv thought as illegitimate by othcrs such as the underground or 
vp% IA opl-nisition. a stvial c4--s or thc majority or the Miple or the gi%cn 
bII I'Aukki. *14wilinificy and Mass Cutuphance: Renectitmi on hfa% Wcbcr and So%ict-Type 
%to% ict ic%*. Its un/s. /t oterstiol #4 Piditictil. 441erkv. v. 16. pp. 35-56. p. 35. 
J-111 Pakukki. 4,11. CiL. pp. 3843. pa%, im.. 
D. 1%id 11colwill. 'LON-rol 6/4-ostocnity and the Limits or rx"wr3lint"i'. Pedslica Vedies. v. 40. 
%Ivci. il iwsc. pp. 40-S3. 
D. IV Id I ICCIII. 1111.7! 1"' '00" LIVIOM: PJACITIMAn 1'rcs%. 199 1. 
. 1411111 William .G ýk I 1 '90 nwal'UHavul fiffif P. 
1 lite RAe tuhl Fall obf I'vembnrAl. Lonclon: 
N1.10101.111 11rcmi. 199X. 
3 
country. An order may be thought as legitimate by the intellectuals -e. g. 
Khonicyni*s Iran-, or by tile military elite -e. g. Greece under tile junta or 
1970s-. or by parts ofthe domestic and foreign elite with a say in the affairs in 
that given state -e. g. Chile under Pinocliet administration which served the 
interests o I'mul ti national companies as well as part ofthe Chilean elite-, or by 
a social class or racial segincrit within tile society -e. g. South Africa during 
Apartheid- while others may rind it illegitiniatc. miuc most or tiic population 
cither considcr the political order to be legitimate or impossible to change, tile 
intc1lectuals may consider it as illegitimate -e. g. Czechoslovakia from nlid- 
1970s to 1989-. 'rherefore. there are different approaches to the issue of a 
political order's legitimacy. 'mis study will focus oil many dinlerent laycrs of 
society and their views oil the issue. Therefore, oil the one hand, tile issue of 
legilinmey ol' a regime may be seen as ambiguous. On the other hand, tile 
general principle Nvill be a judgmental approach based on the principles of 
nberai (tentocrao,. i ictice, ir a political order is considered as illegitimate, it 
Nvill mean it is illegitimate not in flic legal sense -as all political systems which 
tire legally accepted are legally legitiniate- but in terms of the opinion or tiic 
people ofthis country or in ternis of the liberal dernocratic principles. 
Democracy is another key concept dealt with in this study as it focuses'on tile 
issues ol* legitimacy and legitimation during the democratic trans rormati on 
period in the East European countries and focuses on tile case study of 
I lunoitry. Demoemlisuflon and the trans rormation of a political order -or LI 
reginic- into liberal democi-acy are important subjects of the post-communist 
StUdiCS SillCe the post-communist societies experience a transformation 1rom a 
4 
political order to what most people take as its main adversary or alternative. if 
not its direct opposite, from 1989 to date. 
Democralistition can be described as tile transtlormation of a given political 
OrdCr From an either authoritarian or totalitarian regime to a regime which 
allows citizens' participation in decision making. Tile main aim of this 
transf'ortilation is to create a system in which the general public have a say in 
the acts or tile rUling political order either by indirect participation -by 
choosing to vote or not to vote, or, by working in, or in association with, civil 
socielY organisations capable of enforcing policy changes-, or by direct 
participation -by working within the ranks of a political party, becoming a 
candidate in elections and the like-. Such transforniations were seen 
throughout the second half of' flic 20th Century, following experiences of 
transl'ormation first in the former colonies gaining independence, tllcii in South 
Furopean and SOLIth American authoritarian reginles and finally in the East 
Furopean totalitarian political orders. 
'rile process or(lemocralisation and incorporation into tile world economic and 
political systems of tlicsc dcniocratising countries mentioncd above led to the 
development ol*difTercnt schools of political theory. The first of these was the 
School of' Modernisation which incorporated such narnes as 8amuel 
I ILIntington, Danicl Bcll, Dunkward Rustow, and Lucien Pye. These Figures 
claimed that industrialisation was the key concept in transforniation and ir a 
certain society was to industrialise, the process of niodernisation was to force 
traditional, outmoded, patriarchal, rural, clan-based, corrupt social and political 
structures to change, giving way to a ncw, modern, cqualitarian, urban, 
incorruptible democratic system. 
5 
The Modernisation School was challenged in early 1970s by the Dependency 
School %% hich consisted or suci, writers as Immanuel Wallcrstein and licnriquc 
Cardoso, and which claimed that all the world economic and political structure 
was interlinked. They claimed that there were dirrerent parts such as the core, 
semi-periphery and pcripliery in the World political and economic system. 
I'liereflore. dentoct-alisaflon was possible only wilen tile core countries were to 
see it as prolitable to themselves. Neo-Realists such as Joseph Nye have 
adopted similar approaches in defining the role of actors in world politics. 
The mic%val or the Modernisation School took place in mid- I 980s when such 
authors as Lucien 11ye canic up with the idea that the Inforniatics Revolution of 
the 1980s, the introduction of such telecommunication deviccs as satcllite 
dishes. personal computers, global TV broadcasts, Internet, and the like, have 
challenged oppressive reginics. The claim was that through tile Lisc of these 
means. governments becanic unable to suppress the flow of ideas and 
hillormation to its subjects/citizens. Thercrore, the rall of the totalitarian and 
-nucl Huntington further argued that IlUthoritarian reginics was inevitable. Sai 
there were waves oNlentoci-alisalion and that we were living within one such 
wave. Following the work of Daniel Bell in 1961, Francis Fukuyarna argued 
that the ideology as a concept had lost its importance, the world pblitical 
system was going to be dominated by a uniflorm approach, terminating 
idcology as a relevant concept and licnce indicating the end of history as we 
know it. This school of thought, may be rd'erred to as the Neo-Modernist 
School. 
This thesis does not particularly follow any of the al'orementioned political 
schools. but makes use of them when appropriate with tile case it 116cuscs on. 
6 
The set ol'ideas describing the lVellanschwing of this study may be seen as a 
distant relative ofthe Dependcncy School if any connection needs be made. 
There are also other concepts which are directly or indirectly linked with 
reginic legitimacy and legiffinalion that are used in this work. In the following 
work. the concept or civii society refers to the realm of society which is outside 
state ownership and/or control. Therefore, civil sociely refers to the parts of 
social mechanism which are constructed by civilian, non-statc actors. West and 
Fh-s/ Ifodd refler to those countries which formed an alliance in tile allermath 
or tile World War 11 against tile USSR and its allies and subordinates, and 
NNhich include tile European states which had multi-party liberal denlocratie 
political orders and which were in general members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Alliance (NATO). Finally, the system of government that the USSR and 
its Fast Furopean subordinates were governed by is rellerrcd to within the text 
inict-changcably as socialism and sicile socialism, but a distinction between 
communisin and soci(dism is made. In the text, the terms communisin and 
communisl are used to describe the ideological/theoretical bases of the socialist 
system ýNhile the ternis socialismIstale socialism and socialist are used in 
rellerence to the actual practice of the system from 1917 to present day. 
Although tiie use or tiie word socialism might create a confusion in relation 
with the existence of the term as part of the libcral democratic system, it is 
prellerred here to diffierentiate the Marxist vision from the actual practice or 
malpractice ortiie system. 
As mentioned before, there will be a quest in the idea of legitimacy and the 
methods or gaining legitimacy in Eastern Europe during and in the wake or the 
interim to democratic systern. To have a clearer discussion of the sutýjcct and 
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l'or clearer application of the arguments, a case study approach is adopted. 
I hingary Nvill be tile focus ofthis thesis because of its specific position. One of 
the major arguments of the Neo-Modernist School is that there is a uniform 
pattcrn oNtemoci-alisalion all around tile globe and that there was a uniform 
socialist state strLICturc from which a uniform transition to democracy may be 
achieved. This thesis argue. s that this happens not to be the case. I lungary, with 
its complex political balances and with the legacy of the 1956 uprising and the 
C. Rlses and consequences of this event has a diffierent structure than the 
propOSCLI Soviet-type state structure. 
I %Nill examine the concept of legitimacy and its place in the democrtaisation 
and liberalisation processes in Hungary. 
11. LEGITIMACY: A TRANSMUTING CONCEPT 
A. The Need for Legitimacy: 
Fhe concept ol'Iegilintacy. as we understand it presently, may be defined as the 
Justification of the existence of authority and of the ruling classes vis-A-vis the 
ruled masses, According to tile Wcberian definition of the concept (a 
comprehensive discussion is to be found below), as long as the ruling classes 
manage to create a popular belief in the appropriateness of their rule, they 
become leghimatc6. Therdore, the concept defines the urnits or a regime's 
illIlLience o%, cr its sulýjccts or citimis. If popular support reachcs a point where 
(lie ruling political order loses its claim to legitimacy. it loses its reason of 
existence -and its justification to rule. To ensure its domination over the 
political system, the ruling class thercfore has to seck ano find methods to 
justil'y its presence as the ruler in an existing political order. If this is no more 
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possible. a change in the ruling political order or in the government is 
inevitable. The form of change may vary depending on the administrative 
and/or political system of the country in question. The change may be made 
through elections, coups d'6tat. rebellions, civil wars, or revolutions, 
depending on the rules and flexibility of the political system. 
The above definition sunis up tile most generally accepted dermition or tile 
term legitimacy'. However, it is subject to criticism and alteration since the 
concept itselfis subject to change with the change of understanding in politics. 
I his matter will be discussed later in this chapter. The concept of legitimacy 
has been a source of interest for scholars of political science and political 
philosophy since ancient times as it deals with the justification and 
preservation of political power. During history, the concept of legitimacy 
changed in ternis of its definition, the boundaries of its definition and its limits, 
and therellore at times had difTercnt meanings and different amounts of 
importance were cast on it due to the different domestic and international 
political conditions. Thcsc will be analysed in the subsequent parts of this 
chapter. 
Nevertheless. despite changes in definition and the level of importance 
attributed to it, legitimacy had been and still remains a concept that links the 
relationship or the rulers to the ruled, creating a niýjor motive for the existence 
and continuity of any ruling regime. It therefore plays an important role in the 
cstablishment of'political order. Throughout history, the authority enjoyed by 
the rulers or a given state and the rightfulness of a reginic's or a leader's rule 
t' Nla\ Weber. Economy and Society, University or California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
Calirornia: 1978. p. 213. 
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over the citizens or subjects in a state have always been a matter of discussion, 
thus making legitimacy a continuously present issue of political entity. As will 
be demonstrated in this thesis, through its historical evolution the concept 
conlinued to maintain its important place despite changes in its meaning and 
perception. This chapter aims at analysing legitimacy in history, in its modem 
guise. and. in relation to its different appearances in national, international, 
liberal. and socialist environments. 
B. Legitimacy In History: 
'rhe concept or political legitimacy and the problem of legitimising tile 
political authority may first be seen in tile works or Aristotle. In the fourth 
century BC. Aristotle argued that political power obtains consent by tile use of 
coercive force (coercion), by the distribution of rewards (utilitarianism), by 
7 
education (normative techniques) or by sonic combination of these three . hi 
time, although the regimes continued to employ these means to secure their 
rules. the rules or tile political game evolved and new schemes and new 
grounds to base tile claims to power have appeared. 
1. Changes in the Concept of Authority: 
,I, o begin with. the changes that took place relate to tile concept of authority. 
The definition of authority gradually changed along with the shifts in tile 
relationship between the ruler and tile ruled. These changes cover the matter of 
w1io decides upon the identity of the ruler, and the legitimacy of the ruler 
ruling class. In the ancient world, where people were living in a communitarian 
system, the ability of a ruler to rule was dependent upon his ability to fight and 
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his military leadership valucs8. In such a system, those who Icgitimised, or 
delegitimised the system werc thosc capablc or clialicnging his merits as a 
leadcr and a warrior. In the later stages of history, tile ability to orgailise people 
in politics as well as in the battlcfield gained importance, and therefore, the 
importance of tile courtiers, the people with influence upon the sovereign, 
inucascd. Willi religion's extended importance in the pre-capitalist world, tile 
consent (if' religiOLls authoritics was also sought as a legitinlising ractor. The 
clergy represented the link between flic ruler and the divinc will, and thus, 
clerical consent was to be sought9. In the modern era, however, tile importance 
ol'the 'ordinary people'l(l and their perception ortiie government have become 
the core issue in the political legitimacy sutýject. Hence. one may claim that 
there has always been a rclationship between reginle Icgifirnacy and tile 
SOLII'CCS that limit. control, and hold political authority or power, although the 
sources ollimitation vary in time. 
2. Changes in the Scope of Decision-Makers: 
Secondly. in accordance with the changes in the concept or authority 
mentioned above. the scope of legitimacy underwent change. The grounds for 
Icgifiniacy changed from theological to legal and then to political grounds in 
time. The first claims to hold and to limit power were theological and, quasi- 
historical: A divine right to rule due to descent from a ruling family ordained 
by (lie gods or tile God was tile foundation that arranged the exercise, 
7joSeph Rothschild. 'Political Lcgitirnacy in Contemporary Europe* in Bogdan Dcnitch (cd. ), 
L-e. gilimalitm of'Reginics. SagC Publications, London, England: 1979. p. 38. 
,4 Marcel PrOol, Ilistoire des Wes Politiques Dalloz, Paris, France: 1961, pp. 16-20 passim. 
lbid.. pp. 129-130. 
1" *1 lic lerm 'ordinary people' will be used throughout this thesis. It is meant to rcrer to those hurnan 
bein. gs %kho do not hold a politically significant (or gomrinicrital) position, who are not members of the 
ruling class. or the intelligentsia. and nor of the critmprencurial class. The ordinariness of these pcople 
restriction. and legitimacy of power. In this understanding, the monarch had a 
divine right to rule, theoretically given to him by a deity or dcities, and hence 
he would only be responsible 11or all his decisions from introducing taxes to 
declaring war to God or tile gods that granted him the power to rule. The 
responsibility ol'the ruler was to himself and to God' 
In time. the responsibility of the ruler has become to himself and to hiS Court, 
and lie was to secure his legitimaey with tile approval of the nobility and of tile 
clergy of'his lands. The first grounds for legitimacy and power were replaced 
by more rationalist, moral, and philosophical claims to limit authority and 
po%%cr. During (lie Middle Ages, tile legitimacy of a ruler or one of Ilis barons 
was rclated to their birth, in addition to the ruler's divine right to rule. 
Legitimacy. tlicn. began to have legality as a ground in addition to theology. 
Law. as in the florm of common law / law of the land, written or unwritten 
constitutions. and as conventions / binding rules, has bccome the mcans to 
limit the use of' political power, and tile holding of power shifted from the 
divine ruler to tile ruling classes in the form of the aristocracy and the clcrgy12. 
For instance, tile ruler and any member or nobility and clergy were expected to 
be conceived in a legally binding and 'respectable' marriage so that they would 
13 
, lie legilimale 
. Flicy were also bound to act according to thý rulcs 
comes fi-om their lack or direct affiliation with political and economic decision-making positions or 
with the readily-broadcastable rorms. oropposition to these. 
II Sce ror instance Thornas I lobbes' Leviathan for the defence of the idea that the sovereign has 
ropon%ibility only towards God. 
12 Is. 1 1. Partridge, Consent and Consensus, second edition, Pall Mail Press, London: 1975, pp. 13-14 
passim. 
"Possibly. the best-known example of the concept of legitimacy with regard to marital ties may be 
seen in William Shakespeare's play King Lea in which the story of Edgar and Edmund, the two sons of 
61oucester. is told as a secondary theme. In the play, the son born as a legitimate child is represented as 
an elhical. good-hearted, and generous pFrson while the illegitimate son is represented as an evil figure 
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implemented by the ecclesiastical authorities (or other religious authorities as 
the Calipliacy or the office of Sheikll-ul Islani). Institutional devices such as 
tile mixed constitution which enables different people or different institutions 
to control different parts or government, a cliccks-and-balatices system, and, 
division of'11orces, were gradually used in order to limit the ovcr-use and abuse 
ol'iiox%, et-. 
On the other hand, as the nature of the relationship of the ruler and the ruled 
began to change, philosophical and moral limitations Nvere introduced in tile 
major Ilorms ofnatural law, liuman and natural rights, and contractualism. The 
change can be ascribed to the evolution in the scope of people who decide on 
the legitimacy or a ruler and to tile change in their expectations frorn the ruler. 
While once the rulers had to legitimisc tlicniscives through sclf-legitimation or 
by gaining the support /justification of the clergy, that began to change. First 
the landed gentry, then tile merchant class, then those above a poverty litilit, 
then those below it, freed slaves, and finally women, became integrated into 
the voting procedUre. The number of the people to decide on the legitimacy of 
a ruler or a government increased with the enlargement or the groups able to 
have a say in tile issue or who governs. 
3. Tile Contractual Era: 
Fhe evolution of' the society, then, created difilerent sets or relationship 
between the ruler / rulers and the ruled. The expansion of the legitimising 
group 1rom the sovcreign to the courtiers and the c1crgy, and, finally, to tile 
gencral publie meant changes in the way a regime is perceived as legitimate. 
This change altered gradually the grounds or legitimation For the regime, as 
%%ho %vould do an)thin- for his own gain, for Shakespearc, as many of his contcrnporarics. thought an 
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%%ell. Developments in the domestic and international scales for a given nation 
and a country meant different expectations from the rulers and thercfore 
created dirf'ercnt expectations that would support a regime's claims of 
legitimacy. 
A vital step in the development of limiting elements has bccn flic introduction 
of' contractual Cactor in the process of ruling. While preceding practices of 
COM111OLMI approaches like tile GoItlen Bull oJI-Imigaty (1222) and tile Magna 
Curia (1215) were between the feudal lords and the king who was all but 
Owed by them, the contractual theories which appeared frorn tile 17"' century 
owwards were aimed at protecting the privileges and liberties or groups and 
individuals against the centralised governments' power. Some see the 
constitutions as contracts between the state and its subjects. Tile importance of 
tile contractual clements lies in their support to strcrigthen the hypothesis that 
tile state is a part or a two-sided relationship and that its acts need to be backed 
14 
by popular consent. a previously unthinkable asSLI111ption 
Political philosophers like John Locke, Jcan-Jacques Rousseau, David Ilumc, 
and Thomas I lobbes developed the idea of contractual relations between the 
rulers and the ruled and ravourcd the idea or social confracl based on the 
natural la%N,. The concept or natural law was based on justirying and sancýtifying 
theslams quo. The concept follows the assumption that natural principles are 
to be taken as tile rational arrangnient, of tile universe including tile state. In 
due course natural law was used to fortiry canon law, and, thus supported 
establishcd rulers by claiming that there were laws that are ahistorical, 
illegiiiniate child*s existence is unjustifiable in turns of law and religion. 
I IAndrew Vincent. Theories of the State, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 91-115 passim. 
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unchangeable, and rational. These laws provided clear norms for hurnan will 
and flor gowmilient. In his Leviathan (1651), Thomas flobbes claimed that 
natural law was a set of rational rules for self-preservation. As the hurnan 
beings were irrational. their choices would lead thern to war and destruction. 
I lowever. the laws or nature would lead human beings to the rational solution 
of' florming settlements, of keeping an organised statc in cxistence, and of 
voluntarily obeying to this state they formed 
15 
. 
The concepts of' natural law and social contract are linked to the political 
environment they came into existence. When Hobbes was writing his work, 
1-n-land was in a social turmoil, tired of civil war, survived the beheading of tý 
the country*s Stuart king, and the dictatorship or Oliver Cromwell. The 
century-long period between the Reformation and the Civil War had seen a 
slow but steady expansion of cultivated area in his native England as well as a 
16 
rise in commercial activities . The society which grew to be more 
intcrLICpendent has also become more prosperous in the period of order and 
peaccful commercial activity. The rise of Puritan tradesmen and tlicir new, 
secular approach to science, their contribution to the building of waterways 
across the county. coincided with and backed the increase of trade as weil as 
the establishment of capitalism in England. However. when the peace and 
prosperity ol'the pre-Civil War period was brcached, and chaos replaced it, a 
need to legitimise the strict Cromwellian oppression arose. The legitimation of 
151). D. Raphael. llobbes: Morals and Politics, (2nd printing) George Allen and Unwin, London, 
Fnl, land: 1978 (first printed 1977), p. 21. 
1 'Chrisloplicr I lill. C11111ge ind Continuity- in Seventeenth Century England, Yale University Press, 
New I laven and London, 199 1. p. 3. Further discussion of tile structure of the English society at that 
period, the rise and impact of the Puritans on English life, and the Cromwellian cra may be found in 
wher works ol'Chrislopher I lill as well as this book. 
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(lie Cromwellian order was based on the ideas of natural law and of the 
necessity of state as an orderly social structure that human beings naturally 
need. The ideas of I lobbes were in a way the messenger of the popular demand 
flor order at all cost. As the regime had changed, so had the religious structure 
and the monetary relationships and transactions. The alterations to the slalus 
qtio wile were in ravour of the enicrging merchant bourgcois-capitalist class. 
Therellore. new grounds of legitimacy in accordance with the new stalus quo 
had to lie sought. 
Following the same paill with I lobbcs, but writing in a more orderly period in 
which the bourgeoisie was powerful, John Locke argued against Robert 
Filmer's theory or absolute monarchy and the divine right or the kings in his 
First Treatise (1690). Lockc claimcd that, even assurning God had granted 
Adam the absolute and total political authority. it would be impossible to 
prove flor any monarch that lie is related to Adam17. In his Second Treatise, he 
clainis that despite the fact that the subjects have a duty to God to obey their 
rulcr. (lie rLIICI"S power is neither granted directly by God itself nor absolute 
18 
. 
His claim in the Second Treatise was that "the actual consent of each 
individual generated obligation, while the hypothetical choices of rational 
19 
gents generate 
legitimacy. " 
I'his idca ol' Locke was generally adopted by all social contract philosophers 
%ý, Iio argued that individual human beings gathered together and decided to 
give some concessions so that a society would be established in order to avoid 
17 Marcel I'Mot. II istoire des Wes Politigues, Dal loz, Paris, France: 1961, p. 375. 
"Roger Woolhouse. Lin-ke. John in 'red tionderich (cd. ), The Oxford Companion to Philosoph 
()xf*ord University Press. Oxl*ord. England: 1995, p. 493. 
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chaos. The degree ol'thc chaos in the prc-socicty state qf nature dcpciidcd on 
the degree o('autiloritariailism employed by tile regimejustified by tile author. 
In the case ot"I'lionias I lobbes. who wrotc in derence of a highly authoritarian 
regime. if'cliaos was widespread, people would consent to tyranny or absolute 
rule to avoid a worse alternative. While Hobbes' ideas were used to legitimisc 
aUthoritarian rule ofTharles It, Locke's and his followers' ideas created claims 
or legitimacy for three revolutions or tiie 17111 and 18t" centuries: The English 
GIOHOLIS Revolution of 1688, the American Independence of 1776, and the 
FI-C11CII RCV01LItiOII or 1789 all took their roots from Locke's pattern of natural 
I, INV211. 
The natural law concept gradually gave way to tile larger concept or natural 
and human rights and duties. These were seen as intrinsic to be hunian which 
are inconceivable to deny, such as liberty, life, and property. The 1689 Bill of 
Rights in England was the first legal document to provide support to the 
existence of* such rights. The Anicrican, French, and the Unitcd Nations (UN) 
(Icclarations or human rights set further examples. 
With advancements acilievcd in modes of production and with tile spread of 
the industrial revolution From the United Kingdom to the rest of the planct, the 
accessibility of' goods changed in ravour of the poor2l. In parallel Nvith this 
change in the social equilibrium tile degree or expansion or rights also 
increased. Natural and human rights, as the holding of power was being 
generalised to a greater section of tile society to include tile trading classes and 
1'ýDon I lerzog. Ila py Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
Illinois. US: 1989. p. 206. 
20 rvlarcel PrOot. II istoire des ld&s Politiqucs., p. 375. 
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the intelligentsia. acted as definite limitations to governmental activity by 
codil'ying the rights and duties of the rulers and tile ruled. 
Fhe concept of civil society is another idea that is linked to tile concept of 
political legitimacy. Thcrc was a tradition of non-governmcntal formation in 
the Furopean merchant classes. In time, especially with the impact created by 
the Industrial Revolution, this developed to be a distinct part of the societY that 
decided (in (lie prices. trade, wages, and the quality of goods. In due course, as 
"the nation-state developed not just as a boundary creating or maintaining 
device. but as a systern or symbols and shared identity, " 
22 
and, as the nation- 
state also served to the greater participation or merchant classes and gradually 
of'ordinary people to the state administration, civil society gained importance. 
It became a part or ti, e society outside the state bureaucratic mechanism. Civil 
socicty remained as ail entity with powers of influence over the administrative 
decisions. It became a medium through which social, economic, political rights 
and liberties were defciided, and, pressure was imposed on government on 
such issues as respect to individual values and rights. Thercfore, with the 
emergence or civil socicty as a pressurising group on the ruling clite, the 
definitions of* legitimacy and of people who have a say in who rules and how 
are altered to suit the necessitics brought with tile changing times. 
C. Legitimacy In The Modern World: 
i. Max Weber's Contribution: 
At the first quarter of tile twentieth century, the concept of legitimacy of a 
rcgime has 11OLInd a new emphasis with Max Weber's contribution. Weber's 
21 Spencer M. DiScala and Salvo Mastelloile, European Political Thought. 1815-1989, Boulder, 
Colorado, Wesiview Press, 1998, p. 30. 
18 
voluminous and oftcn-citcd work Economy and Society (1922) created new 
theoretical grounds and brought a new manner of perceiving what legitimacy 
is. Wcber argued that political authority is based on a public belief oil its 
legitimacy. Weber claimed that social action "may be guided by the belief ill 
the existence ofa legitimate order. "123 lie accepts legitimacy as tile willingness 
off'ollowers to accept orders from sources of authority. 
For legitimate dornination, Weber establishes three patterns of authority. these 
being (a) rational (legal) grounds, (b) traditional grounds, and, c) charismatic 
grounds. The ruling reginle is perceived to be legitimate by the ruled based 
upon cithcr one or a combination of these grounds. 
Rational grounds or legitimate domination base oil the belief ill the legality of 
the cnacted rules. Those who rule arc bound by the rules but they also have tile 
right to issue commands as tile rules -tile laws- enable them to issue 
commands. 
Traditional grounds are based on established belief in the sanctity of long- 
standing traditions. Those who exercise authority based on these traditions are 
perceived to use legitimate powers. 
Finally. charismatic grounds cover devotion to the exceptional sanctity, 
heroism. exemplary character or charisma of an individual hurnan being, and 
orthe order revealed or ordained by him or her. 
Ill the case or legal authority based oil rational grounds, obedience is to tile 
legally established impersonal order. In the traditional authority based on the 
traditional grounds, the person who leads the traditional order and whose acts 
2213rigid Laf fan. '7 -lie Polilics qfldenlity and Political Order in Europe'in Joumal of Common Marke 
Studies. v. 34. p. 84. 
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are bOUnd by the boundaries of the tradition receives obedience and 
legitimising respcct. In charismatic authority based on charismatic grounds, the 
obedience is to the leader whose distinguishing features create the individual 
believer's belief* in his cl1ariSMa24. In Weber's work, the relationships 
involving the ruling class and institutions such as bureaucracy plays an 
important pail while lie analyses tile outcome of legitimacy gained through one 
ol'thcsc ways, especially through charisma 
25 
. 
Max Weber categorises legitimacy as an outside force, a process that is 
partial 1), linked to authority and not a direct ingredient of it. Ile sees legitimacy 
as a Itictor helping a particular political order to strengthen its power. On the 
other liand. lie believes that in case a reginic fails to legitimise itself, tile lack 
of* legi ti niacy may be balanced by other means such as the use of coercion. 
I lowever. since Weber represents legitimacy as a factor related to perception, a 
concept that is based on the belier or individuals in it, he underestimates the 
pmker alld extent of the process. To take legitimacy as a result of cognitive 
processcs is to deny it the vital role it plays for a regime. If the subordinates of 
a given regime. its subjects or citizens, cease co-operating with the ruling 
regime and deny any sacrifices to that regime that they might grant any other 
reginic they would take as legitimate, that given regime would lose its 
ability 
to mobilise people into constructive channels. As a result of it, one of the key 
OLItlIUtS of* a legitimate system, the system's efficicticy, would be lost and the 
regime would be forced'to use coercion as the only means orjustifying its 
23 Weber, Max, Economy and Society, p. 3 1. 
2-1 1 bi(ýI.. pp. 215-216. 
ZiDragan klilovanovic, Weberian and Marxian Analysis or LaNy. Avebury, Aldershot, Vcrmont, US: 
1989. pp. 14 1- 142. 
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presence in govcrnment. Such a situation would provide the rulers with the 
ability to control the population in the meaning of preventing them from what 
they -xant to do, but would not provide tile abilitY to urge the people to co- 
operate or to make sacrifices for the good of the systern even in the end the co- 
operation or the sacrifices would help the population to be more prosperous or 
morc advantagcous. 
In that respect, David Beetham criticises Weber. Bectilam argues that tile 
Weberian dcl-mition of legitimacy misreprcscnts flic relationship betwcen 
legitimacy and people*s beliefs. Bectliam argues that 
"Jal givcn power relationship is not legitimate because people 
believe in its legitimacy, but because it can beJuslified in 
lerms oftheir beliefs. This may seem a fine distinction, but it 
is a rundaniental one. When we seek to assess the legitimacy 
or a regime. a political system, or sonic other power relation, 
one thing we are doing is assessing how far it can be justified 
in terms of' people's beliefs, how far it conrornis to their 
values or standards, how far it satisfics the normative 
expectations they have of it. We are making an assessment or 
the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given 
systen, or power and the beliers, values and expectations that 
provide its justification. We are not making a report on 
people*s 'belief in its legititiiacy'. 1126 
Therefore. it can be said that the Weberian definition of legitimacy is actually 
a definition of public belief in legitimacy and that it has its shortcomings. For 
instance. lk'ebcr's concept of legitimacy does not provide an explanation for 
such parts orthe concept or legitimacy as consent or legality. David Bcctharn 
argues that acts or consent such as voting conrer and contribute to making 
poNN, er legitimate. Such factors as legal validity. justifiability of the set or rules 
that govcrn a power relationship, and consent derived from the actions 
2(1 David l3ecthain. Legitimation of Powcr. MacMillan, I loundmills and London, England: 1991, p. 1 1. 
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expressive or consent ror the rulers contribute to legitimacy of a system and 
create grounds for obligation to power and not for belief in lcgitimaCy27. 
Further criticism on the Webcrian dcrinition or legitimacy includes Sternberg's 
claim that Weber's classification of the types or legitimacy leaves no place for 
"civil governincilt in its proper sense, " and hence Weber would consider any 
sort ol' representative government as "noil-legitiniatc. "28 Jan Pakulski argues 
that Max Weber neglects a further definition or legitimacy, that based on a 
beliel' that the rulers have superior knowledge of social proccsscs than tile 
ruIc(12". Any given communist party in a state-socialist society would base its 
legitimacy on such a claim that the party has a vanguard role to lead the 
society. A1111OLIgh it may be clainled that Weber ignores it for it is not based on 
autonomous authority. as Rodney Barker clairnS30, one may also argue that 
Webcr ignored any sort or political formation that would not fit his legitimate 
rule model. Also, Rodney Barker, an avid supporter of Weber's model on 
legitinmey argues that what Weber does not "examine is the contribution or 
legitimacy to domination, nor the manner in which it is cultivated, maintained, 
or croded. - and that lie specifically leaves the question of whether legitimacy 
contributes to government open3l. 
I lowcver. with all the shortcomings, the Weberian definition of lcgitiniacý is a 
key definition. Most. if not all, of tile twentieth century discussions on 
legitimacy and state authority are centred upon the views of Weber. The 
27.11)iO,. pp. 12-13 pa-Win 
2,1 Da, 0d Sternberg. 'Typologie de la Lcgitimitd', in P. Bastin ct al., L'Idde de Ldgitirnitd, Paris, Dalloz. 
1967. p. 96. 
2" Jan Pakulski. 'Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet-type 
Societies, ' BriiishAnawal qlTolifictiIScience. v. 16 (1), 1986. p. 37. 
Rodney Barker. Political 1-caitimacy and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 1990, 
p. 55. 
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discussions upon his categories of legitimation are accompanied by the 
indistinct shape of his dcf"initions. If one accepts tile view that "'Weber doesn't 
use Icgitimacy as an cxplailatory tool, but, as ail organising, difTerentiating 
nie-ans and as an idcntif icr of elements in particular systems or rule, " 
32 
and that 
Weber uses these schemes, for instance, to prove tile superiority of the political 
over the econoillic and the bureaucratic, one's perception of Wcber*s work 
becomes clearer. There are also many modern political scientists who argue 
Wcher's legitimacy principles are either inapplicable or old-fashioned or both. 
2. Approaches to Legitimacy after Weber: 
SCý'IIIOUr Martin Lipset, following a quasi-Weberian course, developed the 
claim that the stability and hence the continuity of political organisations 
depended on their legitimacy and on their effectiveness. Lipset's claim is that a 
system ol'government may survive as its effectiveness may compensate for its 
legitimacy deficit and vice versa. For instance, a traditionally fully legitimate 
system may be delegitimised in case it loses its competitive edge or becomes 
indflective. Thus, no system remains legitimate without being effective in tile 
long run. As Joseph Rotschild argues; 
"... some contemporary social- scientists have even 
procceded From this recognition of the organic nexus between 
legitimaey and clTectiveness to argue that the former is 
merely a dependent runction of the latter, and that the task of 
government is to educate public opinion to accept this 
sequence. In other words, technology and science, translated 
into effectiveness and affluence, are to fill the void left by the 
waning of traditional ideologies of legitimation. Not only 
academic theorists . but also ruling regimes sometimes 
subscribe to this seemingly attractive solution to their 
dilemmas of eroding legitimacy. Hence we have 'goulash 
-'I I bid., p. 60. 
32David licetham, Max Wcber and the Thco[y of Modern Politics, Polity Prcss, Cambridgc, England: 
1985 (first published in 1974 by G. Allcn & Unwin), p. 258. 
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socialism' (i. e. the effort to buy public support through 
improved living standards and relative affluence) in East 
Central Europe and the sanctioned cult of rampant 
consumerism in the West. But for political regimes this is 
essentially a shallow and even desperate perspective because 
such a pscudo-idcology, which holds legitimacy to be a mere 
I'Linction of clTectiveness, will leave them naked and without 
principled authority if their efficiency declines. " 
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The events that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe, 
especially in I kingary wlicre a seemingly consumerist version of state 
Socialism -goulash socialism- was expericilccd, have proven Rotschild's 
argument. When the rulers of a country decide to reduce legitimacy to 
erflectiveness or tiie economic system, when the prosperity declines or 
disappears aftcr a while. the rulers have no other means to legitimise their 
presence at government. The Kdddr administration in Hungary in its last years, 
the 11inochet regime whose legitimacy was based on its Chicago school 
economic policies are examples of regimes and the Margaret Thatcher 
government in tile Unitcd Kingdom (UK), tile Ronald Reagan administration 
in the (IS. and the Turgut Ozal government in Turkey are examples of 
governments which tried to sustain their legitimacy by pseudo-ideology 
mainly based oil the rise of economic prosperity. and they all suffered firom tile 
decline or economic prosperity at the end, leaving their countries in an 
ideological legitimacy gap for differing lengths of tinic. 
One IIILlst bear in mind that. although the inspiration for these activities may 
come 1rorn abroad, these were conducted on national level. However, the issue 
ol* legitimacy, especially in post-World War 11 East European scene, begins to 
depend on international as well as national political relations in vertical and 
"Joseph Rotschild, in Denitch (ed. ), Lcl,, itiniation of Reginics, p. 39. 
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horizontal scalcs. The changes in the international balance of power from the 
pre-war environment to tile Cold War environment and then to the post-Cold 
War cnvironnicnt changed the rules concerning international relations, 
intcrnational prcssure and intervention to a country's affairs, and changed the 
way legitimacy of an administration is perceived. The emergence of 
supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU) or such 
ideological blocs such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact affected the degree of interference to political affairs in 
national level. 'nic international intervention decreased or increased depending 
on what bloc a country was in or what sort of an organisation itwas a member 
ol*. The IJJ at the moment has jurisdiction over many political and economic 
iSSUes which were under the close control or national governments of its 
members a decade ago, from the formation of agricultural policy to the rights 
of fishing in rnember-states' territorial waters. Similarly, the members of the 
so-called I'lastern Bloc were under Soviet control on their international and 
national policy decisions. With what is branded the New Mot-ld Oi-der in place, 
the degree of intcrvcntion and the rules concerning outside intervention to 
national all'airs have changed as well. The studies of legitimacy, therefore, 
have to include an international element which may or may not havc. 'a direct 
innuence on tiie acts or an administration and hence its perception as 
legitimate or not. A further discussion of this subject may be found in 
flollowhig parts orthis'chapter an in Chaptcr, rwo. 
There are alternative visions to the legitimacy - efficiency relationship. For 
instance, the members of tile positivist-syslemic school argue that legitimacy 
depends on longevity, clarity, econorny, and enforcement capability in 
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administration. This enforcement capability excludes the normative side to 
legitimation or a regime. Tile positivislic-sptendc school claims that a 
gowninicilt creates its legitimacy through these means cited above, and is 
autonomous as a political system. This approach is criticised by Marxists and 
radical ideologist who argue that a regime is incapable of surviving without 
being based oil normative values, because as it delegitimises previous regimes. 
it will bring along its own delcgitimation since they all function under similar 
I'LlIeS 
3.1 
Therd'orc. one may state that legitimacy as a concept has evolved along with 
the changes in power relations and social responsibilities of the ruling classes. 
Legitimacy. which used to be a concept connected to individual relations, 
cspecially blood rclations all'iliated with marriage bond, dcvcloped to become 
a political-sociological concept which identifics tile justifiability of a regime 
vis-, 'i-vis its sulý)ects. Currently the terrn is used to explain that a regime 
acquires and holds power according to justifiable rules and that it has the 
consent ol' the public, of the ruled, with it. However, there arc different 
approaches to tile concept as it is related with difTerent branches of social 
sciences. 
In terms or law. legitimacy means that tile leader or leaders of a given land -a 
political party. a prcsident, prime minister, king, or a tribal chief- acquires 
power to rLIlC in accordance with legal framework that regulates the life of the 
land. Ir the acquisition and holding or power is in accordance with the laws 
that govern the place. than the regime is legally legitimate. 
. 1-libid.. p. 40. 
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In ternis or philosophy, however, the laws that justify and legitimisc a given 
reginic are questionable in relation to thcir own justiriability. For philosophers, 
(lie existence of a law is no direct proof to its justness and rightfulness. The 
political system's ethical correctness, moral rightfulness, its concern over some 
key issues such as human rights make the system legitimate. 
In ternis of' political science, the main cognition of legitimacy lies in Max 
Wcbcr*s definition: Weber defines legitimacy of a regirne in its subjects* belief 
in its justifiabic nature on the part of the relevant social agents. Conscquently, 
Weber deseribes power relations to bc legitiniatc whcn both those who hold 
positions or political power and those ruled by them believe these relations to 
be j usti I iable / legitimate. 
"For a social scientist to say that a given power relation is 
legitimate. Weber argues, is not to make a moral judgement 
about it in the manner of philosopher; it is rather to make a 
report (which may be empirically true or false) about other 
people's heliqft. Power is legitimate where those involved in 
it believe it to be so, legitimacy derives from people's belief 
in legitimacy. So, lie writes, legitimacy is equivalent to 
'Legitimit5tsglaube' (a belief in legitimacy)-, and legitimate 
po-, ver is power 'als legitim angeschcn' (that is regarded as 
legitimate). " 33 
I lowever. that a regime isjustified in the minds of tile people governed by it, is 
not in itself' enough to make a regime, a government or a leader legitimate. 
There are different factors which contribute to a political system's legitimacy 
as well as its perception as justiriablc by tile people. The legal validity of tile 
appropriation and exercise of power, the issue of justifiability of the rules 
governing a power relationship connected to the sets of beliefs and values in a 
-15David Beeth, "11,111C Leaitimation orPower, 1991, p. B. 
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given society. and the evidence of public consent derived from tile practices of 
the rulers are all parts that make up the grounds of legitimacy for a given 
reginle or a group of power-holders. In that case, David Beetham argues that 
the main concept is not the belief in legitimacy, but the underlying principles 
of'obcdience to the political power, among both those who rule and those who 
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are ruled . Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as a conccpt that 
-involvcs the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that 
the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" 
while Richard M. Mcrelman's definition of political legitimacy is "the quality 
oi"oughtness" that is perceived by tile public to inhere in a political regime. 
That government is Icgitimate which is vicwed as morally propcr for a 
society. " 
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. I'alcott Parsons describes legitimacy as the factor which 
con-csponds, in political power systems, to the confidence in tile mutual 
acceptability and stability of the monetary unit in monetary systerns. This 
I 
power. Parsons argues, is exchanged in compliance with an obligation that 
leaves (lie performer of that obligation with nothing but a set of expectations 
that lic can invoke certain obligations on sonic other individuals in other 
occasions and in other contexts 
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. 
I 
The Weberian dermitioWs degree orsuitability may be discussed, however it is 
also accepted that it is the main framework of analysis for the twentieth 
century social scientists on the issue of legitimacy. Those who. do not make use 
of' the Weberian approach. at Icast reller to it and describc tlicir rcasons of 
36ibid.. pp. 12-1 3 ). 
PRichird M. Merchnan. 'Learning and Legitimacy' in American Political Science Review, vol. 60, p. 
549. 
28 
discord. I fence, the Weberian approach is tile mainstream approach in terms of 
confemporary sociology and political science. 
David Beethani, in Ilis Legitimation or Power (1991) suggcsts that 
effectiveness. order and stability are the outcomes of legitimacy and not the 
grounds or it. I le establishes his conception of legitimacy on the principles of a 
reginiCs validity,. iLlStiriability, and the consent it gathers from its sulýjccts. fie 
argues that when these are established, a reginic is legitimate, and, on that 
aCCOUIIt. the situation generates moral grounds for consent by the ruled. 
Consequently. il'that reginic is taken as legitiniatc, through a particular quality 
ol'consent shown by the ruled towards the rulers, the end-products orcnllanced 
order. stability. and effectiveness of the system may be achieved. This 
relationship between the ruler and tile ruled affiects tile rulers* behaviour 
patterns as well. As a consequence, as the power-holders would be bound by 
tile rule. -, and paradigms upon which the legitimacy or their power is based, 
legitimate power becomes limited power and the powerful lose their legitimacy 
Nklien they flail to respect their power's essential limits 
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This thesis will pursue tile framework put forward by David Bectliarn in his 
Lcgitiniation of' Power, but will also make reference to Weber's schemes of 
I legitimation techniques with an attempt to reconcile tile structural diflerenccs 
, between the Weberian cra and the current post-Bipolar world structurc. 
D. Three Layers Of Legitimacy: 
At this point, before going any further, a distinction should be made between 
the legitimacy orthe state itself and the legitimacy or a ruling regime. In the 
3-41'alcolt Parwivi. Politics and Social Structure. The Frce Prcss, Ncw York, New York, US: 1969, p. 
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current global political system, one may see that, despite all its opponents, tile 
nation-state is the primary agency of international politics. That a group or 
masses ofpcople qLICStion the merits or the legitimacy of a regime that govems 
them does not nican that these people question the grounds of existence of a 
given nation-state. There are, of course cases that show the opposite, as can be 
seen in the attcmpts ofindepcndcnce of such regional nationalist movernents 
in Kurdish-populated territories, Chechnia, Scotland, Quebec. Corsica and the 
MIS(ILIC Country against tile nation-states or Turkey-Iraci-Iran, Russian 
Federation. United Kingdom, Canada, France and Spain, respectively. In these 
cases. the legitimacy or a state structure which is believed to give less than it 
takes 1'rom tile regions (bearing in mind that Scotland is an equal partner as tile 
second kingdom of the UK unlike the other territories which may be seen in a 
way as 'invaded territories'). irnot exploit them, is questioned. The legitimacy 
of a given state, therellore. is in doubt. However, the alternative these 
nationalist movements propose is not a challenge to the concept of nation-state 
or a challenge to the international political structure. What these groups seek is 
the creation or flurther nation-states to the expcnsc of sorne greater ones. The 
case provided by the Scottish National Party, for instance, foresees an 
independent state or Scotland which will be a part or tile European Union and 
which will therclIbre not dirlIcr from tile greater Unitcd Kingdom in ternis of 
international involvement. Tile concept of nation-state therefore remains 
Unchallenged and its Iýgitirnacy is still sound. 
I lowever, while people may wish to keep tile nation-state they have, they may 
(hink that the political system that their state embraces is undesirable. The 
I'lbvid Bectliam. op. cil.. p. 34-35 passim. 
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rulcd masses may think that absolute monarchy or liberal democracy is not 
suitable anymore for the social structure their country has at a given moment in 
time and may feel the urge to change it to parliamentary monarchy or Islamic 
fundamentalism. In such a case, as clearly seen in tile late 1980s and early 
1990s in E-astern Europe, the political systern may be challenged while tile 
citizens ol' that given coqntry may insist on keeping the name, boundaries, 
symbols. capital city, flag and other conccpts relatcd to and identificd with -or 
m, orking as identifiers of- their nation-state. While the govermimital structures 
Nvere challenged and altered in that part of the world in the last decade, 
I lungary. Poland. Bulgaria, Romania remained intact as nation-states. The 
boundaries ol' tile concept of nationalism varied in all these countries. 
I lowever. the nation-state which existed was not cliallengcd by any separatist 
movement. nor there were any major ethnic groups in these countries that 
NVOUld constitute a structure with two or more nations living in one state. In 
other instances such as the Former Yugoslav Fedcration or Czcclioslovakia. 
where more than one nation flormed a state, the state structure was challenged, 
andli inally. altered. 
A third layer of legitimacy concerins the governments, the administrative 
system dominating a given political system. A government may be considered 
-is illegitimate or may become delegitimiscd by dill'crent reasons. In that case 
the people of a given country may be content with their nation-state and 
political systcm as a whole, however, thcy may rather have a different 
governnicilt. This may be carried out through elections which would change 
the government, by mass demonstrations and industrial action or by other 
incans which would force the unwanted government to resign from office. in 
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accordance with the conditions guiding the country's political and legal 
systems. In some extreme cases, the change of government, or the reginic may 
be associated with the change of political system in a given country or the two 
11111), Coincide. 
A dwil crisis in ternis of legitirnacy problems may also take place in a country 
at a certain point in history. Such a dual problem or legitimacy was the core of 
the events experienced in the USSR. As the USSR was a federation or states, 
the centrillugal florces had two foci, namely nationalist separatism and anti- 
communism. In the Yugoslav Fcderation which was a collection of statcs 
brought together by the charismatic Icadcrship of Joseph B. Tito, the division 
aniong flederal states became apparent after Tito's death. On the other hand, 
Czechoslovakia which was a combination of two nations dividcd into two 
dilTercilt countries in a peaceful separation in 1998. In these states, the 
legitimacy of' the state itself was based upon a legitimation frorn above 
principle. florccd by international political circumstances, by socio-cconomic 
necessities. and other factors. When tile factors which bound the smaller states 
together within the larger state's boundaries were eliminated. when these 
I'actors became obsolete, the break-u'p took place. Oil tile other hand, these 
states were expericticing doniestic legitimacy problems as flic rulers 6f these 
states %%ere unsuccessful in establishing a political system perceived as 
legitimate by the people. Hence, both a political system change -and a 
government change due to communist system's peculiarities- and a nation- 
state level break-up took placc in thcse. 
Modern studies of legitimacy, while focusing on these three layers of 
lcgilinlaey, appear to have a tendency to underestimate the outside or the 
32 
international dimension of a given regime's grounds of legitimacy. The main 
emphasis seems to be based on the relations concerning legitimacy in one state 
as a structure, rather than a state as an agent. As the rulers' international 
connections may dictate development at the national level -such as the East 
F. uropean and Latin American examples during the Cold War- rather than the 
developments in the domestic polities, to study a given state as a closed system 
may lead to wrong conclusions in tile study of a political order's legitimacy. 
The second and tile third types of legitimacy described above form the basis of 
this thesis. That is, this thesis concentrates on the legitimacy deficit for a 
given regime ruling in a given country within a prc-defincd political system, 
and not that or a nation-state per se. Thus, the focus will be on tile domestic 
caLISCS ol'delegitimation. As a case study, the case of Hungary and the period 
of'chang that took place in the I lungarian State frorn mid- I 980s onwards will 
be analysed. Nonetheless, as the Hungarian regime from the end orthc World 
War 2 until tile cild or 1980s was definable as a component of a greater system 
ol* bi-polar international systcm, tile international dimension to legitimacy and 
legitimation should be emphasised. 
Ill. LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRATISATION: PERCEPTIONS AND 
MISPERCEPTIONS 
A. A New Dawn For Democracy?: 
With file I'Mentc process which emerged from early 1970s onwards, followed 
by tile creation of a new world order after tile dissolution oe the Communist 
bloc fi-orn late I 980s to early 1990s, many social scientists began to clairn that a 
general inclination towards democratisation is present in the world. The 
process of' denlocratisation which began in Southern Europe in mid-1970s 
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appeared to some to expand to include similar developments in Latin America 
and in Fastern Europe as wc1l as in some parts of Arrica. Some scholars claim 
that all these devclopnicnts are related to a general wave of democracy, or, a 
Ihir(I irave qf(lemociwq as Samuel Huntington describes WO, and that it was 
to he expected as a result of long-term cycles or dennocratisation and anti- 
deniocratisation in the World history. 
From the early 1990s onwards, the idea that that the transformation is uniform 
in all transitory societies became widespread. This idea arose 1rom the tradition 
N%hich saw the Socialist Bloc a union of clone states, all socialist therefore all 
giving the same response to the same stimulus. As they were seen as sharing 
the common legacy or being part or the Socialist political order in their near 
history. it was assumed that they would have similar periods of transition to 
(Icniocracy"'. The main components of a liberal democratic political system, as 
Car as these theories arc concerned, may be reduced to the basic constituents or 
the rule or law: state and regime legitimacy; liberal economy; and, fair and 
compoitive elections. Of these, the rule of law and system legitimacy elements 
%%ould ensure that the regime does not malfunction and prevent it from losing 
its Public approval. Meanwhile, a well-functioning electoral system guarantees 
(lie eligibility or several candidates to fulfil positions in legislative and 
exccutive fields. Market economy sustains the political system by creating the 
suitable economic environment for the political system. The existence of basic 
Freedonis such as the freedom of thought and expression including the freedom 
41' Samuel 1.1 ILInfington, argues in his The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Celli 
.. LqU' 
JUniversity of Oklahoma Press, London, 1991) that after the first wave of democratisation 
between 1828 and 1926. a second wave was experienced during the 1943-1962 period. Huntington 
argues that 1rom 1974 onwards, the world is living through a third wave of democrat i sat ion. 
34 
of" expression of tile printed and audio-visual media, of free and unbiased 
representation or all political rractions in the country, or whether the legislative 
bodies and the cmer exeeutive -as the president or the prime minister- are 
publicly c1ccted or appointed by the parliament or another agency nlay be 
added to the above-mentioned list. However, as there would be no fair and 
competitive elections witliout an equal possibility to compete for political 
power positions for a variety or political fractions, they may be seen as already 
being parts ol'the proccss. 
This list ol'requirements for democracy's establishment and preservation helps 
to create a mould for democracy and democratisation and licncc to draw 
generalised conclusions. The fact that a scries or dcmocratising movements in 
Mrica. Latin America and in Europe followed one another, and that most of 
tile regime changes rated to tile above-mentioned mould of systemic 
requirements flor liberal dernocracy's establishment has strengthened the 
gencralisation. Nowadays. as the Latin American authoritarian reginles were 
likened to their South East Asian counterparts, the East European 
deniocratisation movements are compared with the Latin American 
dc ni oc rati SIti 01,42. 
On the one hand. there are similar situations which enable an observer to 
compare and contrast tile developments in Latin American and Eastern 
1-m-opean political transitions. The constitutional transformation that took 
41 Tile I*ollowers ol'such a view may be exemplified by the works of J. F. Brown, II. B. Feigenbaum and 
J-R. I lenig. I .. I lohnes. 13. (; cddes, E. A. Tiryakian, A. Leftwich among others. Z7 42 Amongst tile political scientists who argue in favour of a comparison and compare Latin American 
and Eastern E. uropean transrorniation, A. Bcrgesen, J. 11. Cox, D. Bartlct, W. Hunter, R. Espindola, V. 
Bolet, D. W. Powers may be referred to in the recent years. in addition to tile members of the Nco- 
Modernist school. A recent and detailed comparison may be found in Sharon Werning Rivera's article 
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place in Brazil from 1984 till 1988 under tile leadcrship of president Tancredo 
Neves 11611ows a similar path to tile Hungarian transition to democracy. Thcre 
is a scrics of' multi-party, niulti-ideology talks, consensus arnong different 
OpilliOIIS iS SOLIght, many different layers of tile social structure are involved in 
the process. and tile parliament as an institution plays a central role in the 
dex clopmentS. 13 (see Chapter 4 for the Hungarian political change and the role 
ol'the parliament in it). On the other hand, the Cact that both democratisation 
processes l'ollo%v similar patterns does not prove that there is a superstructure 
combining both processes. This sort of a comparison is to result in tile rise of a 
tendcncy to gencralise political development all over tile World as tile sub- 
categories or a ubiquitous nlovcnient of dcmocratisatioil. I lowever. such a 
movement oNcinocratisation does not exist. 
B. The Discussion of the Uniformity of Transitions: 
In due course. those who argue that democracy is and should be uniform and 
universal avoid the differences and focus on the institutional necessities so that 
they have an argument. Such an approach is a course based on a lincar I 
pcrception or democracy and its components in tile shape or institutions and 
the acts or these institutions and of their controllers. The idea may be traced 
back to thc Modernist school of thought which was popular in 1950s and 
1960s. According to such Modernists as Daniel Bell, Dunkwart. Rustow or 
Lucien 11ye, modernisation was a linear process and liencc all countries would 
1"olloxv similar processes to those which managed to industrialise and establish 
a democratic system in their Modernisation path of development. Therefore, 
tilled 'I listorical Cleavages orTransition Mode?: Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, 
I fun-ary and Czechoslovakia, ' in ParlY Nlifics. vol. 2(2), 1996, pp. 177-208. 
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the Modernist argument claims that if, say, United Kingdom or Netherlands 
managed to carry out industrialisation and administrative democratisation, 
then SO Could such countries like Greece or Ghana. The paradigm of 
Modcrnisation therefore assumes that transitions from pre-capital i sill to post- 
industrialism and Frorn absolutist monarchy to a liberal democratic system are 
possible and sustainable. Countries lacking the economic and political systems 
-available in tile so-called Capitalist Core might improve their economic and 
political capabilities by adopting patterns of development, and 11ollowing the 
paths taken by these more developed states in the past. That would rnean that 
thCre SIIOUld first be an industrialisation and licrice modernisation or thc urban 
areas. then, as people would migrate to the urban areas from the rural -and 
hence traditional- sectors of the country, they would be forced by social 
Cil-CLInistances to part with their conservative traditionalism and adopt patterns 
of' belierand behaviour or tiie more modern industrial society. Tile levels of 
literacy and hence education would rise and the society would transForm itself 
1'rom a predominantly rural, traditional, religious, conservative, poverty- 
stricken po%ition to a predominantly urban, industrial, non-religious, 
progressive, prosperous stage. This would change the shape of the world as tile 
international relations would be more pacific, more end-orientcd, more rational 
and pragmatic than it cm-rcritly were. 
As tllc decolonisation process accelerated and altered tile relationship between 
(lie states in tile Core and those in the Periphery, the above- nient i oned 
arguments proved to be inapplicable, and, became redundant. Tile main 
43 For Further anal", is of llic Brazilian constitutional transformation and democratisation, scc Javicr 
klartincz-Lara. Iltdiding, Democracy In Brazil, Ipswich: Macmillan Prcss Ltd., 1996. 
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inaCCUracy ol'thc Modernisation Theorists was to perceive the socio-cconomie 
development of* Europe as a given, repeatable experience by any other country 
which is not as industrialised. Such authors as Rostow and Rustow did not take 
the imperialistic policies and hence the wealth accumulated in the continent 
through these imperialistic policies into consideration as a motive affecting the 
aCCLImulation in the European core countries that tile newly 
industrialising post-colonial states lacked. The fact that when the first 
Industrial Revolution took place all the countries whieli expcrienccd the 
industrialisation process were undeveloped and not untlerdeveloped makes the 
idea of' imitation of the dcvcloped countrics by tile developing ones obsQlcte 
and baseless. Moreover, in a eountry with a developing industry and a 
traditional-conservative behaviour pattern, tile transition to an industrial, 
Westerly urban culture was not a vital line of action. In most of the countries 
which leapt Forward in terms of technology and industry, traditional values did 
not vanish and no straight line towards the values or West European-North 
American societies was hence pursued. A mixture of the indigenous and 
6oreign cultures took place, but no uniform post-industrial society based on 
rationality. pragmatism and open-mindedncss cnierged ncither in the newly 
industrialised nations nor in the established industries. Thus. by the late 1960s 
and carly 1970s. modernisation theories lost their appeal and gave way to the 
theorics ol'Dependency and World System Analysis. Another misjudgernent of 
the Modcrnist school was to claim that the West, as a result of the well'are state 
notion and dLIC/thanks to mixed economy, had come to the end of the 
ideological age as Daniel Bell claimed in his End Of Ideology (1960), an idea 
%%hich would be carried into 1990s by Francis Fukuyama in his End Of History 
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(1991 ). This pattern ol'bclief meant that the Western social structure is taken 
and presented as tile end of the human society's development. Thus, it 
presented the West European and North American state and society structures 
as desirable modcls for the 'less developed' nations. 
The first main criticism came to Modernist school from within, from Sarnuel 
I ILIntingtOll. Ill 1962, basing his arguments oil the example set by the Cuban 
Revolution of' 1959 led by Fidel Castro against Fulgencio Batista, Huntington 
argLICd that modernisation in a society might be achievcd through military 
action as well as civil and civic mcans as claimed previously. Then, gradually 
tile idea lost its allure due to the fact that it foresaw a very long period of 
transition. Most newly-independent states had no will to allow a long period of 
time [Ior transition and decided to substitute the lengthy transition with reform 
from above. Moreover, the whole school of the Modernisation seemed to be a 
representative of the Capitalist Core's new orientations. That the Modernists 
began to be influential in the wake or the Bandung Conference of 1955 
strctigthens the conspiracy theory that it was an attempt to extend the control 
of' the Core over its flormer colonies: if the former colonies were to be 
convinced to Follow a similar path or social, political and economic 
development. with similar key institutions, it would mean that there would be 
similar economic necessities and similar types of consumers as tile small 
bourgeoisie would act in a similar fashion in a similar World, and there would 
be no -wish to switch -to a Communist coursc if in mid or long term thcsc 
countries would achieve prosperity as their previous masters. 'rhe idea failed in 
terms of* delivering prosperity but worked considerably well in ternis of 
Containment Policy and of preservation of tile links between the Core and its 
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l'orincr colonies. It was replaced by the Dependency School, as exernplified by 
the works of* 11. Cardoso and 1. Wallerstein, which had a more global, more 
realistic and more Marxist tendencies, as will be dernonstrated in the following 
parts ofthis thesis. 
Fhe retUrn of tile Modernisation theories canic along with the 1980s and this 
tinic depcndcd oil the -, o-callcd 'satellitc dish revolutions, ' or the industrial 
revolUtiOn in inflort-nation technology taking place 1rorn the late 1970s 
on%%ards. much treasured by the ex-Modernists 44 . This time, tile argument was 
bascd on the flact that industrial development in tile leading industries or tiie 
%Norld necessitated the spread of know-how in a global scale to increase high- 
tech products' sales. The information technology revolution of 1980s which 
came %vith satellite telecommunications and the use of personal computers 
permitted the peripheral regions or the globe to receive information that was 
cmicealed from them by their oppressive authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. 
Thus. they claimed that tile world was in a new stage in which inrormation 
could not be censored and thus exposed ties and rnisconducts of their leaders. 
This enabled the expression or disscnt which could be used to change 
aUdioritarian and totalitarian political orders into a competitive liberal 
democracies. The fall of tile military junta in Argentina, the gradual rdding of 
the Phlochet reginic in Chile, tile democratic elections in Nicaragua aller tile 
Sandinista rule of 21 years, and more importantly the loosening of the grip in 
'"For inslance. Lucien Ilyc's article Tolitical Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism' in the 
American l'olilical Science Review, v. 84 (1), pp. 3-19 may constitute a very good example of tile 
Modernisation (heorists' adoption of the inforrilation tcchnology revolution's clTects. Pyc argues that 
(lie inlroduction of* satellite dishes and therefore tile increase in (lie access to international, uncensored 
broadcast bý tile people living tinder oppressive reginles such as Latin American dictatorships and the 
Socialist Illoc %%, cakcilcd the grip or tile political order on its subjects/citizcns and hence prepared the 
domil'all orauthoritarian rcginics. 
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the Soviet Union with Gorbachev reforms were taken as signs supporting tile 
idea that satellite dishes, or generally speaking advances in technology, could 
undermine corrupt authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
C. The New World Order: 
Willi Mik-hail Gorbachev's resignation on 25 December 1991 and the 
subsc(limit collapse of the USSR, the bipolar world political structure ended. 
11cople began to write about the merits of democracy and or capitalist system, 
some clidnicd the history carne to its end as ideological competition was no 
more existent. With the East European states devoting themselves to 
democratisation of their political and liberalisation and capitalisation of their 
econonlic systems, the mainstream social science focused on the 
transIlormation ofthat part of the world. Therefore, theories concerning the fall 
ol' the aUthoritarian regirnes expanded into the area incorporating the 
totalitarian rcgirnes' transition to democracy along similar lines to tile Latin 
American scheme which preceded the East European studies of transition by 
nearly three decades. 
The change was so widespread and sudden that a new world order's 
emergence came unexpectedly. Then, theories changed shape. Now that 
democracy proved to be the major winner in the political systems competition, 
outdoing all repressive regime types, tile modernist approach rocused on the 
possibility or long-term cycles. A sort of Kondratiev cycles was proposed by 
Sanwel I luntington 45 as he claimed that democratic and anti-deniocratic 
sentiments, or 'waves' using the term lie employs, followed each other since 
45--ee S 
., - amucl I lunting(on's book The Third Wave: Democrat i zat ion in (fie Late 20th Centyry (London: 
University of*Oklahoma Press. 199 1) for. a thoroughgoing discussion of the subjcct. 
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the American and French Rcvolutions of 1776 and 1789 rcspcctivcly. Tlic 
elaim floresces that as there are changes at given times in the important 
quantity of* places on the globe, there are such things as waves of 
deniocratisation and de-dcniocratisation triggered by certain key events. As 
there was -a SUrge to democracy once again From mid- I 970s onwards, this time 
including the 11ormer USSR and its former satellite states, as well as the Latin 
American reginies and sonic African dictatorships, and since even the Chinese 
administration was loosening its firm totalitarian grip in favour of a more 
liberal approach. one might argue that we were in a third wave of 
denlocratisation. 
Even the supporters of hegenionic stability / world system approach seem to 
have accepted the main premise that democracy and democratisation are the 
quintessential parts or tile political developments. A. Bcrgesen argues that: 
- ... while stronger core states act outward. planning for 
protective economic blocs to deal with the world downturn - 
EIC '92 and the North American Free Trade Association - 
weaker, more compromised scmi-pcripheral states, are only 
capable ofaltcring their domestic politics - the common move 
toward democracy - in an effort to deal with their worsening 
economic condition. Finally, the periphery, weakest and most 
dependent, shows the least political activity. State policy, 
then. is conditioned by world-syst6m. position: powcrrul core 
states band together, weaker scmi-periplicral states change 
regimes: weakest peripheral states arc stagnant and only sink 
into Vurthcr inimiscration. Existing socialist states, then, arc 
more semi-periplicral than socialist, and act similar to their 
zonal compatriots in Latin America in the general move 
toward dernocracy. "46 
Such approaches. despit. e bcing cxplanatory in their own way, may mislead the 
inquirer. It is trLIC that one may draw parallels between the clemocratisation 
movements all around the globe. flowevcr, one must also bear in mind that the 
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di I'llerences between the types or regimes and the transformations these regimes 
go through, are greater than the superficial similarities of the change. It may be 
argIICLI thilt it is pointless to try to create general isations per se. Ir one tries to 
do so, the attempt would be ahistorical as the development or liuman society is 
still continuing. Therefore, there are no model societies which reached the 
ultimate ievei or development. This is so because human history and social 
history is in continuous motion and transition. To refer to global laws and 
cycles governing dernoeratisation of the regimes at one period and their un- 
democratisation at another period is also ahistorical and illogical as such a type 
of' generalisation is automatically discarding tile important and oninipresent 
structural framework in international politics, which is the intemational 
system. 
D. Different Conditions, Incompatible Transitions: 
The basic inaccuracies in tile generalisation of democratisation are to take the 
route to democraey for granted and to assume that tile needs and requirements 
flor denlocraey is tile same for each and every nation on Earth. This attitude can 
be 11ound in the Modernisation school of though which was popular from mid- 
1950s to late 1960s and shares the same misjudgements with it. 
I'lirce main reasons may be mentioned to criticise the theories of the universal 
and unilbrin democratisation school of 1990s. First or all, due to socio- 
historical reasons, one may not compare or contrast or liken a society's 
structure with others. As diffierent societies develop their value sets and rules 
and laws on (lie basis or diffcrcnt social, historical and gcological 
46 A. Ber-ewn, 'Communism Collapse: A World-System Explanation', Journal of Polific(d und c_ Alifilui: i-Sod"higi-, v. 20 (1), p. 133. 
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requirements, the stage these would switch their political systems to liberal 
democracy and the perception of tile concept of democracy and its 
requircments would be dirrcrent in each particular case. For instance, the 
United States and France have a head of state who also happens to hold the 
chief' CXCCL1tiVC POSt in tile country, while in tile United Kingdom, Italy, 
6cmiany. Turkey or Hungary, the official head of tile state -the president or tile 
queen- is ceremonial and difTerent than the chief executive -the prime minister- 
, and this difference does not affect the degree of dernocratisation of these 
countries. This issue, as is the existence of unicameral or bi-cameral 
representative assemblies / parliaments, is linked with tile historical 
developments which caused onc way of institutionalisation and 
struCtUralisation or tile other. Tile preference of cither a proportional or 
majority-based electoral system as well as the definition of constituency 
boundaries. is also a matter linked with the socio-historical developments in a 
nation's history. 
Fhe socio-historical background of a nation may create very radical 
perceptions of' institutions and ilicir roles in society in dinlerent parts or tiie 
World. apart From administrative institutionalisation. When, for instance, the 
Military is considered as an apolitical institution in Western Europe, it is a 
political actor in such countries as Turkey, Chile and Greece. The intervention 
of* tile military into political lire may be perceived differently in different 
countries as Nvell. in -rurkey, Ilor instance, Military Forces rill the gap of the 
Left-ol'-flic-Centre political institutions in such issues as the preservation of the 
secular system and are supported by the ordinary people, while elsewhere an 
intervcittion by tile military part of the society would be considered as an 
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unwelcome, if not larnentable, event as in most countries such an event would 
terminate democracy rather than keeping it in good working order. Yet, one 
may not argue that Turkish democracy isn't working as well as Italian or 
Spanish democracies because it is different as it bears a different mould due to 
the historical evaluation of Turkish social structure. 
There6ore. to l'ollow the ideas of those like Lefwich or Geddes and to assume 
that there is only one tibiquitous and ornnipresent concept of democracy and 
consequently there has to be a single pattern of dcrnocratisation to be followed 
is incorrect depcilding on the differentiation of socio-historical backgrounds of 
differcrit countries. Secondly, the economic history of different nations and 
differcm states may create discordant economic and social structures at the end 
and these may require special mechanisms to deal with their own problems. If 
one subscribes to the line or thought ravoured by tile Dependency School 
which includes such names as Immanuel Wallerstein and llcnrique Cardoso 
(see earlier discussion of tile Dependency theorists) one may claim that rrorn 
thc 16"' century onwards, the World economy saw the rise of Capitalism47 and 
since then three main groups of countries exist, these being countries of tile 
Core. ofthe Periphery and of the Scmi-Periphery. While the Core has been the 
imperialistic cciltre which dominated and exploited the resources, of the 
Periphery. tile Semi-Periphery has been a middle unit between the two which 
neither exploits nor is exploited enough to be in either category. Tile 
devc1opment or industrial relations, of the urban-rUral balance in the society, 
other demographic factors from the rate of literacy to the GNP per capita are 
'17 For claborate diSCLISSiOll Of tile issue of tile rise of Capitalism, see Immanuel Wallerstein's Tile 
Politics of'World Economy (Cambridge, 1984) and The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, 1979). 
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all affectcd by the economic role a country plays. The variations in the 
economic development in different parts of tile World therefore creates 
different economic models, differing modes of production or differing 
ownership over the nicans of production. In the end, the differences in 
economic structure are to affect the formation of democratic institutions as 
well as their authority over the society. The class structures, the stage of 
Capitalist developnicrit, the social oricritation towards ownership affcct the 
dcniocratic strUcture as parts or the great social jigsaw that they play ail 
important role within. 
A third I'actor that influences the democratic development of a given country is 
its gcopolitical position. It nlay be influential in both domestic and 
international scale. Domestically, the geographical necessities may dictate the 
size ofthe cities, the econornic or political prestige of a given city or region 
over others and may also be influciltial in terms of the dcfining the borders of 
constituencies. On tile other hand, tile influence of other states, either 
neighbOUrs or allies or competitors of a given state is of great importance. The 
degree of' pacific relations with one's neighbours as well as strong political, 
trade and security ties in the international arena play their parts in the 
emergence of' the demand for democracy in a country. Under constant. 'thrcat 
(rom a neighbouring state the mcclianisnis peculiar to liberal democracy may 
not develop as freely and rapidly as in a country situated in a peaceful 
environment. A radical regime change as experienccd. by the Central-East 
European countrics in the wake of the World War 11, or, or the limitations 
imposed oil the capability of action of Finland at tile Cold War Era are 
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cxampics or the strong impact created by foreign intervention or threat of 
intervention to a country's political development. 
As a result of* the social, historical, economic and geopolitical factors affecting 
its historical development, a country may undergo a very diflercnt 
devc1opilicilt process compared to another country which also experiences a 
democratic facclift. Consequently, it can be argued that a single mould of 
democracy and of democratisation is unsustainable and is an attempt in the 
wrong direction. To see the incompatibility of the two different types of social 
transilorniation, one needs to analysc the developments that took place in these 
regions and the infrastructure that sustained or prevented the transforniation. 
Such ail analysis seeks to clarify why the concept of legitimacy of a regime is 
as important as the concomitant liberalisation proccsses. To understand the 
importance and the modern context of the concept of legitimacy, one must 
clarify that each and every region and state on earth has its own political, 
economic and social balances, and that a general rule is not applicable to all 
states oil earth regardless of their backgrounds. Further discussion of the 
sulýjcct with a comparative study will take place in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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Figure I. I. Different Approaches for Democratisation and Legitimacy: 
Modernist School (Rostow, Pye, Bell, et al. ): model industrial country-+ 
modernising country copies model-). industrialisation-+ social 
niodernisation-> democracy-+ legitimate government. 
Modernist School (S. Huntington): waves of democracy and waves of fall of 
democracy-> individual countries respond to wave pattem-> legitimate 
political orders. 
Dependency School (Cardoso, Wallerstein) (international Scale): core 
comitries-> core- periphery intcraction-4 periphery follows the core-> 
legitimacy. 
Dependency School (Donicstic Scale): Core countries-> core-pcriplicry 
interaction-> intra-clite struggle for power in periphery-4 legitimacy. 
Isolated System-1 (Weber): leader/charisma; or tradition/lcgal; or 
systemichnstitutional efrect on society-+ legitimacy. 
Isolated System -2 (Communist): proletariat leads nation through Communist 
Party-> Party assumes vanguard role-> Party sclf-lcgitirniscs-> legitimacy. 
Isola(ed System-3 (Ilabermas): individuals communicate-> civil society 
creates a bridge-> economy and polity realms intcract-)ý legitimacy. 
I nteractive System (Cold War): bipolarity emerges-> countries form blocs-> 
individual countries abide by alliance ties-+ domestic regirnes receive support 
1'rom bloc leaders-)ý temporary coercive legitimacy. 
Interactive System (post-Cold War): US/LJN establishes main principles of 
the systcm-> US/UN forces the principles on individual countries when 
justifiable-> forced dcmocratisation and human rights agenda dominates 
individual countries-> forced legitimacy. I 
IV. TOWARDS A NEW DEFINITION OF LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy, in its current perception, then, is linked to the international as well 
-is domestic elements or political change. As a political conccpt, throughout 
history. it was generally accepted as an agency or dornestie politics, but, 
especially in the second half of the twentieth century, it relates to the 
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international changes as well. The shift in the scope of the concept is 
significant since it points out to the fact that the constantly transmuting nature 
ol'the concept in history still exists. 
The events that take place in the late twentieth century, therefore, may lead us 
into a new definition of the concept of legitimacy which is affected by 
intunational events, domestic needs, peculiarities of any given society in 
%Nhich legitimacy is perceived as a matter of concern, and by tile historical and 
contemporary political practices. SLIch a new definition will also lead to a new 
evaluation ol'the concept. As a result, legitimacy will then become a subject of 
international politics and this will lead to further exploration of the concept. 
This thesis aims at emphasising the international dimension embedded in the 
domestic discussions or legitimacy with the help or a case study. Further parts 
of' the thesis will rocus on the concept or legitimacy in 'opcn' and 'closed' 
systems (see Chaptcr 2), the international elcment in the establishment and 
continuation ol'a political order (see Chapter 3) as well as domestic elements 
that shape tile legitimacy ora political order (see Chapters 3,4,5and 6). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRATISATION AND LEGITIMACY 
1. DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATISATION, LEGITIMACY 
A. Three Important Concepts: 
Democracy. democratisation and legitimacy are three political concepts in very 
Frequent use since the beginning of the de-colonisation process in the mid-20"' 
CCIltUry. These three concepts -not necessarily, but usually- accompany the 
concepts ol' liberalism, liberalisation and privatisation in the field of 
economics. After the end of the Cold War and tile transformation of the fornier 
Fastern Bloc countries into libcral democracics, these threc, political conccpts 
tire ol'great importance in the establishment of the new political order. As the 
Fast E. -m-opean transformation represents a shifl towards both liberal economics 
and liberal democratic politics, there is a strong association of the two sides, 
despite the fiact that conditions in favpur of free trade have not always been 
associated with political liberalisation and dernocratisation as in the ýase of 
11cople's Republic or China or in the Latin American and South European 
dictatorships during the Cold War. 
B. The Cold War Environment: 
A change in the importance attributed to the question or rcginic legitimacy 
took place sinlUltancously and as a result of the regime transforniat i oils since 
late 1980s. Legitimacy of a regime has been seen in accordance with its 
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collaboration with one or the sides or the Cold War. As long as a oppressive 
regime was to continue its tics with tile leading reginics of the Cold War blocs, 
it %kould reccivc military and international political assistance to oppress its 
subjects / citizens, while it would receive economic aid to be used as social 
bribery to sustain public support. After the collapse of the bipolar world 
structure. the political oppression and economic aid have vanished giving way 
to a democracy-orientcd structure in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During the 
post-Nvar period. until mid-1970s when the Difenle process accelerated and 
President Carter of the United States (US) placed particular emphasis oil the 
hunian rights issue, corruption or illegitimacy of a political order was taken as 
a secondary part of world political agenda. There were indeed revolutions, 
regime changes and rebellions during thc Cold War, but very few of these 
created dramatic impact on tile general political polarisation. Such key 
COLIntries as Chile were 'protected' against regime changes, and in such cases 
-is Nicaragua or Angola, civil wars Nvere encouraged if not initiated to keep a 
country within one ol'thc two political blocs. 
Fhe 11111 ofthe Sliall Pahlavi regime in Iran was the greatest exception to this 
gencralisation. It took place when the human rights issue, rather than alliance 
ties, was paramount in international political agenda. In the casc of Ira4. tlic 
corruption and oppression or the ruling political order provoked masses to 
rebcl against it. This very obvious example of a regime's perception as 
illegitimate remained as an exception to tile general international actions 
concerning legitimacy. Most other civil unrcst and coups d'dtat during the 
Cold War period remained intra-clite connicts as the political order 
experienced change. These ncvcr achieved to be movements to dramatically 
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disorient systemic affiliations of a given country as an agent of world political 
system. The case of Iran, in which tile country shifted from the role of co- 
operative ally to possible exporter of revolution, remained an individual case 
(ILII-ing the Cold War in which a country not only went through a political 
regime change but also changed its international political orientation. 
C. The Concept of Democracy and the Idea of Modernisation: 
Until the rise ol'the anti-colonialist movements in late 1950s, democracy itself 
was taken as a mode of government for a limited part of the globe. While at tile 
turn ofthe century the number of countries ruled by a political order based on 
democratic principles was a mere fraction of all countries, from 1950s onwards 
flicre has bcen a drarnatic inereasc in flic numbcr of the countries ruled by 
democracy. based oil the idea of universal suffrage. Tile de-colonisation 
process and the ctilcrgcnce of the Non-Aligned Nations movement as an 
important actor or international politics affected tile situation. Tile emergence 
of the idea of one ivorld based on the concepts of an inlegivied world economy 
and hence on thefi-ee Ira(le pi-inciple took shape with the Bretton Woods 
convention of' 1944. This meant that tile Western powers began to assume a 
role in Nhaping or re-shaping the cconomic and political attributcs of their 
1,01-iner Colonies. 
D. School of Modernisation: 
This changc of' policy in the West caused parallel changes in the social 
scienccs. A group of social scientists labelled as the School of Alodei-nisalion 
cxemplified by such namcs as L. Pye. D. Rustow, R. Rostow and S. 
Huntington emerged. According to this school of thought, economic 
liberalisation would cause libcralisation in other sectors of the society. As a 
52) 
reSLIlt. the traditional and rural parts of a society would give way to modem 
and Lirban values and the society's modernisation Would cause a need for 
liberal democracy based on representation and individual freedom as well as 
economic liberalism. Regime legitimacy would be obtained by reforms from 
the top at the beginning, but in time, as the society develops, this would give 
rise to a public dernand for reforms and democracy and hence legitimacy 
%kould be gained by popular support as well. 
I lowever. when one looks closely to the work of those in this school of 
thought. Such as Samuel Huntington and Lucien Pye, it may be argued that tile 
main aim was to justify tile economic and political choices of the industrially 
developed countries. Such a justification might create a need for tile mostly 
newly-independent industrially developing countries to follow tile same 
patterns ofpolitical and social development based on tile developed countries' 
experience. As a result of this, the relationships between colonial powers and 
their Cornier colonies would develop in terms of indUstrialisation and trade 
relations. Tile necessity felt by each side to the other would prevent any 
political conflict. The issue of legitimacy was treated as a secondary issue 
compared to tile economic openness and political alliliation of tile newly- 
independent Countries. What the members of the Modernisation School, 'were 
looking 11or was legitimation rroni the top and not the rule of those who are 
secii as legitimate by the public in these countries. This approach depends on 
the idea that people From a specific country or a from a particular group of 
countries have superior knowledge. experience and intuition than others which 
is. by definition, racist if not inegalitarian. 
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E. Dernocratisation and Legitimacy: 
Legitimacy is an age-old concept, existing since Antiquity. However, its 
nicaning has changed over tinle. Thus, tile term did not definc tile same type of 
relationships with the same type of parties involved throughout history. To 
illustrate the idea. an example may be given on the concept's change in time: 
Bel'ore the beginning of the Ddtcnte period, the idea of regime legitimacy was 
not considered -neither by the Students of political science nor by the ruling 
classes all around the globe- as a major concept. With the beginning of Ddtcnte 
process and especially after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR)'s 
abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine in late 1980s the issue of regime 
credibility and legitimacy in domestic terms began to regain importance. As 
the political flocus shifted from the needs of a bipolar world structure to tile 
necds ol'individual countries and their respective populations legitimacy from 
below has become an issue of political scicnce oncc again. 
Hie casing ol' international tension between the superpowers led to tile 
reduction of'ccononlic. military and hence political aid to individual political 
orders. As a reSUlt, the number or countries governed by sclr-lcgitimising 
regimes which rorce their legitimacy from the top decrcascd. Cuba, North 
Korea and People's Republic of China are amongst the few such countries. 
Legitimacy has to be considered at the moment as a key concept for the 
transitory regimes from either authoritarian or totalitarian systems to 
representative liberal democratic systems. As there is no direct intervention 
from the OLItside forces, these transitory regimes have to receive the approval 
ol' their citizens if* the transition is to be completed successfully. If a newly 
emerging political order fails to gain public approval and support beyond its 
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being considered as legally legitimate, it will fail to be recogniscd as 
legitimate as a system. and neither social nor political nor economic stability is 
likely to be maintained in such a transitory rcgimc. 
In the international scale, the legitimacy of a regime as a concept and the 
means of legitimation of a regime have transmuted as well. While once a 
regime's legitimacy mightl be cstablishcd by tile means of oppression tile 
regime might use, tile main focus is now on the ruling reginle's popularity in 
the opinion of* the public it ruics, and on its commitmcnt to such issucs as 
human rights and frecdonis and on such secondary issues as corruption. As a 
result. the issue of legitimacy is emerging in a different manner than in 
comparison to the last flour to five decades. 
A considerable transition that the change in the concept of legitimacy may be 
observed is experienced in Eastern ELIropc as well as Latin America which go 
thrOLIgh a period of transition and transformation since the mid-1980s (this 
issue will be analysed in dctail in further parts of the thesis). The newly 
cstablislied democracies of Eastern Europe are still to complete a major pliase 
or transilormation. The importancc of the stability and comnlitnicnt of thcsc 
regimes to liberalism and to democracy, and the fact that the ancien rigime in 
these countries were delegitimised and brought down on the grounds ýf the 
popular will Im liberal democracy and liberal economy, brings forth the 
concepts ollegitimacy and legitimation as key determinants in the current and 
I'LItUre developincrits in that part of the world. 
11. LEGITIMACY IN ISOLATED AND INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS 
To analyse the legitimacy in a nation-state in the late 20"' century requires a 
combination ol'dirtlerent approaches to the issue of legitimacy. Since a nation- 
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state is also a part or the international political system, the need of legitimation 
flor a political order ruling in a given nation-state is of a dual structure as the 
issue is linked to two different yet interacting levels of stimulus and response. 
The first layer is the domestic environment in which the regime interacts with 
its SLIIýIects / citizens, and is responsible to society, while at the same time 
placing (Icniands upon it. Tlic second layer, however. is comprised of the 
international community and hence of the regime's responsibility towards the 
international community. This twofold connection makes the system's 
Functioning more complicated and the analysis of the events related to reginie 
legitimacy harder for any scholar of political science. 
The main problem and tile main difference is that most political scientists who 
I*ollo%v the guidelines set by Max Weber -frorn Fcrenc 1-cher to Leslie Holmes- 
cither totally ignore or reducc up to a grcat extent the importance of the 
international dinicnsion. Consequently, events are observed and conclusions 
tire drawn within an isolated systcrn, while politics in the World cannot be 
analysed within a closed, isolated system. Such an approach may lead to such 
misitillornied perceptions as the approach of the Modernisation School 
diSCLI. ssed above, or as the novel approaches towards the systemic changes in 
the Fast European region within tile last decade. Isolating tile developments in 
politics in general and in relation to tile issue of'reginle legitimacy in particular 
to an isolated system succeeds only in creating an illusion. However, the same 
argument would be truc-for identifying the international influmice as the key 
Rictor in a country's regime change. Tile dirremices made by domestic and 
international I'actors are all components of a larger scherne and as will be seen 
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below. the approaches towards an isolated system and an interactive system are 
radically different. 
John Williams draws attention to this fact and tries to reconcile the difference 
between the international and domestic levels of legitimate action by building 
on the works of such important Neo-Realist scholars of International Politics 
as I lans J. Morgenthau, llcdlcy Bull, and Kenneth N. Waltz. Williams bascs 
his argument oil tile idea that presence of order in the international state system 
is the prior value. Order is legitimised as a primary value in international 
politics cither by the anticipation of statesmen that it must be so as Morgenthau 
clainis: or. by tile need of the states to agree upon some rules so that they can 
co-exist within an anarchic structure as Bull argues; or, by the distribution of 
capabilities aniong the nicnibers of the system as Waltz defcndS48. 
In either case, order is accepted as a ccntral issue of international politics and 
John Williams argues that there is a connection bctween the domestic social 
conlract Nvhich grants Icgitimacy to the rule of the rulers in a given country and 
the foreign relations pursued by this country, for they both are linked primarily 
to tile salle existence or a country's citizens within given territorial borders 
without Ilear of an aggression to their security. I Ic agrees with Martin Wight 
that the legitimacy or a government depends "on its ability to serve the people 
who are the basis of its sovereigniy. "49 However, in such periods of World 
history as tile Cold War cra, a government's ability to serve its people may be 
replaced by its ability to'servc its allies and tile fear of actual war. Under such 
circumstances. tile rear or war and/or invasion leads to the perceived need of 
-19 John Williams, Le-gitim-acy in International Rclations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 16. 
411 jbjýj.. 1). 1 q. 
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effective and excessive territorial control and thereflare governments which 
may provide this but nothing much else, such as tile Pinoclict regime in Chile 
or the Grcck Junta or early 1970s, can be seen as legitimate by their 
international allies and instead or basing their legitimacy on popular support, 
flicy may build it on the need for international order. According to Williams 
who 1161lows the ideas of, Martin Wight, it is a need that appeared after a 
transformation was experienced in tile international politics with the 
replacement of the very limited elite politicians who decided on tile 
international affairs by a far greater number of elite who were members of 
peripheral opposition before the dccolonisation cra'O on the one hand and 
during the rise orthe bipolar state structure. 
A. Legitimacy In An isolated System: 
Taken as a single agent or politics, the modern nation-state is an isolated 
system. In , in isolated system, the administration of power is dependent upon 
hicrarchical principles. However, even in such a system tile role played by 
illdividuals and by their decisions is important. The reason for this is that the 
consent ol' individuals concerning leadership choice is a prerequisite of the 
proper Functioning of tile system. As a result of this requirement, every modern 
political system. From a dictatorship to a multiparty democracy becomes 
soniewhat equalitarian-horizontal as well as hi crarch i cal -vertical in nature. 
A political system is therellore based on collective goals. It is also based on tile 
organisation ill order to attain these collective goals, or, ill other words, on the 
organisational capability of tile rulers in a given political system. Talcott 
' 'I' I bid.. pp. 17-22 passim. 
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Parsons argLICS that, legitimacy, resource mobilisation to implement policies, 
and the associational subsystem which mobiliscs the constituent support and 
doci-mination of tile policies to be implemented are the three pedestals of a 
51 
political System . In such a framework, tile legitimacy of the political system 
NVOUld depend oil the elements under its control as well as its public 
perception. That is duc to the fact that the political domain is responsible for: 
a) preparing and enacting tile laws and the basic setting that deffiles 
politically. legally and therclbre socially acceptable norms and rules. By this 
po%%cr over legislation, it legally legitimises all other social powers; 
b) legitimising itseir as well as other social powers through the same methods 
as above- and, 
0 controlling (lie organised coercive forces or tile State, i. e. tile police, the 
arnied 11orces and tile secret service. which may contribute to legitimacy of the 
political system, but which may, in case of misuse, breech all legitimacy the 
system en. ijoys 
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. 
With these functions being fullilled, the mechanism that govems the state 
creates the grounds of legitimacy for itself and for the political system that it is 
a part of. With tile systern's and the rulers' legitimation, the opposition and all 
I 
other elements of the system are also legitimised within the boundaries of tile 
isolated system. The exception to this proposition, of course, would be the 
existence of an opposition of revolutionary nature, in which case one may talk 
about a legitimacy crisis 11or both the rulers and the political system itself as the 
51 Falcott Parsons, L)L). cit., pp. 338-339- 
521mvid Beciliam. L2c4,:, jt iiiial ion of Powe . p. 40. 
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opposition tries, to delegitimise simultaneously both the government and the 
svStelli. 
1. The Liberal-Democratic System: 
At the systemic level, the Western liberal-deinocracy bases itself on two niýjor 
realins 11or self'-legitiniation. The first of these two is political legitimation and 
the sccond is the econornic legitimation. As the nicans of legitimation, the 
liberal Licinocratic system employs elections for tile legislative organs of the 
country in which the head or government will also be chosen 
53 
. Using the 
elcctions as the main basis, the systcni secures the public consent for its 
clements: By letting a majority of people in each constituency decide who will 
represent thern in the parliament, tile system gives people a relative control 
over the laws which will be enacted. For the same reason, they would show 
consent and obedience to the laws as they are prepared and enacted by their 
representatives. That would legitimise the existence of tile legislative organ as 
well as the existence of the govuriment, formcd either by the political party 
which achieved the greatest amount of votes or a coalition of parties, hence 
some\Nhat loosely reprcsenting the public will. Within that system, the 
previously mentioned three responsibilities or the political domain, narnely 
legitimising the laws and the systern, self-legitimising and legitiniisifig the 
existence and the use of state's organised coercive rorccs are achievable. The 
politieal key is thcreflore to convince the people that they -at least their 
nuýjority. through the electoral system- are tile decision-makers in respect of 
sysmilic dcvelopincilts from legislation to foreign policy. 
-"ibid.. pp. 163-164. 
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I lowever. the liberal-denlocratic system requires economic legitimation, too. 
BV establishing the principle that private ownership and private decisions upon 
economic activities such as investment, consumption and employment within a 
rormally Crec market are the cornerstones of the system, the economic part is 
legitimised. 'rhis somewhat cxistentialist approach to individual dccisions in 
economic issues is breached by tile state intervention in the market. State 
intervention is explained in relation to its protection or its citizens' rights as 
the state is presented as "flie ultimate guardian of public interest ... In effect, tile 
contemporary state undenvrites the legitimacy of capitalism by ensuring its 
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social acceptability as well as its legal validity"' 
Fhe liberal-deniocratic system, thercfbre, has its justification in both political 
and economic nicans based on popular and individual choice. It offers different 
choices in terms of ideologies and economic orientations. The choice within 
the system is then made by individuals eithcr voting in favour or against a 
political party. preflerring a political, ideological, or industrial product to 
another. or by choosing or declining tile alternatives they are granted by tile 
system. Although the variety of tile alternatives in both econornic and polifleal 
fields may vary according to tile capabilities of the country, the existence of a 
I 
variety ol'clioices. or the illusion that there is a variety of choiccs-55, available 
I'or the individUal decision-maker contributes to the legitimacy of the liberal 
democratic system. Therefore, the liberal democratic system has to provide to 
5"iliki., 1). 16-1. 
55 Political choice may vary in terms or ideological inclination of a nation, the international political 
condilions surrounding a given state and the capability of the I*ollowcrs of a political view or an L- ideology to promote their cause. Economic choice may be limitcd in a given country by the level of 
industrialkation, Foreign trade balance. international relations. domestic econornic indicators, and 
illdiVidUill pi-O'crences. As for the illusion of the availability of choice, in a country where 85010 of voters 
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self-legitimise. That is true in terrns of economy, so the system at least seems 
to believe in competition. In terms of politics, too, the competitive character of 
the system is guaranteed by elite competition. To remain legitimate, the power- 
holders have to accept (lie existence of diffiering groups of intellectuals which 
would proVide a spectrum of elites to create an alternative to the rulers at a 
givcn momcnt through otýjcctive c1cctoral process. Such a variety of elites may 
be insignificant as some may never be favoured by the niýjority of the public 
while some others would be favoured, yet, one may always refer to such a 
variety of'choice. At this point, K. Newton states that 
"Jal large number of elites per se is not a necessary 
condition or a democratic political system except in sofar as it 
is recognized that there is rarely a single 'general will' in the 
society but a large number of varying and conflicting wills 
instead. Therellore it is necessary for society to sustain a large 
number orelites capable of expressing and defending the full 
range orpolitical demands in a society. A plurality of elites is 
-in indication that society might be organized into a large 
IMIllber of different groups, each of which is capable of 
dellending its own material and ideal interests against the 
threat of encroachment of other groups. Similarly, competing 
elites are not a necessary condition of democracy insofar as 
political competition is a technique by which accountability 
orrulers to tile ruled can be maintained. Tile importance of a 
pluralist political system lies not in tile number or competitive 
nature orelites but in the extent to which elites are responsive 
and responsible to tile non-elites ..... A society 
in which elites 
are highly responsive and responsible to non-clites is the end 
product ora democratic pluralist SyStern.,, 
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In such a system. the political scheme itseir, as well as the state concept, is 
salle unless a delegitimising factor jcopardiscs its operation mechanism. That 
WOUld tic possible ifa, direct threat to the individual fi-cedoms (e. g. frecdom of 
traditionally vote lor centre-right parties, the existence of a communist party is an illusion of choice as 
to vote for that party will never result in changes in political system. 
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speech. travel. economic activity, right to voýe) or to the power-holders (e. g. a 
coup d'etat. invasion by another state) would emerge or if the people would 
cease to believe in the merits orthe system and in the popular sovereignty idea. 
Unless such cases materialise, the legitimacy of the system is intact while the 
legitimacy or a given governnicrit may increase or decrease according to its 
performance in office. 
2. The Communist System: 
The communist or state-socialist (or, simply, socialist) system, however, 
difl'ers in its legitimation bases from the liberal-dcmocratic system. Tile 
communist system is again based on political and econornic justifications, 
lioN%cvcr. the similarity does not continue beyond this point. 
Politically. the system has two main claims to legitimacy. Primarily, instead of 
the economic and political individual freedoms, this system empliasises tile 
equality principle among individuals. The claim of the communist system is 
that as every man and wornan are equal, there should be no difference based on 
social classes or tile relativity of ownership or property and goods arnong thern. 
Therel'ore. the role of (lie elite in the libcral-dernocratic society as the actual or 
potential leaders of the society loses its importance. However, the society 
needs a leading force. as there is a state and the need of it to be governed. In 
this point. the sceond ground of legitimation for the communist system enters 
into the picture: Marxist-Leninist ideology. This ideology claims to have 
solved the evolution. of mankind in ternis of econornic and political 
developments. Marx claims that that, passing through stagcs, onc of which is 
capitalism, the human race would at the end reach the stage of communism in 
56, lolm Scott (ed. ). Power Critical Concepts (3 volumcs), vol. 3, Routledgc, London, England: 1994, 
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Nkhich the state would be obsolete and made redundant. As this ideological 
doctrine 11oresaw tile working class -tile prolelarial, as tile main force capable 
ol' overcoming the capitalist modc or production through an ultimate 
revolution, tile working class was perceived as the leading part of the society. 
The Communist Party. which stood as a representative of the proletariat, 
would make sure that the transition would be securely made57. As the working 
class was considered to be the most progressive part of the society and its 
interests meant those or the whole society, the Party would be able to protect, 
pui-sue and realise policies that would benefit the proletariat and the society 
and hence reach tile state-rree era orcommunism. 
As the leadership of the Party meant tile representation of tile pi-olelai-im and 
the society. there would be no need for any alternatives or competitors. Then, 
there is no need to seek popular consent through elections as there would be no 
bct(cr altcrilative in any individual or organised opposition as they would 
logiudly contnidict with tile interests of tile Party, that is of the proletariat, 
that is of' the society. The show of consent, therefore, was to be obtained 
through social mobilisation, through activities airned at thc ordinary people. 
Indoctrinafion, education, organisation of mass demonstrations of support, and 
oppression or any activity challenging the status and the importance of the 
state. Party, or what the working class was believed to represent are tile 
methods ohnobilisation (or, irnmobilisation). 
At the economic level, too, the ideological difference is manifest. As the Party 
ýNliich is the oniniscient entity in the society, it controls the economy, too. 'rhat 
PI). 18-19. 
571). Beetham, Legitimation or Power, pp. 181-182. 
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task is carried out by central planning through administrative control. The 
Party monopoly in production and ownership is legitirnised through two 
ideological clairns: The first clainn is that the Party is the representative of the 
lwolefui-ial, the most progressive and hence the most self-aware part of the 
society, and thercrore it is capable of deciding for the best interest of the 
society. The second claim, in parallel with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, is 
that there is an evolutionary process in hurnan history. As the final airn of the 
progress is to reach the state orcommunism in which people would not have to 
work to satisl'y their needs and will have time to develop themselves, and as 
this aim is to be reached by socialist system's evolution towards socialism, the 
process would cover a long span of time. A shortcut to reach the final airn is to 
allow the Party to decide what is the most productive method for the society to 
reach communism and to let it lead the way towards communism. This 
engenders central planning which results in a symbiotic relationship between 
tile government and tile bureaucracy. Therefore, while in the libcral-denlocratic 
system there is a difference between tile state as bureaucracy and the 
government as the executive leadership which is elected to run the state at rairs 
in collaboration and in contact with the bureaucracy, in tile communist system, 
tile state and the Communist Party have become synonymous. Tile burca, Uicratic 
inechanisin developed a direct link with tile Party as key bureaucratic positions 
were to be occupied by party apparatchiks at corresponding railk. 
In such ail ideologically-led system, both economic and political legitimation 
are based upon the systern's ideological indoctrination of the people and on a 
social conlruct based on (lie belief in the bright ruture of communism and on 
tile txý, tj choices of consent or oppression. Within such conditions, tile 
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communist system seems to be more prone to a legitimacy crisis than the 
liberal-democratic system. The reason for such a crisis in the communist 
system is that the state is far more involved in economic-, than the liberal state. 
Failure in economy. JUrgen liabermas argues, questions the rationality of tile 
system and licnce creates a legitimacy crisis 
58. I-labermas focuses on tile 
fili I Ul-CS in the constrLICtiOll or the system, arguing the system is not rational and 
therellore a legitimacy crisis is inevitable. If not aimed at the system in general, 
the outcome ol'a legitimacy crisis based on popular disillusionment would be 
the resignation ol'the government and elections which would probably bring 
the government in power for the following term in the liberal system. 
Meanwhile. neither the state, nor tile I iberal -democratic system of government 
nor the nation-state would encounter any challenges to their existence in such a 
crisis in terms ol'their legitimacy. 
Such a claim would follow that there is a connection between the state 
intcrvention to economy and the rulers' legitimacy. In tlic communist system. 
as the state is totally in control or the economy, then the system appears to be 
more prone to legitimacy crises. Moreover, as the Party and the state are in a 
symbiotie relationship, the crisis would affect all the system. Consequently, the 
St, l(C ill the COIIIIIlLllliSt system would lose its purpose, its raison d'&rc, due to 
its inability to respond to public dcmand in econornics. 
lowever. as it is true that there is a close link between the Party involvement 
in tile economic lille and a possible threat to tile Icgitimacy of the Party and the 
state. this link may only be established by grave economic failure by the 
central-planning administration which wound lead to be backed by a total loss 
5,41, eslie I lolmes. End of Communist Powe , Polity Press, Oxford, England: 1993, p. 
33. 
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or political legitimacy. As the systern is based on the Marxist-Leninist 
idcology and thcrefore foresees the Party playing a vanguard position and, 
more importantly. as there are no feasible alternatives to the rulers, such a 
legitimation crisis is unlikely except in a situation in which serious political 
crisis would be accompanied by severe economic failure. Moreover, as Leslie 
I lolnies points out. what happened in tile Second World from mid-1970s 
onwards was not due to Party's over-involvement in the economic lire, but its 
%Nithdrawal 1rom economic sphere 
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and giving concessions to private 
entrcill-ClIeUrs or the failure to supply the dernanded goods to tile market while 
rel'using ý tile private enterprises that caused the rationality and hence legitimacy 
problem. 
In a state in which the communists have come to power as an alternative to a 
repressivc reginic or at the end or a popular revolution, despite the intensity of 
economic crisis. public questioning of the merits of a communist regime is 
unlikely unless (lie period of crisis lengthens for an indelinitc period. Even in 
SLICh a case. people may be led to belicvc that tile I'ailurc is not originating 
From the silo r1coni i ngs of the Party or of ideology. This would be possible 
because the communist party has tile means of communication and propaganda 
LIIILICI' its control and tile mainstream official ideology clainis that thý party 
assunics a vanguard role for the society's progress. This means, in Jdnos 
Kornai's %%ords. that -ItIlic party knows better than tile people itself what the 
people's interest demands: this is preciscly what 'vanguard' nicans. "60 
Accordingly. people may be indoctrinated in such a way that they would 
4ý"ihid... p. 32 
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believe the failures are caused by the inability of certain unworthy apparatchiks 
or may be threatened by the use of coercive mc-ans. 
There must be a really strong counter-point to prove the failure of the 
political-economic system as a whole to result in such a lapse of faith in tile 
ideology. The totalitarian nature of tile communist system and its control over 
coercive Ilorces hardens the situation for the opposition. Such examples of 
opposition and uprising against the system, however, exist in the form or the 
1951 F, ast German disturbances, the 1956 Polish change of govermlicnt, the 
1956 Uprising ill I ILIngary and tile 1968 events in Czechoslovakia during which 
the people showed clearly that they saw the communist regime as illegitimate. 
A similar stand came from the Solidarity movcrnent in Poland which 
challenged the legitimate atithority of the Polish government However, one 
must also bear in mind that except for the I lungarian case where the public 
opinion associated the tyranny of Rdkosi with tile communist rule itself, the 
idea ol' communist illegitimacy took decades to be popular in the countries 
'libCrated' by communists either due to economic improvements, totalitarian 
oppression and indoctrination, or public apathy. 
B. Legitimacy in an Interactive System: ' 
All the points discussed above are correct if one takes a state as a political and 
cconomic ecosystem which acts within its own limits. However, as no state 
operates in political or economic isolation, any given state cannot be perceived 
as in isolated. limited-in-itscir system. Each and every state has a place in 
international scene and has alliances, trade relationships, debts, partners. 
("I Jimos Kornai, The Sociilist Systern: *rhe Political Economy or Communism, Oxford University 
Press. Oxford. Fligland: 1992 p. 55. 
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opponents, even enernies that it has to act and interact with and reciprocate to. 
I-very state must consider its capabilities, its foreign policy objectives, the 
threats to its economic and political independence, and hence be a member of 
, in interactive system, however it may try to reduce its relationship with the 
others to -a mere mininium. 
As a result of this, a total, ly isolated political and economic environment is 
unleasible. This also needs an alteration to the points discussed above. The 
liberal-deniocratic system may be thoroughly applicable in a limited number of 
liberal-denlocratic Countries such as the United States. United Kingdom, or 
France. I lo%vc%, er. as the degree of predictability and stability in the systems 
begins to become vaguer, as in such countries as Italy, Greece, or Mexico, due 
to systemic I'laws. tile system would be less clearly dcfined. In such a case, tile 
grounds ot'legitimacy flor a given state and its political systern*s existence may 
not be equally legitimising, or may even help delegitimise the administration 
or the system in other countries. Martin Wight claims that many regimes which 
were not considered legitimate managed to survive because the members of 
international state systcin accepted their legitimacy based on these 
domestically illegitimate regimes' respect for tile territorial integrity of their 
ncielibouring states and their willingness to abide by the values of non- 
intervention and order in international scale6l. Furthermore, their willingness 
to accept the valLICS shared by a bloc or its alternativc within a bipolar world 
political structure would also make thesc reginics internationally legitimate 
evcn il'domestically illegitimate and / or unwanted. 
61 Martin Wighi. Systems or States. Leicester University Press, Leicester, England: 199 1. pp. 160-166 
pas%im. 
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Foreign intervention may also be performed in a direct manncr, in addition to 
indirect intervcntion as political support. The main way of such intervention is 
the invasion ora country by another and imposition orthe value-systems of the 
victors to tile losers. In case of the liberal-democratic systern's adoption as a 
result ofa foreign invasion, the success or failure of the systern would depend 
on the success or failure of, the occupant country's persuasion of the people of 
(lie occupied country. A mid-way legitimation of the liberal-democratic system 
and an altcration or it nlay be seen in such countries as India, Pakistan. or a 
rel'usal ol'the system may be observed as in the examples of Iraq and Syria, or 
a scarch For an alternative while a swing in between democracy and other 
possibilities may occur. as can be seen in the Algerian case. 
The same proposition is -or, rather, was- true for the mcnibm of tile Socialist 
Illoc. In countries like the USSR or China which had experienced regime 
changes through Popular revolution and civil war, the system's legitimacy is 
highly dependent oil tile ideological beliers and economic expectations related 
to tile ideological beliers, that is, on public acceptance of tile ideological 
propositions by will. I lowever. even in case of a socialist revolution, with the 
international pl ice it holds, a country like CUba or Angola may never reach its 
gO, 11 01' C011111lUnism and may become a dictatorial state as a result U tile 
presence or lack or international pressures or help. 
In case of* conversion by Ilorce, the consequences may differ from the 
COIISCLjIIeIICCS or conversion by will. A communist system imposed by force 
results in a direct rejection as in the case of Afghanistan or may result in a 
great aniount of' co-operation as seen in Bulgaria during the Cold War. 
Alternatively. tile imposed system may be altered such as in tile case of 
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Albania. or may be reinterpreted such as in the Yugoslav Federation under 
Tito's rule. to serve the needs of a given country or a certain ruling click. The 
indoctrination of socialism by an occupation force may also be perceived 
differently in dirfierent times. For instance, the occupation was first perceived 
as a development as it ended the Nazi occupation, but gradually became a 
source ol'discontent in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
In tile cases of change or regimc due to foreign invasion, the capabilities of tile 
invaded country's people is mostly very limited. On tile other hand, tile 
grounds flor legitimising the new regime arc also very limited. The newly 
established system would, in such a case, represent not the choice of the people 
ofthe invaded country. but of those who invaded it. 'rhereflorc, a legitimation 
1'rom the top scheme is present in such instances. In this case, the consent and 
co-operation ofa small group of the country's elite is enough to self-legitinlise 
the systcm with the support of coercive organs. Even though a part of the 
SOCiCty OLIt. Side the clite formation would support the new regime, thesc would 
COIISfitUte a minority in the overall population. 
As an alternative, the invasion force might have liberated the country from 
another invasion force and a popular sy'inpathy towards the latter invaders may 
appear unfil tile time they make certain that they have no intention to leaV'e tile 
, liberated' lands. In such a case, tile minority collaborating with the invaders 
may get into authority positions in the initial period of sympathy with the votes 
01'1)COI)IC Who NVOUldn't vote for thern in normal electoral conditions, as they 
are seen as national heroes who helped the libcrators liberate their country 
from invasion. When it is apparent that the liberators have no intention of 
departing. the sympathy is likely to disappear and the new political systern 
71 
imposed by the invaders and their brothers in arnis at the invaded country, 
then. it is at this point that the new rcginic is likely to face with a legitimacy 
crisis. In such a case, the two toois or legitimation the new cadres may use 
would be: 
-0 propaganda and indoctrination which would take time and is uncertain to be 
sticcessibl. and. 
b) the use oforganised state coercive forces, that is the use of police forces and 
the armed Comes. these being backed and/or constituted by the occupant state's 
Corces. 
In the case where climination of opposition is followed by a strong programme 
of political brain-wasiling, the acceptance of the new regime as legitimate may 
become easier. I I'this process is backed by some economic success, partly due 
to the transcer or technology and know-how rrom the invader, which might 
prove tile success of the new regime, propaganda becomes more effective. 
I lowever, although the new regime may have all tile means to legally 
legitimise itselrand the components of the new political order, people may not 
accept it as legitimate. This is due to tile fact that the new reginle's ability to 
eliminatc opposition by coercion is il'ot equal to its popularity. Tile lack of 
opposition may steill froni tile belief in the futility of opposition or in the 
impossibility ol' a regime changc cvcn by a revolution. Inaction against the 
reginle. thus, would be a show of popular consent oil its power to eliminate 
opposition. This cannotprove the systcrn as legitimate because the situation it 
cnJoys is based oil the lack of alternative. The main base of the government, in 
such a case. is tile international environment that lets tile invader remain in the 
invaded country. ir the balances change, the occupation forces need to 
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withdraw. and ir the system failed in achieving any success in either political 
or ccononlic lields, it is most likely to be overthrown. 
I'lie case in many Central East European countries following World War 11, the 
situation was sinlilar to that described above. In the post-war period, Soviet 
invasion and backing ensured the triumph of communists in East European 
states. In the first step, new regimes were established with communists 
infiltrating to important political positions. As a second step, in the first. post- 
war elections. these communists were elected to govern the country. Finally, 
they established a communist rule based on the leadership of a Communist 
Party. the representative or the pi-olelarial, and by means of coercion 
eliminated all opposition. Policies followed included collectivisation of 
agricultural sector. tile emphasis on the creation of a blue-collar working class 
in tllc.,; c mostly agrarian countrics, heavy youth indoctrination. These aimed at 
creating popular support and popular will in favour of a communist revolution. 
FITective propaganda and the pursuit of an industrial isation programme sought 
to create compensation in these countries for the lack of the class and industrial 
structures floreseen by Karl Marx for a socialist revolution. The 
indUstrialisation process in thesc: countries was airned at creating a working 
class, a lwolelai-ial, which would have close links with the Communi st' Party 
and in interest in tile continuity of the socialist system as it claimed to act on 
its behal f. The existence of Soviet troops and well-trained actual and secret 
police florces made the, systems established in these countries invulnerable, 
hence reluctantly acceptable. me 1956 rebellion in Hungary ended in great 
11LIMan CaSUalties and a painful pcriod of 'rc-norilialisation' in which the 
economic well-being was exchanged for tile recognition of tile regime as 
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legitimate. In most East European countries, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, such rebellions were avoided by the knowledge on 
the results or tiic Hungarian example. The economic failure of the East 
Furopean communist regimes from nlid-1970s onwards. when combined with 
the USSR's withdrawal from direct involvement through the so-called 
Gorbacho- Docli-ine rollowed by tile less strict Sinan-a DoCjj-jjje62 from illid- 
1980s onwards. created grave legitimacy crises for the East European regimes 
and hence brought them down. 
Therel'ore. the role of international intervention, either as in the case of 
*Western' intermition in the conflict between North Korea and South Korea, 
or in cases ol'the lack orsuch direct intervention, as could be observed in the 
case of'11-ast E. uropean regime changes in the aftermath ortiie World War 11, is 
a key issue of legitimacy and legitimation which transcends the option of 
coercive legitimation. 'rile cancellation of such aid and military protection 
cascd the kill ofthese reginies. Similarly, the impossibility of intervention by 
Russian I"nipire's allies duc to tile conditions of tile World War 1, such as the 
I'act that the Dardanelles Campaign failed and Germany was not yet defeated, 
has made considerable contribution to the success or the Russian October 
Revolution. In both instances, an intcrvcntion by the Western powers'might 
dramatically change tile course orhistory. 
62 The term Sinatra Doctrine was first used in November 1989 by Gennadi Gerasimov, the then Soviet 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman. while trying to find a way to express the Pcrestroika-bascd ne%v Soviet 
floreign policy. as opposcd to the Brczhncv and Gorbachev Doctrines. Ile described the new, libertarian 
approach as (lie Sinatra Doctrine on the basis that the famous singer's popular song "My Way" in which 
lie sings lie "did it my way. " As the new policy suggested the East European subordinates of the USSR 
would be able to l'ollow whatcvcr policy (hey chose, lie baptiscd the policy as the "Sinatra Doctrine". 
For this maller. see J. F. Brown, Surge to rree(lont, Adamantine Press, Twickenham, England: 1991. p. 
62. 
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The 1956 rebellions in Hungary and the lack of interest and/or support from 
Wcstern E'uropean countries is another clear example of tile working of the 
interactivc-systern. Mihaly Vajda claims that while the rebellions were a 
"Struggle for national independence, " the West European states ignored tile 
situation. V. ýIda argues that "it was the Russian intervention in Hungary in 
1956 which revealed that, Western politics not only accepts tile post-1945 
situation. but also carcl*ully safeguards it. 1163 rhe Hungarian political 
philosopher clainis that thc sareguarding or individual freedoms by acccptitig 
the dominance or a world system dominated by two superpowers created a 
threat to the rý)uvcnation of the real European spirit which would mean the 
return to the continuous revision of values, the ability to go back to one's 
roots. rationalism and pragmatiSIT104. 
In unison with V, ýIda, Hungarian sociologist and translator Ferenc KOszeg 
claimed that the West was indifferent to the East European discontent and 
dissent. K6szcg clainis that Kissinger's vision or a peaccrul Europe based on 
the agreement of the superpowers and the preservation of the stalus quo failed 
becMIse people or the Eastern Europe disliked this agreement. He mentions the 
flact that the US Secretary of State Schultz has praised Rims Kdddr in his visit 
to I lungary in 1987 and "reduced his criticism to the simple observati6n that 
K, 'id, 'ir should not smoke so much as the world needs him to remain healilly, "65 
without getting involvcd into any post-Perestroika discussions in the country 
'3 Nlihaly Vajda. 'Central East Europcan Perspectives. ' East Europeaii Repoi-ter, vol. ](I), Spring 
1985 (pp. 5-7). p. 6. 
6-1 11, i tj " p. 
S. 
65 Within the Warsaw Ilact: An Interview With Ferenc K6szeg, ' East Ettrolvat, Rej)orler, 
vol. 3(4), Spring-Summer 1989 (pp. 12-14), p. 12. 
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for the West is too much preoccupied with the governments and 
undercstimates societies while trying to protect its interests. 
Therellore. both I fungarian intellectuals seem to adopt an accusative approach 
towards tile lack of involvement of the West in the domestic political sphere in 
the Eastern Bloc countrics, particularly their own Hungary. However, Vajda 
alld KOszeg miss the point. that the international political environment forced 
tile WCSI FUropean states to ignore the Hungarian revolution to prevent a 
widespread multinational war. When the interilational environment permitted 
fOr a political change in Eastern Europe, the West European states, especially 
the Furopean Union as a supranational institution were of assistance to their 
F. ast I'Mropean counterparts as well as the United States. Therefore, it may be 
claimed that lack or existence of foreign intervention is directly related with 
the changes in the international political agenda. 
Foreign intervention to a country's political system has eff'ects beyond the 
control ol'govermilent. The opposition in a country which is sulýlect to foreign 
intervention is also receptive to changes. For instance, the communist 
illIlLICIlCe in tile East European states has given way to the formation of an 
alliance ol'Llissideilts which covers the most diversiried groups together. In the 
1956 cvcnts in I lungary. the opponents of tile communist regime consistcd of 
an alliance orsuch unlikely allies consisting or reform communists, supporters 
ol'the flascist Admiral I lorthy regime and the Catholic Church allied together 
against the Stalinist. pro'-Soviet regiMC66. 
('11 Male Siabo. 'Nation-State, Nationalism, and the Prospects for Dcrnocratization in East Ccntral 
Ful-ope, in OnnIIIIIIIA1 dilu/ Posi-communist Studies, v. 27(2), p. 381. 
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As a result. the international dimension of legitimation is to be taken into 
consideration when analysing a state system, as it gives way to difTerent 
political developincrits, alliances and affiliations. The role of foreign 
intervention in the definition or sustainment of a particular regime in a given 
country therefore has the ability to alter tile political balances in that given 
country. I lence, the political systern is arrccted and so is tile question orreginic 
legitimacy and tile main techniques that are available to legitimise tile regime. 
Fhe outside innuence over the political systern of a country is capable of 
altering all the dynamics orthc system irthe link between the foreign source of 
mlthOritý' 1111d the dornestic rulers is capable or maintaining their control over 
the population by the use ofcoercion, of propaganda or social bribcry. 
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Ill. LEGITIMACY AND HUNGARY 
A. Legitimacy and Eastern Europe: 
In tile light of' all tile above discussions, it would be correct to argue that 
Icgitiniacy is a dynamic concept of political life. Through its historical 
CMILItiOn. tile concept has modified itself and adapted into tile needs and 
conditions orthe changing systems and societies. Since the appearance or the 
necd Im establishing a kind or rapport between the rulers and the ruled, the 
idea ol*sociul conn-act has been an intrinsic part of tile concept of legitimacy. 
'I'lic developnicilts in the twentieth century gave way to further developments 
and afterations in the definition of the concept. Howevcr, tile fact remains that 
a regime's longevity depends on its being approved by the people it rules. 
The changes that are observed in the Latin American and South and East 
Furopean regions since 1974 have made it clear that legitimacy of a regime is a 
key concept and if a regime cannot reach a social contract with its subjects or 
citizens. it is likely to fail and fall the moment it loses tile ability to cfficiently 
use tile means of coercion to create order. On that account, a distinction should 
be Made between the existence of order -or the lack of insurrection- in a 
country and the actual public support for a regime which provides legitimacy 
to this regime. 11' the regime is perceived as illegitimate, its durability is in 
question x0latcver means of coercion it may employ. The international 
intervention in terms of invasion or direct or indirect military. political, and 
economic support may not change the late of a regime or alter its cognition as 
legitimate or illegitimate. but may only delay regime change. 
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Nor is any one regime identical to another. The conditions surrounding a state 
with their demographic, economic, social, political, geostrategic and historic 
backgrounds enable diiTcrcnt scts of rcquirements for the survival and 
iegitiniacy or ruling rcgii-nes. A socicty*s needs and perceptions may be 
radically different frorn any other's. Consequently. the concept of democracy 
an(] the process of' democratisation may necessitate different routes and 
111-OMILINS to be applied in any given country. The methods or legitimation 
and the grounds of legitimacy may differ From one country to another as well. 
Fastern Europe is a part of the world where one may observe tile dynarnics of 
change and continuity in terms or legitimacy and legitimation in its own 
specific conditions. Due to its post-war history. the region has developed a 
distinct structure. Furthermore, the transmutation in that region is tile most 
evident. recent. and strong one. As tile needs and perceptions in time changed 
sharply in this region within the last decade, so did the expectations from and 
(lie dutics associated Nvitll a ruling regime. Tile political concept or legitimacy 
has been altered to suit to tile requirements of tile new era as well. Legitimacy, 
in Fastern U'urope, now has a clearer, sharper, more pertinent meaning. 
I'lierel'ore. its analysis would require a more focused approach. This very 
research ainis at showing the importance of the conccpt of legitimacy aý wcll 
as the different methods employed to guarantee its presence for a given regime 
within the changing rules or politics by using a specific country as its model 
and nlcdiLlIll ol* representation. 
I IoN%eN-ei-. as the argument of this thesis is that each and every COUntry have 
their own specific needs and conditions, a general, regional approach in the 
study ol'legitimacy is thought not to be suitable. Therefore, a model country is 
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to be used to see the change in the perception of the concept of legitimacy and 
the methods oNegitimation after the changes since late 1987. 
As a model country, this thesis will focus oil tile transmutation or tile political 
system and or aic concepts or legitimacy and legitimation in Hungary, once 
rel'erred to as the most liberal of tile socialist states or the Eastern Bloc. This 
thesis. in its Following parts, aims at pinpointing the conditions that 
surrounded the reginic-society relations since World War 11, the changes in 
terms ol' establishing and preserving regime legitimacy, and the impact of 
I 
changes in tile aftermath of tile implementation of the Sinatra Doctrine 
mplacing the Bre: hnev Doctrine, in tile country. Tile main postulates of change 
and continuity in tile political systern of the country, the change in tile 
importance and rolcs orspecific political and economic institutions, emergcnce 
or di 111cmit political rorces and influcritial factors affiecting the pcrccption and 
implementation of legitimacy and legitimation tecliniqucs are to be discussed 
in tile flollowing chapters. 
B. Hungary as Case Study: 
Fhe discussion above shows that legitimacy is a more complex issue than it is 
taken by social scientists who focus on the subject as a matter of an isolated 
system analysis. The externally imposed and/or protected sort of legitimacy of 
a regime. the economic and social dynamics which afTect the relationship 
bemeen tile rulers and the ruled, the availability of options to the rulers, and 
the willingness ol'the rcgime in power with the people it governs are all factors 
influencing the establishment, preservation and absence of legitimacy. 
01* all the possible recent developments, the East European trans formati on 
appears as the clearest example of all in legitimacy studies. The changes that 
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took place in the political and econornic spheres in the region rrom the early 
20"' Century onwards constitutes a very broad field or observation for the 
students of tiie concept or lcgitimacy. The fall of the empires, the emagence or 
the smaller nation-states that replace these as individual kingdorns or 
republics. the devastation brought by the World War 11, the Soviet intervention 
11ollowing the Nazi invasion, the plantation of Sovict-friciidly communist 
regimes %Nhich 11orced changes in the lirestyle of the people of this region, tile 
resistance movements and the governments' methods to confront these, 
constitute a rich historical background to analyse tile changes to tile concept of 
legitimacy. That the individual reginies had each peculiar solutions and 
techniques also emphasises tile region's peculiarity. 
01' the regimes in Eastern Europe, though, Hungary, tile chosen case-study 
sub. icct ofthis thesis. cmerges as a unique experience as it provides different 
NOILItiOlIS to similar problems than its counterparts in the region. When we 
look at tllc other states in tile region, Guinan Democratic Republic appears to 
be merely beyond a buffer zone with a strict regime. The Polish example is full 
ol'attempts of* renewal ol'the system which meant a change in the Party cadres 
and nothing else. The Czechoslovak example, especially after 1968 events 
"-lioN%. s that it was based on terror and fear as well as indoctrination 
or tile 
C, ommunist ideology. The Rumanian reginle, an outpost or the Soviet sphere 
of influence. Nvas based on very strong nationalism and on the leadership of 
one flamily. 'File Yugoslaý, state was also based oil the charismatic leadership of 
one leader. Tito, while its flederated states were in constant competition with 
cach other. Ol'the Soviet-controlled East European states, only Hungary stands 
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apart from tile others in that its administration was based on a social contract 
aller the 1956 events. 
Aller the 1956 rebellion to nlid-1988, Jdnos Kddir stayed as the leader of the 
ru I ing reginic in II ungary. This makes him a different leader as there has been 
sevcral Icadership changes in ncighbouring countries during his leadership 
period. I lowever. despite his long reign, KAdir never enjjoyed the charismatic 
legitimacy Tito made use of, and as a collaborator of tile invaders, even 
siffIlered Crom the problems due to a delegitimised position vis-A-vis tile public 
in his first decade at the head of the Hungarian regime. KAdir enabled other 
fitictors to strengthen the regime credibility and legitimacy. Ile made use or an 
economic contract which enabled the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to 
exchange political legitimacy with economic prof-it. Even tile use orthe policy 
or-those vvho are not against us are with us" shows that populism, economic 
and social bribery, quid-pro-quo techniques are at tile core or the KAddrist, 
administration's search for legitimacy. Unlike other regimes and other leaders, 
lungarian Communists and JAnos Kdddr have sought the accord of the people 
thev ruled. The ract that threat to use coercive measures did not solve the 
problem was proven by the events in 1956 led Kýddr and his cadres to look for 
more complicated. more feasible, and more populist ways to cstýblisli 
legitimacy For the system. 
'I herellore. the period or JAnos KddAr's rule in Hungary was different in many 
aspects 1rom other East European countries of similar ideological orientation. 
In addition. the differencc in the perception of the ruling political order by the 
lungarian people and the perception of the people by the Hungarian ruling 
political order created a different. set of rules and orconditions in the transition 
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to liberal democratic system in this country. The transformation of dissident 
CiViC gi-OLIJIS into opposition political movements. tile transaction between 
these and tile I lungarian Communists and the round-table discussions which 
Icd to the 114.111 of the communist system in the country also make Hungary a 
PCCLIliar example. 
As a result of all tile above-mentioned matters, I chose to analyse the 
II ungarian example or transition and the transition or the concept of legitimacy 
of the Riling political order/regime in this country. In the following chapters, 
tile Kildlir system's attempts to gain legitimacy in its difficrent stages, tile 
transition and its legitimacy crisis, and the post-communist regime's search for 
legitimacy will be analysed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KADARIST LEGACY OF HUNGARY: SOCIETY AND 
CHANGE IN THE NEW HUNGARIAN POLITICAL ORDER 
1. THE DISTINCTIVE PLACE OF HUNGARY 
As previously discussed in Chapters I and 2, aic issue or regime legitimacy 
had been perceived differcritly in Hungary in comparison with the 
understanding or the issue in the rest of Easteni Bloc countries. The main 
rcason flor this dirference is the peculiar patterns or interaction between the 
administration and the people during the establishment, development, and 
decline of' tile communist regime in Hungary. The specific administrative 
methods used by administrations led by Matyas Mosi, JAnos K66r, and 
K. 'idAr's short-term heir. Karoly Grosz, the problems they inherited firom their 
predecessors as leaders, and the social and economic conditions they faced 
caused tile emergence of a 11ungarian-style approach to tilc Concept of 
legitimacy and tile issue or legitimation. 
I'lle di ITerences in confronting the problems or legitimacy and legitimation in 
I ILIngary qualified the country as a distinctive agent within the state socialist 
system. The differences in terms of rulcr-ruled relationship in comparison to 
the rest ol'the Eastern Bloc and different methods applied in that context by 
the I ILIngarian administration, even under the leadership of a single leader, 
enabled the application of different policies at different times to preserve 
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order. Due to the peculiarity of the state socialist period, the democratic 
transition and the post-cornmunist governments' attempts at establishing 
legitimacy are linked to the events that took place and relationships established 
during that period. 'rhe methods used and the social contract established in that 
cra still arrects tile developments in Hungarian politics. Therefore, the 
interaction between the rulers and the ruled during the reign of state socialist 
leaders IZ, ikosi. KAddr. and Grosz are to be analysed to reach a conclusion on 
how the current political regime needs to respond to different situations that 
take place in the post-communist political arena. While the policies of 
differcm governments and political developments concerning legitimacy will 
be discussed in 11ollowing parts of the thesis, this chapter will focus oil the 
differctit policies employed to legitimisc the system and to secure a social and 
, in econonlic contract during the communist cra in Hungary, beginning with 
the communist seizure of power in the country and continuing with the cfforts 
of J. 'mos MiLlAr. (lie leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Crom 
1956 to 1988 to keep regime legitimacy undiminished. The chapter will then 
Iloctis on the dcniocratisation process which began with the Round-Table 
i)iscussions or 1989. The different methods employcd in the transitory period 
in I lungary are to be emphasised as the peculiar situation of the 6untry's 
political structure needed a different approach. Finally, there will be an 
analysis on flic I lungarian pcople's paception of dcmocracy. 
11. HUNGARY BEFORE KADAR 
A. From The Empire to the Communist Rule: 
Although the developments which took place after he IcIl office will also be 
sed in the thesis. the main rocus or tiis chapter will be Jdnos Kdddr and analys 
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his work as the longest-ruling IlSWP (Flungarian Socialist Workers' Party) 
leader 4rom 1956 to 1988- and the originator of a quasi-social contmct 
between the I lungarian state and the Hungarian people. Kddir's success as a 
leader. his eagerness to adopt and employ difTerent policies in order to render 
legitimacy to the communist rcgimc in Hungary beyond a Soviet-imposed 
indoctrination and coercive threat, and the outcomes of these policies make 
the KIddr administration tile main subject or tws study. Since tile legacy of tile 
Uddr administration in respect of popular expectations about politics and 
economics can still be observed in the Hungarian life, the importance of the 
K, ld, ir administration stretches beyond the terill of office of this Hungarian 
leadcr. 
I lo%%e%-cr. I lungarian history before KAddr's rise to power may shed some light 
on the development of events in the recent past in that country. To analyse the 
K-, lidilir era without mentioning what preccded it would bc an incornplctc 
analysis as tile KAdirist, policies have their roots in tile RAkosi cra. Without 
analysing what prcccdcd the KAddrist administration. one cannot understand 
(lie changes that took place under Jdnos KAddr's rule for the pre-KddAr 
systems ol'administration have impact on tile KAddrist administration as much 
as Kild-Ar has an impact on the current post-communist political order. 
Therel'ore. bcflore analysing tile leader, tile events, and the policies of the 
KilidArist era in the country, a glance at the events that prepared the background 
Ilor the K,! d6r administration is necessary. 
The way I ILIngary was governed before the communist take-over is important 
to understand the political tradition of the country. Hungary. part or tlic 
Austro-Hungarian Enipire From 1867 to 1918, was administered by a sell'- 
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government system. After World War 1, with tile collapse of the Empire, it 
gitined its independence as an individual nation-state. For 133 days in 1919, 
1 lungary becanic a Communist republic under tile leadership of Bdla Kun. This 
short-lived communist government was brought to an end by the 
Czechoslo%, ak-Rurnanian intervention. Tile Szeged Government established 
a 11cr that event and led by lstvdn Friedrich could not survive much without tile 
support of Admiral Miklos Horthy, the aide-de-camp of Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor Franz Joseph and the commander or the last Habsburg flect. With 
elections held on I" of March 1920, it was decided that Hungary would remain 
a kingdom but would be ruled by a regent who would be Admiral Horthy. 
Thus, from 1920 till the end of the World War 11, Hungary was ruled by 
Admiral I lorthy. acting as regent for an unnamed king67. After Hitler's rise to 
power in Germany in 1933, Horthy fell more and more under German 
influence and assisted Hitler with the Hungarian troops in the Nazi campaign 
against tile USSR in 1941. 
Willi the defleat orthe Third Reich, Hungary was invaded by tile Red Army 
dUrint' tile last stages of the World War 11, in 1944-45. Admiral Hortily fled, 
and a provisional government, inclu . ding the communist agriculture minister 
hilre Nagy, was flornied., rhis formation marked the beginning of the erid orthe 
non-coniniunist era in tile country for the next four decades. 
B. The Pre-KSdAr Hungarian Communist Rule: 
1. Establishment of Communist Rule In Hungary: 
Willi the formation of the provisional government in 1945, a momentum 
lowards the establishment or communist rule in tile country began. Ail elected 
(17 William NI. Balkay. Authoritarian Politics in a Transitional Statc: Istvan Bethlen and the Unifled 
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assembly brought a republic into existence in 1946, but it soon fell under 
Soviet domination, although only 70 communists had bccn elccted within a 
total or 409 deputies. In the 1947 elections, which were manipulated to a great 
extent. tile communists became the most widely represented party in the 
parliament Nvith 100 seats. Then, with the slogan "we rebuild the country not 
11or the capitalists but for, the people, " first the new currency unit Forint was 
introduced. The introduction of the Forint is comparable to the introduction of 
tile Deutsche-Mark in tile parts or Germany occupicd by tile Wcstern powers a 
%viiile later as both indicate a sharp, departure from the previously existing 
system and as both signify the beginning of a new era for both countries 
involved. In Western Germany, the introduction of the D-Mark signified that a 
unified control of Western and Soviet parts of the German lands was no more 
a possibility while tile Hungarian communists' introduction of the Forint 
signified a departure from tile old system by removing one of tile most easily 
identifiable elements ortiie previous order. 
Fhe second step was the implementation of a vast nationalisation process, 
beginning with tile nationalisation of tile large commercial banks and then of 
all the enterprises employing more than 100 workers. This process, too, was 
ainled at undalining tile differenccs of the system with the previous order. 
In the third stage. a 'Unification Congress' was licid in August 1948. In the 
congress. (lie Ihingarian Workers' Parly (IIWP) was foundcd as a 
combination oi' all * remaining left-wing fractions, a process observed, 
approved. and commanded by the Soviet leader Stalin himself. Matyas Rdkosi, 
referred to as 'Stalin's apt pupil, ' chosen as the leader of the IIWP, gradually 
[1,1qyin II upgijt)ý, 1919-1926, East Enropcan Monographs. New York, NY, 1982, pp. 10-18 passim.. 
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led tile Country to a Stalinist regime. The final stage or transformation came in 
AtIgLISt 1941) with the approval or a Stalinist, Soviet-type, constitution which 
assigned the 11ungen-kin lflorkei-s' Pai-ly a leading role in tile development of 
the society towards democracy and COMMUlliSM68 From then until the late 
1980s. tile concept or Party was to be used interchangeably with the concept of 
state in the country as in many other state socialist political orders. 
During RikosPs rule, especially after the adoption of tile new Soviet-style 
constitution in 1949, industry was nationalised, land was collectivised and a 
wavc or secret-police ten-or was launched to legitinlisc, the systern by 
suppressing any actual or potential opposition movement even berore such a 
movement was conceived. The Stalinist political order of Hungary, from 1949 
to 1953 was devoted to attain goals in productivity and in creating a model 
socialist environment with collective farms. heavy industry, and complete state 
hegeniony over tile political and economic realms. Coercion was tile basis of 
achieving these goals under RAkosi's rule, as was under Stalinist Soviet Union. 
Thc activitics of the secret police force, the AVO, and the sense of terror 
created by these activities prevented any social opposition. However, this 
attitude towards tile relationship between the Party/state and the people created 
no impact oil the public approval of tile new political order. Tile legitimacy of 
tile state in the case or Rdkosi's Hungary was based only oil coercive power 
and it is a fact KAddr sought to change by early 1960s onwards. 
The general system of political organisation was imposed upon the Hungarians 
by the libei-alion of I lungary by the Soviet troops and despite the success of 
68 Gyorgy Lilvan (ed. ), The 11migarian Revoltilion of 1956. Rclorm. Revoll and RgLvession, Longman, 
London: 1996. pp. 12-14 passim. 
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the Smallholders Party in tile first post-war elections, by the end of 1948, the 
Communists Nvcre holding tile power due to RAkosi's famous saland tactics 
%%, hich weakened the opposition and prevented a centre-left coalition and to 
extensive double-voting". Tile grounds of legitimacy for the Mkosi-led party 
was their ideological belier in the righteousness or what they do, and the 
Soviet occupational forces to convince the nation in case of doubt. Tile 
draniatic changes in the social structure, the intensive collcctivisation of farms, 
(lie emphasis oil industrialisation and oil tile creation of a reliable working 
class. the ban on the oll'springs of the former elite to get a university 
edmation. and the extensive, if not useless, use of force against any sort of 
resistance, created a temporary forced legitimacy for the Rdkosi regime during 
the final years or the Stalinism. However. with the change of cadres in 
Moscow and tile rise or opposition to Rdkosi inside and outside the I lungarian 
Communist Party led to tile events or 1956. Rdkosi's mistakes were to assume 
that the threat and the use of force and an iiltra-partyjustirication of tile acts of 
tile administration meant legitimacy for tile system. fie also underestimated tile 
intra-CPSU conflicts and hence could not foresee tile orthodox and de-Stalinist 
approach that Nvould replacc Stalinism. 
2. The Hungarian Revolution: 
On 14 March 1953, the leader or the Soviet Bloc, Joseph Stalin died. His 
demise changed the Soviet understanding or the Cold War as well as the 
relations aniong the Icading cadres of the USSR. This affected the whole of the 
Fastern Bloc countries. The political struggle that emerged. with the death of 
Stalin resulted in first the cstablishment of a coninlittce to rule the country. 
"'I Nipcl Swain. I ItingAry: Ti - Risc And Fall Of Feasible Socialism, Verso. London, UK: 1992. p. 37. 
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This group ilICILided Beria, Molotov, Zhukov, Malenkov, and Khruslicliev. 
I lowever. by 1956, the country was ruled by a triumvirate consisting of 
Khrushchcv, Zhukov and MalcnkoV70. The change in leadership gave rise to a 
soller, readjIusted approach to the statc-society relations in the USSR and this 
new political order was reflected in the USSRs subordinate states in Eastern 
I, uro lie. 
In I lungary. with (lie support of the Party Secretary Malenkov, Inire Nagy 
replaccd RAkosi as tile prime minister, while RIkosi remained as the leader of 
the Party. In 1955, Nagy's fortunes paralleled those or Malenkov in the USSR 
as they both were removed frorn off ice. This parallelism between the two 
leaders demonstrates the importance of the global structure and of the external 
legitimacy ol'a political order (as discussed in Chapter 2) in the East European 
states during the Cold War pcriod. 
In 1956. lio%vcver. while the dctcriorating dornestic scene ensurcd that on 23 
October 1956 Nagy once more became tile I lungarian prinic minister, Matyas 
RAkosi had to step down from Party leadership. This was due to a series of 
events which happened between 23 October and 4 November 1956 and 
generally reflerred to as the Hungarian Revolution, although there are some 
clainis questioning the reliability of the term 'revolution' since the action 
failed within twelve days from its start7l. 
The liberalisation and restructuring process initiated by public intervention to 
the administration wenf on with Nagy's declaration that Hungary was to Icave 
711 S. J. Ball. The Cold War: An International I listo[y 1947-1991 " Arnold, 
London, UK: 1998, p. 66. 
71 See for instance Terry Cox. 'Reconsidering the I lungarian Revolution of 1956, ' in Terry Cox (ed. ), 
I lungary 1956 - Forty Years On, Frank Cass, London England and Portland, Oregon: 1997, pp. 3-6, on 
an elaborate discussion on the suitability of the term 'revolution, ' and claims on the events being in fact 
, in 'in%urrection' or a 'counter-revolution'. 
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the Warsaw Pact and become a neutral state. The revolution, as a combination 
or two interrelated processes of elite action which embodied "'strata within or 
close to the centre of the Communist power apparatus itself' (such as writers, 
ilItClICCILials, and revisionist communist politicians) and a 'mass process 
spreading throughout tile broad anonymous masses"' as P. Kecskemeti 
argueS71. Nvas unique in this combination and in its being an uprising against 
the Soviet authority and those who represent it, was a momentous event in 
European history. Hence, tile change of government, which, with Nagy's 
declaration or 31 October might as well lead to a change of political order, 
trigggered a strong Soviet response, despite the less strict attitude of tile new 
Soviet regime compared to tlic Stalinist era. On 4 November 1956, Warsaw 
Pact troops invaded Hungary crushing tile revolution, ending tile reform 
process. Aller many coil frontations, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact troops gained 
control and while (lie revolution was crushed, some 200.000 Hungarians had to 
I'lee the country ror the WCSt73. After tile Soviet troops gained control of tile 
country. the I lungarian leader Inirc Nagy was arrested. Tile new communist 
administration was to be led by Jdnos Kdddr who would become tile avatar of 
tiie concept or state in Hungary from late 1956 till his removal from office in 
May 1988. 
The events ol' 23 October -4 November 1956 proved two things for the 
Hungarian communist leadership. Firstly, the events demonstrated that 
coercion was not the guaranteed method of gaining legitimacy, and not even 
obedience. Thc enormity of tile Soviet military support for Rdkosi failed to 
72 Wd., p. 4, From 1). Kccskcmeli The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian 
uprish, ig . Stand flord 
I Iniversity Press, Stan ford, CA, 1961. p. 2. 
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prevent the Cal I of (he I IWII administration. Secondly, the events demonstrated 
that public support was necessary for a regime to survive. The Rdkosi 
administration's failure to accept that power alone is insufficient to sustain 
regime legitimacy and that legal-constitutional legitimacy of' a reginic is 
insufficient to sustain regime existence led to the multi-centric approach of 
. 1i'mos K6LUir. The difficrence of Hungary from tile rest or tile Soviet- 
subordinate states of Eastern Europe relates to tile events of 23 October -4 
November 1956 onwards. After tile suppression or tile 1956 disturbances, tile 
issues related to legitimacy and legitimation in Hungary followed a difl'crcnt 
developmental pattern than the other East European members of the Soviet 
Bloe. The K6ddr regime tried to reach a consensus with the Hungarian citizens 
rather than Coming the rules of tile system upon them, while nicthods varying 
From martial la%%, - to nationalistic communism were used in other countries of 
the region. 
In the wake ofthe 1956 rebellion, the KddAr administration's first tasks wcre 
to re-establish tile communist order, establish a legitimate political order 
acceptable to the I lungarian people, and which would manage to achieve these 
tx%-o objectives by not alienating the , Soviet - Warsaw Pact principles. The 
mistake of l6kosi administration which gave way to the public rcbcllion. 'of the 
. 
1956 was to seek Soviet approval for all its actions while ignoring to seek 
legitimacy in domestic level. It believed that coercive threat and legal- 
constitutional justification/legifirnation orthe ruling political order was enough 
if the external dimension of legitimacy was established. In the Hungarian case, 
(lic close relationship between Stalin and RAkosi and the existence or sovict- 
73Nigel Swain. L(iL: 
-. cil.. pp. 
18-49 passim., 
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Warsaw Pact troops in Hungary appeared to be at the heart of this belief. The 
internal dimension of' legitimacy, even in a closed system -based on single- 
party rule and which excludes the idea of competitive elections-, is as 
important -if' not more important- an elenicnt in respect of the search for 
regime legitimacy. The revolution had aptly demonstratcd the consequcnccs of 
a regime that relied solely oil Soviet support. 'nic riew regime, led by Milos 
K-6dOm sought to re-cstablish the order -in all political, legal, and social senses 
ol' the word- in I lungary. It had to find a consensus betwecil the two major 
actors which will enable the political system to function, namely the Soviet 
Bloc and the I lungarian people. Kdddr's policies in over a time span of more 
than three decades. leading the country and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' 
Party (I ISWII) were all aimed at establishing that balance. 
Therellore, although the period of 1953-1956 is very interesting for many a 
stmient or Hungarian politics in the 201h Century, one has to focus on the 
Kikkir Era in I lungary to see what the current system is replacing both in terms 
ofpolitical and economic system and in ternis of legitimacy and legitimation. 
Fhis chapter will therefore be mainly a discussion of the KAdir Era in 
I lungary. Ilocusing on tile developmen'ts and changes of the period between 
Autunin 1956 and Spring 1988. 
Ill. KADARIST HUNGARY 
A. JAnos KAdAr's Background: 
I 
Janos Kzlidilr nlay be described as tile most important figure in post-war 
I lungarian politics. as both a leader and a policy-maker. I lis models of New 
I. -I-onomic Mechanism and Second economylSeconcl sociely havc become the 
milestones ol' the I lungarian economic devc1opment and underdevelopmcnt. 
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I lis leadership and policies created tile framework for the developments in the 
I lungarian political lire since late 1956 to date. I lis leadership period, from tile 
Autumn oN 956 to the Spring of 1988, may ideologically be labelled under the 
heading of' K(Wtirism as it significs, in a way, a different attitude towards 
socialism compared to the Soviet model itself and the spin-offs from this 
model implemented in other East European countries. Therefore, to understand 
the present political agenda of Hungary, one has to consider what happened 
during the 32 years or Kdddr-led I lungarian Socialism. Therefore, in order to 
have a clearer Picture of the current Hungarian political landscape and to see 
ývhat aff"ects the legitimacy problem in the current political order. a thorough 
study of' tile developments, policies and legitimation techniques of the KAddr 
cra is to be carried out. 
J6nos K66r. a typewriter repairman by profession, joined the Hungarian 
socialist underground movement in his youth and remained in the party 
structure becoming a member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Party 
and 1roni 1948 to 1951, serving under the leadership of Matyas RAkosi as tile 
Minister of Interior. I lowcvcr. lie spent tile period 1951-1953 in prison ror 
charges of' anti-Stalinisni. Then, in 1956, lie regained his place in tile 
nomenklatiti-a and became a Politburo member. 
136ore the 1956 uprising, lie was "not well-known in the country but, where lie 
was kno-vvil. rccognised as a victim of the Stalinist trials and as such relied on 
as an opponent of Stalinisni -a reasonably popular if untried new Party 
Icader-74, although his loyalty to Rdkosi regime as one of its cabinet ministers 
74Willi, llll Shawcross, Crime and Coninromisc: Rings Ud6r and the Politics of llunga! )ý sincc tile 
Revolutioii, Weidenrield and Nicholson, London: 1974, p. 14. 
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was also noted. KAddr, a supporter of KhrLISIlCllCV'S moderate political 
approach, was in Inirc Nagy's Politburo in late 1956. He was also the only 
person who expressed anger towards Yuri Andropov, then tile Soviet 
ambassador to I lungary, on I November 1956 meeting of Andropov with the 
Hungarian politburo. The same night, KAddr was reading a declaration in 
Radio Kossulli stating that "in their glorious uprising [tile Hungarian] people 
have shaken offthe RAkosi reginie"75. 
The sanie KidAr. though, abandoned Nagy's and his supporters' side and, on 
4"' of' November 1956, declared the formation of tile Sovict-backed 
Revolulioniny II, 'W-kei--PeasanI Govei-nment at the time tile Soviet invasion 
began. I le was to return to Budapest in a Soviet arnioured-vehicle and assume 
the leadership of' the Party for the next 32 years while his government 
colleagues were arrested and at times executed. 
With the overthrow of the Nagy administration, a new communist dictatorship 
was set up, with K6ddr as the premier and head of the renamed and 
restructured IhingaHan Socialist Woi-kcrs' Parly (I ISWP), the replacement for 
the dcl'amed and by then notorious Hungarian Irorket-s' Pai-ty. Tile Soviet 
administration promptly promised $150 million in financial aid and full 
Support 11or the new Party and tile new administration of I lungary. Punishment 
of insurgcnts which had begun immediately arter tile Warsaw Pact troops' 
invasion ot'l lungary continued throughout 1957 and 1958, and thousands were 
deported to the USSR. 'Nagy's promise of free elections was broken and the 
only elections were those within the Communist system, that is with single 
candiditcs from tile same party, the HSWP. By 1960s, Nagy and many of his 
75ibid.. p. 15. 
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associates had been executed. In the meantime, Cardinal Mindszenty, tile head 
or the I lungarian Catholic Church who played a role in the short-lived 
liberalisation period, took refuge in the US council in Budapest, where he 
remained until lie was permitted to leave the country in 1971, four years prior 
to his deatI116. The new era in Hungarian life would from late 1956 onwards be 
indexed to the successes anýl failures orone key political figurc, Jdnos Kdddr. 
B. K6dAr's Party: The HSWP's Developmental Phases: 
The I Itnigarian Socialist Workers' Party (1-iSWP), a formation that emerged on Lý 
the day of the Soviet intervention, was, at least theoretically, a creation of 
Rims K. IdAr. 'File I lungarian Workers' Party that it replaced was a product of 
the harsh Stalinist line as was its leader, Matyas RAkosi. The new formation, or 
rather the old party with a new name and a facelift, was, on the other liand, an 
I ofFspring of' a softer generation of communism. The softer approach of the 
I ISWII in comparison with I IWP owes to two important reasons. Tile first. and 
domestie. reason is the impact the 1956 uprising had on the communist leaders 
or I lungary. The 1956 events were, as Terry Cox points out, the first mass 
challenge to a communist regime since the first years of Soviet communism, 
and "were exceptional in giving birth to a sustained mass inowment that 
brielly promised a genuine share of state power to non-conuilunist parties and 
the prospect or a radical restructuring or social relations and institutions 
(III-OllgilOLIt I fungarian society"77. The second, and international, reason is that 
by tile tinle I ISWII rcgained control of the country, tile Stalinist terror had 
ended and a new. more tolerant approach represented by Nikita, Khruslichev 
76 Gyorgy Utvan (ed. ), 0. it.. p. 205. _g: 77 Terry Cox. Loc. qit-, P. I 
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and his colleagues had replaced it. Jdnos Kdddr, leaming from the mistakes of 
his predecessors, adopted a far more toned down approach. All through the 
three and a hal F decades or its existence, the lISWP would adopt a low-key 
approach and would try to use other means of legitimation than to use or to 
threat to use coercion. 
Rudoll* 'PUs argues for, a three-phase course in tile Hungarian Socialist 
Workers* llarty*s evolution. According to ToWs. the I ISWP began, as all other 
Communist parties, as a winguar(I party, then adopted a syslem-management 
mode. and at the end. becarne a i-eurguar(l party. In the vanguw-d mode, the 
I ISWP assurned tile role or an institution providing guidance and leadership to 
the nation. The party, in this stage, strengthened its political power, re- 
designed property relations in thc country, mobiliscd society, and, employed 
the coercive forces ofthe state to gain public compliance. During that first 
phase which was between late 1956 and 1962-1963, T; jkds claims that the 
party administration rid itself of its opponents, both Stalinists and radical 
re lo rin -seekers. and created an ideological framework for its existence. 
The Udzir administration's aim was to diri*crentiate itself from the Stalinism 
just like the 20th Congress of Soviet Union Communist Party78 and to 
0 
convince the masses that it was a legitimate institution. The vanguard phasc 
was. then. in a way, a stage of gaining legitimacy by use of force and by 
proving that there were no alternatives to the systcni. The restoration of power 
was also based on seeking an agreement with the I lungarian people. KAddr's 
1961 phrase, I le who is not against us, is with us- really describes tile mood 
78 Rudoll-FOUs. I lunuai-N. 's Ncuotiatcd Revolution, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, England: 1996, 
pp. 26-28 passim 
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of the new system and of its search of legitimacy. The urgent requirement in 
this stage, though, was not public legitimation, but was to be seen as all entity 
the I lungarian people had to learn to live with and which would not threaten 
liVCS 01' tile Hungarians unless another rebellious movement took place. Tile 
search 11or compromise begins in tile first phase of the Kdddr administration, 
but it is only in the systein-managenicrit phase that tile famous KAddrist 
compromise and KAddrist social and economic contract appear. A discussion 
oil the impact of these on legitimacy will be dealt with in the section on civil 
society tinder KA&r or this chapter. 
The second phase. tile sjsleni-nianagemenl period, began in early 1960s to last 
until tile end of' 1970s. By the early 1960s, political power secure, tile Party 
was reorganised. tile 'security belt' organisations such as tile Young 
Communist League or the trade unions were revitaliscd, the political 
opposition -nationalist and Stalinist alike- were eliminated and hence tile 
system seemed to be immune to another rebellion. In tile SYsIeni-mantigement 
mode. tile I ISWP began to emphasise tile diffiercrice between the Party and tile 
State and gradually lell the roles of economic management to the state 
oil icials. I lo,, %, evcr. this policy was aimed at giving the IlSWP less emphasis in 
public relations. By diminishing the level of contact between the Party aýd the 
public by locating the state mechanism instead of the Party mechanisms in 
issues directly related to public life, such as the management of economics, the 
role ol'the state was redc1lined. 'rhe airn in this policy was to channel any sort 
of public discontent away from the IlSWP to the organs of state. As a result, if 
economic policies faltered, the bureaucracy and not the IlSWP would be 
blamed as the Party would attribute the failure to economic policy makers. 
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I lowever, due to the fact that key figUres in the HSWP were also key figures in 
the state bureaucracy, the control or the Party has not diminished over the state 
mechanism. A decrease in Party control over the state sought to redefine the 
basic tenets ol'communist state systern in which tile communist party and the 
state Nvere interactive as their structures and perfon-nances overlapped as the 
construction ol*a DNA spiral. 
Oil tile other hand. according to T6kds. the decrease in the superficial Party 
involvement in (lie administnition may be linked, to tile flailure of the rerornis 
to create the expected development. In such a case, the Party has few 
alternatives Such as returning to the use of Stalinist methods that it inight. 
exercise in a very limited manner not to cause a new public outburst, or try 
new reforms. 11'ricither works, T6kds argues, tile Party sought to disassociate 
itseir cron, tile Cailurcs, attributing the blame to the state. 'rhis would lead the 
Party into a new phase in its developmental scale, namely the rearguar(I phase. 
The filikire in achieving tile economic objectives, especially in the 
commitment to the expectations DIP (dognal' i peregmil - catch tip and 
Surpass) policy which was a product of tile 21st Soviet Communist Party 
Congress o 1' 19587". brought the H SWP into tile rearguardphase. 
The rearguard mode "is dcsigncd to gain time for organisational self- 
ýxamination, policy reassessment, and the orderly re-deploynient of the party's 
personnel resources to non-party entiti&'80. In this phase, emphasis is placed 
oil tile bold and charismatic leadership, on tile party's retreat from the political 
71) ibid.. p. 92. 
"I bid.. p. 3 1. 
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scene as direct manager of public policies, and, on the new 'contract' between 
the party and tile low-ranking members of tile nomenklatura. 
TOWs claims that at tile end of this phase, the party beconles a "helpless 
captive oi'a system ol'its own creation*', because the military shifts its loyalty 
Crom the Party to the state. expertise outweighs party membership, and 
economy takes over from idýology in the conduct or foreign affairs of the state. 
Thus. the party becomes a follower of developments in the country rather than 
being the creator of* the agenda. 'nic events that took place in the country f1rorn 
late 1970s onwards may be seen as an example or such a lose of control. 
I lowever. it is also true that ideological loyalty to the Party was a key element 
in obtaining and prescrving prorcssional positions. Ergo, T6kds's argurnent L- 
that the party becomes an outcast in its own systern is not sound. That the 
I ISWP has lost its ideological integrity and commitment to create ail ideal 
communist state and that it appeared to provide solutions to the economic and 
social probicnis is true, however. that tile Party was not in command and 
control ol" tile developments in the country and that its leadership lost its edgc 
to provide new solutions to tile problems, are not true. One Must bear in mind 
that the secon(I econoinylsecond socOy model came into existence during 
what TOUs labels tile rearguard phase and this model provided a inajjor 
hIlluence in the transition to dernocracy and oil the expectations of the 
I linigarian people from democracy. 
This said, (lie lailure or tic system-managemcnt phase is undeniable. T6kds 
links it to the railure in flic New Economic Akehanism (NEM) policy, 
introdLICed in 1968. following the New Course approach introduced in 1961, at 
the OLIUSO of (lie Kdddr regime. The NEM introduced the concept of 
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consumerism to a society in which 98% of tile nicans of production were state- 
owned. Given the lack of economic expertise in the Politburo members, the 
failure. combined with tile state monopoly over the production, was 
unavoidable. By the end of 1970s, the systcrn was struggling to prevent 
I lungary from folding down under the combined burdens of the state's 
external debts and the Party's railure to provide what it promised in its social 
contract with the people. TUds' observation is true but odd as he doesn't 
believe in the existence ol'a social contract between KddAr and his citizenry. 
I le sees the I'ailure of this phase as the beginning or the beginning or political 
rcilorni-seek-ing in the society and links the secondsociely idea to this failure. 
On the other hand, if one disregards 'r6kds on the issue of social contract, 
combining Ilis idea of rearguard policies or tiie IISWP with tile second 
econonty concept, thesetting is applicable to I lungary. With the acceptance of 
-a KAdArist social contract, the rcarguard phase in the IISWP history becomes 
an attainable idea. I believe that KAddr has ofTered a series or compromises 
1'rom the top. bellore these were demanded by the public, and these 
compromises constitute a scrics of ccononlic conccssions from the Party to the 
people in exchange or their obedience. The KAddrist social contract, therefore, 
is not a single contract. but a continuum orquitlin-o quo policies based 6n the 
exchange ol' a rise in welfare with political obedience. That the economic 
rellorms of' 1960s failed do not and should not lead us to tile conclusion that tile 
Party has become a rearguard organisation itself. Unlike in Poland where tile 
communist party became politically rearguard and was -Icft as a niere 
reactionary to the political developments which were led by outside forces, 
especially the Solidarity n1ovemcnt, the IISWP remained in control of tlic 
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political agenda as long as the international agenda permitted for the continuity 
of' the siums quo. Thcrellore, one should not take a shill in tile Party policies 
which allowed the introduction of various economic concessions serving the 
same end as the Party losing control of tile events in Hungarian social and 
economic lil'e. 
The change in the key bureaucratic positions at managerial level from an older 
generation to a younger generation is seen as another important point in the 
change. TOUs argues that professional ism was preferred rather than party 
membership in bureaucracy. Fle reaches the conclusion that by the 1980s, 
I lungarian social structure was thoroughly difilerent from the origins or ttic 
regime. The rise in social mobility and hence in social stratification according 
to prollession. educational background, involvement in tile second economy 
and the like are also seen as factors that created a blueprint for the Hungarian 
civil society. 
F'rvin Laszlo takes another approach. He sees the development or communism 
in I lungary in four stages. Tile first is the period qf iransition, covering the 
time bet,, veen 1945 and 1948, from the Soviet 'liberation' of Hungary from 
Nazi invasion to the communist take-over of power afIcr the 1948 elections. 
The second phase is tile Gleichschallung period (1949-1956) in whA tile 
communists under l6kosi's leadership tried to suppress and eliminate all 
politieal opposition by harsh Stalinist methods. The final outcome of this cra 
%vas tile 1956 uprising during which Nagy became tile leader of the country, 
the Soviets invadcd Hungary, and KAddr became the new leader of the new 
communist party. re-labellcd as the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. These 
developments were rollowed by tile pet-iod qfmoi-ienlalion (1957-1960) as the 
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regime tried to re-establish itself through ideological orthodoxy and 
SLIppreSSiOII. That period would transform itself into the perio(I of 
libei-tilisulion firom 1961 to the end, and, during that period one can see the 
KMAr regime struggling to redefine itself as can be seen in the introduction of 
the New COUrse in 1961 and in the implementation or the New Economic 
Meelianism in 196881. 
Both approaches see a similar logic behind the development of the HSWP. 
Flie driving lorce behind this logic was a desire to retain political power while 
seeking domestic legitimacy. Both the success and Failure of KddAr's Party 
steni From the very reason of trying to reach that aim within a limited 
capability ol'acting in a limited operational space. Tile limitation comes from 
the dual nature or its rcsponsibilitics which it has to perform to satisry both the 
USSR and tile I lungarian nation to prevcnt a repetition or 1956. 
C. The Question of System: 
The above-mentioned lines of development, and especially the general 
departure ol' K6ddr From the policies followed and implemented by his 
predecessor RAkosi. invites questions concerning the nature of the KAdAr 
regime. It is generally accepted that -any state socialist system is actually 
totalitarian in nature. This belief classifies the Sovict-type state socialism, 
regardless ol'period or country. under the heading lotalilaHan. I lowevcr, if we 
can site a social contract, or at least a quasi-social contract. between the 
Uddrist administration and the Hungarian nation, then the systern perhaps 
should not be ref . erred to as totalitarian. 
HIErvin Laszlo. 'rhe Communist Ideology in Ilunga! 3!, D. Rcidcl Publishing Co., Dordrecht, lioland: 
1966, pp. 37-31). 
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l'otalitarianism canic into use in the 20"' century, firstly to describe thc Italian 
111scism, despite similar precedents in history. Critics of authoritarianism began 
to use the term to describe the three systems that are fundamentally against 
democratic pluralism. nanicly Nazism, communism, and Italian fascism. After 
World War 11. the term began to imply Stalinist communist 963. *rule and 
I-C111,611CLI to describe state socialist reginies of' Eurasia. The greatcst, 
contribution to tile issue canic from Carl J. Friedrich who gave five factors that. 
constittacd or justified Ilic labcl 'totalitarian' in the Tolalilai-icinism 
Cmilerence of* 1953. Later, when he published the book titled Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy in 1956 with the co-authorship of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. tile number ol'factors rose to six for Friedrich and Brzczinski had 
considered communism as tile real modcl for totalitarian rule since tile Nazis 
wcre del'eated. The six factors that made a regime totalitarian according to 
Friedrich and 13rzezinski were: 
1. An ol'ficial ideology focused on a perfect Final state of the hurnan race, to 
which everyone is supposed to be devoted. 
2. A single mass party usually symbolised by or subordinated to one person. 
I'lic party has a hierarchical structure and is considered to be superior to or 
united with the state bureaucracy. 
3. A technologically advanced, near-compicte monopoly or ti, c coercive 
weapons by that party and the bureaucracy subordinated to it. 
4. A complete or aiiiiost complete monopoly of tllc nicans of mass 
communication. 
5. A central control of and direction over the entire econonly. 
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6. A system ofphysical or psychological control by use of terror. 82 
According to these, the Stalinist RAkosi reginic proves to be totalitarian. 
I lowever. ir one takes into account the 1956 uprising and its consequenees for 
the political leadership of Hungary and of the USSR, one expects changes 
From the line 11ollowed by the RAkosi administration under the rule or JAnos 
Kild6r. 
When we analyse Kiliddrist policies, it is obvious that there is, at least in the 
theoretical level which does not reflect on the execution level, therc is a belief 
on a perflect final state or human race. It is the basic communist belief that the 
ideology ol'the system burgcons from, thcrcfore it is normal that it is present in 
the K,, 1(16rist system of administration as well. Tile existence of a single party 
under the control of one person is also present and is united with the state 
bUreaueracy as 111LICII as to be seen identical to it. There also is a state / Party 
monopoly over the coercive weapons and mass media, so tile third and fourth 
requirements ol'a totalitarian reginic are fulfilled by KAdAr's I ISWP. 
Control over the entire ceonomy exists in the KAddrist system, as well. uic 
entire economy was centrally planned in KIddr*s administration as well as it 
was under l6kosi's. The iater stages ot the K66rist regime, though, may be 
taken as a diversion from the mainstream totalitarian rule over ccot6iiic 
activities. It' one accepts the argument or Alec Now that "therc is not and 
cannot be a political economy of socialiSM, "83 the Mdarist attempts to create a 
socialist market cconoiny, the so-called goulash socialism (to be discussed in 
82 F. ugene Kamenka, 'Totalitarianism, ' in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petit (ed. s), A Companion to 
Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, England, 1993, p. 632. L' 
83 Alec Nove. The Economics of I-elsiblc Socialism Revisited (2"" ed. ). Ilarper-Collins Academic, 
London. Fnilland : 1991. p. 13. 
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this chapter and in Chapter Four) appears to be a contradiction to one of the 
main principles of the totalitarian rule. The socialist system cannot have a 
political economy because, according to many scholars of socialism, including 
BUkharin. llrcobrazliensky, and Stepanov, political economy analyses the 
unorganised national economy and is unsuitable for an economy which is 
adJusted by a consciously, made plan84. Thus, one may argue that by the 
introduction or goulash socialism, creating ail anarchical economy coexisting 
with the centrally-planned economy, Jdnos Kdddr has, created a diversion from 
tile orthodox totalitarian organisation and took the administration of the 
economy 1rorn a totalitarian socialist form and transl'ormed it into a quasi- 
socialist and quasi -total i tarian form. However, under KddAr the economy was 
mostly based on central-planning and hence, tile economic system, even with 
some diversity 1roni the original blueprint, may still be considered totalitarian 
in nature. 
Under these circumstances, one can say that five out of the six requirements 
pronounced by Friedrich and Brzezinski exist in the KAddrist regime. 
Consequently. tile K6dar administration may be generally branded totalitarian. 
I lowever, there is a sixth clenicnt aniong the requirements of Friedrich and 
Brzezinski vis-ä-vis a regiiiic's totalitarianisni, naniely, a system of phýsical 
or psychological control by use of terror. Hannah Arendt clainis that 'total 
terror' is the main component of total itarianisn185 while Franz Neumann argues 
that total itarianisin is the most repressive of political systems and its main 
characteristics are "the destruction of the line bct%vccn state and society and the 
84 N. Ilukharin. Ekonomika Perekhodnogo Perioda (Moscow, 1920) citcd in ibid., pp. 13-14. 
108 
total politicisation of society by the device of the monolithic party"86 and that 
the society "is totally permeated by political power. " 87 By this, Neumann 
means that individuals become ingested within the system as society loses all 
independence. and hence individuals become subject to control and 
manipulation more easily". It is obvious from the events of the Autumn of 
1956 that the processes or mass mobilisation and terrorisation of the society 
1'requently used by the R. Ikosi administration had provcn un prod ticti ve. Undcr 
. 16nos MiXtr's rLIle. especially from early 1960s onwards, there exists a regime 
that declares "those who are not against us is with Lls"89 and it is a regime, as 
will be discussed below, which chooses social contract -or economic 
briberýv-- to terrorising the masses. As the sixth requirement is a key feature 
xvith regards to people's lives, one may claim that KAddr's way of leading 
I lungary may not be considered to be totalitarian in the entirety of the meaning 
the term suggests. 
I Ising tile term aullimilarian sometimes used to refer to this sort of a quasi- 
permissive totalitarian administration seerns unsuitable. Since the use of the 
term 'authoritarian' by Jane Kirkpatrick in delining right-wing and Westcrn 
Bloc-member despotie reginies as opposed to 'totalitarian' which she used to 
describe lefli-xving and Eastern Illoc-niernber despotic regirnes. the term 
authoritarian is used to define right-wing autocracies thus unsuitable for 
defining KidArist reginic. 
85 See Ilinnah Arendt's The Oritains-of Total itarianism (2 cd.. Meridian, Nc%v York: 1958) for a 
detailed discussion ol'thc subject. 
86 Franz Neumann. ] lie Democratic and the Authoritarian State, The Free Press: Glencoe, 1957, p. 245. 
87 lbid.. 1). 2,14. 
John J. Schwartmantel. Structures or Power. Whcatshcaf Books, Brighton, England: 1987, p. 2 10. 
Andrew Felkay. I Greenwood 
Press. New York. New York: 1989, p. 154.. 
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Thudore. it may be argued that Kdddr's regime was totalitarian in its core, 
lio%%, c%, cr it did not comply with two important aspects of the definition or a 
totalitarian regime, hence making it a quasi -total itari an regime as opposed to 
the total Stalinist total i tarianism of Rdkosi era in Hungary. The difference in 
the implementation of the rules of the system under K6ddr's rule stemmed 
1'rom tile socio-political oýitcomes or tile 1956 uprising. Consequently, tile 
Kikkir regime was diffierent in tcrms of its foundation Crom its predecessor and 
therd'ore brought along a new kind of' socialist system to the Eastern Bloc, 
working as if* a balancing act betwcen tlic rcquircmcilts of socialist 
administration and the needs and dernands of a resentful nation. 
IV. THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY 
A. A Balancing Act: 
The system in I lungary, therefore, suffered frorn a dilcrnma of balancing 
loyalties since the beginning. While under tile rule of the post-war communist 
regime Icd by Rdkosi loyalty was to Stalin and the Stalinist pattern of 
socialism rather than to the I lungarian people. Under KddAr's rule. flic balance 
alternated in order to adjIust to the changes in the domestic front and in the 
Kremlin. The ainn in this balancing act was to secure the positions of the 
ruling elite. I lo%N-cvcr, any such changes can result in political instability that 
limits the acts ofthe ruling regime. 
RudolUra6s identifies the key domestic policy dilemmas of K6ddr regime 
through its rule ol'flaur decades as follows: 
a) accumulation of political legitimacy; 
I-CSOLII-Ce allocation, 
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c) social engineering; 
d) political stcering, and, 
e) keeping ideological liarniony9O. 
Securing regime legitimacy is the most important or these as it forms the basis 
of' tile other points. The use of sheer coercion, as proven by the Rdkosi 
experiment. is not a problem eliminator in the Hungarian case though it may 
appear to be a problem solver in the short-run. Thus, tile regime had to 
legitimise itscl f and in so by avoiding the use of slicer coercion and avoiding to 
upset the USSR administration. 
K, 'tdArism is thereflore a delicate balancing act. This issue will be addressed in 
further detail in tile flollowing parts ortiis chapter. 
B. KAdArisation: 
Charles Gati sees tile process of reconciliation in Hungary as a product of, and 
a proeess initiated by. Jdnos KAdAr and identifies it as K6ddrisalion. He points 
out that rather than perrorming structural changcs, what KAddrist regime did 
was simply to develop a set of political otýjcctivcs aimed at maintaining power 
while avoiding more vigorously ideological political prograninics seen in other 
East European countries. In due course, the reginic tolcratcd religion and 
material ambitions of its subjects as long as these sustained tile regime's 
approval by the people. The main idea was to reach the socialist nian "who is 
Unselfishly dedicated to that which is good for society, but in the meantime the 
system accepts and works with a population considerably less perfect than tile 
ideal type"' 
90 I'Okds. pp. cit.. 1). 1. 
')ICharles Gali. I lunggy and the Soviet Bloc, Duke University Press, Durharn, US: 1986, pp. 160-16 1. 
The First step or Uddrisation was the oppression of the opposition in tile wake 
of' the 1956 uprising. but tile real Kdddrist era began in the early 1960s. In 
1961. K6d, ir was able to make changes in his cabinet and remove most of the 
remaining Stalinists. By replacing them with Khrushchevite reformers, he was 
strengthening the link bctwcen his cadrcs and the Sovict administration. His 
speech at the 22"d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was aimed at 
enipliasising the negative aspects of the cult of personality, a means of 
legitimation used by both Stalin and Rdkosi. Aftcr rrceing himsclf rrorn 
suspicion. lie initiated his campaign against RAkosi, forming a commission to 
inspect RAkosi*s crinics during his reign. KAddr's position with regards to 
R-6kosi and Stalinism gained public approval, which was vital in establishing a 
basis Ilor legitimacy for Kddir's new regime. To quote Andrew Felkay, 
"KilklAr was well aware ol'the truism that the more people 
flound themselves in agreement with him, the less they would 
oppose him. With this in mind, he formulated the Party's 
"alliance- policies and summed up his approach at a People's 
Front meeting, by restoring 116kosi's dictum "Those who arc 
not with us are against us, " to "Those who are not against us 
are with us. '*... I le believed that there was no need for 
individuals to overtly proclaim their loyalty so long as they 
(lid not challenge tile Party's supremacy and tile country's 
link with the Soviet Union. lie held the view that tile regime 
must provide people with opportunities to improve their lives. 
.. ()2 
Otherwise. there would be no chance of survival for the KAddrist 
regime and of* preventing social disturbances. Even though tile main source of 
legitimacy 11or Kidar in tile early period of his rule was the Soviet military 
presence. the threat to use coercive means of the state, these alone would not 
be enough to keep the regime in power in the long-run. People needed to have 
92Andrcw Felkay. LILipply-ii-ILd 
-111CUSS-R. 
1956-1988, p. 154. 
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holic ror their ruture and needed to see that those who provoked the 1956 
evellts were removed from power. Kddir gave them both with his Neiv Course 
policy. From September 1961 onwards Kdddr removed tile remnants of Rdkosi 
regime from poN%, cr and the administration sought a peaceful coexistence, if not 
an alliance, Nvith the public. 
The next step. in KAddr's course to gain legitimacy, was to bcgh! to convince 
the I lungarian public opinion that the new socialist rcgime was different than 
the previous one and that it thought of the welfare of the public. KAddrist 
regime ainied at reaching this end was to work on the improvement of the 
I lungarian economy and ensure that every sector gained more from the general 
improvement. 
TO SLIIII tip. Uddr's reginic ticcded to brihe people to convince them to 
support the new rcginic and KAdAr did just that. With a rcalistic re- 
arrangement ol* agricultural policy, which allowed private owncrship of 
household land with Canning rights, agricultural production improved slowly 
but steadily. By mid-1963. flic 'houschold plots' wcrc producing 50% of milk, 
40% or pork and fat. 60% of poultry and egg. 30% or vegetable and fruit, and 
SLIpported 38% of the cattle while they covered 10.6% of the arable land and 
28.5'/"'o of' vineyardSO. At the same time, foreign trade was ernpliasised. and 
both trade and touristic relations with the West began. 
I'lic new approach or tile KAdArist regime showed it in political scale, as well: 
In March 1963, an aninesty was announced for the refugees of 1956, prisoners 
convicted flor their activity in 1956 uprising, war criminals -who had served 
o. vo-thirds of' their sentenccs, and rormcr Stalinists. This amnesty was to 
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demonstrate tile rcgirne*s tolerance for opposition and different thinking. An 
agreement with tile Vatican on 15 September 1964 regulated the position of 
(lie Catholic Church in Hungary. That would also contribute to the public 
perccption ol'KddAr. 
All these domestic activities, therefore, aimed at two main purposes: a) to 
develop an image of Kdddr as a tolerant, understanding and hence tolerable 
leader. and. b) to prove that socialism was not unbearable as a regime and that 
g it might even lead to sorne individual gains if one did not overtly oppose the 
system. '['here were t-wo main policies to prove these. On the one hand, the 
K. I&Irist regime was struggling against tile Stalinists and Nagy-supporters. Tile 
claim was that they were revisionists, and therefore ideologieally inapprovable. 
The I lungarian Socialist Workers' Party bureaux and Evening Schools were to 
have a 2-year special course in addition to their one-year course on ideology so 
that these points Nvere made clear in people's minds. On the other hand, 
liberalisition in tile economic and social spheres was aimed at eliminating 
dogmatist Stalinism and assuring public opinion that tile system was tolerant 
enough within the firaniework of the socialist system. 
In cillect. that mcant 'we do whatever we can, ' a message aimed at the 
I lunprian IlLiblic opinion, showing that the new administration was willing to 
make changes as long as these changes were not obstructed by the Soviet 
administration. The expulsion of Mosi and Gcr6 from the Party and the 
investigations against theni was an attempt of reconciliation. With public 
sympathy still with Nagy and his colleagues, the expulsion of the two from the 
`3E. Laszlo. oli.. g:! t., 1). 36. 
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Party aimed at showing the public that tile new HSWP administration cared for 
what happened in 1956. 
Accordingly. tile KAdArist attempts to gain legitimacy, except the first four 
years oi' firm oppression that followed the 1956 uprising, may be labelled as 
populist practices. The compromise was between a regime that sought not the 
direct involvement of its sutýjects to the fulfilment of its ideological olýjectives, 
but their silent support. The perception of support here, indeed, is in the form 
ol' not directly challenging the systern bearing in mind that full and voluntary 
co-operation is out of the question. People supported the KAdAr regime by 
remaining indifferent to who rules the land and by what ideological tendencies, 
ýNliile seeking inaterial improvements. So, a clear quid pi-o quo strategy can 
summarise the Kdddrist regime's relationship with the people it ruled as far as 
tile domestic political relationships are concerned. Surely, all this depended oil 
the developments in international politics. 
At this point, one must remember that tile Kdd6rist choice of interacting with 
the public is a breakthrough. Although the system appears to be a normal quid 
pro quo relationship within tile Western nornis of political interaction, it is not 
so in the socialist system. As discussed'previously in this thesis (see part II. A. 2 
in Chapter I'Nvo). the socialist systcrn legitimiscs itscir lot within tile 
1'ramework ol'a the i-ttlei-s and the i-ided relationship but within the framework 
of* a the nilem und the ridem relationship. That means, in the rest or the 
Eastern Illoc and in I lungary before Kdddr, tile socialist administration sought 
to legitirnise itseir vis-a-vis the bureaucracy rather than vis-a-vis public 
opinion. As the party justified itself to tile bureaucracy and vice versa, the 
system required no public intervention or public approval. What K6dAr did was 
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to after this legitimation process by introducing ordinary people's opinion into 
the general framework of' political system. This difTers Kdddr from all other 
leaders of' the Eastern Bloc, for lie is the only East European leader who 
managed to seek public approval as well as approval from the ruling elite and 
tile Soviet administration. Both Nagy in Hungary in 1956 and Dubcck in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 disrcgardcd the ruling elite's (and Soviet) approval 
and wanted to have only popular consent and Icgitiniation. The results for this 
loss of perspective was tile Sovict and Warsaw Pact military intervention to 
their countries and flicir loss of their position. Thus, Kdddr's choice of 
introducing public approval into the socialist legitimation process while not 
disregarding the role of the Party elite and the Soviet authority is the main 
rcason for his regime's succcss. 
C. The External Influence on Legitimacy: 
As cited above, in addition to the domestic relations in terms of legitimacy in 
N%hich K6dAr introduced a novel interpretation to the socialist understanding of 
legitimacy. there is a powerful international dimension to be considered with 
regards to reginic legitimacy. The legitimacy of the I Itingarian reginie, as well 
as any other E-astern Bloc country's reginic, depended on the Soviet approval 
or oic leadership in the country. Even in tile seemingly most unusual case, 
kviien Whadyslaw Goniulka was elected as tile leader of the United Polish 
Workers* Party in 1956, lie had to be endorsed by the Soviet leadership. While 
the K-6dAr reginie was to establish a feeling of trustworthiness based upon flic 
system -and not necessarily upon the leader- at the domestic level, its 
relationship with the Soviet administration was leader-dependcnt. 
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Oil tile domestic level, the post-1956 regime, populist as it might be, was not 
backing tile image orJAnos KddAr as a leader at tile beginning. Instead it had 
chosen to emphasise the image of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and 
its main aini was to prove that the Party was not against but for tile welfare of 
tile people. Oil the other hand, all the 1-ISWP performance depended on the 
approval or disapproval of tile USSR's administration. Rdkosi had based his 
rule oil the personality cult, constructing it oil tile examples of Lenin and 
Stalin. had to flee to tile USSR when his strategies collapsed. The Party had to 
be backed by tile Soviet troops to regain control of Hungary in November 
1956, however. it managed to reconstruct itselfby alienating R6kosi, his image 
and the maJor principles tile Party which operated under Rdkosi's control. Tile 
use of the leader motive. considering tile low level of approval that KAddr 
received during tile restoration period, was untleasible, and thus, tile role of tile 
leader was substituted by the Party as an agent of politics, at least for a decade 
11ollowing the 1956 rebellion. 
I lowever. as speeific leaders in tile Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) were tile representatives or different Fractions of the original Soviet 
nomenkhamw and as the leader of the USSR was regarded as the leader of tile 
Socialist World, tile cult of leadership was indispensable in that countrý. The 
change of' leadership meant a serious change of policies, and it meant that if 
Khruslichev was to stay in Moscow, he would require assurances. Tile attempt 
to by-pass the occupant-of Kremlin by Inire Nagy proved disastrous, and K6ddr 
was %vell aware of tile situation and was not to repeat tile same mistake. Hence, 
oil tile one hand, lie had to prove that the system was not leader-depcildent and 
seek ideological and systemic legitimacy at tile domestic scale, and. on the 
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other hand. lie was to admit that there was both an ideological and leader- 
dependent legitimacy in Muscovite administration and act accordingly. 
This created a dichotomy for the KAddr administration: On the one hand. it had 
to prove to the I lungarian people that the regime itself is good and on the other 
]land, lie had to prove himself to the Soviet leadership as a worthy leader. I 
narne this situation that narrowed the manoeuvring space for tile Kdddr regime 
as the ificholomy qfK&I(ii- (see sub-heading on the subject). Khrushchcv was a 
liberal compared to Stalin, but, as the 1962 Missile Crisis would prove once 
more. lie had no intention of giving up his reginie's ideals and principics when 
SLICh an act might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Consequently, 
%%hatever the Uddr administration was doing, it had to be in conformity with 
the thoughts ofthe Muscovite leadership as it lield the real power in Hungary 
through direct control or coercive forces. Hungary was also licavily dependent 
on Soviet raw materials and tcclinological know-how to sustain its industrial 
(level opmen 1. The lack of mineral resources in tile country and the apparcritly 
limited possibility of trade with the West forced I lungarian leadership to have 
good relations with the USSR, beyond ideological commitment or political 
necessity. 
KAddr had to have good relations with the USSR. Such a limitation 
on the rraniework or action for the Hungarian administration meant that it was 
bound to a po-,, %, cr outside its boundaries for the approval of its acts performed 
for the benefit of its subjects. For that reason, international rather than 
domestic factors appear to create the major consideration of policy shifts for 
the KLIýr regirne. To quote Charles Gati; 
118 
'*In early 1956 it was the anti-Stalinism of the 20th CPSU 
Congress -and Mikoyan's and Suslov's visits to Budapest- 
that made Kld6r an active opponent of Rdkosi and Rdkosi's 
Stalinist practices. In the early 1960s lie assumed a moderate, 
reformist stance only after Khrushchev's decisive victory 
over the hard-line dogmatists at the 22 nd Congress of the 
Communist Party orthe Soviet Union in October 1961. ")4 
Therel'ore. in political terms, KAddr was bound to please both tile USSR and 
(lie I lungarian public for tile political survival or both tile regime and llimsclf 
as its leader. As lie was neither a thcoretician nor a real intellectual, keeping 
the balance between the two sides was based on his negotiation capabilities 
and social bribery. Politically, that worked in tile form of liberalisation to flic 
extent that the international climate allowed, the development of simple 
populistil in the Western sense of the word. The acceptance, and even 
willingness to be a part of a COMECON agrcernent in 1962 which would 
create a division of labour among the Eastern Bloc countries is a sign of 
attempts to please both sides. Hungary was given the task of specialising in the 
proLILICtiOll ohiianullacturing goods, and production ofaluminium as I lungary 
%vas the o%viier of the third richest bauxitc mines in E. uropc. Though, it was to 
extract the niatcrial, ship it to the USSR, and then receive the semi-processed 
aluminium from there and produce goods with it; an arrangemqnt that 
contented both sides. 
Legitimation of' the systcrn was depcndent on this two-sidedncss of KAddr's 
policies. K,! dAr could. not risk a repetition of what happened under Rikosi's 
rule Ilor nationalistic feelings, but also for it would manufacture grounds for 
international anti-propaganda material for the Eastern Bloc. His close 
')4C. Gati, Wi. cit., p. 165. 
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inspection and interpretation of the developments within the Communist Party 
of' the Soviet Union (CPSU) helped hirn to have a more relaxed attitude 
towards his own nation. I le managed to use the 1956 revolution as a trump 
card against the Soviets and hcnce could afford to give greater concessions to 
Hungarians compared to other East European regimes and leaders' 
capabilities. I lis alignment with Khrushchev, and later with Brczhnev helped 
I lungarian political and economic development. When, in 1968 
Czcchoslovakia %vas invaded by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) 
troops which included Hungarian as well as other WTO members' troops, 
I lungary was implementing the first stages of its New Economic Mechanism, a 
flairly liberal attitude towards economy thanks to KAddr's good relations with 
the Kremlin. For that matter, L. Jubo Sirc points out to the differencc of the 
I lungarian system as early as 1966, when the antecedent of the NEM, the 
I ILIngarian Reform Resolution was put into effect. Sirc clainis that the 
I lungarians were "aiming at a faster rate of economic growth, while preserving 
the equilibrium of the economy, " by one-year. short-term, economic planning 
and by intending to regulate the economic processes by making use oF market 
mechanisms'l-5. Thus. the Hungarian regime, therefore, was able to introduce 
market mechanisms into the system and rcmain supported rath&r than 
penalised and corrccted by the core of the Second World. When one compares 
tile Czechoslovak and Hungarian situations, tile distinction enjoyed by 
KAdArist I lungary becomes more evident. 
At that point, it should once more remunbered that in analysing tile legitimacy 
of' any regime in E. astern Europe during tile Cold War cra, to simplify the 
[jubo Sirc. I: conomic Devolution inE-astcrn Europe, New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 91. 
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situation in terms of regime legitimacy into a matter of public approval and 
CXCILIde the international factor would be a mistake. The relationship or the 
heads ol'state in East European region with their Soviet counterparts decided 
the Fate of the East E-uropean leaders as well as the fate of their countries. I 
Nagy's nationalistic eagerness and his na7ivctd led to tile 1956 confrontation 
between the I ILIngarians a, nd the WTO member-states. Nagy's belief that if 
I lungarian administration asked, the Soviet control would end in Hungary gave 
way to the seriOLIS problems. On the otlicr liand, Wladyslaw Goniulka. by 
establishing good ties with the Soviet leaders of the tinic and at least appearing 
to he willing for compromise and consensus, managed to lead Poland until 
1970. Following the footsteps of Goniulka rather than cither Matyas R,, Ikosi 
who gave too much emphasis oil his ties witil tile USSR or Inlre Nagy who 
totally ignored this relationship and focused on populist policies, Kdddr played 
his international card right during the rules of Kliruslichev and Brezlinev, but 
lost his initiative against Gorbachev reforms since lie was too old and too old- 
flashioned to rellorni himself and his administration. 
One can also observe that Kdddr's administration has always supported tile 
I JSSR in all the foreign policy actions'orthe superpower. That helped KddAr to 
create the impression that his regime was in unison with the USSR and that 
%%hatever ideological alteration lie might pursue in the domestic level would 
not alter I lungary's support for tile USSR and the socialist cause. 
With that clear commitment to tile Soviet foreign policy objectives, lie could 
also satisl'y his country's domestic needs of -especially economic- reform. 
Charles Gati implics that his policies vis-A-vis the Soviet Union are 
reminiscent of tile 'i-ehicuml tilly' role assumed by Hungary as against the 
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Third Reich during World War 11. During the war, Hungary was allied with the 
Axis powers, but it was trying to keep the door open to the Allies and that, 
policy was called as the hinfalwfilikit, literally 'see-saw poliCy'96. What KAdAr 
did For the three decades or his rule may be dubbed to be a wiser and more 
careftillypla)edvasion of hinlapolilika. 
Yheref'ore. to gain legitimacy before the eyes of tile Hungarians without 
up%etting the Soviets was a hard task to accomplish and one which left very L- 
Cew alternative routes to (Iollow to its pursuer. The KAddr regime may not be 
simply discredited for its lack of creativity in its search or internal legitimacy, 
%%hich -was established on a quidpro quo basis. Populism and social bribcry 
seem to be the only alternatives IcIl to an administration which has to keep tile 
system going and tile USSR content. As no major deviation frorn the socialist 
principles was possible and manifest use of force to control the masses proved 
to be a 1111ilUre. what Uddr did is the only rational way to keep the sumis quo 
alive. 
D. The Economic Dimension: 
Under the circumstances described above, tile Uddr administration had to 
provide a considerable imprownient'in the lives or the I lungarian people in 
order to accumulate the support it required to keep the domestic side of the 
balance working. Offering prosperity in exchange for superficial political 
support in the form of remaining indifferent to the political order's structure 
and ofengaging in no open opposition activity was the main proposal of the 
Kikk1ir reginic. MdAr aimcd at exchanging economic prosperity for political 
Gati, oll. cit., pp. 169-170. 
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indifTerence rather than for straightforward support. For that reason, Rudolf 
"I'lik&s argument can be adopted. TWs argues that: 
"Kild5r's main social policy objective was the amelioration 
of the regime's congenital illegitimacy through the 
transformation of tile non-clitcs' conlingeni compliance with 
the party-state's watered-down ideological expectations and 
key policy outputs into consensual support; or, failing that, at 
least into passive toleration of the political milus quo. For 
this reason, terms such as "informal understandings, '* "(id hoe 
trade-offs, " and "protracted non-institutionalised bargaining" 
seem to be more accurate descriptions of the operative 
characteristics ofpcople-regirne relationships in tile KAdAr era 
than is "social contract""97- 98 
The regime sought to maintain the slatus quo in intra-bloc relations while 
providing growth in the economy and hence prosperity. This may be taken as a 
realistie goal ora regime which had bad experiences with over-ambiti oils goal- 
setting l'ollowcd by economic and political problems. 
In ideological terms, K66rism may be taken as an understated social contract. 
The creation orthe socialin man was not a priority or this regime as foresecri 
in the socialist ideology. Instead, its main priority was to keep social peace and 
order in tile society. ir one takes tile main aim or a social contract as 
establishing the stability and continuity or tile regime that is in power instead 
or reaching a highly philosophical aim such as to reach the stage or 
communism and creating tile socialisl man, then, KAddrisni is a proper social 
contract. It managed to survive for more than two decades. It provided tile 
most free breathing space in Eastern Europe for intellectuals, either of regime- 
9711. ToWs. 2p. cit.. p. 119. 
" Rudolf TOWs is not the only person who dislikes to use the tcrrn 'social contract' to brand the 
relafionship between the Hungarian people and those who rule it. C. M. llann labels the process as 
'Kidilri%t social compromise. ' to give an example (see, for instance. Hann's 'Introduction' in C. M. 
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supporting or dissident kind. Tile Kdddr regime provided an economic recipe 
to inake I lungary tile most competitive and most compatible economy with the 
West aniong tile Second World members. 
The two most important features of the KAddrist economy's differences from 
its E*ast European counterparts were the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) 
programme laUnclied on I January 1968, and the late 1970s' so-called secon(I 
econono, initiative. Or these, the rormer was aimed at developing the national 
economy and hence increasing national prosperity. The latter, wilen tile first 
failed in late 1970s, was to convince people that they could acquire extra 
earnings through moonlighting. The NEM was to prove the socialist system 
%vas capable of' sustaining the prosperity or its sulýjccts while tolcrating 
individual economic ambitions. These were meant thus to provide the regime 
with some relative public support that it began to lose due to economic 
Cai I ures. 
The New Exononlic Mechanism, introduced on I January 1968, was aimed at 
responding the needs ol'a foreign-dependent economy. The NEM foresaw the 
replacement of tile 'S ovict-style plan directives of the I lungarian econonly with 
market relations aniong firms, the litilitation of ccntral pricc determination; a 
link between domestic prices of exported and imported goods and the world 
market prices: and. decentralisation of a major part of investment decision09. 
Fhe ref'orm programme was radical to say tile least by Socialist Bloc standards. 
To achieve his goal of implenicnting the NEM. KAdAr had to convince Leonid 
I lann (ed), Market Economy and Civil -Society 
in tfuniZary, Frank Cass Publishers, London, England: 
1()90). 
'"Bela Balassa. Rerorming the New Econornic Mechanism in I-lunp-na, World Bank StafT Working 
Papers no. 534. Washington. DC: 1982. p. I 
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Brezhnev that Hungary was and would remain a socialist country and that 
problems peculiar to I lungary would need solutions peculiar to Hungary. In a 
period of intra-alliance conflicts and of the Arab-Israeli War, Brczhncv was 
convinced and accepted, ir not approved, the NEM. Thus, Hungary became the 
first country to adopt senii-capitalistic measures to deal with its economic 
prollIctils. 
I'lic I lungarian administration's willingness to support the Soviet intervention 
to Czechoslovakia provided greater Soviet approval of the NEM, and the 
rellorms went on until mid-1970s. From 1968 to 1972, the Hungarian economy 
grew with an annual rate of 6.2%. The long-standing price subsidies were kept 
even under the NEM to prevent a high increase in prices. In the meantime, the 
I lungarians had begun to purchase product licences from the West so that they 
could sell the goods produced with the new know-now to the COMECON 
countries. The intra-COMECON division of labour also helped the country's 
industry to mass produce such material as the Ikanis busses which served. the 
Soviet Bloc. 
I lowever. the other socialist countrics' leaders, as well as conservatives in the 
I ISWP were against the reforms, and, by mid-1 970s, KddAr was isolated in the 
del*ence of the reforms. The managers of large enterprises feared lest things 
Nvent wrong. The trade unions saw that the peasants and small private 
entrepreneurs were getting bctter-off while industrial workers' real wages 
decreased. Some members of intelligentsia opposed the reforms as they 
thought the economy was taking precedence over culture in the country. With 
this politically influential opposition, the NEM began to slow down, and then, 
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with tile 1974 Oil Crisis, came to a haltIO0. What Hungary had, then, was a 
rigid command economy unable to cope with the serious world oil crisis. By 
the end of' 1970s, the economy was in dire straits as the gap between'the 
domestic and international market prices widened, government preferences 
came before market necessities, and foreign debts grew. 
On the one hand, the problems of the N EM+9, as C. M. I lann recognises, were 
I 
not dircctly domestic in natUre and coincided with the developments, positive 
and/or negative, in tile international economy. I lann observes: 
"In a small Country such as Hungary, very much exposed to the 
international econonly, at every stage in the reform process a great 
deal has depended upon trends in tile wider economy. The initial 
euphoria surrounding tile reforni was considerably influenced by a 
Cavourable external coqjIuncture. The faltering of growth in the 
later 1970s was partly due to the energy price crisis or the 
decade. "I'll 
On the other liand, as Marlon Tardos observes, there was a very important 
domestic clement in the problems faced by the NEM systern. According to 
Tardos. tile probIcnis arose both from the structure of tile socialist systern and 
the unwillingness for rcrorrn within the ruling elite. Tardos claims that: 
-Those who uns,. verwingly pursued nationalisation after 1945 
resisted to any reform measure of the system for a long time. 
Moreover. no comprehensive reform was made until the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) was introduced in 1966-1968. 
Then. too, tile change was focused oil tile management of 
state and co-operative enterprises which were, in practice, 
vei), similar. Substantial freedom was offered to these 
enterprises. but tile so-called 'market-like' regulation 
remained under tile bureaucratic state hierarchy dominated by 
party bodies. .... [T]he NEM constrained tile increase of [the 
1'"'A. ['elka). ýT. cit., pp. 230-236 passim. 
I'll C. M, I lann, Introduction in C. M. 11ann (cd. ), Market Economy and Society in Hungary, Frank Cass 
Publishcrs, London, England: 1990, p. 6. 
126 
private sector's] share, and limited its activitY to small-scale 
III-OLILICtion and the scrvice sector. "102 
In 1978 and in 1982, new measures were taken to prevent a total collapse of 
tile I ILIngarian economy. Foreign trade balance was in serious imbalance, as 
were production. productivity, and the individual income levels. The loss of 
the economic edge brought along a legitimacy crisis for the Kiddrist. 
government. The severity of' the economic crisis nicant that Kdddr regime's 
ofTcr in exchange ol'peacerul obedience to the reginic, was no more available. 
Such a situation placed the fragile legitimacy or the regime in jeopardy as one 
of' tile two bases flor the regime's legitimation of its raisons d'&rc was lost. 
Soviet anned muscle might be a deterrent capable of suppressing any form of 
social unrest but would be unable to prevent the materialisation of social 
unrest. Thus. from 1982 onwards, 
'*the reginle allowed a limited libcralisation under the slogan 
of*mass participation'. First within the Soviet bloc, Hungary 
introduced compulsory multi-candidacy in parliamentary and 
local council elections, gave regional administrations greater 
political and financial independence and relaxed, to some 
cx1ent. controls over tile forming of voluntary associations. 
State-owned ministry-run companies were handed over to 
boards ol' directors and workers' assemblies. New sorts of 
business initiatives -Such as tile 'contract shop' scheme under 
which individuals could hire franchises frorn state firms, or 
tile enterprise 'economic work collectives' (VGMKs) were 
permitted. "103 
These changes were the steps to create the so-called second economY which 
WOUld permit individual workers and peasants, as well as small entrepreneurs 
102 NVirton Tardos. "]Iie Property Rights in Hungary. ' in J. Matyas. S. Kovacs, M. Tardos (eds. ), 
Rel'ounLand TransCormation in Eastern Europe, London: Routledgc, 1992. 
1113Stephen Noti. 'I lungary AfIcr KAddr, ' The lVorld Today, v. 44, no. 8-9, pp. 128-130, pp. 128-129. 
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to cam greater sunis of money in exchange of moonlighting or working extra 
hours. 
The seconil econonij, had two main legitimacy-rclated features: Firstly, it 
helped people to accumulate a considerable amount of income which 
sometimes would exceed the related person's wage by tenfold. Therefore, a 
sense of' prosperity continued to exist despite tile worsening of the overall 
economic situation. Moreover, tile econonly was profiting from the surplus 
value produced in tile extra working hours. These would contribute to the 
reginie*s image orprovider of wealth and prosperity. The second aspect, oil the 
other ]land. was ail indirect contribution to the regime's legitimacy: 'File people 
%Norking indiVidLUIlly to provide their household with some money gradually 
shirted rroill having a class-consciousness to individLialisnlIO4. The extent of 
individualism might be cillarged to covce the household or tile working person 
or his or her workniates in moonlighting hours. However, the individuals 
working in tile secontl econonij, lost tile social bond with tile members of tile 
same social class or social environment. Although one would mainly relate this 
individualisation to industrial work, Nigel Swain points out that the 
encouragement of the so-called 'household plot' during the last years of the 
KAdilir regime created in alternative, agrarian second-ccononly which'enabled 
private. that is family as opposed to corporate, co-operative, farming. an 
1" Dr. itilia Szalai. Hungarian sociologist and the head of the Max Weber Institute in Budapest, 
emphasised the cll'cct of second economy in the society in the interview I conducted with her in 
Budapest on 16 April 1996. Dr. Szalai argues that social alienation of individuals and the loss of the 
'we-feeling' within (lie society have their roots in the second economy. She clainis (lie rise in material 
ambitions is brought along by the concept or second cconorny and this has affected the balance of the 
society by limiting. ir lot ell'acing For good, the social side or individuals. Prof. Joszef Bayer of the 
EIAT lh; iversity and Dr. Gabor K'OrOsi or the KTI Institute ill Budapest supported her argunlent ill tile 
interviews I conducted with thern oil 18 and 19 April 1996. 
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practice Car less common in Czechoslovakia of the time'O. I. The Roman 
principle (fivitle el impera, divide and rule, is still a strong policy and thercf6re, 
while people flocuscd oil their personal or family interests, they spent far less 
time in order to judge the legitimacy of the political system. The fact that the 
NNorking 11OUrs were considerably extended through the second economy 
initiative contributed to the flact that people had materially no time to deal with 
politics. 
V. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE KADAR REGIME 
A. The Beginning of the End: 
Despite the flact that people had less time to spend on politics -partly due to 
tile qUaSi-social contract labelled as the 'Kdddrist social compromise' by C. M. 
I lann-. developments outside the country forced changes in the domestic front. 
Changes in the international background, especially policy changes or bloc 
leaders 11orced changes in tile position and relationship models of tile 
subordinate states. Important events in the Soviet Union, namely the 
Afghanistan campaign of tile USSR, tile mplacenicilt or Lconid Brczhnev after 
his death by Yuri Andropov in 1983, and Andropov bcing succccded first by 
Konstantin Chernenko in 1984 and then by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, 
creatCd first a wave or uncertainty in the Soviet political scene. *ri, csc 
developments ai'llected East European, then European and World politics in a 
great extent. Later oil. these changes led to a new and fairly radical economic 
, and political rel'brin programme in tile USSR From late 1986 onwards. 
Under 
such conditions. once tile foreign intervention disappeared or seemed to 
11'5 Nigel Swain. 'A. gricultural Restitution and Co-opcrativc Transformation in the Czech Republic, 
I Wngarý and Slovakia. * Europe-11shiStudies, v. 51(7), 1999, p. 1216. 
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dis, ippear. there Nvere not many alternatives to be taken by the I ISWP to retain 
its %% eak position oflegitimacy before the eyes of the I lungarian public. 
The struggle of tile succession now was apparent in the Hungarian political 
sccile and it was now between three main groups; the conservative wing of the 
I ISWII. tile rerbrin-seeking wing of tile IISWII, and, tile dissidents. The final 
outcome was the loss of MdWs leadership position and then the 
dismemberment ortiic i iswp. 
As a restilt ol'all tliese, cliange in the IISWII cadres becaiiie iiiiiiiinent. Jänos 
K, Id. Ir %vas removed from office and was appointed to tile honorary role of 
Part), presidency at the special conference or the I-ISWP in May 1988. In the 
same congress and tile following Central Committee session, 37 new members 
joined the I 09-member Central Committee. These changes meant tile removal 
of' not only KAdir but also most of the influential figures of tile KAdAr 
administration from orfice and the beginning of a new administration in line 
with tile requirements ofthe new Soviet administrative policies. 
January 1989, there was a clear division between the rerormist and 
conservative wings of' the IISWII as well as a dramatic increase in tile 
opposition to the single-party systcm. Political organisation capablc of running 
candidates in a possible forthcoming election -such as the Alliance, 'of Free 
Democrats. tile Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Siliallholders Party- 
emerged. Oil 14 January 1989, the New March Front attempted to establish 
communication between tile I-ISWP and the newly formed parties for the first 
time. This attempt was followed by tile acceptance of a multi-party future 
political environment by the I ISWP on II February 1989 and tile formation of 
the Opposition Roundtable oil 22 March 1989 as suggested by tile Forum of 
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Independent Lawyers. The Opposition Roundtable comprised of eight political 
organisations, namely the Alliance of' Free Democrats, Alliance or Young 
Democrats. the Sniallholders Party, the League of Democratic Trade Unions, 
tile Hungarian Democratic Forurn, 11ungarian People's Party, and tile Social 
Democrats. Tile summer of 1989 saw the establishment of the National 
Roundtable talks and the acceptance of decisions concerning the regime 
change. The end or the IISWP rule canic in the wake of the National 
Roundtable talks and by tile spring of 1990, Hungarians were voting in multi- 
pally. 11IL11ti-candidatc elections for the seats in a multi-party parliament. JAnos 
U&Iir %%ould not see the new era of multi-party liberal democracy as lie died 
on 6,1uly 1989106. 
B. Tile Dissidents, The Roundtable and the Transformation: 
To clairn that tile opposition in tile country appeared as a result of tile changes 
in tile USSR would be just ovcrsiniplirying tile scene. The changes that took 
place in the USSR and lience in tile Soviet attitude towards tile East European 
states and their administrations have galvaniscd tile opposition movements in 
I ILIngary as elsewhere in tile Eastcni Bloc. Tile opposition, though suppressed. 
"as in ever present 'I'orce' in tile Hungarian systern. Based oil the 
chronological path or three-tier party scheme lie makes use or, Rudolf TAds 
analyses the role of the opposition. the dissidents and their inipact in 
III. Ingary's 'negotiated revolUtion'107. lie invests ail important role in tile 
political, acadenlic and literary elite or tile country in respect of the transition 
I"(, Nigel Swain- I lum-, arv: The Rise And Fall Of Feasible Socialism., pp. 18-23 passirn. 
107 Ruioi Kiss sees the process somewhere in the middle of revolution and reform, and, based on an 
idea ol"Tinio(h), Garton-Ash. labels the transformation as 'refolution, ' as it is a hybrid of reform and 
revolution. It is basically the same as TiAds' 'negotiated revolution. ' See JAnos Kis' 'Between Reform 
and Revolution. ' in East Eurolvan Polilics antI. Socielies, v. 12 (no. 2, pp. 300-389), on the subject. 
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tO 111LIlti-party democracy. because these were the members of the non- 
governmental party in the roundtable. 
TiUs groups tile dissidents into three categories: a) those supported by tile 
reginic. b) those whorn the reginic was indifrerent to, and, c) those takcii as 
illegitimate and had to be suppressed by the reginne. 
Those Nvho Nvere supported by tile reginle were generally high-level members 
(it' the nomenkhmaw. economists, scientists and non-party intellectuals who 
championed tile reginic but criticised it for being not patriotic enough or not 
too much in flavour or the Party, and their runction was in a way to sustain tile 
legitimacy of the reginic. Thcir contact point was flic high-rank party 
authorities. 
The tolerated dissidents were after human rights, religious autonomy, greater 
artistic Frecdoms, and supported a lirt on censorship. They were retired party 
offlicials. high and medium status intellectuals, and those non-party elite who 
had good connections in the Party. Their contact was either with tile proper 
authorities or with unauthorised recipients like the foreign media. 
The suppressed dissidents, on the other liand, consisted of low status 
intellectuals with no Party connections, youth. rcligious activists and former 
political prisoners. These were asking for a regime change, the withdrawal of 
SO%, 'iCt tI'OOPS fi-0111 IlLingary, in effect following Inire Nagy*s legacy in their 
way. These organised strikes, printed samiatals, directly connecting with the 
people and were organised under multi-purpose groups, unlike the previous 
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two which were acting cither on individual basis or in small, objject-oriented 
1,,. roLii)sl()x. 
Dissent. according to '176k6s. changed its shape in tinle and began to irritate tile 
administration in an increasing manner. 'ne shill of majority of dissident 
movements From the first group to the third as tinic went by created an 
atmosphere of intolerance in the government nnd hence greater suppression 
bcgaii to appear. TOUs tries in Ilis book to create an image or oppressive 
regime against the dissidents, howcver fails to firmly back his argument. lie 
mentions the 15 March 1988 demonstration and tile police intervention to it as 
an example of the suppression. lie claims that while for years the 
demonstrations were seen as a sort or peaceful marches of high-spirited high- 
school and university students, in 1988, the police intervened and lience 
oppression is observable. On the other hand, lie seenis not to mention that the 
Ud6r reginic. from 1972, the first ycar of 15 March nationalistic 
demonstrations. till 1988 had not intervened by using force. Therefore, one 
may think that tile tolerable nationalistic youth might as well transilorm itself 
with the help or some agitators to a suppressible group or dissidents. His other 
examples of' the suppression of dissent are not very convincing either. The 
point seems to be an attempt to exaggerate the sufferings of the dissid6its who 
wcre at tile end sharing tile same negotiation table with tile IISWP 
apparatchiks, rather than providing an objective overview of what happened. 
TiUs claims that especially from 1986 onwards, dissent has begun to be 
perceived as a 'hostile' party rather than a tolerable 'opposition'. lie states that 
the dissident groups were from then on taken as a force threatening the 
ll', 4 RudolfTiUs. SN)-. -Cit.. P. 
170. 
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regime. fully collaborating with Western powers, namely the US, and with 
each otlicr"I". I Ic mentions such sainizdals as tile special issue of Beszýlij of 
inid-Jime 1987 which began with the message "Kdddr Must Go! " as an 
example ol'organised democratic opposition which was powerful enough to 
see Minos KA&r leave his post of Party leadership in a year's time. The 
paniphlet liad cotiie aller tlie change of preiliiersliip in tlie country, and there 
WOUld most certainly be greater changes within tile I ISWP cadres, including 
most possibly J6nos K66r. Therefore, to clairn that tile ideas mentioned in tile 
samizdat %vere influential is not exactly the best way of commenting on the 
situation. especially when one considers the new policies adopted by the USSR 
concerning the East Europcan involvement ol'tlle country. 
R)Us, perhaps deliberately. I*ocuses mainly and solely on the internal political 
debates and developments or Ilungary and never mcritions the international 
environment which let the dissidents to become a strong opposition and a 
ma jor factor in I lungarian political life in the second part of' the 1980s. Tile 
lack or introduction or the developments in the international environment that 
SUrromided the change is a rnýjor flaw in his theory, because all of a sudden, 
the dissidents sceni to get more and niore powerFul and take control without 
any considerable changc in the domestic political scene. flowekr, had 
Brezlinev or his two immediate successors been still alive and had Mikhail 
Gorbachev been a member of and not the leader of the Soviet Politburo, none 
(if' the changes in the- Eastern European region were likely to happen, at least 
not at the same pace. Gorbachev's dual policies of Peresimik(i and GItisnost 
and his ambition to replace tile leaders of tile subordinate states to the USSR 
P"' pp. 173-200 passim. 
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created the impact that led to the change of Hungary's as well as any other 
socialist state's systems. The absence of intervention by the Soviet troops and 
the USSR*s willingness to renovate the East European regimes and its 
adoption ofthe Sinatra Docirine gave way to tile National Roundtable -ralks of 
1989. 
At this point. one must ngte that Gorbachevite rel'orms were different Crom the 
previous attcnipts at relorming the communist systern. According to Pcter 
NI'll-cuse. 
"The beginnings or the transition from real existing socialism 
in most ofthe countries of Eastern Europe were led by those 
who saw themselves as reformers of socialism. Even in the 
heydev ol* the strongly centralised state-run systems of 
production and distribution, in some cases out of pragmatism, 
s with 'goulash communism' under Kaddr in Hungary, in 
others out of a concern about failures in tile centralised 
economy. as tinder Khruslicliev in the Soviet Union.... With 
perestroika. it was different. Gorbachev. ..., flor instance saw his clTorts as 'encroaching on socialism, but only the 
socialism that was built bureaucratically, tinder which the 
countrv vecred off tile path on which it had embarked in 
1917. ': ' 1() 
I'lius. Gorbachev*s attempts at changing tile Soviet society as well as tile way 
Fastern Furope was administered, both in ternis of politics and in tcrms of 
ccononly, lailed to overlap with the general understanding or ref'orT in the 
Second World and led to a period of surprise in which the East European 
leaders belonging to the old guard did not know what to do. The success orthe 
1989 - 1991 reflornis and revolutions lies partly in the new a'pproach adopted 
by Gorbachev. This can bc seen, for instance. in I locricckcr's insistence on 
11cler Marctise. 'Privatisation and its Discontents: Property Rights in Land and I lousing in the 
Transifilin in Eastern Europe, ' in Gregory Andrusz et al. (eds. ), Cities After Socialism: Urban Change 
Lfljjsýt in Pom-Socialist Societies, Blackwell, Word, England: 1996, p. 149. alit] C( 
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staying, in power. and in KAdir's inability to react to developments. The role of 
(Yorbacliev in the process is therefore paramount. 
TiUs observes a transfiorniation in KAddr's perceived image following the 
route or reinctuni liosiage in late i 950s, risk-laking reformer in 1960s, and 1he 
goo(I kilýq in the 1970s which would be transilornied into eifficeble(I autarch by 
the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, Kdddr was a tired and nearly scnile leader 
incapable orflast decision-making and his only ability was to change people in 
the Politburo and to try to keep the economy afloat with great amounts or 
roreign (. Icbt. Thus. tile end of tile KAddr administration gradually took place 
I'ronl rnid-1980s onwards. This gradual decline is reflected in the fivc-stage 
evolutionary scheme by'1'8kds: 
a) the collapse orthe KAdArist centre form April 1984 to November 1986; 
h) the advance of' bureaucrats and technocrats to high posts. from December 
1986 to June 1987. 
c) the Karoly Grosz campaign, rrom July 1987 to March 1988; 
(1) the conservative counter-mobilisation to prevent Grosz's replacement of 
KLU'ir. 1roni November 1987 to March 1988; 
c) the negotiated succession, from April to May 1988111. 
This gradual process or Kdddr's loss of control in the country created a 
vactaim through which reflormist ideas were able to penetrate into the I-lSWP 
management. Karoly Grosz needed progress in tile economic reforms lie had 
begun to implement in his premiership. On tile other hand, he had to struggle 
to keep his leadership position against tile Reform Socialists in the IISWP. 
Throughout the 1980s then, with power shifting from tile centre to the 
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periphery in the i-earguard fashion, tile rise of dissident formations as strong 
political actors became unavoidable. 
Fhe benel Marics ol'the Party's adoption or a rearguurd position can be sited 
as tile state bureaucracy, tile interest groups and policy lobbies, and, indirectly 
the citizens of I lungary. In the rearguard mode, the state bUreaucracy was 
more independent. %%hile civil associations kept growing. Therellore. a greater 
degrce or political Freedom was available for the citizens. 
Fhe change in the Party cadres, the rcplacciiient of the old guard by the new 
nanics such as Laszlo Marothy. Matyas SzOr6s. Gyorgy Adzel, Rezs6 Nyers, 
and . 16nos Berccz in the partly free elections of 1985 resulted in tile 
strengthening ol'the rellormist wing in the timp. 'rhe new forces gathered by 
(lie bureaucracy. regional-scale party organs. organiscd intercst groups, 
politicised intelligentsia are all domestic factors influencing the changes in tlic 
domestic political climate. However, these changes were strengthened, ir not 
ignited. by international developments. For instance, tile rise of tile 
independent social groups from mid-1980s onwards nlay be linked to tile 
relaxation in the Soviet attitude towards such social activities. 
In the domestic level though, to claim that the dissident groups and the 
independent civil associations may be seen as descendent of the latý 1960s 
and 1970s nlay not be too wrong. As Terry Cox and Laszlo Vass argue, there 
is a loose link between the tradition of rcrorm and the emergcnce of such 
groups. The development of fully sentient and functional political 
p. 272. 
137 
organisations Nvas possible only by the end of 1980s'12. This connection may 
lie extended to include the relationship created between tile dominant and 
subordinate parts of the society in Hungary. The legitimacy of the regime in 
I ILIngary Nvas special to that country within the general context of tile Eastern 
1310C. 
By the end oi' 1988, there were twenty-one new or recently founded political 
Iissociations which identified themselves as societies, leagues, associations or 
171-onts. Nvith tile exception of tile Independent Sniallholders Party (SlIP) which 
promptly chose the word 'party' which was usually associated with tile IISWP 
and hence ývhich was quite unpopular'13. These formations would lead to the 
creation ot`6 political parties until the Opposition Roundtable that would begin 
oil 22 March 1989. The participants of the National Roundtable that would 
begin on 133 June 1989 were the IISWP, these aforementioned 6 political 
parties. 11bur policy lobbies. Four social groups, and an observing organisation. 
I'lle transfiormation was strengthened by the beginning or the withdrawal or 
Soviet troops 1rom I lungary on 25 April 1989. It continued when the 1ISWP 
surrendered its nomenklanit-a rights to the Wmeth government on 8-9 May 
1989. the death of JAnos Kilddr on 6 July and the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum (I IDF) candidates' election victory in the by-elections or Jýuly and 
August 1989. 
The National Roundtable or 14 June-18 September 1989 was a crucial 
breakthrough 11or regime transformation, and thcrcrore, a unique and successrul 
112 Terry Cox and Lasz1o Vass. 'Civil Society and Interest Representation In [Jungarian Political 
Development', dourna/ qfCommunisl Studies aml Transilion Politics, vol. 10, no. 3. p. 16 1. 
113 Indelmident Smallholder party claimed to bc the offspring of the pre-communist SIIP and thcrcforc 
adopted 1he name to show the political continuity. 
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process towards denlocratisation of the system as a whole. The Hungarian 
National Roundtabic had coilccrns beYond regime change as it sought to make 
the transition to multi-paily competitive politics as easy and as painless as 
possible. 'rhis situation secnis to be peculiar to Hungary as the domestic 
political conditions differed frorn other East European countries due to 
different approaches in the regime, - subject relations and in legitimation ortbe, 
regime. For instance. the Polish Roundtable was merely an attempt to prolong 
tile stay ol* the Communist Party and or Jaruzelski in power, and not a 
gathering ainled at casing the tensions or transition to a new political systern. 
011 7 October 1989 at 22: 24, in tile second day of the 14th Congress of the 
I ISWP it was annOLInced that the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party ceased to 
exist. The declaration also announced the establishment of the ncw Hungarian 
Socialist Party which was to host the Reformist wing of tile party in the new 
multi-party systcn1114. This announcement canic nearly a montli after the 
National Roundtablc -agrcenient's signature. This act shows that, unlike in 
Poland and many other East European countries, the ruling party was not to try 
to fight to the end and accept to be conquered, but would re-shape itself and 
fight Im the domination of tile system under diffierent conditions. So, tile 
importance ol' the negotiations may be linked to this -very well calculated- 
decision ol'the Communists. 
V1. THE KADARIST LEGACY OF HUNGARY 
TO SUM tip. I lungarian political structure presented a different environment 
compared to other East European states in its transition to democracy. The 
basic reason for tile diilcrcnce is the political peculiarities of the Hungarian 
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state due to the 1956 uprisings and its consequences. The events that took 
place in 1956 have created a need to have a diversion from the orthodox 
Stalinist method of legitimation through coercion. rhat forced the Hungarian 
leadership to pursue different methods or legitimation. Due to tile fact that 
there was no possibility of creating a more liberal political environment 
because ol' the conditions the international environment dictated. ref'orms in 
(lie cconomy which would make up for the loss in political freedonis were 
used to legitimise the reginie. 'nic introduction of economic liberties sustained 
the lormation of indcpcndcnt civil -associations -such as flic student or 
prollessional representative groups- and permitted flic formation or a kind of 
civil %ociety background. Oil tile other hand, tile second econonýi, initiative 
caused a I'amiliarity in public towards tile liberal economy and hence eased the 
economic transition to an extent, at least in comparison with the other Eastern 
Bloc conversions into C-apitalism. 
The National ROLIndtable or 1989 may also be taken as a major and unique 
evcilt in tile East E. uropean trans rorniat ion. During tile National Roundtable, 
both the I ISWP and the opposition were willing to reach the aim of a least 
troublesome transition to a multi-party liberal dcniocratic system. 
A fler 1956. the I ISW P sought a sort or economic legitimation. It atteiilpted to 
be perceived as a provider of economic bencFas to its subjects unlike any other 
Eastern Bloc communist party. However, when the economic policies of tile 
Parly failed, it had to gradually retreat to a rearguard role, letting the dissidents 
gain greater political control. The Party then tried to shift the image or failure 
into other parts of tile state mechanism and tried to disengage itself from tile 
'47. 
140 
stale mechanism. Thus. the HSWP under Kdddr's rule tried to be a defender of 
its subJects" economic beilefit, and when things began to go wrong. it tried to 
save its popularity by shilling the blame on sonic other part of the state 
mcclianism. 'I'lle same policy may be seen in tile political scene as tile message 
given by the I ISWII was that it could not engage itself in political reforms as it 
would jeopardise the economic frecdonis gained due to very hard persuasion of 
the Soviet authorities. 'rhc HSWP therefore was giving messages or being 
restricted in both its relations: In the domestic Icvel, the message was that the 
I lutigarians were to be satisfied with what they are granted in ternis of 
economic benefits as in political sphere the IISWP's actions were seriously 
finlited by tile USSR. Oil the other hand, tile message given to tile USSR was 
that the liberal econornie attitude was a must due to political reasons as tile 
I lungarians have shown that they were not much pleased with tile Communist 
rule in 1956. 
The changes in (lie USSR during the second part or 1980s created tile grounds 
l'or both sides to putting more pressure on Kdd6r and his administration as the 
USSR was willing for more political concessions and the Hungarians were 
unhappy with the state of the economy which began to collapse at the end of 
1970s. The rise or the political opposition was due to econornic failure hs well, 
and as the IISWII had lost its main tool of legitimacy as well as its 
international raison d'ýIre in the rorm of a barn-dog ror the USSR whosc 
actions would be permitted as long as it played its part proficiently, to stop the 
change Nvas not possible anymore. 
Hie nc\v leadership of the IISWP thercrore, From nlid-1988 onwards had to 
find a way to reform the credibility of the Party, reform the economy, and find 
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new gl-OUIRIS of legitimacy for itself. It failed in all these aspects. The National 
Roundtable discussions and the dissolution of the Party were therefore the only 
sensible way to go as it might give a chance to the I-ISWP or its derivatives to 
seize po%Ner once again -as it happened in 1994-. A new rcgime with new 
grounds of' legitimacy was needed after the failure of KAddr's legitimation 
processes aller flour decades of work due to social bribery to a great extent. 
New institutions, new policies, new political rules and a new period of 
orientation Nvere the elements the new political order needed to rind an 
alternative to the KAddrist social contract115. Thercrore, the future of the new 
political order depended and depends on how it deals with tile KAddrist legacy 
of' I lungarian political system As will be discussed in Further parts of' the 
thesis. a decade after the fall of the communist regime in Hungary, MdAr's 
political legacy still afTects political developments in the country. 
115 The attempts to instittitionalisc and ideologically rcshapc thc new systcm will bc discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5. respectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIETY, INSTITUTIONS, AND CHANGE IN THE NEW 
HUNGARIAN POLITICAL ORDER 
1. CIVIL SOCIETY, CHANGE, AND LEGITIMACY 
A. Discussions On Civil Society Under KAdAr: 
vile concept or tile secontl society and that or political dissent in the KAdAr era, 
especially 1rom mid-1970s onwards, was taken as a sign of the existence or 
civil society in I Itingary. Observation of the events that took place in thc wake 
orthe letter or intellectuals supporting the Czechoslovak Charta-77 movement 
and of' the socio-cconomic conditions forcing the implementation or tile 
secon(I cconomy / seconcl sociely concept into the I lungarian system, led to 
discussions oil the existence of civil society in IlUngary. That the dissident 
movement in the country grew and formed what were to become the legally 
illcgitimate parts of tile National Roundtable Discussions, and that the 
systemic transformation took place in a politically more advanced manner in 
I lungary than its East European confederates. are two points supported by such 
aUthors as It. TOWs. J. Frentzcl-Zagorska, Oleg G. Rumiantsev and David 
Beetham. who. based on these two points, argue that civil society existed in 
I IL111g, 11-Y bellore the transfiormation to democracy. 
'ro analyse the existence or non-cxistence of civil society in prc-transitional 
I lungary. especially during tile late 1970s onwards, one has to focus primarily 
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on the definition or the term civil society. Only when one clearly defines the 
concept and understands its implications, a discussion on the existence or non- 
existence ol'the concept in the KAddrist era can be shaped. 
B. A Definition Of Civil Society: 
Civil society. as a concept, has a variety or definitions. These diverse 
definitions of civil society may however be reduced to three groups. Civil 
socict), nicans: 
in the Weberian sense, a world or interests (such authors as Locke and 
I legel who preceded Weber are to be incorporated into this group as well); 
b) in a Gramscian sense, a rendition of the society as the suni of all social 
groulls and connections which are independent oF the state at institutional 
IeN el. and. 
0 as a nan-mcd-down political concept, tile purposeful sell'-organisation of 
socially active lorccs' 
16. 
I I'onc combines tile second and the third propositions. and takes the concept of 
civil society in a neo-Gramscian understanding, that is. if onc takes civil 
society as a "structure of the self-organisation of society, located outside, 
though not disconnected firom, the institutional framework of the statc, "I 17 the 
definition ol'ci,, -il society becomes clearer. Civil society results in the'creation 
of' the normative structures which define group identities and interests. 
Morem, cr. it has to present a link between tile members constituting tile 
society and its past, its traditions, and its normative and hicrarchical valucs of 
social behaviour. It Fulfils, based on these two points, the tasks of inspecting, 
116 Oleo G. Rumiantsev. Trom Conrrontation to Social Contract, ' East European Polifics and 
Societies. v. 5( 1 ). Winter 199 1. (pp. 113-126) p. 114. 
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controlling. and criticising state policies on all sulýjects, and, if necessary, 
(IcIlending the interests ol'the society against tile statel 18. 
011 the one hand. therefore, civil society means a restriction on the power of 
the state as an entity. It constitutes an obstacle to the state so that the state will 
be Iorccd to linlit its control over the whole body of social activity. On the 
other hand. civil society, nlay also stand for a composite of self-orgallised 
social Foci within tile society through which people can work collectively to 
sol%c problems or to channel them to the organs -usually within tile state- 
N%llich may solve thern. 
In all descriptions of the term 'civil society', there is a common set of required 
elements so that civil society would runction. These are: 
a) z za iiial-k-et ccolioliiy. 
b) independcnt media of communication and information, 
c) sources or expertise which are independent orthe state but which provide 
experlise on all governmental policy issues, and. 
d) a network of'voluntary associations in all areas of social life' 19. 
Of these, the cxistcncc of a market economy provides the freedom of 
ctiterprise and ol'choice. The existe6ce ol'cxpert organisations inspecting the 
government provides an objective look at the deeds of tile state and of the 
ruling political order or government. The existence of voluntary organisations 
in all fields sustain the availability of political choice and of the right to 
choose aniong difreront organisations. The existence of independent media, 
117 Janina h-ciltzel-Zagorska, 'Civil Society in Poland and Ilungary, ' 56viet 9udies, v. 42 (4), 1990 
(pp. 759-777), p. 759. 
I IN Ibid.. pp. 759-760. 
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and fi-cedoni over communications and the ilow information enable the 
expression of' the Frcedoilis of thought and or spcech and the unccnsored 
COIIIIIILIIIiCatiOll or ideas. The state's role in the creation of civil society is to 
cnable the lwo basic Crecdorns. that is. the frcedorn of association and the 
freedom of'speech so that civil society may truly function. 
C. Civil Society and 'Second Society' In KSdArist Hungary: 
As one may induce 1rom flic cxplanations above, civil society appears to be 
capable ol' existing only under a liberal democratic system which comes with 
1'reedoms of spcech. inflormation. association. and, 1'rec elections. Without the 
presence ol'the basic constituents ora. liberal democratic system, i. e. open and 
accountable governnicilt, free and fair elections carried out on tile basis of 
universal sulfrage, civil and political rights, and a democratic society resulting 
ofand based oil these, the cxistence of civil society may not be claimed. Ergo, 
in lhe light ofthe parameters of the definition ol'civil society described above, 
a communist civil society may be labelled as an oxymoron and tile Kdddrist 
I ungary may not be considered to have a civil society. 
On the other liand, one lias also to bcar in mind that tiic concept or civil 
socicty discussed from tile beginning of tile section is based on the West 
Furopean - North American model of society and political order. Tlýercforc, 
the concept defined above is not at all times applicable to tile conditions of* tile 
East Furopean states within tile Cold War context. 
Hungarian sociologist Flemer Ilankiss addresses this issue in his study 
COIILILICIC(I ill 1987 and published ill 1988.1 lankiss proposcs a model ol'second 
I 1'ý David Beetham and Kevin Boyle. Introducing Dernocrac , UNESCO-Polity 
Press, Padstow: 1995, 
pp. 107-108. 
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sovioy to bridge the gap. Instead ora separate and fully functional civil society 
system as understood in tile Western sense, lie proposes a two-tier social 
organisation. In this. the first society represents all that has been rcalised by 
the ideology-sanctioned model, that is, in tile East European case, the socialist 
system. The second sociely thercrore becomes in I-lankiss' view all that is 
outside tile structure or the first society. Tile secon(I society therefore, would 
he lilade up ol': 
a) a. second economy, which is private economy which is either legal or in the 
Conn of*black market, 
b) ail alternative public opinion as a result of illegal/underground media 
operations. 
c) a second Culture including sub-cultural groups as hippies as well as religious 
groulls. 
(1) a second social consciousness which preserves and develops value systems 
dii'llcring fiviii those of dic statc, and, 
e) a secomi set or socio-political interactions including opposition activities, 
citizcn initiatives. and a network of informal relations in professional. 
religious and other groups. 
I lank-iss clainis that these would give rise to the rormation of interest groups 
%%hiCh Will 11,1%'C influence on the policy-niaking in the country. flankiss 
conchides that a secontl society which may be all East European alternative to 
the Western concept of civil society does not exist although activities exist ill 
ill I the I ive areas lie proposes. I [is reason is that these activities never suril up 
tO COnStitUte a grouping capable or proposing a different set or paradigms to 
those pi-o,,, -ide(I by the first society. Ile concludes that the cilicrgence or civil 
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socicty in I lungary in partiCUlar and in Eastern Europe in general is obstructed, 
but may emerge in fimcl2ll. Thcrerore. it can be claimed that Hankiss takes 
I ILIngarian second society as a quasi-civil society which may either be 
cate,, oriscd as a subgroup or civii society or something that has the power to 
evolve into the form orcivil society in time, rulfilling A the rive rcquirements. 
Follo%%ing I lankiss' I ist of requirements Forthesecondsociqy but avoiding his 
conclusions which were premature as expressed in 1985 in tile prc-Perestroika 
period. one may claim that the concept of seconct socielj,, vaguely described as 
al I activities beyond the economic and social control or uie totalitarian regime, 
constitutes the equivalent of civil society in the Western sense. As in a 
totalitarian political order there is no political discussion nor possibility for tile 
public to have any control nor inspection power over tile deeds or the state 
administration, the concept of second society, as a network of economic and 
socio-political activities and of religious, traditional and of national values 
which normally are unauthorised by the communist system, serves as a 
substitute as close as possible to the concept of'civil society. Andrew Arato, 
%N riting on the Polish civil society activity in 198 1. argues that civil society in a 
communist system may be SLIMIlled tip as what is uncontrollable by tile state 
apparatus. Ile also points out that tile two ways that civi I society might change 
the social structure in Eastern European states during the Cold War era were 
blocked. The first. lie claims, was the revolution from below which was 
unlikely to take place after the 1956 experience in Hungary (see part ILB 
above on this matter), with the only possible exception of one such revolution 
in the imperial cciltre itself, in this case, the USSR. The second nicans, Arato 
Mý. ciL, pp. 766-778. 
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proposes. is the reform movements implemented from above by the rulers of a 
country and sees, with the exception or Hungary, that this option was blocked, 
aller the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Arato then claims that a third way 
is possible as shown in tile works of Kolakowski in 1971 and of Michnik in 
1976: Partial yet structural reforms from below. Instead of an 'all or nothing' 
approach. the ordinary people were to ask ror improvements in flicirsocial life, 
living standards, working hours and such, and to form organised structures to I- 
obtain these. if possible. The Solidarity movement in Poland which insisted 
that its main aim was to improve the rights and working conditions of the 
Polish workers and that it had no political ends (in January 1981) can be seen 
-is an example of such an attemptl2l. 
Following Arato*s argument of the third possibility, one may claim that 
I'Olalld. Czechoslovakia, and Hungary arc the three Soviet Bloc countries 
where a Nort ol'secoml sociely emerged and developed into an East European 
version ol'civil society. In Poland, the Solidarity movement and its followers 
confronted the ruling political order in an openly political, confrontational 
manner with collective action and organisation. The aim was to change the 
state structure by nicans or reform from below which would give way to a 
structural change at the end. The Polish example of second socictý / civil 
socict), therellore is a political and visible scheme, especially after tile tOLIgll 
stand the Polish government took against tile Solidarity Movement. When tile 
ganisation gained structural legitimacy in the public despite its illegal nature, ort 
it became an alternative Nvay orexpressing political needs of the Polish people. 
121 Andrew Arato, 'Civil Society Against The State: Poland 1980-8 W Telos, no. 47, Spring 1981 (pp. 
23-47), pp. 24-28 passim. 
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The Solidarity movement has also benefitcd. from charismatic legitimation by 
the influence ol'its leader Lech Walessa who becanic a symbot for the Polish 
struggle against the communist total itarianism. 
In Czechoslovakia, political activities were concentrated in the actions of tile 
intelligentsia especially after the Spring of 1968 events and the reign of terror 
that l'olloved it. Unlike Poland, no popular movement with strect 
Licnionstrations or industrial action took place to disturb the ruling political 
order. The main concern of the dissident intelligentsia was the issue ofliurnan 
rights and to case tile tight control the administration applied in the wake of 
Sprino 1968. 
On the other hand, in I hingary, based on the need of* the administration to 
negotiate to gaill legititilacy, and based oil the recollections or tile popular 
memory on the 1956 uprising. a compromise was SOUght and reached. From 
carly 1960s onwards. as Janina Frentzel-Zagorska observed, critical but not 
01111OSin, " ilitelleCtLials asked for economic reform from above, and only in the 
I-ate 1980s voiced their wish for political reform from above as well as further 
liberalising economic rcl'ortilsl22. CiVil society in Hungary in the intellectual- 
political sense therellore consisted' of the intellectuals who sought the 
continuity (if the regime through rerbrillation. 'rhe idea or lcgitimacý of the 
regime flor the I Imigarian intellectuals therctlore lied upon tiie success or tiie 
reform programmes in tile ficid of economy as tile external support made tile 
overthrow of' the regime impossible. As a result, I believe that, although 
dismissed by Arato and others as a revisionist, this compromisc-based system, 
the transaction bct%vcen the I lungarian ruling political order and the I ILingarian 
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PLIblie. despite being based on econornic reform and the improvement of 
econonlic libcaics most or tiie time. constitutes an example of the third 
possibility to change the systcm. 
Likewise. as excrnplificd by the introduction or the secoml economy idea in 
late 1970s and by many other reforms from the top which preceded it, the 
belief of the ordinary people and not only of intellectuals that the political 
order is legitimate was a primary objective sought by the Kdddr administration. 
What Uinos K, i(lAr wanted to have was a sort ol'social contract which would 
bind tIIC public not to rebel against the ruling political order, but which would 
not on the other liand bring any unbearable burdens for the administration. 
Thinking in ternis or Western i ilterprctat i oils of the concepts or social contract 
and ol* civil society, the idea that a unilateral social agreement appears not to 
be a prool' [Ior tile existence of civil society. Oil tile other hand, in a system 
Wicre the state has a selr-declared legal legitimacy and is tile oninipotent 
political power-holdcr. and where the institution of communist part), is 
interchangeable Nvith the state apparatus, an authoritarian agreement may be rl 
(1111)bCLI as a social contract and the pLiblic (consisting of'ordinary people and 
intelleetuals alike). taken as a side to this agrecrnent, may be understood as 
assuming a part ol*civil society. 
In such an agreement. "the citizens will rcIIOUncc certain liberties, il'thc state 
NOI guarantee them a stable rise in the standard of living"123. In I lungary, what 
happened since tile cild of tile 1950s was that Kdddr -always sought to reach 
compromises if* not agreemcnts. The system was restrictivc towards a social 
jj 122.1anina 1'rent/el-Zagorska, pp. it., pp. 772-773. 
12-1 (i, Iýtimiant%ev, W, cit.. p. 12 1.. 
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contract based oil mutual political compromise as proven by tile events or 1956 
and with the presence of the external element of regime legitimacy. Ergo, 
instead of' a social contract based oil pure political terms, KAdAr proposed a 
series ofecononlic contracts with some political concessions implemented in 
bet%%cen economic liberties. The public would have a better living standard 
and the I ISWP would have undisputed political authority (for post-coi u ist n ITI 11 
implications orthis Kdddrist social contract, see below)124. 
The existence of such a system, despite the ract that the government was 
immune rrorn public inspection by either tile means or some extra- 
gox, crnmental organisations or by the means of firce elections. created the 
ground flor civil society in KAddr's Hungary. However, the limits on the 
runctions and oil tile sphere of influence or this society is a matter which 
requires further analysis as it gave rise to both the dissident movement which 
became the opposition in the interim to democracy, as well as to the main 
problem orthe K6d6r administration that I brand as the Dicholom. y of KtUit-. 
D. The Dichotomy Of KAdAr: 
The post-war Hungarian political order was based oil a Stalinist constitution 
and despite all the reforms which were carried out after the 1956 uprising, the 
s) stem continued to be a Stalinist system in essence. The KAddr administration 
oil the one hand had to give or appear to give concessions to the public. oil tile 
other hand it had no external credibility to afford to refibrill the system from 
top to bottom. The regime, as observed by Josef Gorlice, invited people to 
124 1 lowevcr. this never means that the state never gave political concessions. The very basic example 
that a Depariment orSymbolic Logic was set tip and then replaced the Department of Dialectical Logic 
in the I Iniversity or 
hudapest h4iý' 1980s (see Janos Laki and Katalin Ncurner, 'Past Continuous: 
Philosophy in I Itingary Before and Aller the Political rurn, ' Shidies In E(isl EuropeaiiThoiýizhf, v. 5 1, 
1999. p. 2.47) shows stich a trend in politicsas well as in economics. 
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C011111,11-C tllC I ILIngarians* situation with the populations of otlicr East European 
countries and this WOUld lead to a conviction that Hungarian society was -a 
richer. more dynanlic, reasonably Freer society in comparison to othcr societies 
in the same situation. The Ilungarian state permitted "a significant range of 
indiVidUal freedoms, especially in the field of economics, but it was not 
allm%im, the essential questions or power and strueture to be brought into 
question -a strategy of granting concessions without rights as JAilos Kis calls 
it"125. 
In cach and every possibility that the international duties of the Hungarian 
ruling regime would permit, reforms, especially in the field or economics, 
were granted. The aim of' the KAddr administration was above all to avoid 
social complexities and a conrrontation with tile publiC126, thercrore it granted 
NNIlat would be tile bascs of socio-cconomic development Ilor the exchange of 
social obedience. 
I lowever. as there Nvere internal balances to be considered. namely the issue of 
obtaining in intra-party legitimacy which would enable the ruling cadres to 
remain in power. some compromises were suspended. For instance, tile 1968 
economic relornis were withdrawn in 1972 to silence the hard-line communist 
opposition within tile IISWP. The return to repression over the dissident 
intcliectual took place in 1972-73 period as several dissidents %vere expelled 
from the I ISWP and sonic distinguished members of Budapest intelligentsia 
like Ferenc Felier. Ivan Szclcnyi. and Milialy Vajda were forced to emigratc127. 
12ý Jowl' Gorlice, 'Introduction to the Hungarian Dcmocratic Opposition, ' Berkelcy Journal Of 
Sewiologv. v. 31.1986. (pp. 117-167), p. 117. 
12' 1bi 1). 118. 
127 jbij.. p. I lo. 
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The cancellation of some reforms and tile hardening of the administration's 
approach lowards dissident voices were reflections of the personal fears of 
Midir and his close colleagues for the rate of their prospective positions 
against the Muscovite administration. imiddr was to compromise too much in 
the eyes ol'the Soviet administration at a givcn time, lie would be replaced by a 
hard-liner. or another 1956-style military intervention could take place. On the 
other hand. il'the KAddr administration was to totally ignore the public wish, 
then another uprising might occur. 
Ergo. oil the one hand. K6ddr had to satisfy the wishes and orders of the Soviet 
regime. and on the othcr hand. the needs and deniands of the I lungarian public. 
I lie Klickirist compromise was granted From the top with no apparent demand 
1'rom the below. because the demand from the below would only be too vocal 
to be limited to donlestic scalc only. On the other hand, KAd6rist 
administration was unable to disregard the terms and conditions or tile 
compromise with the public, as it was a quid1ro quo sort of politico-economic 
contract with the I lungarian public. I brand the situation that Kdddr suffered 
durhig the balancing act of' various internal elcments by competing groups 
%Nhile maintaining a lidelity to the USSR and preserving tllc stalus quo, as the 
PicholoinY (? fKddcir. 
The dicholomy of' K(Uir is the essential building stone or tiie sullus quoist 
policies ldoptcd and implemented by KAdar during his 32 years reign as tile 
I ISWII*s supreme figure. These policies acted as preventive devices for the 
establishment ora Solidarity-like movement in the country-with the claims that 
I lungarians were in a far better situation compared to other East European 
pcople. 'I'lic KAdArist dichotomy prevented on the one hand the KAddr 
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administration to impleincrit truly and thoroughly comprehensive cconomic 
and soeial rellorms, yet on the other hand prevented the formation or a strong 
opposition to go beyond the symbolic acts or the underground artists calling 
themselves tile hiconnu and who organised unofficial art exhibitions in privatc 
apartments128 or bcyond tile attempts to change the political order bY tile 
vinbourgeoisemew ol'the Hungarian society. 
Due to the %ticcessrul impleniciltation of Uddrist legitimation tccliniques 
based on the qui(Ilwo quo strategy, the communist system survived in I lungary 
until the great change in the world political structure in late 1980s permitted 
greater structural change in individual countries of tile Soviet Bloc. Tile 
change was to remove some restrictions in respect or the freedom or speech 
and ofcommunication. notably after the general aninesty of 1985. The change 
caused political activity in the country to expand. ne switis quo KddAr tried to 
prescrve hence becarne tile slahis quo anle, this resulting in Kaddr 
administration's loss ol'Iegitiniacy. Kdddr was unable to ofrer fui-ther changes. 
Flie political environment that created the Dicholomy (? f KtUir kept Jdnos 
KA(Uir in power flor 32 years, bUt because of tile existence of' this dichotonly, 
tile same KAdAr had to leave office. 
11. THE EFFECTS OPCIVIL SOCIETY' 
A. Two Perceptions Of Civil Society: 
Civil socia-v was dcscribcd abovc from Elemer I-lankiss' point of vicw. 
I'liroughout this thesis, in order to be more identifiable, tile term 'civil sociely' 
rercrs to the scctors orsociety which are not. by definition, inseparable parts of 
the state realm. that is. which are non-political parts of the society outside tile 
12K Roger Scruton. "I lie New Right I nCentral Europe, 2: Poland and II ungary. ' PoliticalSimlies, v. 36, 
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policy -making process. Although there are a variety of definitions concerning 
cil'il sociel-r. the above definition seems to be accurate in terms or dcscribing 
the Functions ol'civi/ socie(v. 
Whatever description is extended to the concept, civil sociely is perceived in 
two precise manners by two difrerent schools of thought vis-A-vis its 
relationship with (lie state. The two schools consist of the Hegelian and Nco- 
I legelian school on the one hand, and the Scottish Enlightenment school on 
the other. The I legelian and Neo-Ilegelian approach to the subject of civil 
socioy is based on the claim that state and civil sociely are two different and 
adverse entitics and cannot co-cxist. Hegelians. and aniong them those such as 
Gramsci. think that when one of the two sides has a loss. the other grows 
-stronger as one is the complete opposite of the other. On the other hand, 
Scoltish 1-iflightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith were argLlillg that state 
and 001 sociely, may and do coexist and are actually parts or a whole rather 
than two opposite sides or a conl1rontation129. Therefore, while cither the state 
or civil socicty has a loss, both sides lose, or when one has a gain, both gain. 
While the political change in Southern Europe and Latin America might be 
used to support the I legeliall vision of civil society. Ilic Past European and 
post-Sovict transformation rrom mid- I 980s onwards is more on tile side of the 
Scottish E-rilightenment approach. The changes in the existence or credibility 
of' one part or the equation, for instance a change in the living standards 
towards better or worse, may have direct indications oil the public perception 
1988. (pp. 638-658), p. 647. 
12'1 Krishan Kumar, 'The Evolution or'Society: A Darwinian Approach, ' in C. M. Hann (ed. ), When 
In Rapid Social Chang. Complexity and Creativity, London, UK: The !_ Kl 
Athlone Press. 1994. pp. 25-26. 
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of the new political order. The development of civil society agencies may 
contribute to the public acceptance and approval of the new political order or 
diminish the strength of a negative response up to a certain extent. 
Willi (lie historicall background of tile second socieiy which dominated the 
I IMigarian social life from 1970s onwards, it is possible to claini that the 
I lungarian people Nvere already practising sorne soil of non-governmcrital, 
social organisation. Although there is an ciement or familiarity with the second 
economy and the second sociely. wlictlier thesc two coiiccpts wcre supporting 
or hindering the formation of a post-communist civil sociely nceds to be 
discussed. 
B. Is The Second Society a Civil Society or a Proto-Civil Society?: 
The Kad-, Irist social contract was based on the provision of a better standard of 
living in comparison Nvith other East European nations in exchange of political 
obedience. or rather depoliticisation. Tile diminishing economic benefits of 
Udilr's New Economic Mechanism in the mid-1970s led to the widespread 
organisatio n or %Nhat would later be dubbed as tile second economy, a concept 
%Oich was present since tile early 1960s. With the simultaneous existctice of a 
secondImblieslAem which covers the illegal and serni-legal publications like 
the sumblal. it was characterised by Elemer Hankiss who branded the whole 
ol'this set ol'social networks as the secoml sociely. Ilankiss' idea of second 
sociely comprises of' a combination of a second econonty, second culture, 
second social consciousness, a second level of social networks which made up 
11 111(), 1(Ilitllie %%,. 1101e130. 
131) Susanne Klausen. Tirst Society, 5econd sociqv: Mutual Discontents. Interview with Elemer 
I lankiss. ' Eit. %/ Europetin Reporter, vol. 3(l), November 1987 (pp. 63-65), p. 64. See Chapter 2 for a 
Further discussion and explanation or I l. ankiss' idea of second socie(r. 
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I lowever. as the second sociely is a derivative coneept, that is as it is a concept 
N%hich Nvas created to Ilind a solution to the shortcomings of thefirst sociely 
NNhich was the lcgally legitimate, socialist socicty existing only at tile official 
level and within the I ISWP and the bureaucracy. its merits as a quasi-civil 
sociely are disputable. In the last two decades or tile KAddr administration in 
Hungary. the mzýjority or tic people who were eligible to work were 
participating in the secon(I economy and a considerable part of the 
intelligcnisia Formed tile segment in the society I lankiss rerers to as tile second 
sl)here (? /* I lowever, Im tile former was not directly interested in the 
latter*s activities. one may not possibly clairn that there was a civil sociely. at 
least in the mak- ing, in the late-Kdd6rist I lungary. As Elenicr flank-iss observed 
inan interview in Nomliber 1987: 
"ITIlie nizijjority or tile population lives a more or less 
negative existence. By that I mean that they in fact do not 
really participate in tile "first society*s" political, social or 
spiritual litle. They do not live from the values of tile first 
society and these values have no influence in their lives. 
People are neutral or indifferent towards these institutions but 
they have been unable to develop new ideas. values or 
institutions. Nor does the second way of lille offer attractive 
conditions flor tile vast majority. The seconcl sociqy as a 
whole is placed in a difruse socýal position. It is twisted and 
distorted, but with a core structure which resembles proto- 
institutions or proto-mcchanisms, but which in this quasi- 
legal posture cannot be used as a model for a new social 
sysicin. In this glictto-like condition it cannot evolve into 
anything truly healthy and dynamic and attain a larger 
significance. Hence. I do not believe that in the future we can 
expect a realisation of tile second socielj% Oil the contrary, 
... it would completely 
disappear were tile first society to 
denlocratise. -131 ' 
131 lbid, 1). 65. 
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I lankiss' rctilarks point to the fact that the second society as a concept is an 
aftempt to an alternative culture within tile pararnetcrs of the state socialist rule 
'Ind not a form of civil society in the making even before tile opening of tile 
s), stcm to the en'cct. -, of dernocratisation. Albeit the existence of dissident 
groups and illegal or scmi-legal publications such as in swnizdca, the public 
involvement in tile political level of tile second sociely is negligible. That is 
(hic to the nature ol'the KddArist social contract and the social bribery which 
was a part ol'this social contract. 
When one looks at the formation of tile non-governniental organisations and 
other civil sociely components in the post-communist era, one can see that 
these organisations rcilect to a great extent the non-political nature of tile pre- 
(Icniocratic society . 
in I lungary. I lowever, there are elements in this generally 
depoliticised environment which may be linked to a more politically oriented 
segment ol*the seconclsociely. 
C. The Roots of Politicised Civil Society in KAdArist Hungary: 
Within the Gorbachevite international political framework of d6tclite and 
against tile backgrOUnd or gimnost, politically oriented groups emerged in , L_ 
I ILIIlgll')' Within tile SeCOII(l SOCiely. These groups may even be considered as 
tile possible ancestors or a post-communist Hungarian civil sociely. These may 
also be dubbed as alternative cultures in the Western understanding or tile 
N%ord and these have Four main foundations: a) tile minority groups who fought 
to keep their national identity such as the Gypsies and tile Jews, b) 
environmentalists and urban conservation groups vv'ho were. politicised as their 
conservationist demands clashed inevitably -and deliberately- with the 
government's policies oil industrial development, c) members or tile political 
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dissident groups who published material in the sainizdca format, or published 
and circulated other illegal or senii-legal newspapers, journals, and magazines, 
and finally. d) tile general public who in fact were not involved in politics, but 
Nflio Lire a party in the Uddrist social contract and who therefore expect 
economic benclits in exchange for political indirfcrencc. 
Fhe first 1%, vo ofthese rour categories are legal as there was a right to organise. 
I lo%ý. ever. while tile national minority groups were truly interested in 
prescrving their social/national identity within the I lungarian state which was 
in essence. at least in the ideological level, universalist, the environmentalists 
and urban conscrvationists had a further political agenda: As to criticisc tile 
administration oil ideological-political grounds consisted a crinle even in the 
loose glasnost atmosphere. to voice environmental conccrns and to claim that 
the administration had no interest in the environmental health or its population 
was a means of discrediting the administration without apparent political 
involvement. Besides. since the 1956 events have created a cautious public 
response to political-ideological agitation, the voicing of seemingly apolitical 
concerns werc likely to receive more public backing. The environmental 
campaign to prevent tile constrLICtion or tile Bos (Gabcikovo)-Nagyniaros Dam 
011 the 11LIngarian-Slovakian border has been a lively issue of clikussion 
aniong the I lungarian public. The debate which began in 1983 continued with 
the emergence of (lie Danube Circle, an organisation which did not ask Im 
permission to organisC and which replaced tile legal ly-establislied Association 
for the Protection of' the Danube ItCgio, 1132, and continued into the post- 
1.12 Gyula Denes, 'The Politics or Environmental Protection, ' Eas/ European Reporter, vol. 2(2), 
Spring 1986 (pl). 4-5). p. 4. 
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C01111MIniSt cra'3-1. This was pcrceived as a political campaign to discrcdit the 
I ISNVII government without a real political involvenictit and creatcd interest in 
the generally apolitical Hungarian public over the issue and over the 
misconduct or tiie I lungarian communist regime. The Danube Circle became a 
succcssl'ul public rclations cause of the Hungarian dissident movement as it 
managed to gather five thousand people to dcrnonstratc against the Bos- 
Nagyniaros Dam in May 1988 while in September 1988 it arranged for a 
massive florty thousand people-strong dernonstration urging the suspension of 
the construction work. Although the attempt failed at the moment, the Miklos 
Neincill government suspended work on tile darn and tried to cancel the 
pl-() J eCt134 
Formations vvhich supported a social, as well as a political cause filled the gap 
bowecii Ilic sccond and the third groups. For instance. tile Social Coninlittce 
flor the I loincless (SCI 1) which emerged in early 1989 and which supported the 
cause ol' the homeless but which rerused any homeless person to enter the 
committee as a member because it was an organisation "llbi" the homeless and 
not -ol- the homeless. It was run by intellectuals, "it was a social nimcnient 
which used demonstrations and petitions, it was a movement. fi)r rather than of 
its target group: it Nvas ready to discuss with the [Budapest m6liicipal] 
comicil...: and finally it achieved reSUItS. "13.1 The SCI I, therefore has become 
an organisation attempting at politicising the Hungarian pcople, howcver it 
lacked the political nature of the third group. The Tenants Association formed 
133 I-amas I'leischer. "I'lle BILIc Danubc, ' East European Reporter. vol. 4(2), Spring 1990 (pp. 78-80), 
1). 78. 
1.1-1 Ijill J, omax. 'The Strange Death of 'Civil socicýv' in post-Communist Hungary, ' Journal (? f 
Communism Studies wid b-ansilion Politics, vol. 13(1), March 1997(pp. 41-63), p. 45. 
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in 1988 N%as a similar movement. These groups, helped in some central issues 
like environmental protection and housing problems, but in the long run, werc 
limitcd in scale and scope and could not reach tile mqlority of the population 
and wcrc helped by the post-Gorbachev atmosphere or greater understanding 
as %kell as abusing it to harass the ruling regime. As they were short-lived, 
issue-orientcd. and. had a secondary airn as wearing out the administratioWs 
already sinking popularity. they cannot be mentioned as a group on their own 
but as a niche between the politicised activists and the overtly political 
dissidents. 
The third group in the communist era alternative culture formations consists or 
tile polideally active dissidents. These published material as tile sand-dals or 
other illegal or semi-legal newspapers, journals. magazines, held opposition 
meetings. 11ormed political groups and attempted to politicise tile nation. Such 
samizdats like the Beszelij and Val& I helped the members of this group to 
spread their ideas and create an intra-clite discussion forum outside the reach 
ol' the oll-teial control and censorship. The members or this group, however, 
tire themselves members of' tile intelligentsia who are outside the decision- 
making Cli(jUc but within tile boundaries of intellectually influential part of the 
society. This group is made up of students, philosophers, teachers, members of 
acadenlia. economists and other political ly-incl ined profcssionals, and, by 
definition. they are not mcnibers of the common public in general. Their 
higher political awareness and their comparatively higher living standards - 
despite tile gradual decrease in the living standards ol'the academicians which 
LIS C. (;, vickvance. 'Environmental and I lousingMoveinents in Cities After Social ism: The Cases of 
Budapestand Mosco%v. * in G. Andrusz et al. (cds. ), Cities After Socialism, p. 252. 
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continues N%, cli into the post-communist cra- put these into a different position 
ol' relationship with the power-holders as the members of this groups arc 
potential powcr-liolders themselves. 
Onc major difflerence between tile intelligentsia in this third group and the 
ordinary people in the fourth group is the former's ability to negotiate with the 
ruling class oil a philosophical - ideological basis. While the KAdArist social 
contract was an exchange of economic benefit or relative economic freedom 
with political obedience. the intc1ligentsia. asked For intellectual fireedoni. 
Thcrellore. they were not part or the Kdddrist social contract. The censorship 
and a lack of' 1ree expression of thought, and not the econornic hardship, were 
the main problems flor tile intelligentsia,. In tile nicantime, tile general public, 
the parts of the socicty which arc outsidc tile definition of intelligmtsia 
identilied their nuýjor probIcnis as those issucs conccrning evcryday lire such 
as the rising prices. the lack of needed consumer goods in the supermarket 
shelves or the lack or financial ability to arrord these. ir we keep this in mind, 
it is arguable that while the dissident part of the intelligentsia carried out 
activities to dellend the intellectual rights and freedoms in Kdddrist Hungary. 
the main support to thern came from the public when the economic 
inconsistencies of' tile communist administration began to undo tile 
'depoliticisation in exchange for economic benefits' equation. 
The best example for the differences of the intellectual dissident approach and 
the ordinary citizens" understanding of the UdArist regime is the youth 
movement Diah; gus. It emerged in the 1980s as ail organisation or young 
secondary school pupils. It Sought nuclear disarmament. The leaders of 
Diah; gus attempted at keeping their distance firom both the government and 
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the intellectual dissident class for they thought Di(ih; gus was in fact a legal 
organisalion. working tinder the guidelines set by the KAdAr administration. in 
the end. the I ISWP disagreed and Dial6gits was disbanded in the wake of 
threats over the educational Futures of the members and of pressures both on 
the members and their parents'-16. The organisation, unlike tile 
environmentalist organisations stich as the Danube Ch-cle, did not receive any 
assistance 1'rom the dissident circles who thought it was just an offspring ol'the 
KA&Irist establishment's brainwashing campaign. 'rhe Western equivalents or 
such an orgaili sati oils showed no interest either for it remained unnoticed due 
to the lack ol'a famous figure in its leadcrship cadres. 
Thc indifference of the Hungarian intelligentsia towards such an 'innocent' 
organisation as the Dial6gies shows that thcre was a gap or understanding. ir 
110t 01' trust. between the intelligentsia and the general public. The 
intelligentsia's relusal or the existing social contract under the Kdddrist system 
and their negative attitude or ti, ose who abide by its rules, and the general 
publiCs general indifferctice to the pcrils the dissident intellectuals race, 
created this gap and kept it alive. It was only when tile dissident intellectuals 
begail to make use or the economic decline as flicir nicatis of communication 
%Nitil Ilic gcncral public that interaction between tile two sides really, I began. 
. 
From then on. that is from mid-to-late 1980s onwards, a popular mobilisation 
against the rLding political order emerged. Hence, only from that point onwards 
one may reller to the existence of a nation-wide pscudo-civil society with mass 
participation. 
136 ttLid_, p. 44-45. 
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D. The Reform Proposals: 
In order to enable civil socieýv to function properly in its liberal democratic 
seilse. tlie reloriiis souglit aller by tlie Ilungarian intelligentsia liad to be 
carried out. With the transfer of some segments of political power to the 
public. with economic liberalisation and with public participation into policy- 
making process tip to an extent, civil sociqv might bUrgeon in the KddArist 
I IL111"ary. I lowever, as tile members of the dissident intelligentsia were and are tý 
by definition a marginalised minority of the society. the efforts towards 
creating the environment suitable for the establishment of civil society 
components came into existence only when tile economic requirements forced 
political change in the domestic scalc and when the international political 
environment pumitted such changes. 
As Csaba Oombar and Laszlo Lengyel observed in their 1986 article, tile 
changes came not rrom the activities of the intelligentsia to create a haven of 
ilItClICCtLial Freedoms. but from the negative response frorn the general public 
towards the lack orcommitment. to the economic causes of the Kdddrist social 
Contract: 
'I'lic common denominator is that until now there has 
been no political reform. 
The reason Im our uncertainty are as Follows. From the 
OLItSel. we have witnessed not just rellornis with an economic 
content, bill we have also seen how since the late 1960s the 
activit), or higher political organs involved in direct econornic 
management have been transrormed institutionally. .... 
But 
wc have noticed that quasi-political alternatives have been 
constructed.... And what is important, a start has been made 
in institutional nictarnorphosis. .... Quasi-interest 
rcliresentation organs have emerged, which are ill part no 
longcr transmission belts for tile central organs of state and 
party. Ilaillautonornous, half-independent ecorlornic areas 
have come into being, notably the private plot, ancillary 
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industries, small enterprises etc. and these have not been 
integrated into any kind of hicrarchical political order. The 
mass media pursues the propaganda or success, but even if it 
does so with great unevenness, it is developing gradually 
towards an all but open, almost critical, here and there 
independent European-type of autonorny. "137 
The main catalyst which enabled the formation or a pscudo-structure of civil 
sociqv in I lungary, therefore, is not the political efforts or the first three 
groups which, aller all, were minorities in terms of dcrnography and social 
class structUre. but the economic discontent of tile masses with the ongoing 
econoniie decline proeess. The members of intelligentsia who published the 
sanlizdals were also aware of tile situation and in tile late 1980s, tile economic 
element has become their main point of argument, rather than the political 
freedoms iSSLIe. 
In Ame 1987. a group of intellectuals who were gathered around the satilizdat 
Bes: elij published a programme titled Tonditions lor a Political Renewal'. 
I'his manillesto pointed out to the fact that the reluctant public consent era was 
over due to tile consequences of econonlic decline. Its authors attacked the 
KillLU11-iSt social contract as a negative consensus reached between the Kdddr 
administration and the Hungarian people which resulted ill the granting of 
small sacrifices by (lie state instead of large-scale social, political and 
economic rcrorm. The programme foresaw that there arc three ways out of the 
crisis situation ror Hungary: a) a series of campaigns to 5trengthen the 
nationalistic. ideological or racial feelings through mass mobilisation and 
relocation of' populations like in Rumania; b) a widespread economic 
137 Csaba (j()jjib, ir and Laszlo l, cjj_gycl, 'it May Be..., ' Easl European Repwier. vol. 2(2), Spring 
1986.1). 10. emract firom the authors' atlicle titled IOn the Queslion of Social Worm' published in 
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liberalisation programme which would change the economic environmcnt 
dramatically while tile single-patly dictatorsilip would rcmain intact likc in 
South Korea: or. c) a social contract which would replace the existing 
4consensus* with tile participation or all layers or the society. The first 
condition flor the realisation or tiic last possibility was Jdnos KAdAr's Icaving 
his post as the head ofthe state and or the administration13.1. It is interesting to 
sce that tile first alternative was. up to an extent, adopted and used by tile 
I 11,111g, 11-4111 Democratic Foruill government dUring the First post-communist 
parliamentary term. the second alternative failed during the later stages of the 
communist rule in the country, and the third way was actually adopted as the 
basis ofthe National Roundtable negotiations of 1989. 
A second group ol'ititelicctuals which might be described as nationalist-radical 
110PLIlists and N%ho were within the ruling clique or tiie communists, nict in 
Lakitelck in late Septenibcr 1987. During flic niecting, Inire Ilozsgay, tlic 
leader of tile People's Patriotic Front (PIT). made a speech stressing on the 
problems (if' the state apparatus. With the participation of twenty-two 
iIIICIleCtUalS. thC PIT' had already issued a reform proposal titled 'Turning 
Point and Rellorm' which was published unauthorised in the March-Junc 1987 
iSSLIC or tile samizdat IfinnoncM. This manifiesto accused tile staie or 
establishing a monopoly over tile sources ol'inflormation and thcrcrore creating 
mishil'ormation on the condition or the I lungarian econonly. This claim was 
based on tile assumption that most people considered tile country's economy 
T(irxat h doin A tilt this, 1936. issue 1. 
13.4 *A Social Contract: Conditions ror a Political Renewal. ' East Eurolvan Relvi-fer, vol. 3(l), 
November 1987 (pp. 54-58). pp. 54-55 pass. im; taken rrom special issue, June 1987. 
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to be better than their own economic situationlY). Tile remedy the PPF was 
proposi ng was the strengthening or the mass niedia and its public credibility as 
%vell as strengthening the position of the Party. me perception of public by the 
twent) 7 
-tx%o intellectuals who wrote the proposal are interesting: 
"A significant sector of the population is ruled by apathy. 
They receive no information as to how they should 
understand tile loss of previously professed values of 
socialism (i. e. material certainties, stable prices -and job 
security) and cannot distinguish between the enforced retreat 
and tile unavoidable reevaluation ofthe system. 
In the most recent period, because or the divergence 
bet%%cen tile use of reform phraseology in tile media and tile 
actual social and political practice, the word "reform" has 
become voided of meaning and devalued. even for those who 
largely know what it means. It is though-provoking that 
ncarly 40 percent or those asked in a Survey could not answer 
the question as to what this concept meant .[.... ] No 
economic consolidation or renewal of any kind is imaginable 
NN, ithout regaining credibility in the public splicrc. "140 
The clevcil years that followed the publication or this document has seen a 
total political and economic transtlorniation and a reform process. As a result 
ol'this rellorm process. the mass media became a rreer institution with floreign 
im-cstment -and know-how transrer. The flow of hiron-nation bccanic an 
unintermpted, uncensored process. However, despite all these changes the 
public vie%v of* the role of' the administration did not alter dramatically to 
prioritise intellectual Freedoms over economic concerns. Economic problems 
are still tile most important issue in tile agenda of the ordinary people in 
I lungary. The respectability of such institutions as pol itical parties, 
11" Troposal flor the Reform of the Public Splicrc. ' Eist European Rcporter, vol. 3(l), November 1987 
(pp. 58-61), p. 58. 
"() IL)ULý pp. 59-60. 
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government and tile parliament are still very low (see rurther parts of this 
chapter Cor a detailed discussion). 
On the other hand. one must admit that the samizdat system, based on the 
illegal publication and distribution of dissident ideas, has worked in creating a L- 
national interest and flamiliarity with the political sphere. - As the distribution 
nullibc1's ol'these journals and newslettcrs increased. tile ideas of tile dissidents 
N%lio vvi-ite flor these publications spread around slowly but unmistakably. That 
the 1989 National Roundtable discussions were so successful in persuading the 
ruling class to leave officc without popular uprisings or a civil war as in other 
neighbouring COLIntries within tile sarne pact, can be linked to the fact that tile 
diSSidClItS were by then well-known and respected, and that was due to the 
impact ol' the sarnizdats in addition to tile failures or the Hungarian 
communists in the fields of economics and of public relations. 
To sum up. it is rational to claim that tile activities ofthe dissident groups have 
bcen. tip to an extent. SLICCCSSfUl in undermining the Hungarian communist 
reginic. I lowever. the inability of the Hungarian administration of the tinic to 
tackle the pressure stemilling from a) ti, c ioss or its international backing due 
to the policies ol'glasnasl and 1wi-eso-Whi, b) the domestic economic failure 
due to the inability to catch up with the rcquirenlents or the new infbriýnatics 
industrial revolution which took place From early 1980s onwards and due to 
the inability to make the scmi-liberal second economy mechanism in a manner 
to beilefit the state and the people, and as a result of these, c) the failure of the 
state apparatus to play its part in the Kaddrist social contract, were the main 
reasons Im the j*, 111 or tile communist systern in I lungary. It is hard to claim 
that the second society idea, under these circumstances, may be considered as 
169 
either vivil sociqv or a pscudo-civil sociely which emerged from the conditions 
of* I lungarian state system. That some parts or the second society were indeed 
floundations for a post-cormilunist Hungarian civil sociely is a corrcct 
assumption. but to observe a civil sociqy in the K66rist I lungary which had 
no widespread POPLIlar support nor wide-scale activities of protest, no access to 
NNidespread mass media, and no role of inspection or pressure over tile 
government policies would be irrational. The process or strengthening which 
took place in the last three years of 1980s, especially allcr JAnos Kdddr's 
replacement in the May 1988 Congress, may be seen as a civil society 
formation. however. even so, it is too short-livcd to influenec the totally 
, di ITerent nieclianisnis or tiic post-communist I fungarian socicty. 
111. CIVIL SOCIETY, CHANGE, AND POLITICAL AGENDA 
A. The Mechanism of Change and the Social Factor: 
I'lie changes in tile agencies of tile political order in Hungary altered tile 
superstructure or the political order in the country through a new 
institutionalisation process (see a detailed discussion in Chapter 3 concerning 
civil society and Chapter 4 for institutional cliangcs). Ho-wever, the 
institutional change in the superstruCtUre, for instance the cstablislimcnt of 
political parties. their nation-widc organisation, the change in the importance 
and/or perception ol* such agencies as tile parliament. political parties, or tile 
trade unions. the restructuring or the economic and political mechanisms and 
agencies, the separation of power within the legislature, executive and the 
judiciary. were either rmlltS or causes of infrastructural changes in the society. 
Thc Ilorniation 1roni scratch in some areas, and, strengthening in sonic others, 
ol* eivil society. led to and interacted with a nuýjor social transrormation in 
170 
%%hich people have experienced difTerent levels or change, novelty and 
(I i sa ppoi litillent. 
As a proccss. although supported by popular will, tlic transilormation from 
totalitarianism to liberal democracy was experienced as a series of rerornis 
Crom above. The process of'cliange, therefore, has been an issue handled by the 
clite ofthe I Imigarian society. The introduction Of SLIch alien concepts as civil L- 
rights and 1'reedonis, new electoral procedUres, political parties and election 
campaigns in the realm of politics, and such concepts as inflation, 
unemployment. Ilexible exchange-rate mechanisms, dcvaluation in the realm 
of' economics. have created their relevant social consequences, affecting all 
layers of the society. Although there has been an increase in tile activities of 
vivil sociel. 1, and civic organisations, the population had to go through a 
process ol' learning tO Use and mistiSC UIC 11CW ill-StiftltiOllS, tO CIIOOSC from 
arnong new concepts and sets of* valuesI41. Tile learned difference in tile 
paccption ot* and reactions to the process of"change have influenced both the 
structure and stratification of' the society and tile perception and role of tile 
concept o I'legiti iliacy. 
Theref*ore. tile winners or losers in the new system, the expectations and 
disappointments ol' the public within tile new socio-political order, ana the 
activity ol'civil sociel), are key elements aftlecting the perception of the concept 
oflegitinmey. The concept of civil sociely and whether it is a reliable source to 
examine the evolution of' clemocratisation is ail issue this chapter will be 
dealing with. I lomever, changes in the social structure of the country, as well 
141 Ferenc Nlis/livet/. 'Pirticipation and Transition: Can civil vociel ,v 
Project Survivc in I lungary?. ' 
'0111111 it/ 1A I Sludies und Dwnsifloit Politics, vol. 13(l ), I March 1997 (pp. 2740), p. 27. 
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as the mood swings in social classes due to tile change in specific parts orthe 
economie and political mechanisms, have a great impact oil people's thinking 
and perception or political developments. Therefore, national voting bchaviour 
and tile perception of political parties and their political platforms, as well as 
support Im particular political parties are also affected. 
B. The Problem of Adaptation: 
While analysing the change in the society and therellore in the perception and 
signi i icance or tile concept or iegitiniacy ill UIC I 11.111garian society, the issue or 
adaptation needs to be closely considered. In the transition to any novel form 
ol'behaviour. adaptability and the costs and effiects of adaptation play a pivotal 
role. When one considers the differences bct%veen tile aLithoritarian reginic of 
the pre-communist cra which only experienced one Free election process and 
the communist cra. it may be claimed that although there was a transition From 
authoritarianism to total i tarianism, the transition was without revolutionary 
changes in the state-socicty relations as both authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes are state-centric. 
On the other hand. the new political order is individual-centric and is based on 
the interactive relationship between state and tile citizen. The change from 
intcracting with a totalitarian state mechanism which owns all the nicans of 
production and wilich was largely self-legitimising to a system which requires 
public participation and public approval of its acts, and which is legitimised by 
tile public approval, is a. first for Hungarians. The shecr existence or tile new 
political order demands tile existence and ffinctioning orcivilsociely. In effect, 
this legilimises the new political order as well as easing tile interaction 
between tile state and the citizens and providing a checks and balances 
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mcchanism for the ncwly-enicrging political superstructure. The issue or civil 
socieiy and its I'Linction is thercrore vital to the Hungarian political transition. 
IV. POST COMMUNIST CIVIL SOCIETY: GROUNDS FOR LEGITIMACY? 
A. Is There a Post-Communist Civil Society?: 
In spile ol' the lack of political participation by the general public into the 
membership of non-governmental organisations during the KAdAr 
administration'42', rrom 1970 onwards there has been an increase in non- 
political civil representation organisations. The rigurcs of' membership have 
gromi 1rom 2.171.000 in 1970 to 2,979.000 in 1989 despite a decrease in the 
IlLIIIlbCI- ofcivic associations Crorn 8,886 to 8,514 during the sarne period, 43. 
The increase in the nurnbcr or youth organisations, pensioners' associations, 
the emergence of' civic legal aid groups, political organisations and of' 
prollessional chambers and associations is a positive sign pointing to tile 
emcrgencc (if' it civil socie(y structure similar to that in tile Western political 
system. I-specially notable is tile increase in representative organisations for 
such economically vulnerable groups as the youth (troubled by unemployment) 
and the pensioners (troubled by cver-dirninishing living standards). Such 
organisations prove that there is a development in public consciousness 
towards the checks and balances mcchanisms and policy-manipulatiort and 
awarenes% orthe uses orinterest representation. 
"12 To this. Irade unions may constitute an exception as they were organisations of interest 
representation under the old regirne with extensive membership numbers. Ilowever. it must be 
remembered thit these were extensions of the ruling order and were generally controlled by the Party- 
appointed managers rather 1han e Cý genuine workers' representatives in most cases. 113 Cox and Laszlo Vass, 'Civil society and Interest Representation in Hungarian Political 
DevelopnICIII., Journal qfCommunin Sluclies wid Ti-ansifloit 11ofilics, vol. 10(3), 1994 (pp. 153-179), 
P. 15-1. 
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On the other hand. it is also interesting to see that an actual 49% of the total 
number ol* civil socielY lorniations in 1992 belonged to sports and sports ran 
clubs. that some ol' tile environmental, wonlen's, educational, human rights 
associations are actUally political party-affiliated. Besides, when one considers 
that or the one and a half million members or the non-governmental 
organisations, 1.147.157 are actually members or trade unions with no active 
participation, Ferene Miszlivetz's assumption that "organ i sati onal density docs 
not necessarily an expression of tile civil ethos. or, as Agnes Heller puts it. of 
the *republican spiriC. " 144 needs to be considered. The lack of an established 
middle-class. along with the lack of intercst due to the gencral suspicion 
tox%ards the nature or politically-inclined non-govanniental organisations 
%% hich is a remainder or the communist era, diminish the active participation 
ratio in tllcsc orgailisations lience narrowing down their cliances of influciicing 
the government in policy-making and policy-implemmiting stages. 
Table 4.1. Civil Associations in Ilunp-arv. 1989 and 1992145: 
Association Type Number in 
1989 
Number in 1992 
Mass communication - 72 
Artists' Associations 616 439 
Trad. Folk-Arl Circles 634 
Sports and sports fan clubs 3,066 6,315+ 
Leisure/ hobby groups 93 399 
Fralcrnal societies - 237 
Elducational societies 105 220 
Scientific societies 123 193 
Children's/Farnily 
organisations 
139 
Vouth organisations 55 496 
Disabled's assoc. 141 
Pensioners' assoc. 38 . 140 
Offier health-care assoc. 62 95 
llencrit groups 141 
Emironmental assoc. 75 246 
Architectural groups - 246 
Economic Interest 660 
III Ibid, 1). 21). 
143 Data Ilrom ibid., pages 155 (1989) and 174 (1992) respectively. 
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representation groups 
Proressional chambers and 
rederations 
299 
Civic legal aid groups 419 
International relations 194 
Political organisations - 61 
TOTA 1, (including not 
li-tefl)146 
8,396 30,507 
j. till. N ligult: 1-1 lakul Iroill I. lNilsmetz anicic. 'rarticipation anLI I ransition: Can Ovilsociety llr(ýIcct 
Sur% i% e in I lmmar)?. ' 1997. 
The increased florcign ownership of production facilities in tile country either 
by means or 11oreign direct investment or by means orioint ventures also limit 
the hilluence or tile non-governnicrital citizens' organisations. That tile 
cconorny is run in co-ordination with rules introduced by the stand-by 
agreements with tile International Monetary Fund (IMF) rneans that Hungarian 
governments do not have much of a say in the way tile economy is managed 
creates 11urther problems for the civil institutions. Tile lack of influence of 
civic organisations over economic policies of tile government diminishes 
public interest towards these organisations as the public interest is mainly in 
the improvement of the standard offiving. 
B. Two Protests Within Civil Society and Social Fragmentation: 
1. The Tax! Drivers' Blockade and Following Public Protests: 
The low priority assigned to politics. and political participation in civil sociely 
activities may also be linked to tile lack of communication bet,. ycen the 
intelligentsia and tile rest of the society. While a considerable section of the 
Hungarian intelligentsia chose disscnt and flought against the communist 
regime. all I lungarians now middle-aged or older have spent'the mtýjor part of 
their lives under the same regime and normally would not like to think of 
1-16 Numbers l'or (lic totals l1rom 17-crenc Miszlivctz, 'Participation and 'rransition: Can the Civil Society 
ProJect Stirvivc in I lungaD,?, 'Journ(d (fConummistSfudies (ind b-ansilion Politics, vol. 13(l), March 
1997 (pp. 27-40), p. 28. The figures includc associations and foundations. 
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virtually their entire adult life as a dark age of shame and defeat as the 
intelligentsia members propose that era to be. The Hungarians would like to 
see a certain continuity in their lives, and this is the point where the distinction 
occurs: While the ordinary people would like to perceive a continuity element 
vvith the improvement of their economic environment, a trend which began 
under Klmos Kildili's leadership, the intelligentsia is more concerned with the 
bUildillg ofa continuous line of political developilicnt which might be traced 
back to KAdArist era as well. 
Fliereflore. the publie perception ol'the new post-communist political era and 
the public expectations from this new system differ from the perception and 
expcoations or the intelligentsia rroni tile satile systeni. The two important 
post-communist means or action taken by the ordinary people and by the 
intelligentsia, the taxi drivers' blockade or 1990 and the Democt-atic Charter 
or 1991 respectively, show the diflerence in the attitude and understanding or 
the liew regillic. 
'I'lic taxi drivers* blockade took place in the wake orthe first anniversary oruic 
proclamation ofthe I lungarian RepubliC147, From 24 to 26 Octobcr 1990. The 
rise in tile pctrol prices rcsulted in'a spontaneous demonstration by the taxi 
drivers. The protest emerged from the discussions between the taxi drivers and 
the petrol station owners and the drivers gathered before the parliament on the 
night ol'the Friday, 24 October and when their demands of negotiation were 
reJected, they blocked the roads first in Budapest and then in most towns and 
inter-city roads. By 26 October, all the trafflic in the country ground to a halt 
flor al I the nic(lor arteries were blocked by the taxi drivers. The government first 
176 
responded to the blockade by the threat of using coercive means, however, 
vvith %Nide pUblic support from the lower-incoilic segnicnts of the society and 
the I-elUctanee of* the police and the armed forces to enter into conflict with the 
protesters. as well as large parliamentary pressure from the main opposition 
parly of' the tinle, tile AFD, it agreed to negotiate. The negotiations were 
COIIdLIctcd through the already existing Council of Interest Representation, ail 
institution originally aimed at solving problenis betwecii the employers, 
employees and tile government. At tile end of tile three days of blockade, the 
goveninmit limited tile pctrol price increase to only 35% of the original 
increase and accepted not to prosccutc the protesters. On tile other Iland, the 
protesters accepted that the petrol prices were to be set by the world market 
11LICtuations in tile future and to remove all tile barricades by the l'ollowing 
Monday mornillg148. 
The taxi drivers' blockade has beconle tile first post-communist social 
movement in which tile ordinary people confronted tile governing elite. Its 
cause. as most other problems relt by the general public in tile post-communist 
cra. was purely economic. The iow ievci or adaptation at thc higlicst point of 
tile transitory period and tile public frustration stemming from the incapability 
to change government policies gave rise to such an impromptu act. Public 
SLIpport flor tile taxi drivers, the lack of violent confrontation despite the 
counter-protests of (lie ruling I IDF partisans, the reluctance or the army and of 
117 -I, Ile new post-comillunist I lungarian Republic was proclaimed Oil 23 October 1989. 
ga 1-19 AIILII'-, I'; Boioki, 'Dernocrats Against Democracy?: Civil Protest in I lung ry Since 1990. 
' in Gyorgy 
gMing Democracies in Fast-Ccntrýl E:, tiTrgp-e, Budapest: Hungarian S/oboszlai (ed. ). Flying Blind: Eiji -1 
Political Science Association, 1992. pp. 383-390 passim. 
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tile police to intervene point to the shared recling of frustration with tile 
novelties ol'the new system by the public. 
The taxi drivers' blockade was followed by many small and large-scale public 
protests, ranging from (lie protest against tile president Arpdd Goncz in 1993 
by tile skinheads to the right- and left-wing protest movements. Smaller scale 
blockades. similar in essence to tile drivers' blockade, just like in tile case of 
the Wirosliget blockade oil the Earth Day in Budapest in 1993 and tile Bocskai 
Street school dernonstrationl49 fililcd to gain the same impact on the society 
and %%ere controlled and limited by police presence. The farmers' protest in the 
Spring or 1997 has blocked halrof the motorways ill Hungary. Thc reason for 
this blockade. and then. the I'arniers' rally in front of the Parliament in tile 
autunin of tile same year, was the rise in agrarian taxes'-10. The general 
character of' the public protests is that ordinary people ill I lungary failed to 
express their displeasure From the regime in another way. If one considers 
these protests were conclueted in a period where unemployment rates soared 
11-0111 tell thOUSand to six hundred thousand people, and that , lost or the 
unemployed Nvere seen as long-term unemployed, it is clear that tile public 
%NOLIld IM estrangement from the new system and hence express itself' with 
Such protests. 
2. The Democratic Charter and the Point of View of the Intelligentsia: 
On the other hand. the Democratic (liarler is ail act originating from within 
the intelligentsia. In Septembu 1991. Jzlnos Kis who was the chairman of the 
141) NIAle S/abo. Trom a Police State to a Demonstration Democracy: Policing Mass Demonstrations 
in I lungary Before, Duringand After the Regime Changc, ' unpublished paper, p. 19. cm 
* 15" Ibid.. p. 20. 
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AID. and Tanias Bauer, a member of tile AID National Council publislicd an 
article arguing the I IDI--led ccntre-right coalition governnicilt was gradually 
shilling to the right and authoritari ail i sm. They proposed a charter in which 
citizois would declare their principles and argue that the democratic 
transilorniation was not yet complete. It was an attempt to improve the 
participation ol'the intellig ntsia into the political affairs in I Itin ary. Tile main IN 9 
problem perceived by the initiators or the Democratic Charier project was the 
danger ol' thern bcconling perceived as opposing to the system once again, 
rather than the opposition to the government. Tile charter which was pUblished 
in September 1991 and penned by such well-known figures within the 
IlLingarian intclligentsia such as Gy, 3rgy Konrad and Milialy Kornis, was 
signed by arOL111d five thousand people within two niontlis' time. 
Fhe charter became an issue of political debate as the opposition parties 
%Upported it cspecially after tile IM Rmsef Antall removed tile head of the 
IMIg', 11-iffli National Bank after lie had signed the charter. With the support of 
the opposition pat-tics and in accordance with the results of a meeting of nearly 
halkif(he signatories ofthe charter in December 1991, it became the core ora. 
social movement and on the national holiday of 15 March 1992, tile Charter 
nimement asked its 11ollowers to protest in streets. The result wýs a ten 
thOUSMILI-StrOng mass demonstration in Budapest on that date'". 
At the end. the Charter did not evolve into a political party. However, its 
impact is considerable when one takes into account that it began as an elite 
mowment and largely remained so despite its popularity. The success the 
Democratic Charter movement is due largely to unpopular governmcnt 
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policies and their outcomes, including price rises, increasing inflation and 
unemployment rates. and social instability. The discontent with the I IDIF-led 
coalition's policies gave rise to political fears which included a fear to 
transcend from a totalitarian communist regime to an authoritarian capitalist 
reginic. The public fear or I lungary becoming a capitalist authoritarian regime 
aftcr 11our decades of'communist total itarianisill was tile reason for widespread 
public support to tile movement. 
'I lie imijior difIlerence between the esseticc and growth of tile two movements 
ol'protest is that they ire based oil difTerent priorities in people's minds. Tlic 
taxi drivers' protest has become a public all'air overnight due to its direct 
contact %%ith the most popular public problem, namely the rising prices which 
constantly pull down the standard of living to Iowa limits. The Democratic 
Charter was dilTerent in essence, and although being a popular movement. due 
to its mainly intelicctual basis, it remained limited to a group of tile population. 
In a rapidly changing environment, wilen tile econornic necessities are the 
main concern Im the general public, a change in the political agenda is always 
taken as ofsecondaq importance. 
The difTerence between the priorities of the ordinary people and of the 
intelligentsia also sets the basis for a two-ticr legitimisation process: While an 
intclligentsia incorporated into the ruling clite may perceive a political order as 
legitimate. the general public. those who arc outside tile highly-educated 
prollessionals. may perceive it as illegitimate. The necessary step to guarailtec 
the continuity ol'the post-communist systcrn in I fungary is to ensure that both 
segments oftlic society approve of the new regime. 
I bid.. pp. 3 )91-395 passim. 
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The main fiactors which influence tile difference of perception between the 
ordinary people and tile intelligentsia is the levels or education and or income, 
-is N%cl I as the txvo sides' ability to find jobs under the new economic and social 
circumstances created in the post-communist era. These factors create a social 
fi-a-mentation and are to possibly create a polarisation between the well- L- 
educated. politicised prollessionals and poorly-educatcd, apolitical masses. The 
1"onlier is likely to be the driving forcc in the I lungarian capitalisation process 
and create the new I lungarian middle-class, while the latter may encounter 
%%orsc livino conditions than under Kdddr. L- 
1. Educational Differences: 
In terms ofeducation, there is a real difference between the urban areas oil tile 
one liand and the rural regions or Northeast I lungary and Lower Transdanube 
region in the Southeast. Whilc in tile urban areas tile education levels indicate 
that 1rom 15% in general urban areas to up to 30% of tile population in 
Budapest to have Ilighcr education, in Northeast and Transdanube regions the 
I-IgLil-CS are usually tip to 5% ol' tile population having higher education. In 
contrast. in tile Northeast and Transdanube regions, where tile main unit of 
dwelling are small villages. the ratio. of people with a maximum of eight years 
ofelenlentai3, education goes up to 50% in some parts. In Budapest a, nd other 
urban arcas. this figUre is down to a maximum of 20%112. Table 4.21 gives a 
clearer indication or tiie educational dirfercnces between social classes and 
hence clarifies tile answer to the question wily tile intelligenisia's world-view 
di 111crs 1rom that ol'the ordinary people so definitely. 
152Data Il-0111 JOS7Cf Mevaros and Istvan S7akadat, Ma,,,, yai-orszaa Politikai Atlasza, Budapest: Konrad 
Adcnatier Stillting, 1995, maps 4 and 5. 
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The table below shows that after a year, those having a higher education or 
more qualified jobs or jobs requiring some learned skills have seen an 
inillrovenlent in their income levels and there has been drops in tile percentage 
ol' their grOLIPS' involvement in the lowest-carning one-fifth of the society 
%%hich includes people or 16 years of age or older. In contrast, people who have 
1111 Clenlentill'N' education. no job-spccific skills, those involved in agrarian 
scOor and those with disabilities or liabilities have seen a rc(luction in their 
incomes and began to live in greater poverty's-I. 
Table 4.2. Poverty 1)), social class and education. Percentage of people 
above 16 years of age and living in the lowest-carning 20%, of the society 
in terms of per capita inconicl54: 
Educational and social classl /Percentage or 
the population living in the lowest-earning 
1992 
(%) 
1993 
(%) 
MUCATION 
0-7 ý ca rs of prima ry schooling 30.6 31.6 
8 yea rs or primary schooling 26.5 29.2 
Professional skill-teaching schools 21.8 23.2 
Secondarv School 12.1 11.1 
University or offier higher education 
insfifutions. 
8.3 4.0 
MICIA I, CLASS OF III EM"FIVE PE. 011LE, 
Iligh Position 11olders 6.0 2.7 
Intellectuals 7.1 6.6 
Middle-Rank rmploycesand Foremen 7.3 7.4 
Employees (Ordinary. lobs) 11.2 10.7 
Private Entreerencurs 18.2 13.6 
Qnalificd Workforce 17.4 16.7 
Unqualiried Workrorce 22.4 25.6 
Peasants and Agrarian Workers 21.3 37.7 
SOCIAL CLASS OFTIIE INACUIVE PEOPLE. 1992 1993 
uncnlploýcd 44.7 43.9 
Pen-Ooners 15.8 11.9 
Disabled Pensioners 26.7 34.3 
Single Moffiers 35.8 38.5 
153 Also %cc OIX D. Social and Labour Market Policies in II ungary. OECD. Paris, 1995, for more 
detailed data on the decline ofincome in the lowcr-earning parts or the 11 ungarian society. 
I" From Rudoll' Andorka, 'Ancicnncs ct Nouvelles In6galitds Sociales en I ton "' ric, ' Revue D'Ftudeýv 
Compin-wives Em-Ow. %1.1994(4), December 1994 (pp. II 1- 129). table 8 in p. 125. 
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When edueation and job qualification affect so much in turns of income 
dirl'erences within the space of one year, the degree or appreciation and 
involvement by individUals in the new political process, are unsurprisingly 
IONN'. With SO IIIIICII IIUCtUation in the levels of income, in an environment 
v. -here only having higlicr education, capital to start onCs owil company, or a 
ski Iled-labour-oriented proression helping to improve one's standard of living, 
the lack of' intercst towards politics and political life which includes 
participating in the activities or civil s-ociely formations is undustandable, ir 
not. justiliable. 
2. Economic Differences: 
, S)OCial class distinction with regards to employment type and educational 
background is afTecting income levels and hence living standards of the 
IlUngarians. The difflerenee between those Nflio have higher than average 
income and those vdio are below tile poverty line also indicates to the different 
standpoints in perceiving tile new reginle. As tile expectations and tile positive 
or negative olltcollie 01, tliese expectations in relation witli one's cducational 
and prollessional background and hence onc*s ability to fit in and adapt to the 
working conditions or the new. capitalist, liberal-democratic cra, are factors 
%NlliCII iI1lILIeIICC (lie perception or the regime. Conscqucntly, the legitimacy or 
the post-communist I lungarian political depends on the feeling of* adaptation 
that the I hingarian people exhibit. 
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Table 4.3. Differentiation or houschold income by profession from 1962 to 
1992 in Hungary, in relation to the national income level (100%)155: 
Ilotnehold head's 
social Class 
1962 1972 1982 1987 1992 
I ligh Ilosiflon 
I lolder 
154 150 127 125 16F 
Intellectual 154 ISO 127 125 140 
Middle-Ilank 
Employee 
128 115 107 117 114 
Elliplo) cc$ 
(Ordiniry. lobs) 
119 108 99 93 120 
Private 
Entrepreneurs 
N/A. N/A. N,, A. N/A. 122 
Skilled Workrorce 109 loo 99 102 100 
Unskilled 
Workrorce 
82 86 84 81 90 
Peasants and 
Agrarian Workers 
87 105 95 90 99 
Pensioner 84 83 98 94 91 
Unemployed N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. J 7 S 
Student N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. 
EE1 
10 
E 
I lod 
The data 1roni the table above suggest that some groups experienced an 
improvement in their income levels over (lie last three decades. Changes in 
income levels in many prollessions indicate the purchasing power or all but a 
small Fraction ol' the employed people increased. However, the data above 
reflers to only offlicial income. Frorn early 1970s onwards, first illegally and 
then in a quasi-legid structUre, the secon(I economy activities were another and 
more important part of national inconle generation. Tile use of the I lungarian 
version of' moonlighting worked on an untaxcd. uncontrolled basis; and are 
excluded rrom the table above. In general, with the exception or the 
agricultural production, the ilicans of' production used in the process of 
creating, tile extra inaterial wcre owned by the state and workers were able to 
use tile state-owned workshops and machinery ror frec in exchange for flicir 
political obedience. HoNNever, when the political systern shifted from state 
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socialist to liberal democratic, the accompanying shift took place in the field or 
economics firom communist to capitalist. Most factories were privatised with 
their control going to cither foreign owners or to joint ventures. The 
sociological as well as econonlic result of this was the loss of access for most 
ol' the blue-collar workers to the means to produce the extra material to 
provide thein with a second, unofficial and quasi-illegal inconic which in 
general was more significant than their legal inconic presented at the table 
above. 
Consc(luently. although tlicre appears to be an increase in the levels or incorne 
thrOLIgh the past three decades in Hungary, the gencration of household income 
depended more on the second econonij, activities than the actually recorded 
income levels. Tile loss or part, most, or all or that secondary income is far 
more important in terms or standard of' living improvement than any increase 
in the ol'ficial inconle as these were not considered as adequate even by the 
K. I(Virist state structure which at the end permitted tile rorniation or a tax-free 
and illegal secoml economy for it could not provide the ticcessary Icvels or 
income to support the desircd living standards. 
The lollowing table which indicates the levels of satisfaction of private life 
based on a poll taken in 1992 may constitute a more aecurate basjý for the 
commenting on the social fragmentation in I lungarian society and the effects 
ol*this Cragmentation towards regime perception. 
As can be scen from *tlic results of the survey, the lower-incomc groups in the 
socicty are pessimistic towards the future while the intcliectuals and. thosc who 
carn higher aniounts than average have higher expectations towards the future. 
1-55 Data gathered Crom Lit Lid, tabIcs I and 3, pp. 122-123. 
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The StUdents. categorically a preliminary group of intelligentsia-members havc 
the highest cxpectations From the I. uture as their education will guarantee theni 
a place in the higher carning segments of tile society if the economic trends 
continuc in the same manner of development. This general decline in 
IIOLISChOId income has to do with the change from the Kd&rist policies and 
liciicc lias bcen a problem flor Hungarian reginic transition tllrOLIgllOlIt UIC 
1990S. 
Table 4.4. Satisfaction towards four dimensions on private life in 
II ungary, 1992: (The table is made on a level of 0-10 scale, 0 signiryingthe lowest and 10 
the highest. ) 
Social class of standard income lire 111) to future 
the personI of life now in perspecti 
/ Average general ves 
%atisfaction 
a% tip-+: 
High Position 5.7 5.9 7.3 5.6 
II older 
Intellectual 5.2 4.8 6.8 5.7 
Nfiddle-Rank 4.5 4.7 6.4 4.4 
Employee 
Em plo) ces 4.9 4.5 6.3 4.6 
(Ordinary 
. 101)%) 
Private 4.8 4.4 5.9 4.6 
Entreprencu 
rs 
Skilled 4.4 3.7 5.8 4.1 
%Vorhforce 
Unskilled 4.5 3.8 5.4 4.2 
Workforce 
Peasants and 4.2 3.2 6.1 ý. 8 
Agrarian 
WorLm 
Pensioners 4.4 3.5 5.5 3.8 
Unemployed 3.3 1.5 4.4 3.1 
Student 6.6 3.1 7.1 5.9 
General 4.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 
population pool 
above 18yr of age 
In contrast with the well-educated and well-employed, the lowly expectations 
From the Future aniongst the peasantry and agrarian labour force, the 
micniployed. and the pensioners is alarming. That tile private enterprise 
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owners are not as optimistic as tile Iligh-position holders and tile intelligentsia 
'IbOUt the future of their standard of living while these arc supposed to beconic 
part of'. ir not the driving rorce in, tile newly- rorilling Hungarian middle class, 
miggests that tile ncxv regime is unsuccessful in creating confidence. The main 
reasons Im- (lie lack of confidence from the middle-class entrepreneurs towards 
111C 1-10st-CO111 In Lill i St systcm are the lack of stability and the need to live by a 
scries ol'ccononlic emergency measures. As the state is unable to print moncy, 
raise %%agcs. disable hillation and its outcomes, and as tile economy is run in 
connection with. il* not in command of, the IMF and the international market 
I'luctuations. the competitive free-market mechanism is likely to create sonic 
more disadvantage ror tile lowcr-inconic carners in the short-to-medium run 
and hence create in aura of dissatisraction in the Hungarian public. 
klorcovcr. as can be seen from Table 4.5 below. during tile mid-1990s. the 
trend set in tile table 4.4 continued. Most of tile people surveyed in Hungary in 
1994 through 1996 believcd their household finances went worse than berorc. 
It is remarkable to see that tile level ol'pessirnism in Hungary was similar to 
the other countries SUrveycd in 1994, but it changed dranlatieally in thile and 
vvhile the people questioned in other countries became more optimistic and/or 
saw a positive change in their income levels in 1995 and 1996, HuAgarians' 
position remained unchanged. 
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Table 4.5: Change In Household Finances: Better, Worse, or 
Unchanged? U16 
Vear /I : lungary Poland Belarus Czech Rep. Slovakia Bulgaria 
counir - 
1996 1 i: 51 11: 20 11: 15 11: 28 11: 21 11: 18 
1): 18 
%V: 76 
11: 43 
W: 35 
U: 30 
W: 54 
1995 11: 9 11: 11 11: 9 
11: 2.1 IJ: 32 11: 18 
\V: 66 W: 54 W: 72 
1994 It: 8 It: 10 11: 9 
I 1: 23 0: 32 U: 18 
\V: 68 W, 54 W: 71 
B: Better. U: Unchanged, W: Worse 
U: 43 
W: 28 
U: 37 
W: 41 
1): 36 
W: 42 
11: 22 11: 16 11: 9 
t 1: 37 U: 31 U: 23 
W: 40 W: 52 W: 66 
B-. 22 13-. 14 11: 10 
U: 33 LI: 26 U: 24 
W: 45 W: 60 W: 65 
Besides creating a vacuum of systemic legitimacy before the eyes of' the 
general publie. the regime itself is damaged from the economic gap being 
created aller the transformation. Moreover, inequality in income distribution 
may lead to serious social probicnis. However. the immediate problem which 
I'Liecs tile iSSLIC of legitimacy in contcniporary I fungary is the nlemorics or thc 
Kild, 'u-ist social contract and tile nostalgia towards tile positive effects or that 
social contract not f'ound in the level or the intelligentsia or high-position 
holders. but aniongst the majority ortlic people, the ordinary people. 
V. THE ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE NEW 
SYSTEM 
A. The Change and the Legitimisation Criteria: 
1. Change In Political Structure: 
The Call ol'the socialist rule and the 
dismemberment orthe Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party marked the beginning of a new era in the Hungarian political 
,; )-% The new systern which differed firom the previous one in many aspects ., teni. 
required ,t new framework for legitimacy of the ruling political ordcr. 
The state 
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StRICture as a whole required to be based oil new principles, because tile 
political system undergoing change within the capitalist system -e. g. from 
I'ascism to liberalism- or within the socialist system -e. g. from Stalinism to 
rellorm socialism- but from one end of the political spectrum to its antithesis, 
1'rom single-party state socialism to multi-party liberal democracy. Although in 
Cliapter One it is argued that I support Immanuel Wallerstein's idea that both 
the socialist and capitalist camps of the Cold War era (which may respectively 
be rellen-cd to as First World and Second World or West and East) were 
actually part of' a single capitalist world structure in view of tile fact that tile 
communist canip has originated as a response to the capitalist carnp (see 
('11,111tCr I). One must also rccognisc the structural and operational differences 
between the communist and capitalist institutional and social structures. 
Therellore. tile systemic change from one end of the political and economic 
spectrum to the other requires tile development of new patterns of action and 
interaction within tile post-transformatory regime. 
As a result or this, in legal, social and political terms, the new political order 
that emerged aller the fall of the socialist regime in Hungary had theoretical 
and practical bases that differed widely from tile general practice within'the 
socialist system. This chapter will focus on -tile change in the new system 
which led to the development or new laws, new requirements, new criteria to 
. 
judge for the performance or the system and ofits main elements. 
The institutionalisation orthe new system may be seen most clearly in tile first 
parliamentary term Crom mid-1990 to mid-1994. Firstly, this period witnessed 
156 Data collected fi-Ol" (lie 1994,1995.1996 surveys of the European Union, published in Candidate 
Countrie Emobarometer. 
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the development or a new political systern based on rrce elections and 
universal suffrage. Secondly, the first post-socialist government created the 
norm Im the Following governments to be evaluated. Thirdly, the voting public 
became able to judge tile changes in the political system by examining the 
changes in the parliamentary structure, the competition among political parties, 
and the general level of satisfaction concerning policies rollowed by the 
government. 
As to the observation or aic change in tams orlcgitimacy, one may claim that 
it is observable through tlic domain of legality and the domain of politics 
which also incorporates ideology. 'nic legality of a regime is linked to its claim 
to legitimae. y. It is so. because, when flic legal environment changes with the 
socio-political transibriliation. the legality of the new regime becomes distinct 
Crom the legality of' the regime that preceded it. This differenee is caused by 
the change in the legislative mechanisms and by the legal Framework thc state 
and its executive branches, tile government and the bureaucracy, embeds 
themselves in. In ternis of politics and ideology. there is ail observable change 
in respect ol'the issue of'regime legitimacy. While tile former change nlay not 
be as clearly observable as tile latter, they both play crucial roles in tile 
translIonliation orthe systcm. 
2. The Legal Aspect: 
In legal term. %. the claim to legitimacy may be brought forward by examining 
the Icgal bases of the ruling political order. In due course, just as the cincien 
regime. the new political order accepts the i-ide oflair principle and builds its 
legal claim ror legitimacy upon this principle. Basically, both the (Inciell 
regime and the new regime share the same understanding of law and order 
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ý%Iiieh means that the working political order must be based on the existing 
kms and regulations and aet within tile guidelines set by those laws and 
I-CgUllitiOnS. Consequently. although the laws and regulations have changed in 
the transf'ormation from the ancien regime, tile new I lungarian political order 
has a claim to legitimacy which is bascd oil identical ground as its 
111-cilecessol.. 
As a result. in legal terms, the legitimacy or tie new regime is based oil the 
constitution. the laws, rules and regulations that arrange tile election and 
perflormance of' the political authorities. However, although the patterns or 
legal legitimacy used by botil regimes are identical, there is an important 
difilercnce in the essence of these two clainis: F. veil though the new systcill 
bases its claim ollegal legitimacy on the grounds that it is lawful, and is acting 
within the limits of* the existing constitutional rules as its predecessor did, the 
clement of consenstis gives ail advantage to the new regime the socialist 
I hingarian regime had failed to experience. The new regime's advantage is that 
it gained %%idespread national support through the amendment process of tile 
1949 Constitution by the means or the National Roundtable Discussions of 
1989. This is a very important differcnce between the communist and post- 
communist reginies ol'ilungarian State. Unlike tile Sovict-backcd coiýnrnunist 
regime. the new constitution as well as other elements -as tile electoral law and 
procedures- were a result of tile consensus reached at tile National Roundtable 
discussions. This con*scllSLIS was reached by the representatives of all political 
Ilactions and 1ractions in the country, represcnted by the members of the 
opposition and or ti, c government or the time during the talks. Thercrore. it 
may be argued that tile 11CW gUidelines that tile Hungarian political order 
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operates under have the approval of the majority of the. Hungarian people, 
wilike those of the socialist regime which operated within the parameters 
dictatcd from outside I hingary. 
Flie legitimacy ol'the statc as a political actor is another fortifying element for 
the idea of the rule (? /* 1mv. If the existence of the Hungarian, State as a 
superstructure is questioned, the legitimacy of the regime that rules it cannot 
be dellended -is the state as an ciltity would not bc considered as a legitimate 
Cramc%%ork Im the operation of such sub-systems as political order or 
cconomic structure. I'llereflore, so far as tile legitimacy or tile regimc in 
conJunction with tile state as a superstructure is concerned, the lack of any 
opposition to the existence of the Hungarian state as a supustructure points to 
the existence of' a national agreement on the entity called the Hungarian 
Republie. While other parts of Eastern Europe, such as in the cases or tiic 
YLIgOSIavian Coil Ilederation or Czechoslovakia, surflered from national and 
ethnic strains between tile forming nations of tile state which resulted in 
fragmentation. tile existence of Hungary as an independent and unified state 
remains unchallcilged. For that reason, as there is support for the existence of 
the state structure. it is seen as a liýgal and Icgitinlate ctitity, and, thereforc, 
legal structures that defines I lungary are legitimate. 
II 
I lowever. legality. even irsustained by public approval of the statc*s and the 
systeiWs legal legitimacy, is insufficient by itself to sustain legitimacy of a 
gi%-cn political order. Legitimacy of a ruling political order has to depend on its 
political-ideological basis and its interaction with people, that is, its public 
perception and its exchange or policies or economic measures to deserve a 
positive perception. 
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3. The Political - Ideological Aspect: 
Consequently. to obtain legitimacy through the political-ideological level is 
more wcansome than to be legally recognised as legitimate. Due to the nature 
ol'transition. it has been difflicult to convince people of the merits of the new 
system. This is partly due to KAdarist economic policies. 
While the Antall and Baross governments which served between 1990 and 
1994 Ilocused on ideology and nationalism to provide a new set of values to 
undo (lie communist set of valLICS. the I lorn government From 1994 to 1998 
Focused oil promises for improwinents in the field or cconomy and in living 
standards. 11olloNving a nco-KAddrist policy. The following Orban government 
1'rom 1998 to (late has rollowed more liberal but as much populist policies, yet 
dillIers Ilrom its predecessors in its more system-oriented approach to politics 
and public relations. In comparison to Czechoslovakia and Poland, it has bccil 
dil'ficult to secure public Support for the new political order and individual 
governments x0ich serve within this new political system, due to the lack of 
charismatic leaders. I lowevcr. in some sense the absence of such leaders has 
'also eased the transition as a systernic process rather than a leader-based 
charismatic process -to employ Weberian terminology. The only problem in 
I lungary NNas not tile lack of popular, mediatic leaders, as there are problems 
originating 1rom the political legacy of Jdnos MdAr. Irving Luis Ilodebateitz 
explains tile change in tile East European political system in general as 
Follows: 
--in its simplest historical terms. the breakdown of the 
BreAnev Doctrine and the rise of Gorbachev's Pei-estmika 
provided Eastern Europc with a window of opportunity to 
break the shackles of an unwanted, oppressive regime. Only a 
short decade ago, tile Soviet Union and its satellites were 
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captive to the claim, one that united every regime since the 
tinle or Lcnin, that.... to embrace tile communist system was 
to cross o%-cr fi-oni the mythical bilateral world or capitalism 
to communism once and Cor all. With tile 'revolutionary seize 
or poN%-cr. * any real politics ceased to be practiced, replaced, 
as it were. by circusscs and caucuses dedicated to celebrating 
the new order. 
The explosiveness of' the events is partially explained by 
the absence orroutine politics in the communist world. After 
the concentration of power in the liands or party offlicials and 
government bureaucrats, organised opposition collapsed, or 
was crushed. in each East European nation. What emerged 
N%as an essentially apolitical opposition, drawn rrom a variety 
of' fields and proressions but outside the rrarnework of' thc 
communist pail), as such. What rapidly unflolded was a 
struggle between party officials without legitimacy... and the 
emerging ilon-political rigures 4roni welders in Polish 
shipyards to poets in Czech bistros- who established solid 
support Croin broad sectors. "157 
Thc above aCCOUnt. with the exception of its final part. applies to 11LIngary as 
%%Cll. It iS 11-11e that tile I ILIngarian opposition emerged under Gorbachev's new 
liberal policies. and that the opposition leaders were of different backgrounds. 
I lowever. the similarity ends there. None of tile opposition leaders were 
charismatic or fiamous cnough to inflUence development and to be seen as 
symbols ol'a nev%p era. It was only aller 1<66r's removal from office and tlicn 
his death that the I lungarian transition to I iberal dernocracy gathered pace. 'nic 
clI'ccI ot* K, klAr on I lungarian people was an important element in thcý change, 
although changes in the international environment were crucial. The 
implementation or the Glasnost and Perestroika policies and the abandonment 
oI, illtel. %. elltiolli. st policies in the East European region by tile USSR, assisted 
the process ol'cliange ill I ILingary. The lack or great popular movements from 
157 Irving Luk I lodebateitz. 'Revolution, Longevity and Legitimacy in Communist States, ' Siudies hi C- Conflyarillive hilel-lialiolial Deveh)pmem, vol. 27(l). Spring 1992, (pp. 61-75), p. 62. 
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befoxv. unlike in Poland -with the Solidarity movement-. meant that the 
I lungarian demand flor change was a contest among intellectuals, and hence, 
the change came as a compromise between the wishes of the intelligentsia, 
either members of' tile communist or of tile anticommunist camps. Therefore, 
the political change has been limited to the negotiations among different 
Fractions ofthe elite. Those outside or the intelligentsia were more interested 
in a positive change in their economic conditions than tile change in terms of 
ideology. The use of tile concept of ideological change per se was insuffilcient 
in convincing people that tile new regime with its difTerent economic 
1'ranieNvork was better than the ancien i-egime. 
B. The Issue Of Representation: 
Along with the change in the political-ideological axis comes change in tile t_ 
understanding and implementation of the idea of representation. III a 
communist system. the communist party, the representative of tile proletariat 
by definition. is assumed to Fulfil tile task of representation by standing as the 
progressive segment of' society. Consequently, in a communist system, 
wpi-csentation is executed through kleologicid i-ein-esentation idea and tile 
C0111111LIlliSt party is the main agency of representation. Meanwhile, the 
industrial and agricultural trade unions act as pressure groups in a very limited 
sense ofthe term. In liberal democracy, however, representation is required to 
be carried out through a series of institutions including the parliament, political 
parties. and pressure groups. Tile transition rrom. being a subject under 
C0111111LIllist rule to be a citizen in a democracy is a major attribute of the 
systemic transl'orniation for any individual, and tile change in the mode or 
195 
representation is a part of (his continuum or transformation. Accordingly, tile 
structure of tile political mechanism has to endure several changes in the 
transition to democracy fi-orn the communist system. The transition which took 
place in I ILIngary. as in other E. ast European states, has brOLIght major changes 
in the substance and tile perception of the political system as a whole, and as a 
part of it. has strong implications concerning the change of rcpreselitativc 
111cchanism. 
In such a fundamental transition, the change in tile mainframe calls for 
changes in tile SUbdivisions. The electoral system needs to be altered to enable 
individual candidates and tile candidates or independent political parties to 
contest parliamentary scats, the government type needs to be altered to specily 
cither a presidential or a parliamentary-governmental system; the electoral 
system needs to lie rearranged so that a system or electoral representation 
based oil either a proportional representation (11R) or majoritarian system in 
general and local/niunicipal elections may be adopted. In tile Hungarian case, 
tile change in the political system required the adaptation and alteration of tile 
electoral system and choices over the forms of government and representation. 
All these issues were solved in Hungary by a series of roundtable discussions 
aniong tile members or tile communist regime's ruling clite aýnd tile 
(Icniocracy-sceking opposition of the time in 1989. The negotiations outlined 
the boundaries of the future political system through a set of compromises 
from both sides. The'conclusions that the negotiating parties reached mostly 
proved to be a inid-way between the dem ands of the opposition and the 
leadership ofthe time, ensuring tile guaranteed participation of the opposition 
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to tile political lire in a formal manner while also ensuring socialist 
representation even in a limited way in the new system. 
VI. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION 
'I'lie political transformation which took place in Hungary from late 1980s 
onwards caused changes in nearly all aspects ofthe I lungarian social lire. 'File 
changes included the rc-cmcrgcncc of political parties-, tile direct and indirect 
participation in tile political realm by the citizens of tile country; the rise of 
civil socict), orgailisations, changes in tile electoral and legislative processes; 
and tile adoption of' different economic and social policies by the 
administration. The major change in tile interim to democracy was tile 
politicisation of the masses which, by means of elections and representation, 
shaped the new regime's working frarnmork. 
A. Political Representation in Democratising Societies: the Rokkan Hypothesis: 
Stein Rokkan. in his 1970 book Cilizens. Eleclions. Pyt, lies proposed a 
hypotlicsis oil tile emergence or the proportional representation (PR) in the 
electoral realm. To begin with, Rokkan observes that in the history or West 
European politics. there is a tendency of extending tile right to vote to wider 
and wider circles of citizens since the French Revolution of 1789 so that at the 
end a universal suffrage might be reached. rllcn. lie proposes a four - step 
11orniula 11or political transf'orniation. rhe first step is tile incoi-Imi-alion or tile 
classes and/or sections of' residents kept out or the system under tile original 
political criteria. The second step is the mobilisalion of these citizens into 
electoral contests. The third step is their tiaivalion into diFect participation in 
public fille. and. finally, the fourth step is thefin-mmion (If 1he nuflon-10(le 
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polilicul Inn-IJ, oi-gunisalions which would eventually alter the old political 
system as it would change local and national political power structurcsi 58. 
In accordance with this 11OUr-step model of change, Rokkan claims that tile 
In-ollorlionol relwesentution system in elections is an outcome of this political 
cliange process. I le claims that the rise of tile working class as a political actor 
-it the end or the 19"' and tile beginning or 20"' centuries gave way to 1 tl C 
In-o1wrliontil rel7resenfulion (PR) system. Rokkan argues that as tile working 
class became quickly politicised, it demanded a lower representative threshold 
so that its members. as well as tile members of the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie might be represented in legislative organs. At the same time, as the 
po%ý, er of' the working class political force threatened the monopoly or power 
of' the mature, well-establishcd political parties. these too asked lor tile PR 
system Ilor they knew the rise of the proletariat was inevitable and that they 
might preserve at least some seats they held in the parliament irproportional 
representation replaced the niýjoritarian system. Tile preservation of tile 
majoritarian system of election might deny tile bourgeois parties tile ability to 
preserve the parliamentary seats and lience tile legislative power they held. 
Therellore. Rokkan*s hypothesis proposes that in a dernocratising, transitory 
society in which the liower to vote is transrerred into wider scgnýcnts of 
society. PR is tile logical electoral system. 
Arcnd I. i. iphart clainis that tile same logic is applicable to the post-communist 
transition in Fastcrn Europe. ir one replaces tile rising Nvorking class with tile 
newly burgeoning democratic forces and tile'cS-tablislied ruling class with tile 
15, ý Stein Rokkan, Cititens. Elections. Partics: Approaches to Ilic Comparative Study of the Proccsses 
of DevcloljLi)cn!. Oslo: Universtictsrorlaga, 1970, pp. 226-227 passim. 
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COMMUniSt party cadres, the structure of the East European transition or I 9gos 
can be explained. Poland with its extreme PR system and presidential political 
Formation is the main example of what Lijphart names as the Rokkcin 
14i-lywhesis 159. 
B. The Making of the New Hungarian Electoral System: 
Despite tile similarity or tile events in Hungary to tile presupposcd changes in 
the Rokkan I lYpothesis. tile I lungarian political systcnI differs from tile system 
proposed by Rokkan and Lijphart. From 1989 onwards, the political systeni in 
Hungary experienced changes which allowed the masses to participate in 
policy-making. The changes sincc-1989 enabled tile rcalisation or nlulti- 
candidatc free elections based oil universal sulTragc as well as political 
mobilisation of previously depoliticised masses which was achieved largely 
through file I-eSUrrection of civil society. Their incorporation into tile 
negotiation process shaped tile new regime through political organisations 
which in turn became political parties, and led to the establishment of nation- 
%vide political parties. 
Thereflore. political changes in I lungary between Spring 1988 and Spring 1990 
4rom the retirement ofJdnos Kdddi to the first free elections-. followed tile 
path pursued by tile West European democracies. However, altho, ligh tile 
pattern flollowed by the Hungarian political structure was similar to the 
transIlormation scheme proposed by Stein Rokkan. tile outcomes of tile 
transl'ormation were not in unison with Rokkan's predictions. The Hungarian 
systein which makes use of a mixture of the rnýjoritarian and PR types of 
14" Arend Li 
' 
iphart, Democruflunion ond Constilulional Choices in Czechoslovakia. 11ungary, und 
l'ohind. 11MV-1991. in Gyorgy Szoboszlai (ed. ), Flying Blind. I lungarian Political Science Association, 
199 
electoral representation and its parliamentary-based government with a 
symbolic president is outside the stereotype proposed by Rokkan and voiced 
by Li. iphart. 'I'lic representation system used in Hungary is more majoritarian 
than PR. This resulted despite the fact that the systern broadened its 
boundaries by including the majority of tile Hungarians in tile indirect 
(Iccision-making process in nleans of first tile National Roundtable 
diSCLISSiOlIS. and then by nicans or free elections based on universal sulTrage 
and representation by political organisations. 
The main reason I'm the existence or tiic current post-commullist I lungarian 
system may be attributed to flic negotiation process bcfore flic systernic 
chan e. As both the opposition and the government of the tinic wcrc aware L 
that democratisation was incvitable and wished for a pacific change. the 
multiparty talks led to a hybrid system. Oil tile one hand, the communist rulers 
ol'the countD, knew they could not hold to power ror long as tile Popular will 
and tile intcrnational political environment were against such a course. On the 
otlicr hand. the opposition knew that tile I-ISWP had the power to block tile 
change lor a long time. Thererore, tile electoral system. the presidential offlicc 
n and the powers and responsibilities or the reah- s or the estate were defined by 
a series of' compromise. -,. The lack of* a unirying figure as the head or tile i 
Hungarian political opposition powerful enough to lead masses into a 
revolution. and. tile wish to give the administrative power to a government 
directly elected by people rorced the participating parties to. adopt a system of 
government based oil a powerful executive led by a primc. ministcr and lience 
to tile adoption of' a limited, representative presidential role. The desire to 
Budapest. 1992, pp. 100- 104 passim. 
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prevcm a vcry large number of political parties being represented in the 
parliament gave way to the imposition of ail electoral threshold, while the 1ear 
ol*one party having a substantial majority in tile parliament and hence possibly 
leading to a C011tillUation or the ancien regime led to the complicated electoral 
pl-OCC(ILli-e. s. As a result or the Roundtable negotiations, tllc Hungarian 
Parliament in the beginning had six part iamentary parties and the number of 
political partics represented in the parliamcnt rernaincd tile same in all three 
POSt-COII I III Lill i St parliamentary terms. III the meantime, coalition governments 
lime become the norm either due to necessity -as in the first and third 
pulianicnts- or due to a preilerence to share responsibility and tile blame in 
national mattas -as in the second parliament-. 
As to the (Ype of representation, it was decided as a result of a debate over 
%%liether to adopt a proportional or a majoritarian representative model. rlic 
I lS\VP was interested in a tn, ýIority representation basis ror they were 
com'inced that their better-known candidates secure their return to 
government. while the opposition backed a proportional representation scheme 
as their candidates were by and large total strangers to the public. To oN, crconle 
this stalcmate. tile electoral system was formed in a lialf-majority - half-PR 
basis. 
The parliament modified lie text or the agreed law to change tile 
rcpresentational schemes. According to tiis, orthe 386 available scats. 176 
%%, cre to lie elected in single-member constitLICIlCiCS, 152 in a proportional way 
and 58 seats were to be allocated to the National List to correct the 
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representational disproportion which are to take place in county and single- 
IlICIllbCr C01lStitUCIlCiCS 160. 
A two-stage minirnum threshold to prevcnt an ovcr-divided parliament was 
also florcscen. The first step requested a pre-candidate to collect at least 750 
signatures in his/lier district to ensure his/licr candidacy, and the second step 
lbrcsa%Ný a necessary 4% or national votes to be won by each political party in 
order to be represented in tile parliament. A political party was also asked to 
have candidates in at least 7 constituencies to be able to present a national list. 
A political party %Nhich satisfies the nornis of both electoral thresholds may 
then compete within a two-round election process. In this election round, tile 
voter is to decide Cor a candidate for his/her constituency and then vote for a 
national list by a political party. irthere is a turnout above 25% and irone or 
the rcgional candidates manages to get more than 50% orthe vote cast at that 
district. there is no need for a second round, but ir it turns out to be the other 
%%ay around the sanic process has to be l'ollowed once more yet with tile two 
mostly-voted candidates or the first round. 
This system. while protecting tile greater organisations against the smaller 
ones. secures a representation or political parties in the parliament in a fashion 
%0ich \%ould either let one single party or two parties form a government, 
%NithOUt the need to 1101-111 multiparty coalition governments which inay create 
instability in a not-yet-stable system. Of about 60 political parties that were 
registered by the end or 1989, only 12 managed to present a National List and 
only 19 could do so with county lists. 13 parties held a majority of 97% of all 
'ý'41('armcii Gon/ales Enriquez, 'Ilectoral Systems and Political Stability in Centml and Eastern 
1. "tqjýljlý'. 1111dapest: I lilligarian Centre for Democracy Foundation, 1995, pp. 18-19 passim. 
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candidates in the 1990 elections while 28 parties cither nominated their 
members as candidates or supported some others' members as candidatesl6l, 
and 6 political pat-ties became represented in tile parliament. 
C. Deviations From the Rokkan Hypothesis: 
1. Electoral System Formation and Activation: 
Even if* in terms of' political change they follow the Rokkan Hypothesis, in 
lerms (it' representation the East Central European countries, including 
I lunuary. tic not fit into the Rokkan I lypotilesis. Arend Li phart points out to IýJ 
the fact that (lie condition of Icgifirnacy and the role played by the old 
established parties determined the outcome. In Poland tile traditional 
communists licld poNver in a system imposed by tile prevailing international 
environment. However, tile international environment had changed while 
giving rise to open opposition which challenged tile legitimacy or tile existing 
order. With tile withdrawal or tile Soviet support and the rise or the reform 
wing within the I ISWP. tile opposition had nothing to fear during the Round- I- 
Table discussions or 1989. The ref'orm-secking communists Nvithin the I ISWP 
did not see the issue of* continuity in the power positions as ail immediate 
issue. and the opposition knew that, the quasi -1 egi ti macy or tiie communist 
regime Nvas rractUred at the time of discussions. Therefore, the opposition was 
stronger than the ruling regime during the talks. 
In addition to the unstable position in terms of legitimacy, the attitude of the 
1xii-ties to the changes in political system and the attitude of the general public 
to the political process afficeted the formation or the new Hungarian electoral 
s)s(cm. The over-enthusiastic and extremely optimistic approach or the 
ibid., pp. 20-2 1. 
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Reflorm COIIlIIlLIIliStS Within tile IISWP led them to insist on a mainly single 
candidate by district ni, ýIoritarian electoral system with a semi -presi dent ial 
government type with a higher electoral threshold of 5% as opposed to 3% 
demanded by the opposition. The legislature or tile time was also made up by 
communists as a %khole, so the final electoral system was more majoritarian 
than PR. %% hich in 01'ect cost tile ex-I ISWP a number of members in tile post- 
communist parliament. Public mistrust of communist party led to a mistrust of 
the concept of 'political party' as a whole, as well. Therefore, as Pit nearly 
almost 111cant party-list PR system, tile case for the PR appeared weak during 
the negotiation processl6l. 
2. The Problem of the Intelligentsia and Konrad and Szelenyi's Approach: 
One niaJor problem with the Rokkan - Lijphart point of view is that it is based 
on a palli that was 11ollowed by the Western industrialised states, and therel'orc 
it is based on the development of social classes. social strata, and 
1111LICI'Standings or cultural and economic capital in that part or tiie World. 
llo\%ever. in Eastern E-urope, as pointed out by George Konrad and Ivan 
Szclcnyi. as well as others such as Claus Offe, Bela Grcskovitz, and Gil 11-yal. 
a dill1crew developmental path was rollowedl(I-1. 
According to Konrad and Szelenyi, tile Eastern European socialism has created 
its own system oroppression and exploitation orthe working class. This nicant, 
that '*under tile 'dictatorship or tile proletariat' it is actually the workers who 
Arend Lij1phirt. ppxif- p. 106. 
See Fro inmance, (oil Eyal. Ivan Silenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Miking Capitalism Without 
ýLqjqa 
* 
lists (Verso. London, 1998). Claus Offic. Varieties orTransition (Polity Press, Cambridge. 1996), 
WILI l3cla Greskovits. Political Economy: Protest and Patiencc (CI: U Press. Budapest, 1998), in addition 
to Konrad and Szelenyi's iuc-lassT-omver- 
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make tip the most underprivileged class. "104 Thus, tile extension or tile 
privilege (which would become tile right in tinic) to participate in the decision- 
making process Im the %vorking class that lorilled tile backbone of Rokkan's 
hypothesis. had railed to materialise in East European socialist systern. 
Intellectuals. with their understanding of socialist theory and their influence in 
decision-making circles even when they are not directly incorporated in these 
circles. have become influential in dccision-making while tile workers were 
lell in more or less tile sarne position as their Western counterparts, despite the 
flact that the main basis or tiie communist system is the dictatorship of tile 
pi-oletariat", -5. This situation, combined with the intellectuals' domination over 
the bUreaucracy. has prevented the development of even a quasi-civil-society 
as reqUired by Rokkan and Lij1phart for tile dcvclopilient of a liberal dcniocratic 
System. 
The doillillint position of tile intelligentsia, despite part or it was rnarginalised 
l'or they rellused to be incorporated within tile ruling socialist party. enabled 
thein to secure a leading position in the post-cornmunist society alongside tile 
members ol'politocracy and managerial class. The intellectuals, therefore, have 
retained their controlling position in'the decision-tilaking process of their 
country and hence prc%, cnted the political decision-illaking to be alTectcd by 
the general publie, illCILiding workers, peasants, small entrepreneurs, and 
StUdCrIts. by forming alliances with the post-conimunist, power elite'66. The 
transition was reached by the Roundtable Discussions. ail intra-clite 
1111 George Konrad ind I vati Szelenyi. Thc I ntcllcctuals on the Road Lo_ClassPower, I larcourt, Bracc, 
Jovanovich Itic.. Nc%% York. NY, 1979. p. xiii. 
163 lbid-.. pp. 146-184 paS'Sim. 
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negotiation process. and the new order was established not by tile masses but 
by the power clite orthe communist and post-communist cras. 
As a result. it may be claimed that the Rokkan Hypothesis and the Rokkan - 
I. i. iphart point ol' vieNv I'ails to explain the post-communist East European 
situation as it is rellcrring to a gradual generalisation or illflLlencc on the 
decision-making process while in the East European cases, tile illflLICIICe Was 
narro%Ned down to a group of intellectuals rather than to be generaliscd into 
greater segmients ol'the society. 
3. Electoral System and Its Applications: 
In conjiunction with the formulation of the clectoral system and its application, 
one may claini that the Rokkan Hypothesis, although in itscir a valuable guide 
to the stages of' flormation of a, new political order, is inapplicable to the 
I lungarian situation in terms of providing a framework or prediction in respect 
of* the chronology ofevents. Although it is possible to claim that the necessary 
pi-crequisites Rokkan indicated took place in tile I lungarian context. one may 
not claim these Functioned within tile parameters set by Rokkan and LýIphart. 
In a plain approach, it may be claimed that, in I lungary, tile incolI)ol'alion step 
took place with the National Roundtable discussions and tile free elections that 
followed, tile mobili. wilion step took place with tile political campaigns and 
"ith such events like the 1990 taxi drivers' strike (see the l'ollowing part oil 
cki I society I'm a discussion or thc sutýject); the aclivallon andpolifical-parly 
. 
1brin(ni"n steps took place within the pre-deniocratic threshold from n1id- 
1980s mmards. However. that these steps Nvcre taken 
in Hungary does not 
necessarily mean that Rokkan I lypothesis is justificd. Tlic lack of* popular 
166 (; il Fyal, Ivan SMenyi, Eleanor'rownslcy, Making Cnpitalism widiout Cipitalists, pp. 33-35 
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interest in the formation and use of civil society mcclianisms in ternis of 
political influence. the low ratio of voters attending tile ballots, the similarity 
ofnearly all political parties in tlicir cconornic choices. and the low figures of 
membership Im political parties point out to tile fact that despite socio- 
political change and three multi-party clections, tile Hungarian political system 
is not as mature as Rokkan and Lijphart thought it to be. 
The main deficiency in the application of tile Rokkan Hypothesis into tile East 
Fluropean situation stcnis from the fact that one may Foresee a logical path For 
the developnicilt or dcinocracy in a totalitarian system, but oilc cannot impose 
rational choice to the systcrn from outside. To believe that tile public is rational 
'is in entity and hence is to act in a given pattern within given parameters, 
cspccially in the wake Of SLIC11 social turrnoil as experienced in Eastern Europe, 
is un6easible. Consequently, while the Rokkan Hypothesis is sound for 
creating a transitory model and for following the developments in the post- 
C0111111LIlliSt transition. it is unhelpful in trying to predict what took place in a 
given stage of development. 
VII. TRANSMUTING SYSTEMS: SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES 
A. Systems in Transition: 
Tile Rokkan I lypoillesis discussed above deals with the internal political 
clements ol' change. Oil the other hand, more comprehensive theories 
concerning the political cliangc were produced in tile last two decades. These 
Cocus oil the idea that tile individual or regional political transitions which took 
place in 1980s and 1990s in difTerent parts of. tile World prove that the 
existence ol' a political trails formati on in global scale. These theories argue 
passim 
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that the basic needs or individual societies changed simultaneously to seek the 
implementation liberal democracy. Consequently, the political changes 
resulted in gencralisations and these took the form or comparative studies 
betwecii the deniocratising regions of the world. The comparative studies 
I'OCUSCd cspecially oil dernocratisation processes in Eastern Europe and in 
Latin Ainerica and Southern Europe. The former was seen as a colitinuation or 
the transrorniation or (lie South European - Latin American denlocratisation 
process which had started nearly a decade bellore the East European 
trails6orniations. 
The institutional trails formation in Hungarian political system is discussed in 
the previous parts of' this tlicsis. The following part aims at analysing tile 
coi n pari soil-, between the Latin American -South European political 
transIbriliation and tile East European transformation which includes tile 
I hingariall case analysed in this thesis. Tile main reason for such all analysis is 
to lind N%hether or not a mould or transfiormation frorn totalitarian and 
authoritarian reginies to dcniocracy exists. For this airn, tile agencies that forni 
and sustain the political order before, during, and artcr the political transition, 
the social backgrounds of* the two parts of the globe, the driving forces in the 
transition. ideological and economic causes and outcomes of tile transition will 
be analysed. 
i. System Building: 
The niain comparison brought forward to indicate to similar trends ill 
demoeratisation in recent years was the onc between Latin America and 
Eastern Furope. The comparison emerged as there were sonic common 
elements ol'democratic systcni-building and sonic similarities in the wa. v the 
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society Nvas organised in totalitarian and authoritarian reginies in ternis of the 
relationship ol'the rulers with those they rule upon. The main driving force 11or 
the comparison is the way these two groups of countries are perceived: The 
Latin American countries wcre l'otindcd by the Europcan, mainly Spanish and 
PortUgUeSC. conquistadors destroying the state mcchanisms that existed oil 
these countries prior to (lie conquest. Latin American state structures and 
societies have emerged as a mixture of the outside influence dictated upon the 
natives and native clements which somehow managed to resist to the change. 
I'lie result was a colonial system which endured from the early sixteenth 
witury till the end of the nineteenth century. Tile first independence 
movements date Crorn 18 1 Os and continued since then. Thercfore, the Countries 
in tile hatin American region had to survive for four centuries with a political 
system which wasn't their own, under a colonial administration which 
alicnatcd natives from the power positions and bureaucracy, and which 
dictated the needs and wishes of the overseas coloniser over the country's 
economy and society. When the countries in the region gained their 
independence and (lie colonisers became assimilated in the new system as parts 
ol'the elite. there was no one in these newly independent countries experienced 
in bureaucracy. technological details or production, administration, exýccpt 
n)ilitary issues. I lence. these countries were driven to a chaotic environment in 
which tile key to solutions were seen either as to seek outside help, this time 
from (lie United States. or as resolving the matters by military coups d'6tat. 
A parallel may be drawn with Eastern Europe from this point. Although the 
1:,, ISt European Countries had periods of independence during their existence 
and were not created by an enforcement or, a- foreign culture, they were 
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OCCUPiCd by great powers of Europe for very long pcriods during the last five 
centuries. 'I'licil. tile 'Soviet invasion -or liberation- during tile 1945-1989 
period ClISUred that these countries experienced similar positions to tile Latin 
American countries in the colonial era. Although tile main difference between 
(lie tvvo systems was that while tile Latin American system was based on race 
and hence those would be, allowed to positions in state bureaucracy or ill 
engineering positions were those who were of European origin and or Catholic 
I'aith (excel-it Surinam %Nhere the Dutch ruled). in Eastern Europe those to be 
allowed to Iliese positions might be natives yet had to be of Marxist faith, tile 
system worked in a very similar pattern. That is the underlying reason for tile 
I'act that after tile end or tile communist rule, most of the key position holders 
had to be lell in their positions with a mere declaration of conversion to liberal 
(Icniocracy as there was no replacement for them at tile immediate post- 
Communist cra. Such similarities gave rise to tile claims that one may draw 
paralicls betwcen tile two deniocratisation processes as tile social backgrounds 
and the post-'independence' situations arc somewhat similar. 
2. Changes in Political Structure: 
In the realm of' political structural' changes, there are more manifest 
similarities. There is a denlocratisation of tile regimes in both parts or the 
world. flollowing (lie same key patterns or institutional isation and restitution. 
Therellore. it may be claimed that the Latin American denlocratisation may be 
seen as -in exemplary, if not a rorcrunner, to the East European changes as the 
transilorniation towards liberal democracy from authoritarianism began first in 
Latin America and then was followed b tile East European states. Tile need to y -1 
grant more individual Freedoms in both cases ignited the fall of the 
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authoritarian and totalitarian reginies. Moreover, both series of changes took 
place as a result ofthe end of the Cold War and of the emergence of a New 
World Order. There certainly are sonic similar processes in both regimes to 
make the comparison look worth the cfrort. 
To begin ,,, ith. the changes towards a truly democratic system seek primarily 
the establishment of a system responsive and responsible to the public. The 
establishment of such a system would require guarantees on basic rights and 
freedoms. the introduction of political and economic choice; and the litling of 
censorship orall kinds and the calibration orclection results. Therefore, it may 
be argued that the establishment ofccrtain components of a liberal democratic 
system is required in both authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the 
transition to democracy. Of the necessary changes, the emphasise is placed on 
the need to have a competitive political systern with a conipetitivc and free 
c1cuoral process based on universal suffrage. Consequently, as this major 
component of denlocratisation is lacking in all deniocratising regimes. 
parallels may be drawn between the problems and solutions to these problems 
that may be raccd in each and every democratising rcgirne. 
As to the similarities or the regimes to be replaced, one may emphasisc the 
iniportaiwe the unelected bureaucrats and technocrats enjoy in both totalitarian 
and MIthoritarian systems. As these have no power assigned on them by tile 
popular choice, i. e. as they are not elected but appointed to their positions, 
their wsponsibilities arc normally towards' those who appoint them and 
therellore not to the public's demands., Also, the limits Over the regime 
legitimisation is restricted to the opinion of those'in power positions, nallicly 
the high bureaucracy. local notables, and tile political leaders. Whether the 
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nicnihers of* a Latin American junta or the members or tile Politburo of a 
socialist state. the power-holdcrs had a very limited responsibility towards tile 
public as they derived their staying power From the coercive means they 
control and ideological orientations which enable them to influence the public 
opinion and tile international environment during tile Cold War era. 
3. Change and the Question of, Regime Legitimacy: 
At this point, one must remember the Grarnscian argument that "even in tile 
most despotic societies, there is a measure or active support by a minority, and 
there is passive acceptance by larger sectors who believe there are 
compensating advantages to themselves and no realistic alternat iVC,, 
167. In the 
authoritarian Latin American regimes, the minority on whose support tile 
regime depended was tile traditional elite consisted of either drug barons or 
great lanners or industrialist owning generally assembly plants. This group of 
inllucntial people N%, Iio had either a limited degree of public support or none at 
all. had hilluence as the owners or tiic means of production. Hence, as they 
gained prosperity under the authoritarian regime, they supported it in the 
domestic scale. In the meantime, they supported tile anti -communist Western 
Bloc ol'countries in the international ar&na. Tile vic%v was taken that the deeds 
ofaily regime might be acceptable as long as it was not lost to the comniunist 
camp. The main support for the totalitarian regimes or tile Eastern Bloc came 
1'rom high-rank offlicials in the armed forces and bureaucracy, as well as from 
recruits to tile Party and-through ideological propaganda. On tile international 
side. support came rrom the USSR. the political and ideological leader of tile 
Fastern Bloc. Thereflore, in both types of reginles, one may talk of a limited 
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legitimacy and a low need for legitimisation while there is a need to Icgitimise 
tile rule oftlic rulers before tile eyes of those who might end it. 
Consc(luciltly. the legitinlisation process is based on intra-clique legitimisation 
in both types of'regimes. Yet, the system might require some alterations as tile 
general public might come to a point of total dissatisfaction and force the 
ruling class to leave their positions either by rebellion. civil war. or a series of 
industrial action and by other non-violent means. To prevent this, tile rerorms 
ill SLICII systenis conic from tile top as well: Once there is a general 
dissatisfiaction in the public, especially in the realm or economics, rcilorm 
prograninies are initiated and applied without asking to the public. In tile realm 
or pol itics. some concessions are possible, yet these need be limited in scope. 
A good example of' such political initiatives in tile Eastern Bloc were the 
policies or Glasnost and Perestroika. They both have become tile bases for tile 
deniocratisation in (lie Eastern Bloc although the main intention of the policy- 
makers was to reflorni the state socialist system and not to dcrnocratise it. With 
(lie draniatic increase in the public expectations and in tile freedom of' 
expression, these policies also became the major motor forces to create tile 
momentum ordismembernient of the U§SR as they created tile suitable milieu 
For the dissident ideas to spread beyond what was thought possible a decade 
ago. These policies could not be labelled as real steps towards democracy or 
liberalisation, but to bypass tile malfunctions in the communist systern. Similar 
processes Nvere observed in tile Latin American political life as Russel Bova 
demonstrates: 
167Frank Cunningham. Democratic Tlico! 3ý and Socialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. p. 34. 
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"In its original and most narrow sense, "glasnost" referred 
to a policy aimed at increasing access to inflormation, thereby 
rcdUCiIlg tile Veil of' censorship and secrecy that had long 
%mothered SOViCt Society .... [G]Iasnost shared little in common 
with tile Western idea or "frecdorn or inflorniation" and even 
less with Western notions of democratic, constitutional 
governincilt. 
.... This liberalisation often referred to in discussions of the 
Latin American world as decornpressao (dcconipression) or 
apertura (Opening). typically involves tile institution. 
restoration and liberties of individuals and groups... (Andj in a 
rcgime (if liberalised authoritarianism, -, the liberalisation 
CIIJON'CLI... is granted and controlled from above, and is 
potentially subjject to revocation at any time. " 168 
I'liere irILICC(l is a similarity in the reform processes and in the objectives the 
rdorm proccsses, are meant to aini at. Consequently, one may argue that tile 
change from authoritarianism to liberal dernocracy in Latin America and the 
change 1rom total itarianism to liberal democracy in the former Eastern Bloc 
are similar procedures. lience the two transformation proecsses may be 
comparable and contrastable. If one adds that similar problems and similar 
solutions are around in both transitions in terms of institutionalisation, as 
countrics in both parts ofthe world needed new constitutions, new sets ol'laws 
and regulations, new electoral processes. new institutions as parlianients and 
political parties %%hich flunction propqly, one nlay see tile case in getting 
involved in comparisons. Not surprisingly, in the last coupic of yea, rs, to 
equate the change processes in tile two difTering parts of tile world, united only 
by their desire to adopt liberal democracy and their technological inequality 
,, vith the countries of* Core Capitalism, became a widespread 'practice. Such 
com pari soils intensillied dUring the institutionalisation process in the florilierly 
communist and lascist-dictatorial reginics. As the Latin American countries 
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were first to demoeratise. they were seen as an example for their East 
Furopean counterparts. 
B. Dissimilarities in Transformation: 
1. Driving Forces: 
In spite of' the t1het that there is a great similarity between the relationship 
patterns ol'the ruling classes vis-A-vis the other important power-holders and 
IIIC public opinion in both authoritarian and totalitarian reginies, one may not 
compare the two sets of* regime transformation. The main reason for this is that 
the two regime types and the countries they dominated difTer in terms or 
historical background, social structure. economic system and political 
orientations both in domestic and international scale. 
The main obstacle Ilor comparison of the two regime types sterns from tile fact 
that the proposed cycles ofdcniocratisation and Un-dernocratisation are merely 
illusions. It is true that the world has experienced some 'waves of democracy, ' 
yct it is not possible to vcrilýv whether these waves occurred as waves or 
democracy pei- se. In all instances, there has been a driving Force, an ignition 
point and in international frarnework which eased tile other reginies pursue in 
tile S, 1111C direction. In tile last decade o(democratisation, one may identify two 
niaior Caetors in tile shape of economic necessities and changes in tile world 
order. 
01' these driving forces. economic necessities have been the main concerti of 
the Latin American states and of tile USSR, the main benefactor in the East 
I'All-OPCall Scheme. In Latin America, as the economy had reached to a point at 
v, hich majjor social disturbances might take place. changes were introduced. 
111,41wswll Bova. Tolitical Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition, A Comparative Perspective' 
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The economic environment which necessitated the changes consisted of high 
levels of' internal and foreign debt. high inflation rates, decrease in real income 
of* the ni, ýIority of' the population, and incapability to adopt to new 
technologies. The changes came as the fiberalisation of the systern, rather than 
tile adJustnient of the economic itýjusticc. These may also be seen as tile 
adjustnient ol'the private sector to tile new economic requirements so that it 
would not lose its competitive edge. 
The 11orcign pressure oil human rights issue on tile Latin Americans 
authoritarian regimes From the US and the EU meant a decrease in foreign 
economic and political support. The change of the world political structure 
with the de%clopment or tile D6tcnte policies was of no assistance to tile 
authoritarian regimes either. As the strategic importance and the need to keep 
tile Latin American states on the side of tile Western Alliance decreased, the 
pressure on the regimes to adopt political and civil rights and Freedoms 
accclitable in European and North American standards increased. Furthermore, 
the collapse of the bipolar world order from 1989 to late 1991, meant that 
these reginies had no more support from outside and hence were forced to give 
way to more democratic schemes. 
As to the Fastern Bloc, from 1987 onwards, a process of r6orni was 
pecessary -as the planned economics or the bloc members were seriously 
Cailitig. The same problem haunted tile USSR, the main benefactor or the 
whole socialist world, as well. To regenerate its economy, it had to rid itselfor 
the burden of' supporting a series or countries in Europe which functioned 
merely as a bLll'[*cr zone that modern war technology did not really necessitate. 
in 1'"litics, no. 44. pp. 118-119 passim. 
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The main idea behind tile 'Sinali-a Docn-ine' was to free tile USSR from tile 
burden created by its satellite regirrics in Europe. 
It is also true that the industrial revolution of inrorniation, technology ill tile 
1980s which made nearly all previous services sector technologies obsolete 
had its filir share in the way to the transition as tile Modernists claim. As the 
economic burdell ofcoping with tile new technologies in computer science and 
telecommunications was enormous for closed economics, all economic 
liberalisation was necessary and once tile access to inflorniatioll eased ill the 
Eastern Bloc, the end of the reginics came quickly. 
W'hen one looks at tile matter in the light of these lacts, it can be argued that 
the deniocratisation processes are linked with the international order. The 
world order from late 1940s to late 1980s was pernlissive of authoritarian 
reginies as the notion of' loyalty to an ideological cause -and liencc to a 
superpower- was the main identifier of a country's regirne rather than its 
hunian rights records or economic achievement or income distribution in that 
country. A change in tile world order, specifically the end of the bipolar era 
a shill towards a rilulti-polar system that we now experience. has some and 
resonance in history. For instance. the cbllapse of tile European based balance- 
or-power system with the United Kingdom performing the role of tile keei)el- q1' 
h. alance and the rise ol'a inulti-centric system in the interwar period, and the 
rise ol'the bipolar system allcr World War'll, caused changes in the perception 
and in the priorities in tile perception of regimes. Therefore. as the rules of 
ii, iternational politics change, a once vital ally may lose -its status to be 
perceived as a harsh. oppressive and unworthy dictatorship that has to be 
isolated in order to enforce global aernocratisation. Thus, one may talk of 
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cycles. but only provided that tile cycles are related with the global political 
system changes and not related to an invisible hand which conducts tile 
beginning and end ofwaves of dernocratisation because the World feels the 
need Im democracy. That is to say that a cyclical change environment 
concerning all the world political structure may be proposed, however this 
wotild only be 11ormulated as "whenever a change in the world order occurs, 
states and other political actors react to this change by adapting to tile 
necessities of the new ordcr". A very long and vague cyclical occurrence this 
may be. it also is tile equivalent of the physics law "every action has an equal 
and opposite reaction'*. Moreover, tile cyclical dcrnocratisation approach is 
insLifficient to explain why anti-denlocratic forces develop if democracy is 
considered the most desirable system. 
2. Alliances and Cultural Camps: 
From this. a brief second point may be made claiming that while East 
Furopean people depended oil tile termination of' their alliance ties with tile 
stiperpo%%cr that controlled them to denlocratisc. tile Latin American 
denlocratisation was dictated in a way by tile superpower which manipulated 
them. Although tile initial steps of democratisation came from the Soviet 
administration and with the opposition or , lost leaders of East European 
countrics. the main drive was from below and tile end of tile Soviet control 
marked a way orindependence for the East Europeans. lience while tile end of 
tile Soviet control meant a rebirth for tile East European countries, tile end or 
tile Soviet threat meant tile fall of their regimes for the Latin American 
dictatorships. 
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A third difTerence is that the Latin Americans always associated themselves 
with the Wcstern-Capitalist culture. Thercibre, even the most oppressive 
re-inie in Latin America sought ties with the Western world and emphasised L- 
its place in the Western civilisation while tile West, in general, embraced such 
regimes as one of* its variations. On tile other hand. the East Europeans were 
caught in in experiment of' alternative to that mode at least in terms of 
economies and politics. The ideological dill'crcnccs meant a total alienation 
1'rom the values and norms of the Western culture and indoctrination or the 
Marxist-Leninist alternativcs to the Wcstcrn system. Hence, the Eastern Bloc 
played the role ol'an alternative to the Western world and was perceived as a 
dillIerent entity by the West. Moreover, as Laurence Whitehead points out, tile 
East Furopean case or late 1980s may be likened rather to the dccolonisatioil 
process or Africa and Asia in 1960s than Latin America. as East Europeans 
are. in a way, struggling to rind their national identities and their long- 
suppressed sovereignties 169. 
It is Ilor this reason that the forces competing for power differs in these 
countries. Political lille in most authoritarian Latin American countries is based 
on (lie competing local notables these be great land-owners, coffee or drug 
barons. or high-rank military officials. The main aim of a party is to prevent 
the others to seize power. Therdore, if'one of' these traditional elite canic to 
power. the main aini would be to maintain power as long as feasible. That 
means the use or such methods as cheating in elections, dictatorship without 
elections. suppression ol'other powerful people and tile like. The opposition 
11"Laurence Whitehead, 'East-Central Europe in Comparative Perspective, in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric 
Ilerring. George Sanlbrd (Editors), Building Democracy'?: The International Dimension of 
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consisted of other bidders flor power. However. in the Eastern Europe, the 
regime was ideologically solid and well-defined and the only grouping was 
between tile Communist Party and its members and the others. Thus, there is a 
very definite difference between the origins of the two transitions and nature 
and meaning orthe change. 
3. Ideology: 
ILICO]Ogý' plays I crucial role in both political and economic parts of tile 
system. To begin with. the definition of tile needs of the systern is made 
according to the iLlcological choices. Tile Socialist system was based oil the 
dominance orthe ideology. That meant that the East European countries were 
to have a centralised bureaucracy and a central ly-planned econonly. 
The bureaucracy in the Eastcrn Bloc were part of an intrinsic relationship with 
(lie ('0111111LItliSt Party. Under tile COIllIllLIIliSt theory, the Communist Party held 
the vatiguard role to lead tile nation to tile final stage of Communism. The 
Party controls (lie whole state mcchanism as it has a Supposed leadership role. 
ThcrOlore. the key positions of tile bureaucratic mechan i sill, if not all tile 
bureaucraey. were in the hands or tile Party apparatchiks. At the end, this 
relationship C(lUated tile concept of the 'state' with the concept or tile 'Party', 
eliminating the possibility that any ideologically unsound practice might be 
carried out. I lence, ideological needs carne berore the pragniatic necessities. In 
tile POSt-COMITILIlliSt era. therefore, privatisation policies and tile liberalisation 
in tile economy in general "in Eastern Europe means tile creation of* a new 
class. a bourgeoisie ... [creation of which] is made morc. probleniatic in tile 
contemporary context, wherein an internationalised economy may pre-empt tile 
Democnklisation in Fastern Imrope. London: Leicester University Press, 1994. p. 37. 
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development or an indigenous alliance or analogous function"170. Thercrore, 
there is tile problem ol'a structural change in the economy in Eastern Europe 
%%hieh is peculiar to the relationship created during the Communist rule 
between the State and the other segments or the society in relation to 
CCO11011lics. 
On the other liand. as flenrique Cardoso has noted, "dissinlilarities in Latin 
Anicrican political regimes and other variables should not obscure the fact that 
all these countries. with the exception or Cuba, are capitalist and occupy a 
subordinate position in the international cconomic orderl7l. This means that 
they were part of' the (quasi-) liberal econornic system of the West with the 
occasional protective regulation or two. while their political system was 
incompatible with liberal democracy's requirements. In economic terms, cost- 
ellIcctiveness was considercd to be more important than ideological 
motivation. Consequently, the economic and bureaucratic mechanisms or the 
Latin American reginics were administered by technocrats. The similarity of 
(lie technocrats to (lie apparatchiks is that they both put emphasis on planning 
and they both are appointed. Apart from these two points, however, 
technocrats are entirely dirferent in performance from their socialist 
counterparts as they ý elevate economic over political criteria, are less 
nationalistic (read ideological-oricnted instead or nationalistic if you wish) 
then 1)Ojilicialls172, and are much more pragmatic in terms of ainling at 
170 1 larvey 11. Feigenbaum and Jeffi-ey R. I-Icnig, 'Privatization and Democracy', Governmice: An Lý 111fernoliomilJourfull qfpoficy cm(lAthniiiistralion, vol. 6, no. 3 (pp. 438 -453). 1993, p. 439. 
171 AkJandro Portes. Tatin American Class Structures', Latin American Research Review, vol. 20. no. 
3 i (pp. 7- 39), 1995. p. 7. 
172juati D. Landau. -rcchnotrats and Mexico's Political Elite'. Polilictil Science Qu(irterty, vol. I 11 
(2). Summcr 1996 (pp. 295-322), p. 29.6. 
221 
providing solutions to a problem. Therefore, while Mexico, Argentina or Chile 
had seen no improvement in political issues including human rights their 
economics dc%, cloped to cope with the changes in industry. The best example 
ol'the ecominic success of the technocrats may be shown in Pinoclict's Chile 
%Nhere the dictator employed the so-called Thicago Boys, ' a group of 
economists From the University of Chicago Nvho favoured limited state 
intervention to economy and libcralisation of the political system by 
privalisation and limitation of state control over fi-ce trade, to cure tile 
economy %%hile not attempting to liberalise the political scene at all. 
4. The Economic Factor: 
The lornier members ol*the Eastern Bloc are not only experiencing a transition 
to liberal. competitive political systern, but they are also undergoing a process 4-- 
of' econonlic liberalisation which has ncver been a problem in aUthoritarian 
reginies as they were part of the capitalist world. Despite the fact that through 
a superlicial analysis. both transitory reginic types tilay seem to suiller from the 
same disruptions in the form of problems of dcbt, innation and structural 
Ijustment to domestic and international liberalisation, the problems of , a( 
Fastern Flurope are inuch more proround. As hidy Batt observcs; 
"The East E, uropean economics were not merely over- 
regulated with an overblown state sector. but flully state- 
dominated econonlics. lacking a developed private sector and 
even the most basic institutions or a market economy. 
Moreover. they were geared overwhelmingly to an 
international trading bloc -tile CMEA- which operated rorm 
the -v%, orld econom) ...... and which has now collapsed. Tile 
scale or tile task of' economic transl'ormation and structural 
reorientation is unprecedented, and likely to take much longer 
than initially expected. The social costs will, bc high, and 
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I)OIILII, 11' confidence in the goal of a markct cconorny cannot 
lie taken lor granted. " 173 
Therellore, I-astern Europe undergoes a dirrerent dimension of change not 
experienced by Latin AniericaM. The peculiarity of tile challenge created by 
the ccononiic transf'orniation makes the East European case unlike any other 
transition. as Latin American. South East Asian, Southern European 
ccononfles were always incorporated within the Capitalist mode or production. 
perhaps "ith tile exception orthe transition rroni the pre-Capitalist ccononlic 
relationships to Capitalism in tile transition from the Ottoman Empire to tile 
. states such as Turkey. Albania and Bulgaria after the first World War and tile 
transition orthe pre-Capitalist relationships in the East European countries to 
(lie Socialist nlodc or production after the Second World War. However, tile 
transition From the Socialist system to the Capitalist systern has no precedents 
in history. thus. it is unique and constitutes a unique challenge to tile East 
FLiropcan leadership cadres. 
5. Political Reform: 
The question of' political rerornis is another -source ordifference between the 
transitory nlovcnients in the two regions. Similar to the case of econornic 
rellonns. political rerbrins are dictated 1roni tile top in authoritarian regimes or 
173judv Ilatl. --l-Ile International Dimensions of' Democratisation in Czechoslovakia and Hungary' in 
Geoffre), Pridliam et al. (1-d. s), pj). cit., p. 17 1. 
17.1 Allila Agh claims that there are four different scenarios of development in the European integration 
process of' the Fast European countries which are Gernianisation (EU integration with great German 
inllucnýe over aie countries or thc- region). Turkisation (partial integration limited to security issues), 
Yu, goslaviNation (no integration at all), and Europcanisation (rull-scale integration). What Agh not too 
correctly rel'ers to as Turkisation is mform-dictatorship and is actually a mirror-imag of' the Latin 
American model discussed here. Chile would be a rar better example for that model, but Agh, staying in 
the European context. chose"rurkcy. 11*1'tirkisation is red as Latin Arnericanisation, the argument makes 
more sense an([ the discussion in this study becomes clearer. To see Agh's comments, see his article 
litICLI 'I'lle 11,11-adows olýTransition: The External and Internal Overload of dic Transition Process, ' esp. 
pp. 21-30. iii Terq\1 Cox and Andy Furlong (cd. s). I lun-gary: Tie-Politics of Transition, London, 
England: Frank Cass. 1995. 
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Latin America, where, Terry Lynn Karl argues. transition from above is the 
predominant case. She points to the fact that whenever there has been a 
transition 1rom below. it did not lead to stable democracy as the members of 
the traditional clite responded with subversive opposition175. The pattern of 
transition 1rom above may be gcneraliscd in Southcrii Europe as well including 
POIALIý1,11. Spain. Turkey in addition to the Latin American countries such as 
Chile. F. cuador. Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador. Argentina and 
perl, 176. The general pattern in such countries is that tile ruling authoritarian 
regime, either due to external pressures or the domestic pressure stemming 
('rom opposing traditional elite. decides to move away from the oil-ice and 
arranges multi-party c1cctions which would result in a period of democracy. 
I lo%v strong popular discontent may be. regime change is nearly always 
orchestrated Crom the top and necessitates pressure firom abroad or from the 
strong members ofthe opposing clite. 
I lowever. in Eastern Europe, despite the flact that the Gorbachev reforms came 
from (lie top and ignited tile whole process of dismembeniient, in most cases, 
except Im Bulgarial77. the change c anie from below. The cliange that was 
floreseen by Moscow was surpassed by the East Europeans not bccause tlicir 
I 
rulers were willing to introducc drastic changes. but because there; was an 
enormous pressure from below for change as the Soviet military presence was 
lifted and the Sinalra Docti-ine which allowed individual countries to chose 
, ell. I)CIlloCracy and Democratization, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 
44-45. quoling 1rom T. Lynn Karl, 'Dilenimas of Democratization in Latin Amcrica'. Com1wralive 
Polilit -. v, vO 1.2 3( 1). 1990. ( pp. 1-2 1 ), p. 8. 
176/bij. 1). 45. 
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their own political and econornic programmes replaced the Bmzhnev Docit-ine 
which floresaw a Warsaw Pact intervention should onc bloc country attcmpt to 
change its political orientation. The mass defections from the German 
DCIIlOCI'-lIiC RCl)Ublic. tile Solidarity movement in Poland, the activities ofthe 
opposition groups such as FIDESz in Hungary, the Rumanian revolution 
combined with a coup. constitute evidence that the change was frorn below 
and irreversibly so. 'file rise or nationalism and bigotry in tile region after tile 
end or the Communist rule Show-, tile popular involvement in the process of 
Change. 
Fhe change From below, that is change as a result of the popular will is the key 
dil'Ilercnce between tile two regime transitions. As there would be no likely 
local notables to prcvent a Full democratisation, the possibility of success in 
the Fast European transition looks far better than the Latin Amedean 
transitions in such countries like Colombia or El Salvador. I lowcver. the East 
I'Mropean transition was not as smoothly realised as in Costa Rica or in 
Venczuela either. Unlike these countries, tile Fast European states has to 
SLII*I'er 1rom the perils ol'cconoinic transition resulting in unemployment, lower 
purchasing power. higher inflation'and higher prices. concepts East Europeans 
who were not LISed to until the cild of 1980s. I 
Despite the flact that since mid-1970s there is a global inclination towards 
liberal democracy. it may be argued that this inclination shows itseir in 
difTerent conditions under dillerent circumstances. That there are coninion 
points between the East European and Latin American, not to mention South 
177And %0h the exception ol'the USSR; yet the USSR cannot be included into the list. The Soviet 
Union doesn't Count as it is the foreign power involved. not one orthe East European states converted 
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European. transitions to democracy, the similarities may be seen as similar 
responses to tile same changes created by tile same driving lorces. 
I lowevcr. to overemphasise the similarities overlooking tile differences of the 
two regions undergoing processes of democratisation would result in the 
thought that the two regions underwent the same type of change. From, that L- 
point. one may argue tilat, tlicse two are similar in social structure. economic 
and political background and that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are 
alike. which they are not. One may not link the Latin American and East 
Furopean practiccs ordenlocratisation oil a one-to-one basis. 
Nevcrtlicicss. as they both arc the product of tile same ma or change in j 
international political structure, namely the end of tile Bipolar World Order, 
thcre arc and will indeed be similarities between the two processes of 
transition. I lowever. to create imaginary ties. theorising upon waves of 
democracy and lience creating intangible rival Vorces of' pro and anti- 
dcmocracy helps only to blur one's mind. One has to bear in mind that liberal 
democracy. considered by many as tile best way or govertinicnt in tile 
Capitalist mode orproduction, nlay prove to be unritting for sonic societies at 
any stage ortheir political and social development. Consequently, democracy 
may be inscrtcd to and be rejected by a social structure which is unwilling to 
accept its conditions or which believes as a whole that another type of' 
government is preferable. There is, however, no ground to talk about 
democratisation %,, -avcs. although the concept facilitates tile perception As this 
I'acilitating effect in perception oversimplifies tile situation. One has to bear in 
mind that -there are no general izations that are not historically tinic bound, 
to socialism by slicer Come or the Red Anny aftcr the War. 
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because there are no systems and no structures that are unchanging" 178, hence 
there are no real models nor similar or dissimilar routes to follow to reach an 
end as there is no definitive, absolute end. Therefore, it can be said that the 
transition From tile Bipolar World System to a Diffuse World System is the key 
reason in the Call or dictatorships and socialist regimes and in the rise or 
democracy. 
Yet. Nfliatever the reason for the change in the attitudcs towards democracy, 
there is a change in flavour of dernocratisation and o1justification of a reginic 
in the donicstic scale rather than international scale. This very inclination that 
is in ascent from the late 1980s onwards created a parallel rise in importance 
I*or the concept of legitimacy of a regime and of a political system, issues 
suppressed during the Cold War era despite their vital importance. 
One may conclude that the transformations had common characteristics as 
well as peculiarities. Moreover, even in tile regional scale there are difrerences 
11-0111 a Country to another in terms of methods of transition, the duration of dic 
transition period, the speed or the institutionalisation process and the 
adaptation ()I' Society to tile llcw political and economic order. Therefore, the 
Fast I"Lli-Ollean trans lo rniat ion is different froill the Latin American 
transilorniation. Furthermore, the Hungarian transformation by itsell' iý to be 
, treated as a unique ease within the general context of tile East European 
political transformation. I'lic strLICturc of tile parliament, tile formation, 
representation, and * membership characteristics of political parties, 
organisation of' civil society agencies differ from tile rest of East European 
178 1111111,11, tlel Wallers . tein. 
I lie Capililist World EcononLy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
1979,1). 134. 
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countries which went through similar political changes. These characteristics 
Ol'the I lungarian systern will be discussed below. Tile conclusion concerning 
the pattern ordeniocratisation processes is that each system operates as part of 
all *open system' so that transformation may begin but then reacts to tile 
conditions and needs or its 'closed system' created by tile country's internal 
political. social. and economic background. 
Vill. THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
A. The Legislature and the Political Parties: 
The first in, ýIor cliange brought along by the new system was the requisite of 
holding Free, inulti-party and multi-candidate elections oil a hybrid of the PR 
and the inaJoritarian electoral systems. However, tile change in the electoral 
sysicin. following the pattern proposed by Rokkan, is merely tile introduction 
of' tile third step towards deillocratisation, that is, the mohilisation of masses 
into indirect participation in the political decision-rilaking process. 'rlle 
electoral process. thcreflore, is only a means and not the end, ill politicising 
society. The main institutions ill politicising society into a democratic structure 
are (lie parliainent and tile political parties. With tile activities of these two 
which florni the legislative and executive branches of the state structure, and 
with the flormation and functioning of nation-wide political , party 
organisations. the old political system would be altered to suit tile necessities 
or tile lie%%, political order. Therefore, tile first elections and the parliament 
%%hich %%as to be flornied upon their results, have a vital role in the shaping or 
the liberal democratic system in a transitory society. 
The 1990 elections, ill this context, have two important functions: First, they 
have set the fornitila for tile later elections and proved that tile electoral system 
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vvhich was introduced in tile National Roundtable discussions was working 
ell'iciently. Secondly, the 1990 elections have pinpointed to tile six major 
political parties Nvhich have become members of parliament from within tile 
pool or thirteen political parties which represented 97% of all candidates. This 
process or reduction in the number of the major political parties enabled the 
I lungarian political system to run ill a far less fractured manner ill comparison 
to other post-co ill rn till i st societies, such as tile Russian rederation or Poland, 
which are plagued by a very large pool or political parties. 
Political pat-ties represented in tile parliament were also tile recipients of tile 
majority or all votes. The representation of these parties in the parliament led 
to a systemic stability which fortificd the role of tile parliament and eased tile 
opcration of' the new political order. As both the parliament and tile political 
parties are the key icons of' the transitory period. tile clarity in the Formation 
and identification ol'these two major political institutional Crarneworks enabled 
tile transition to take place more smoothly and lience enabled tile strengthening 
ol* the legal legitimacy of the state and or the new political order vis-A-vis tile 
public Opinion. 
B. Parliamentarisation: 
1. The New Parliaments of Eastern Europe: 
At tile I)eginning ofthe post-communist era the parliament crnergcd as the only 
easily Formed and the most easily accessible icon of the new political order. 
Therelbre. tile role of parliament has become far more important and vital 
than it usually is in tile established liberal democracies. As tile parliament as all 
institution was associated. within the transitory period, with tile rnýjor tasks of 
rest rLICtUri ng the new political order, aniending, or replacing the communist 
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CODStiftition and other laws, creating an area or discussion for different 
political %, ic%v, -, voiced by the newly formed political parties' representatives, 
and with florming and inspecting tile functions of the executive branch. it has 
liccome the focus or attention for the general public in all post-coninlunist 
societies during latel980s and early 1990s. Parliament was now seen to 
11inction in a democratic manner. It managed to refashion itself as an important 
part of' the new political system -as distinct from its role under communism-. 
This gave it extremely high ratings in the mind or uie Hungarian pUblic. 179 
Attila Agh rellers to the rise of importance in tile role or and the public 
expectation Ilrom the parliamcnt as ovei-l)cii-litiiiici? lai-i. v(ition. 
The main reason Im tile intensity of the expectations and tile burden of the 
tasks held by the newly-fornied parliaments in Eastern Europe in general and 
in I fungary in particular Avas the fact that tile newly-flonned parliaments ol'the 
region have to perl'orm (lie multiple task of conslituent parliament and the 
tasks ol'a normal legislalive organ at the same time. Since few, irany, or the 
members having served in democratically elected bodies, and with few, if any, 
practices and internal structures of the pre-revolutionary era suitable for use in 
the new system, the newly-lormcd parliaments are expected to form a 
gox-crnment. inspect its functions, create and adopt tile necessary laws, bý-Iaws 
and regulations. and crcatc a new working environnicilt in which these could 
takc place. 
171) JjIllos Siln,, n tq'sel-ves , that (lie parliament was ranked second 
highest in public opinion in 1989 in 
terim ofrespect. while it ý%ent down to (lie fillh position out of six in 1992 while the army which was 
ranked third in 1989 went tip to the first spot. Sce Sinion's Fieldniamlial's Baton and Pence. Budapest: 
Academy of Scicnce, 1993. 
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2. The Clash of the Parliament's Roles: 
Fach country in the East E-uropean region adopted a difrcrent approach to the 
issue of this multi-task procedure of being both the active legislature and a 
constituent parlianictit. In Bulgaria, the first post-communist clections were for 
a Grand National Assembly. tile task of which would be to compose a new 
constitution. In Poland. tile parliament held the duty of amending thc 
constitution and the changes wcre inadc first throug 1 the negotiations betwcen L-1 
the Communist Party and the SolidaritY movement First in 1989, then in 1992, 
%khen Solidarity's so-called Little Constitution formed the basis of a 
democratic constitution. The Czech and Slovak republics had their own 
amended constitutions allcr tile dissolution of' tile Czcclioslovakia while 
Rumania adopted a brand-new constitution in 1993180. In I lungary, the 1949 
Stalinist constitution was anicnded but not replaced. 
The main reason flor Ilic use or flic 1949 constitution with amendments was 
that in the first post-coninlunist Hungarian parliament, changes in tile 
constitution required a two-thirds majority. Due to the discord arnong tile 
political partics oil the constitutional issues, the two-third majority could not 
be reached. As a result, tile constitutional changes ground to a halt. Intra- 
parliamentary conflict has harmed Hungarian political process more Strongly 
than it harmed other East European political orders due to tile ract that it was 
I lungary that made the transition based on political consensus and mutual 
compronlisel8l. The' llailurc of the s, ystern of compromise and consensus 
I" David N1. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative Vie , Armonk. New York: 
M. E. Sharpe. 1994, p. 127. 
. 
Tectivengms und Agencb Concenit 1,41 Attila Agh. Biimlýv Road to Europetinisation: Policy Ej -olion in 
the llwýt: urhm Legislation (1990-1993) in A. Agh (d), The Emergence or pst Central European 
Parliaments: The First Steps. [3udapcst:. I lungarian Centre of Democracy Studics, 1994, pp. 72-73. 
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reSUlted in the Hungarian parliament's disability to perfomi its duties as a 
constituent asscinbly and caused tile decline in popular trust in the parliament. 
On the other hand, it Nvould be correct to assume that the main function of a 
parliament is not to prepare a constitution but to legislate necessary laws and 
to amend laws previously enacted. In addition, tile image of the parliament as a 
Icgislative organ has a prcýedencc over its role as a constituent assembly with 
regards to public needs and expectations. Therclbre, public loss of trust 
towards the parliament may not be associated only with tile failure or reaching 
11 COnStitUtional consensus among the political parties. The failure to solve 
socio-ccononlic problems through new legisIdtion or by change of government 
through clectoral process have more to do with the declinc in the public 
interest and ti-LISt ror (lie parliament than its failure to act in unison to introduce 
a new constitution. When tile two functions ofthe parliament as a constitution- 
making body and as a representative assembly which enacts laws and 
regulations, the latter role, is the one more associated with the concept of 
parliament in public mind. as the former has a temporary life expectancy, thus 
a clash aniongst the roles carried out by the parliament would either be 
artificial or short-lived. 
3. The Hungarian Parliamentary Structure: 
The Parliament is therefore. in essence, a representative body -and it is 
perceived as such in tile Hungarian society since tile first post-communist 
parliamenCs flonnation through two- round clections in 1990. The constituency 
structure ol'the country defining the ternis'of'eligibility to picnibership or the 
Parliament is regulated by Act 34 (1989) which dictates a mixed constituency 
system. Of the total 386 seats. 176 are decided in individual constituency 
i1 
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elections, 15'. ) oil thc basis or 20 district lists (county and municipal), and 58 
seats on the basis or national usts. 'nis dual electoral systern allows the voter 
to use one vote to support the desired candidate in the individual constituency, 
and secondly. to support a party list. 
This constituency representation systcrn was designed during the 1989 
ROLIII(11,11)IC as a compromise between the wishes ofthe sides, and hence, is 
complicated. Parties which claimed to be the descendants or the pre-1949 
period. such as the Sniallholders Party argued in tile Government-Opposition 
Roundtable negotiation proccss or August 1989 that a list system should bc 
used in the elections as the one used prior to the Communist take-over or the 
COUntry. Other parties disagreed claiming that regional liabilities should be 
Cavoured as wc1l as stable majorities should be sought. As a result of these 
discussions. I lungarian electoral system has three different methods to Fill the 
M6 seats ol' tile Parliament. The number of tile parliamentary scats decided by 
each of tile three methods and the way these three methods work are described 
by John F itniorris as l'ollows: 
"a) 176 single member district (SMD) seats (32 in 
Budapest). based oil subdivision of the counties and the 
c, apital. In these. a candidate is elected if lie obtains 50 per 
cent plus one or the votes cast on tile first ballot. This is rare. 
In 1994 only two MIN (both MSzP) were elected oil tile first 
ballot. against five in 1990. In the second ballot, held two 
Nvecks later. a plurality (first past the post) applies. The top 
three candidates and any others with at least 15 per cent of the 
first ballot vote can remain in the field. 
b) 152 seats are allocated to regional lists in each county and 
the capital. Each area has a seat allocation corresponding to 
its j)OjILIIatiOII. Voters have ... a second 
list vote. There is a 
five perectit threshold for obtaining seats in this category, 
though of' course even smaller parties can elect MPs in the 
smd category... 
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0 58 (plus any unallocated regional scats) form a national 
pool. These are allocated on the basis of residual votes from 
the snid's and regional lists. The threshold applies here too. 
--182 
In the individual constituencies, a prospective candidate requires tile support of' 
-it least 750 voters to appear oil tile ballot. Tile acquisition of the required 750 
nomination slips is at the same time a precondition for the subsequent listing 
of' (lie parties. District lists can be established by any party which has 
candidates in at least one-quarter/at least two or tile individual constituencies 
in that district. National lists call for at least seven district lists. Entry into 
Parliament previously required at least four percent of the votes cast nationally, 
on party lists. while by tile tinie of tile 1994 general election. the ceiling was 
raised to five percent. 
According to tile law. every I lungarian citizen of 18 years of age is eligible 
both as a voter and as a candidate flor elective office. 
4. The Members of Parliament: 
As a result orthe change that the political order went through, the structure or 
the parlianicilt has also changed in terms or the qualities and identity or the 
ncNv members of' parliament (MPs) in Ifungary. Tile new Ws, mostly 
inexpcricnced in parliamentary political life under tile ancien 1-eginle, were 
mostly dissidents undcr the old regime or professionals who had no direct 
political corincctions until tile transformation. Arpid G6ncz, a renowned 
playwright. echoing the political ascent of the neighbouring Czechoslovakia's 
Vaclav I lavel, was elected the president or the country by the parliament. 
Many other people indirectly interested in political life but whose professional 
182 John Filzillorris. -The II ungarian LIccl ion of May 1994', EleclortilSludies, vol. 14 (1) (pp. 77-81), 
234 
interests were elsewhere became members of the cabinet. In the wake or the 
May 1990 cleetions. the first non-communist prernier of Hungary, J6zscf 
Antall. was a medical historian, the Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament was a 
historian ol'the 19"' century I lungary, tile foreign secretary was a historian of 
diplomacy NNhile a medical doctor was appointed as the ministcr responsible 
[Ior healih and Nvelfarel 83. None or these key positions went to professional 
politicians. because, apart 1'roni the communist apparatchiks or the unciell 
i-eginte. there were no prollessional politicians in the Hungarian society at that 
time. 
When the prollessional distribution of the new membas of tile Hungarian 
11,11-141111ent is analysed, it appears that tile new parliamentary elite of' Hungary 
gathered From two main sources: a) Professionals whose political preferences 
NVCrC SUbSUIlICd within the boundaries or their professions but who constituted 
the centre of' any newly-established political organisation by using their 
nct%Norking skills and political knowledge, and. b) local notables, people who 
, 
lack in political skill and knowledge compared to the first group, but who are 
respected and prestigious in their local community. Akos Rona-Tas claims that 
the **kind orlocal prestige that elevated the elected into power came from their 
position of' being *above politics'-184 during tile communist era and this 
proved short-lived due to their role in tile new political order. 
The 1990 election in which 386 MPs were elected, shows that having a 
prollession not directly related with politics has been an important element in 
I 
March 1995. pp. 78-79. 
Akos Rona-Tas. "I lie Selected and the Elected: The Making or the New Parliamentary Elite in C, 
I lmi-arv. * East EIII-olval, 1,, )Iificv (intlSociefles, vol. 5(3), Fall 1991 (pp. 357-393), p. 357. 
19-1 392. 
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one's election to the parliament. The following table shows the proressional 
distribution ol'the first post-communist legislature in Hungary. 
As can be see firom tile table below, tile struetural division of the Hungarian 
Parliament in the aftermath or tiic, first non-communist elections shows a two- 
tier division between the two groups cited above. Also, it is not surprising to 
sce that the members of the newly rising bourgeoisie as medical doctors or 
1, m)-ers are represented in the first post-coninlunist parliament cvcn though 
they lack the necessary political cxperience. 
The composition ol'the parliamentary groups by mostly inexperienccd people 
has C011tribUted to tile election results in 1994 as the general public voted 
overwhelmingly flor the IISP which incorporated expcricliced pre-transitioll L- . 
cadres within its ranks. me 1998 ciections, oil the othcr hand. were 1101.1ght in a 
new environment where all the participants have become professional 
politicians within (lie cight-year period of experience with democracy. 
Table 4.6. Professional Distribution of the 1990-1994 Parliament's MINIM: 
Proression NIPs Elected 
(%/386) 
General 
Grouping 
Agronomists, Vets, Co-op 
II eads 
29 Local 
Notables 
Clergymen 11 L. N. 
111I)sicians, Dentists, 
Chemists 
40 L. N. 
Teachers 32 L. N. 
Social Scientists 79 Politicised 
Professionals (P. P. ) 
Laivvers 51 P. P. 
Journalists 16 P. P. 
Writers, Linguists, Critics 21 P. P. 
Artists, Actors, Sportsmen 14 P. P. 
Sales/Ilotel/Middle 
Managers 
5 
I 
Technocrats 
Engineers, Architects, IT 
people 
42 
I 
Technocrats 
I 
185 The hil'ormation on the numbas is from ibid.. pp. 379-380. cven though the division of grOLIPS is 
mine and dii'llerent from Rona-Tas' clas. sirication. 
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Miners, Farmers, Industrial 17 Non - Proressionals 
Workers 
Small Entrepreneurs 14 Non- Professionals 
Clerics, Accounfan(s, Soldier I Low-rank, white. 
I collar workers 
C. The Political Parties: 
1. Political Parties as Institutions: 
Apart 1rom the parliament, the other key figure, ir not the protagonist or the 
whole new system, are the political parties. As an institution, tile parliament is, 
at tile cild ol* tile day. a medium, a mean to achievc liberal denlocracy. 
I lo%%ever. the major agencies which are involved in this airn. and tile main 
agencies wilich are to manipulate tile system, arc tile political parties. In due 
course. i I' the transition is to succeed, the main contributors to this end will be 
the political parties as individual actors. and not a gcneral coticcpt of' 
parliamentai3, democracy or the parliament acting as ail unibrella institution. 
The break-up (if' tile old reginic has seen tile emergence or re-cmagence or 
political parties in tile I hingarian political scene, although some were cithcr tile 
spin-ol'I's or claimants to be descendants of previous political parties. The 
11LIngarian Socialist Party (IISP), for instance. was formed by the reform 
communists ol'the I lungarian Socialist Workers' Party. while the conservative 
communists joined in the formation of tile Agrarian Alliance (AA). Many 
1-1,11-tiCS ill the COLIntry. in I'act claim to be cithcr direct dcsccndants or devoted 
l'ollowers of the pre-war political actors. Of these the Independent 
Sinallholders' Party (ISIIP) clainis to be the same party which was founded in 
the inter-war period and which was the main opposition party. It was tile party 
ol'the land-owning peasantry and had won the 1945 e1cctions in which it stood 
-is tile 1lon-communist. party in tile elections receiving 57% of tile votes. It 
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was reformed in 1988 by its previous mirs. 'nie 1 lungarian Social Democratic 
Party (I ISDII). being one of the pre-war political parties which merged with 
the Communists in late 1940s, was also reborn in the form of a more Left- 
I. ibel., Il 
All ol'this lirst group ol'political parties, tlicn, are linked with a past institution 
or claim to have SLICII links through tile use or party names or politicians and 
political ideas associated with the previously existing political parties. The 
main reason Im the claims or linkage to tile past political entities rises From the 
wish to make use or politics of nostalgia, that is, to make usc or tiie popular 
memories or preViOLIS political parties. By creating such a link, it marginalised 
party organisation rrom the communist systern. The new parties hoped to 
receive a larger margin of votes and hoped to use their past to present 
themsek-cs as national Ilungarian' partics. Therefore. the claim to llavc a 
lcgilhwite link Nvith a previously cxisting political organisation, in the political 
cliaos of' I lungary in late 1980s and early 1990s would cvcntually give an 
advantage to the newly flormed organisations Im tlicse would be perceived as 
descendants ol' parties that are placed in the coninion public memory. In this 
case. the act o I' abandoning sorne major policies has no great effect on tile 
otes. because although tile names or tiie old political parties arc still part or 
the common memory. after four dccades of Communist rule, the chances that 
the maJor policy perspectives of political parties of 1940s being remembered 
accurately were low. The choice to follow the policies of' their namesake 
parties as the Smailliolders Party did, or to abandon or dramatically aItcr tllcse 
IMAndrm KOrOsenyi. 'The Hungarian Parliamentary Clations, 1990', pp. 72-73. in Andras Boz. oki, 
Andras KOrOsenyi. George SchOpIlin (ed. s), Post Communist Transition: Emenging Pluralism in 
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policies as the I lungarian Social Democratic Party did depends on the possible 
popularity ol'these policies in the late 20th century. 
There NNere also those politicians who followed a different way. The newly 
l'ornied political parties had a clairn to power based on their opposition to the 
(-'OllllllLllliSt TUIC in tile latc-KMAr period. and their legitimisation was based on 
their refonn-oriented. change-seeking approach to I lungarian political lifie. The 
"inner of tile 1990 clections. tile Hungarian Democratic Forum (I-IDF). flor 
instance. was the rcsult ol'a crisis, in 1987, in tile late Kdddr era, and was a 
nationalistic and populist movement. It served as a centrist institution between 
the ruling Communists and the radical opposition groups. It changed its 
structural framework under the leadership or ic)zscr Antall, who took ovcr as 
the party's new leader in 1989 and who took tile party to tile line of German 
CINA'St I Christian-Democratic with a nationalistic side. That is, tile party 
has become a conservative, nationalistic party which promoted fundamental 
values ol'religious and national origins. 
The Alliance (if' Free Democrats (AFD), on the other hand, began as an 
unibrella organisation. The roots of the party were found aniong the Hungarian 
opposition intellcOuals, who, in 1980s, transformed their concerns of' 
opposition 1rom the Pursuit Or human rights issues to more direct pýlifical 
activities. This general umbrella organisation first turned into the so-called 
Network. a loose alliance of regime opponents ill tile Spring of 1988. The 
Network led to the flor'niation of flic Alliancc of Free Dcmocrats in Autumn 
1988. The AFD is, then, an alliance or tile bourgeois radicals. Christian 
Minocrats. Liberal Conservatives, various fractions of Social Democrats, and 
jtqttu, a!: y, London: Pinter 116blishers. 1992. 
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()I' (il-censI87, which combines all these groups under an institutional 
frammork similar to that or British Tories. 
The Alliance offoung Democrats (FIDESz) is a party that developed on tile 
basis of a youth opposition movement of 1980s. Its first predecessor was an 
Andependent Youth Union* opposed to the Communist KlSz (Communist 
Youth I Inion), ind dates From 198 1. Then, with theopeningol'new, specialised 
COIICgCS ill BLIdapest and elsewhere ill Hungary, tile student clitc of these 
colleges -such as tile Budapest University of Economics- followed the idea or 
florming their own youth organisation and in March 1988, FIDESz was 
founded. It became a radical youth movement which did not hesitate to adopt - 
aggressive and I'Lindanicntally anti-communist methods. Its participation in the 
round-tablc talks in 1989. and its members' highly active participation in these 
talks enabled it to debate beyond its character or a youth organisation and 
rdorm itsel I'as a political party close to tile line pursued by tile Al- D 188. Yet, 
the FIDF. Sz was a radical political party which would not accept any nierribm 
above 35 years of* age. at that time. The rule of having no members above 35 
years orage %%as lifted md'en Viktor Orban, the charismatic leader or tiie party, 
tunicd 35 in 1995. 
To generalise the specifications or this second group, one may claim 
illat tile 
ne-wly emerging political parties claim their right of existence and legitimacy 
on tile grounds of a political movement and can be affiliated with various 
opposition figures in lie 1980s. All of these political parties can be linked to 
I X71_1S/1,1 "'I'lie Character of Political Parties in I lungiry (Autumn 1989)", in ibid.. pp. 37-39. r% L- 
I 881sivan Stumpl, "Political Socialisation or the New Generation: Alliance or Young Democrats". in 
(; ýOrgy Csepeli. Laszlo Kcri. Istvan S(umpr(ed. s), State and Citizen: Studies on Political Socialisation 
in l'o%t Conpiumim Lamern Europe. 13m. lapcst: Institute or Political Science, 1993, pp. 67-79 passim. 
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CHLILICS in society who ideologically associate themselves with the parties. 
Tlicir commitment Icgitimises these parties as their representatives. 'File 
associated clique may be formed by liberals or tile Greens or the independent 
youth %%ho do not %Nish to be associated with any political ideology but want to 
have a say in the I'Liture ortheir countryl 89. 
Yct. Io rule a country, to conipcte in a national scale and win the right to rule. 
political parties have to go bcyond the lcvel of being representatives ora given 
portion orthe nation and persuade the others that they are worthy or support. 
The I irst group of political parties. those which idcritified thernselves with the 
past political parties, by relating themselves to/with tile past experience orthe 
public with their so-called predecessors, managed to create such ail image in 
the minds of' general public. 'rile pcrl'orinance of a previously active political 
party (stich is tile ISI 11)) or of' an important rraction within a political party 
(just like [lie I ISP) may be used to convince masses that the re-formed party 
may N%ork 11or (lie benefit or the country, or that the new cadres will pursue a 
inore advantageous policy vis-A-vis tile public (as llSDP chose to claini) and 
sought to redefinc their policies without totally denying their origins. 
Oil the other hand, the newly emerged political agencies, those organisations 
which were Conned within and by the 1980s lack this luxury of assýciating 
themselves with tile previously livcd, cxperiences. They hoped to associate 
themseNes as political profiessionals who could manage change, a flactor 
cspecially important d tiring tile uncertainties or transition. Tile frequent policy 
FIDES/'% sell'-representition as the 'party or tile youtii, may be seen as a policy to convince tile 
ideologically neutral -or indifferent- part of tile Hungarian youth to vote. Therefore, it is possible not to 
have mv direct ideolo-ical all iliation with a political party but to Icgitirnisc it by voting for it. 
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alterations of' the newly born parties may be linked with this wish to obtain 
Public legitimacy and secure political power. 
Moreover. the -social existence or political parties is another key issue in their 
succcss. The lack or existence or nation-wide organisation is a key in nation- 
wide legitinlisation of' the party as well as its political orientation or 
backgrouml. The lack ora weil-organised nation-wide structure may result in 
the parties bascd oil local representatives which do not show interest in the 
11,11ion as a %%hole but which prefer to defend tile interests or a regionil, 
geographical and licnce sociological group. such as urban intelicctuals or the 
Great Southern Plain POPLIlation. The lack of nation-wide organisation of 
1: 11)1, 'Sz cost thern a great deal of votes and tile denial of a nation-wide 
recognition and legitimacy in the 1990 elections in which they got only 8.94% 
o I* N otes. 
The Icgitimisation of political parties as individual organisations. then, 
depends oil their ability to convince tile public opinion on their being rightful 
and l'ollo%Ncrs of* previously existent political parties or on their being the right 
choice lo govern IIIC COLIntry bascd on their perflorniance as opposition 
movenien1% in late Kadarist period, and on their nation-wide orgailisation. Yet, 
the problem with political parties' legitimacy is not peculiar to individual 
organisational ievei oniy. 'nicir perflorniance as a group, as a set or agents 
%Nithin the political structure has its very important role in legitimisation too. 
2. The Parliamentary Political Parties: 
Hie parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament . 
llavc experienced 
ideological 11LICtuations as well as actual fragmentations in their menibmilip. 
I lo%%cvcr. tile six political parties represented in the first parliamentary period 
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or 1990-1994 remained in the parliament in tile aflumath of both the 1994 and 
the 1998 clections. though the representatives and their values have changed ill 
time. 
DUrint, ' tile 41 year period or interregnum, there were no active alternative 
parties to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, although the multi-party 
system and individual parties were never abolished outright by any legal ruling 
Or Court LICCiSiOll in I lungary in the aftcrniath or tile communist take-over. The 
only exception to tile undisputed rule of the I ISWII in those 41 years was tile 
brier re-emergence of' the pre-communist political parties during the 1956 
UpriSing. 
The lirst steps to the establishment orthe inulti-party systern in I lungary. took 
place in 1987 and 1988. During these years, popular movements and political 
or, anisations appeared and in a short period of time transilornied themselves g 
into political parties. The I lungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was rornlcd oil 
September 27.1987. in Lakitclek, and transformed in September 1988 into a 
it movement with a political program". In tile spring or 1989 it finally became a 
political party. Within the sarne process, tile AM came into being out of tile 
I Netýý'ork of' Free Initiatives -formed in 1988-. In January 1990, tile political 
organisation became a political party. The Federation of Young Democrats 
(I - IDI-Sz) which now has become the Hungarian Civic Party, was also formed 
in 1988. Yet, tile real breakthrough came when The Hungarian Socialist 
Workers* Party declared its own dissolution oil 7 October 1989. In its place, 
the I lungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) was formed, now defininig itself as a 
social democratic party. In November 1988 the Independent Sniallholders' 
Party (ISI 111) was flormed. In January' 1989, tile I luilgarian Social Democratic 
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Party 0 ISDP) appeared oil the I lungarian political scene. Both the ISI-113 and 
tile I ISDP claimed to be direct descendants of tile parties of tile same name. By 
the time the elections were held in 1990 (25 March and 8 April were tile dates 
01' tile IWO rounds of election), some 65 political parties were forl-ned and 
registered. I lowever. only 12 of these 65 political parties could fulfil the 
conditionsso Illilt they Could compete in tile general elections. orthcse, eleven 
partics could achieve more than 1% of tile total votes cast though only 6 or 
them were eligible flor parliamentary representation, that is only six parties 
lia%e passed the 4% election threshold -which would rise to 5% in 1994 
elections-. 
The III-St SCSSiOll Of(hC InUlti-party Hungarian Parliament convened oil 2 May 
1990, and tile new coalition government was formed oil 22 May, by the 
representatives of' tile I lungarian Democratic Forurn, tile Independent 
Sniallholders' Party. and the Christian-Dernocratic People's Party. The first 
post-conimunist government. then. was a Christian-Conservative alliance, 
leaving the liberal (FIDESz and Alliance or Free Democrats) and the socio- 
CICIIIOCI', ItS (I ILIngarian Socialist Party) oil tile opposition benches. 
Although during the two elections 'held in 1990 and 1994 there has been 
I. raginentation within political parties, raising the number of tile political 
parties represented in tile Parliament from six to filleen, the 1994 elections 
resulted in representation of the same six original parties. During tile first 
parliamentary period. *such parties as the Hungarian Justice and Life Party and 
tile Market Party were flornicd from the I fungarian Democratic Forum (see also 
the establishment of tile Hungarian Democratic People's Party during tile 
sccond parliamentary term, in early 1996), and a division of the Sillailholders' 
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Party took place due to arguments over the party"s representation in the 
go% crimient. I lo%vever. the representation in the Parliament was not altered as 
the rractions which turned into political parties were lcft outside or tiie 
parliament aller the following elections. In addition to the intra-parliamentary 
divisions. 111C IlUnlber of parties outside tile Parliament has increased 
geometrically. At present, tllcre are 130 registered parties, although 100 to 110 
tire actually 'phantom' parties with a few dozen or a flew hundred members and 
hence lack any opportUrlity to achieve to pass the electoral threshold 190. 
IX. THE PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION IN HUNGARY 
A. The Parliamentary Representation of Political Parties: 
hQ I Imigarian parliamentary systcm resembles that of a chaticcilery 
dcinocracy. The main executive organ is the cabinet. Its members are elected 
firom within the parliament. Tile highest executive position is premiership, 
while the presidency has a value only in ternis of symbolic representation. Its 
main representative body. tile Parliament, has a unicameral structure consisting 
of' 186 members or parliament (thence, MIs) who are elected for four-year 
terms. The I lungarian Parliament holds two regular sessions, one in spring and 
one in autumn. tile first rrom February I to June 15, and the second from 
September I to December 15 during the year. Since May 2,1990, it has been 
in constant session by alternating regular and extraordinary, sessions. 
The parliament holds its plenary sessions oil Mondays and Tuesdays, while 
Wcdnesdays and Thursdays are reserved for committee meetings. During tile 
1990-94 parliamentary period, tile Parliament enacted 219 pew laws, amended 
213 laws. and brought 354 decisions. Most of these amendments and 
1"Domfloaded 11rom tile I nternet database of tile tI ungarian Embassy in Washington D. C.. 
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enactilient are necessary steps to deal with tile newly established democratic 
s)-stem and a market cconomy. 
The first elections in 1990 did not result in any single political party gaining 
power. I lie votes. due to the electoral systern made a coalition government a 
necessity. A coalition between the Hungarian Democratic Foruni, the 
Indelicn(lent Smallholders, 11arty and the Christian Democratic People's Party 
sharcd the responiibility of governing the country with the IlLingarian 
Democratic Fortim being the majority partilcr in the right-wing coalition. The 
results ol* this first clection in the post-coninluilist era may be seen as a 
rellection ofthe public desire to get rid of tile ancient reginic and to support a 
liberal political and economic systcrn. 
Table 4.7. Parliamentary seats gained by political parties after the 1990 
elect ions 191. 
Pirly NlSzP SzDSz FKgl' Fl D ESz KNDP NIDF A Joint Inde 
Name A Deput- pen 
ies (let) t 
Seats 33 92 44 21 21 164 1 4 6 
Won 
( iuidc lo Parties: I fungarimi Socialist Party (MSzl'). Alliance offree Democrats (S/. I)Sz). Independent 
Smallholders Party (FKgl'): Christian Democratic People's Party (KNDP): Federation or Young 
Democrat,; (I 11)1: SZ)-. I hingarian Democratic Fortim (MDF). Agrarian Alliance (AA). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
M I's of'coalition governmeni formed oil 22 May 1990 consisted or tie 
Hungarian Dcniocratic Forum (MDF/IIDF), the Sniallholderg Party 
(FKgP/ISIIP) and the Christian Democratic Pcople's Party (KDNP/CDPP) 
constituting nearly 6W, o or all parliamentary seats. However, in time, the 
parliamentary aritlimiCtic changed as some dissidents appeared in each party 
and 11ormed new political parties or remained'as independent MIs. Towards 
C. 11-111CII 60111,11CZ Fill-i(ILIeL, rJecloral Si-slents on(I Political Slabilin, in Central and Eastern 
LyroLT. Budapest: 1995.1 lungarian Centre for Democracy Studies Foundation, p. 2 1. 
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(hC CIILI 01' the flour-year parliamentary cycle. the balance had considerably 
altered and nearly 20% of the MPs sat with groupings othcr than thcir original 
affiliates. reducing the government majority to around 50 percent. 
More than 20 parties ran candidates in the second general elections lield in two 
roundS LlUring May 1994.15 parties managcd to eompile national lists. and in 
the end the same six parties made it to Parliament as in 1990, though in 
111111damentally differctit proportions. 'nic I lungarian Socialist Party 
(NlSzl'/IISII), a party formed by the refin-in wing of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers* Party, received flic most votes. 
Table 4.8. ParliamentaD, seats gained by political parties after the 1994 
vierfinn.;? 
PHr(y NIS. /T SzDSz FKgI' FIDESz KNDP NIDF MDPP Independ 
Name ems 
Seats 209 69 22 19 20 19 15 6 
Won 
Oddo to Parties: I lungarian Socialist Parly (MSzl'). Alliance of* Free Democmts (Szl)Sz). Independent L- 
Smallholders hirlý O'Kg1l). ChriNtian Democratic Pcople'% Parly (KNDP). Federation of* Young 
Dclimcrak (F1DLSZ): Ilungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). Hungarian Democratic People's Party 
(KIDIIII) 
Fhe 1994 elections, as can be seen in Table 4.3.. gave way to a difTerent 
combinalion ol* political party representation than the 1990 clections had 
yicldcd to. Anothcr coalition government was founded aflcr these elections, 
this time bct-vveen thc Hungarian Socialist Party who had enough votcs to form 
a government by itscil' yet which prellerred not to, and tile Allianceý of Free 
Democrats which were the second biggest party in the 1994-1998 
parliamentary period. 
Fhe 1998 elections %khich werc lield in two rounds on 10 and 24 May 1998, 
once again. reSUlted in the same number of political parties being represented 
in the parliament. The Christian' Democratic Pcople's Party lias lost all its 
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seats, while tile I lungarian Democratic People's Party has lost its seats to its 
descciulant, I lungarian Justicc and Life Party: 
Table 4.9 ParliamentaD, seats gained by political parties after the 1998 
jccjiOj,.,; l92- 
Parly NanvcýNlSzll SzDSz I FKgp I FIDESz I KNDP NIDF I MP I NII: F: P: ý 
-Seat% Won 134 22 1 48 J_ 148 101 17 101 14 
(inide to Parties: I lungarian Socialist Party (MSzl'), Alliance or Free Democrats (Szl)Sz). Independent 
Smallholdcr% hnfý (I: Kgl'): Chrimian Democr atic People's Parq (KNDII). Federation or Young Democrals (I'il)I: SZ)-. Hungarian Democratic I, orum (Mt)l: ), Ilungarian Democratic People's Party 
fNII )IT). Workcrs* (Communist) Party (Ml'). I lungarian Justice and Li re Party (KI I Ell). 
Although there has been a change in the representation of tile political parties 
with the exception OfthC CXCILISiOll of the Christian Democrats 1roin the 1998- 
2002 parliament. tile ideological representation in the parliament was not 
altercd by the 1998 cleetion results. The inability of the communists to have ail 
Nil' CICCtCd through their Workers' Party and the continuity of the nationalist- 
to-liber-al tendencies of' the Hungarian Democratic People's Party by the 
11LIngarian Justice and Life Party, prove that there is a continuity in the 
parlianicritary reprcscmation and voting procedures. 
Table 4.10 Parliamentary seats gained by political parties after the 2002 
lectioll, ,, 
193.. 
I'striv NISIP SzDSz FKgp FIDESz NIDF MP NIIEP 
Name 
Seat% 178 19 0 188 0 0 0 
NN on 
I'lic 2002 eleetions were different in their structure and outcome 1"roni the 
prvvious c1cctions duc to the association of the country*s future with tile 
Furopean Union (EU) mcnibuship and hence people voted in the second 
round of' the elections in accordancc with thcir vision of EU membership. 
1`2 Data m the 1998 election results gathered from the web-site of the Italian organisation Agora, 
in September 1998. 
Dala on the 2002 election results gathered from the web-site of the International Foundation for 
Election Systems. IFTS. http: //w%v%v. ifFs. orgtcgiiide/rcsultstinit'liungary-par-O2. htin. 
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'I'lirce political parties. Fidesz. Hungarian Socialist Party, and the Alliance of 
Free Democrats have become the parties favoured by the voters ill tile second 
round ol'the elections and the combination or all other parties could rind only 
47.006 voles Cor theniscl%-cs in the second round of tile 2002 elections. The 
I lungarian parliamentary structure, therefore. was dramatically altered ill tile 
2002 elections flor tile general wish of the Hungarian public to have a strong 
government and/or a strong opposition in the parliament in this transitory 
period. 1: 11 membership. thercl'ore, has become a more pivotal issue than party 
prellerences and loyalties. 
The Hungarian Parliament has a diversion of political views represented 
%Nitliin itself' by the mainstream political parties. Of these, six have been 
represented ill parliament firom 1990 to 2002, thus, one may assume that there 
is a discernibic trend or development in parliamentary traditions. Moreover, 
some orthcse parties claim to be the direct descendants or tile political parties 
of' the pre-conlillunist period. such as the Sniallholders' Party, while tile 
Ilungarian Socialist Party is the heir to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' 
Party. now was divided into two political parties, the other party being the 
I lunuarian Workers' Party. As to the results or the 2002 elections, it can be 
claimed that even the relatively strong system of representation in Ilunýary had 
to he revised 11or the voters wanted to see their country's government as a solid 
mechanism and not a coalition or a weak lead or one party over nearly equal 
others. 
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B. Major Parliamentary Political Parties in Hungary: 
Political parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament are either newly 
established political parties or those who are successors to the communist 
reginie*s leading party. 01' the first group, some claim -such, as the 
Independent Sniallholders Party- to be the followers or the reincarnation of a 
political party that once I'Linctioned in the pre-socialist period, or claim to be 
rcpresentatives of a social group or class. 
John T. Ishiyania distinguislics between the newly rornied political parties and 
the successor parties. claiming that, of all the post-comn1unist political parties 
in Fastern E-Airope. the coniniunist-successor parties are, "unlike 'new 
partics. '... not merely clubs or notables or 'couch parties' (%%, here all members 
COUld lit on a single couch)" but are "distinct organisations, and by any 
definition represent 'real' political parties. " 194 The other political parties 
which rely on the claim of' historicity try to obtain the same degree of 
distinctiveness and hence create a fMing of reliance on the public by 
association with a historically continuous process. Paul G. Lewis' observation 
that the success orconimunist-successor political parties such as the SdRP in 
Poland and the I ISP in I Itingary result rrom the main strengths of what lie 
ternis as the traditional mass party, which has "a high membership in terms or 
the post-coniniunist context, good finances and material resources and a high 
degi-ce o forgan isational development, " 05 sustains Ishiyania's, argumentl"6. 
I'll John T. Ishiyama. *The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organisational Developments in 
Post-Communist Politics, * 11olitival Research Quarlerýv , 
'v. 52 (1). March 1999, p. 88. 
Levvis. *Introduction and Theoretical Overview, ' in Paul G. Lewis (cd. ), Party Structure and Paul G 
QmanLigljon in East Central Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 1996, p. 16. 
196 For a discussion on . 11eneralisations on political party organisation types, works or Petr Kopecky, I lerberl Ki(schelt. l1aul G. Lewis. Angelo Pancbianco. John 1'. lshiyama. Richard S. Katz and Richard 
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On the political parties flormed in the post-communist era, Alcks Szczerbiak 
observes that "cvidcncc confirnis many of tile hypothesised characteristics 
ascribed to the new political parties in postcommunist Eastern Europe: a weak 
grounding in the civil society. dependence on the state for material and 
Ii nancial resources. and a centralised decision-making structure combiticd with 
4-CCI()I-, Il 1()Cll 111 to 110 Illy. " 107 
The I Itingarian Parliament, for the thrcc consecutive post-communist c1cctions 
had the same six political parties under its roof and hence shows a collerent 
and consistent attitude unlike other post-coniniunist regirnes' legislatures. The 
II ungurian %, oters* consistency in terms of electing tile candidates of tile same 
six political parties in all three general elections, as well as tile two-terill 
service orthe Conner President 
Arpdd G! jncz and tile unproblematic election or 
Ilk SUCCCSSOr PrOr. Icrenc Madl to the post orprcsidency in tile year 2000 can 
be taken as proor or tile positive effects or the Roundtable Discussions and tile 
distinction created by the KAddrist regime's quasi-social contract, 98. 
lli)x%cvcr, the Hungarian political party system is not a fully-functional, 
ineclianisin %%hich is based oil tile institutions. Although there is ample 
evidence oil the institutionalisation or political parties and sorne sort or party- 
Cept tile al, filiation among the Hungarian voters. it is also possible to ac 
argument ol' Gabricla lionski and Malcolm Punnett that tile I lungariall party 
system is based oil leadership and leading figures as these represent a symbol 
Mair in the theoretical arena, arid the works of Attila Agh, Gabricla llonski, and Aleks Szczcrbiak in the 
re-ional/practical arema can be cited. I- 147 Alck% Siczerbiak. "resting Party Models in East-Central Europe. ' Par(y Politics, v. 5 (4), p. 518. 
I" See Paul G. Lmis. 'East-Ccritral Europe: The Czech Rcpublic, Slovakia, I lungary, and Poland, ' in 
S(Cphcn White. Judy Butt, and Paul G. Lewis (eds. ), 13cyclopments in Central and East Europgan 
Politics --2. London: MacMillan Press, 1998, p. 33, on parlianicritary 
fragnicritation in the first Polish 
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to the general public to follow. Ilonski and Punnett claim that the dissident 
I lungarian intellectuals of the communist era now emerge as power-holders 
and policy makers which give them an extra power oil the party administration 
and organisation. and provides public figures to follow for tile public while 
casing intra-party Icadership-scicction procedures to remain not entrenched 
yet"". Although their arguments may be sustained by tile decision of FIDESZ 
to prd'er the leadership of Viktor Orban to their founding principles, or by tile 
I IDF's intra-party succession race after the demise of' party leader and Prime 
Minister 
. 16zscf Antall. one also must consider tile institutional isation or the 
political parties within the new political order. 
I lence. one may argue that tile I lungarian political party organisation is still to 
solidly rooted in the liberal democratic system in terms of' its 
representational prercrences in ternis or the rormation of the intra-party 
hierarchy and in terms ol'the public representation, that is whether a political 
parly is to become a catch-all. cartc], or class-specific organisation. However, 
Own the parliamentary representation of the Hungarian political parties is 
considered. it can be argued that the political party organisation in ternis of 
illStitUtiO11,11isation of* political partics in Hungary is establislicd in a morc 
stable manner than all the surrounding Eýast-Ccntral European eduntries' 
political parties and the I lungarian political partics havc a bater rclationship 
vOll their voters in comparison with the rcgional post-communist reginies. 
and Czech parliaments. I lungary remains distinct from these two examples as there were fragmentations 
in mid-parliamentary term but these were not sustained by the voters in the following elections. 
Malcolm Punnett and Gabricla lionski. 'Leading Democracy: The Emergence of Party Leaders and 0 Their Roles in [lie I lungarian Partics, * in'rerry Cox and Andy Furlong (eds. ), llunga! y: The Politics or 
'-Lra! jsjfI )n. London: Urank Cass. 1995, pp. 101-102. ijý- 
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The polifleal parties that are represented in tile Hungarian Parliament are as 
follows. 
I. Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP I MSzP): 
The I lUngarian Socialist Party is a direct descendant of the IISWP. It was 
established after the dissolution tile IISWP by the Reform Socialist wing of the 
Party. 'I'llereflore. tile I ISP has a socio-denlocratic attitude and has a positive 
approach towards privatisation and direct roreign investment. 
The leader of' the party and tile Prime Minister in tile 1994-1998 period is 
Gyula I lorn -who was the Minister of Forcign Affairs in the last Communist 
government. During that period, Gyula Horn played a prominent role in the 
establishment ol' diplornatic relations with South Korea and Israel, in the 
dismantling of the Iron Curtain, and supported tile re-unification of Germany 
by allm6ig Fast (Jumans to 11ce via Hungary to the West. Additionally, he 
completed preparations Im and later signed the agreement on the withdrawal 
ol'Sovict Iroops fi-oni I lungary. Thus, as a rerorni-wing nienibcr or tllc I ISWII, 
I lorn NNas the leading figure to lead the post-communist IISP. 
While in tile 11990 elections tile party didn't do well, receiving only 9% of the 
votes and 33 parliamentary seats, in the 1994 elections it emerged as the main 
part), From the ballots, magnifying its percentage in the total votes cast to 54% 
and its scats in the parliament to 209., The liarty was the nlýjority coalition p 
partner in the 1994-98 legislative era in co-operation with tile Alliance or Free 
Democrats, the second biggest party. 
lio%%evct-. the IISII has lost its supremacyAn-votes in the 1998 elections to 
Fidesz gathering 32.2% ol'the votes and 134 parliamentary seats, making the 
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I ISP the second biggest party in the parliament. The party is not a member of 
the government in (lie 1998-2002 parliamentary term. 
2. Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz): 
The presence or Alliance or Free Democrats originated in tile late 1970s as a 
social opposition movement to tile Communist regime. Chiefly concerned with 
human rights. it initially gathered intellectuals who adopted a critical attitude 
towards tile existing systern. Tile group called itself 'tile democratic 
oppositioW. Later oil. this democratic opposition gradually embraced political, 
prollessional. cultural, religious, minority and other oppositions to the single- 
Part)* rule in its composition. The Nelwork of"Fi-ce Initiatives emerged from 
this co-operation and transformcd itscir to tile Alliance of Free Democrats oil 
l"November 1988. According to the Manifesto or Principles, approved by tile 
FOL111dilIg Convention, the Alliance of Free Democrats is tllc'party of freedom 
and solidarity'. The Alliance supports liberal policy and wants ail independent, 
democratic wcll'are state. 
In tile wake orthe National Roundtable Negotiations of 1989, tile Alliance of 
Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats, supported by tile 
Smallholdcrs Party and tile Social Democratic Party, initiated a rererenduln oil 
Wiether the people should directly elect the President of the Republic. As a 
result of the reflerendum. the majority or citizens decided not to elect the 
President directly, bel'ore tile general free elections, and left this function to tile 
new Pirliament. 
Hic AFD became the second largest parliamentary party with 92 seats aller the 
1990 elections and became tile leader or the opposition. 
Arpdd G6ncz, a 
11ornier member ofthe Executive Board of tile Alliance of The Free Democrats, 
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-v%-as elected President of the Republic. In tile 1990 municipal elections, it 
achieved notable success with its candidate GAbor Dei-nszky becoming tile 
Mayor of Budapest. Yet. due to intra-party connicts, tile Party leader JAnos Kis 
did not run 11or re-election. His successor, Peter Ti3lgyessy, was elected in 
November 1991. In November 1992, the party held a congress resulting ill 
leadership changes. IvAn retr), who used to be leader of the parliamentary 
group. %%as elected president or tile party. In July 1993 the Liberal 
hilermitionale voted uilaniniously to include the Alliance in its organisation. 
Durhig the 1994 parliamentary elections, the AFD remained the second largest 
party in the Parliament with 67 seats. At the 1994 local elections, the party 
preservcd its results and remained the second largest party of tile country. 
(41bor Deniszky, the Mayor of Budapest, was re-clectcd and the Alliance of 
Free Democrats achieved leading positions in most or the cities or county 
status. as well. 
The AFD has entered into a coalition with tile Hungarian Socialist Party. the 
victor ol'the 1994 general elections. The Coalition Agreement includes a very 
(Ictailed 'hylaw of tile coalition' providing equal positions in decision-making. 
The Government Program is based on'the prograrns orthe two parties. despite 
(lie unequal parliamentary positions held by the two partieS200. A series of 
scandals including tile Tocsik privatisation scandal affected the AFD and 
appeared to harm tile public image of the Alliance. 
As a reSUlt or the corruption accusations and the poor performance of tile party 
in (lie 1994-98 coalition government with the I ISP, tile- Alliance of Free 
Democrats have lost more than hair or their parlianiciltary seats in tile 1998 
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cleclimis. The AFD*s parliamcntaiy seats were reduced fironi 60 in 1994 to 24 
ill 1998 and its share in the votes was reduced to 7.9% compared to the 17.8% 
ill 1994. 
3. Hungarian Civic Party [ex-Federation of Young Democrats) (FIDESz), 
1--'11)1-'. Sz has a similar background to the AFD. It was founded on 30 March 
1988 1)), a group of* 37 University students and young intellectuals. Miklos 
Andrasi. Viktor Orban -is well as, Ivan Csaba, I. aszlo Kover, and Andras Racz, 
were Ille leading figures in the movement. The nailic FIDESz was chosen as 
the motto of' (lie group. The word literally means -self-confidence, 
(rustworthiness. belief". They lield a two-day congress at the Jurta Theater in 
November 1988 in which the members of the Federation discussed and 
adopted the drall ol'the program of tile organisation. In 1989, it had beconic a 
considerable political actor in opposition with 80 local grOLIPS and 3,500 
members. It was in organiser and a Icading member or tiic 1989 Roundtable. 
The main decision-making body of FIDESz was its Congress. The 
representatives ol' local grOLIPS created the Council. the highest body between 
the sessions ol'the congresses. Local groups ol'l--'IDESz were autononious, and 
elected thch- leaders. and determined their own struCtUre. 
A maJor characteristic ol'the Federation Nvas that none or its nicnibers; sliould 
exceed 35 ycars ol'age alld had to leave the organisation W11CII tUrning 35. This 
rule. liowevcr. was altered wlicn Viktor Orban. tile leader of FIDE-Sz turned 35 
himsel I'. Orban led the party Ilor a while longer but is not tile leader anymore. 
Despite I-Cceiving Only 5% orthe votes cast in tile May 1990 elections, FIDESz 
has comimicd to be an influential actor in Hungarian political life and was 
., 
ilc ()rtlle S., L)S7 at the address www. szdsz. liu. 21111 From (Ile 
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tipped as one ol'the victors ol'the 1994 elections in which it could only defend 
19 ol'its 21 seats in the actual elections. 
The 1998 elections saw a dramatic change in the voting behaviour of the 
I lungarian electorate in Ilavour of the FIDESz. The Federation has become the 
Cavourite ol'the electorate lor its liberal economic programme and its urban, 
inteliccitial. youtili'LlI image. In the 1998 clection campaign. FIDESz was 
victorious becoming the largest party in (lie I lungarian Parliament. Despite the 
Ilact that it gained only 1.8.2% of' the POPLIlar vote. with its victory in the 
-seat constituencics it managed to hold 148 parliamentary seats. Viktor single 
Orban became the fourth prime minister of post-conimunist I hingary, leading a 
coalition government lonned under FIDESzs leadership with the participation 
ol' Independent Smailliolders' Party and thC IlLingarian Democratic Forum as 
the smaller members. In the 2002 elections, FIDESz led the votes. 
FIDI'Sz has adopted the name Hungarian Civic Party in addition to Federation 
01' YOLIII. Q Dcniocrats and although still using the abbreviation FIDF. Sz, tlic 
party lias officially become IIDESz-MPP. 
4. Independent Smallholders Party (ISHPIFKgP): 
'I 'lie I ndependent Smallholders Party (ISI I P) claim's to be the direct descendant 
of' a political party of' the same name in the prc-1949 era in Hungary. It re- 
1lppC, lrCLI. or was resurrected, during the late 1980s and played its part ill the 
National Roundtable discussions. Its determination to introduce ail electoral 
sYstem similar to the one uscd prior to tile communist take-over helped define 
the bOUndarics ol'the current elcctoral system. 
Flie party has a sectional appeal though claims to have support from a variety 
or social segments. The main support or tiic party conles from flic agrarian 
257 
parts ol* tile country, fi-0111 tile votcrs who are in principle in support of' tile 
liberal market economy but who. in practice, are For the preservation of the 
agricultURII III-OtCCtiOlliSIll. YCt. beyond that group the party clainis the faiths of 
anti-Communists. nationalists, devoted Christians, and quasi-liberals201. 
[lie wake of* tile 1990 elections, The ISIIP has become one or the three 
coalition partners with its 44 MPs. However. the Party seemed to work against 
ratlicr than %%ork within (lie coalition government. and in March 1992 the party 
oFficially lel't tile coalition. However. the government stayed ill power as 30 
out of' the 44 MI's of' tile party remained in the government benclies and 
claimed that tlicir CaLICUS is the ISHP despite their dismissal from the party. 
In the 1994 elections. the party's share ot'votes IclI 4% to 7% and it lost 18 of 
its 44 parliamentary scats202. In the 1998 elections, the party managed to 
increase its scats to a record level of 48 and has beconic'a small partner in the 
F1DFSz-lcd coalition government. 
5. Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDFIMDF): 
The I ImiLgarian Democratic Forurn first appeared at Lakitclek in September 
11)87 as a poptilist-nationalist tunbrella organisation lor tlie liberal and centre- 
right political views outside the Urban intelligentsia. It sought to be a lbrum for 
'all opposition florces20-33. With its anticomMUnist and nationalist political and 
liberal economic agenda. it won the first parliamentary elections gaining 164 
ol*the 386 pirlianientary scats. This enabled the Hungarian Dcniocratic Foruni 
2111 (Pabor Toka. Tarties and Electoral Choice in East Central Europe', p. 7 of paper to have been 
publ isl ied it) 11. [. e%% is and G. Pridhann's. 51(thilisLik Ft: ygile Democt-acies. Widow Routledg-c, 1996. 
2'12 Carmen Oon/alez Enriquez, qp_. cit.. lip. 23-24. 
"" Attila Agh. The 11orliamenItirv lVii 
* %, 
To Democi-acy. The Cuse Qf Makizaty, in Gyorgy Szoboszlai 
(ed. ), ! j% ingjýjlitAil. Budapest: I lungarian Political Scic; icc Association, 1992. pp. 289-290. 
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to establish the first post-communist government in Hungary leading a centre- 
right coalition with its leader J6zsef Antall as Prinic Minister. 
The inability ol'the government to Fulfil public expectations and tile death or 
Rv%el' Antall in 1993 -l'ollowed by his replacement by the then Foreign 
Secretary lIcter Baross-. lcft the party's Popularity damaged. In the 1994 
elections the I lungarian Democratic Forurn received only 19 parliamentary 
scals and in 1998 elections they lost two more seats to their competitors 
rcducing their parliamentary seats to 17, becoming the smallest part of the 
FIDESZ-1ed coalition government. 
In March 1996, an inter-party crisis led to the fragmentation of tile party and 
out ol'the dissident group a new political party canic into existence under tile 
leadership of Ivan Szabo. Thc party is narned I lungarian Democratic people's 
Parly (lll)PP/MDNP) and has seventeen Nips in tile 1998-2002 parliament. 
Thcrellore. tile total of pirlianientary scats occupied by tile I IDF and its spin- 
OlTiS aCtUally 34 as these share the sarne ideological grounds. Thcrerorc, the 
Rill (11' tile IIDF cannot be seen as dramatic as the Christian Democratic 
]'copie's Party Mlo ceased to function within the parliament in tile wake of' 
tile 1998 elections. 
6. Christian Democratic People's Party (KDPP): 
The Christian Democratic People's Party is the immediate legal successor or 
Democratic People's Party which was founded in 1944. It cea. scd to flunction 
during the war and was subjcct to political suppression in 1949. It was re- 
cstablished in 1989. The party sees tile individual as tile centre of its political 
philosophy and ernphasises that it is not a church party but an orgailisation 
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%%hich adopted tile rules of' (lie 2 millennia old Christianity. The party has a 
right-ol'-the-centre position and defends basic freedoms, rights to property, tile 
liberal market economy and preservation or Christian values. Dr. MArton, 
k1rosi is tile head or the party. 
The CIA111 served as one of tile three coalition partners in the 1990-1994 
government and had a 1% rise in its support in 1994 elections compared to 
1990. %%ith a rise From 6% to 7% resulting in one additional MP. In tile 1998 
elections. however. receiving a mere 2.6% orvotes in the first round and hence 
(lid not achiew the electoral threshold, and thus failed to be represented in tile 
1998-2002 parliamentary period. 
7. Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEPIHJLP): 
During the 1998 elections, the marginal Hungarian JUSticc and Life Party 
(M 11: 11/I IJ 1Y) managed to overcome tile parliamentary threshold and became 
the parliamentary replacement of (lie CDPP in the 1998-2002 parliament. It is 
a 11ir-right nationalist party led by Istvan Csurka and With fOUrteen MI's in tile 
parliament creates a notable contrast with other political parties. Tile I ULP is 
against 11oreign oNNnership of' farmlands and foreign direct investment in key 
sectors of industrV204. 'File rise of -an extreme right-wing party above the 
national threshold is a siggn which displays the POPUlist discontentment with 
(lie transilion process. 
C. Non-Parliamentary Political Parties: 
Parties outside (lie parliament. the Agrarian Alliance, tile Republic Party, tile 
FAin-cpreneurs' Party. and (lie Workers' Party, (the ideologic 
. 
al succcssor to the 
flornicr communist party. the MSZMP) have gdebaten stronger. In May 1994 
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clections. only the Agrarian Alliancc and the Entrepreneurs' Party managed to 
Obtain parlianictitary representation with one MP cach. Tile Hungarian Social 
Democratic Party and the National Democratic Forum founded by Inlre 
Vozsgay have distinct clusters of support, but all the saine. neither achieved tile 
I ive percent threshold in May 1994. 
The I lunvarian party s. NIstcm can be considered relatively stable becaLISC three 
large parties linked to the main ideological currents (MSzl3. SzDSz. and MDF) 
haNe become prollessional competitive 'catch-all parties'. Furthermore, due to 
the I ive percent minimum parliamentary threshold, the I lungarian 
parliamen(ary system will not tolerate a firagincrited part), system, as is 
confirmcd by the results or the 1994 elections. Due to tile so-called 
constructke motion (if' no confidence, the government coalitions within 
Parliament are stable. The gowninicilt parties have the nuýjority of the 
parliamentary seats, therefore a vote or no confidence is not likely to 
o%vi-throw the coalition government unless one of the coalition partners join 
11orces %%ith tile opposition. 'nierefore. the lIDr-Sz-lcd coalition has a realistic 
opportunity to remain in government with a rundanientally unchanged 
Oomposition until the next election. 
I fungarian Workers' Party, tile most influen'tial of* tile non-parliaiiientary 
parties. was foundcd in Dccenlbcrl989 by those OLItside the reform wing of tile 
I ISWP. It is a ]ell-%ving Marxist party of 'ncw type'. It is led by Dr. Gyula 
ThOrmer. with Attila Vajnai, Je)zscf Eros, and Eva Fitos serving as his vicc 
presidents. The I IWP has about 20,000 members, with about one thousand 
201 Domiloaded Rom the Central Europe Online Websile at the addrcss www. centralcurope. com/ 
CCO! SI)CC ki Ll I LIIIC ICCI j USI Ii fiC. 111 III I Oil 17 Septenibcr 1998. 
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basie organisations all over Hungary. It claims to represent the interests and 
demoeratic rights or working people. The party is against further privatisation 
()I'tllC I ILIngarian economy and a more active involvement of rorcign capital as 
%%ell as the country's membership to NATO and to tile European Union. 
Although being tile majjor non-parliamentary party with a strong organisational 
net%% ork. the I IWII has no electoral backing and therefore is not expected to 
liccomea member ol'parlianient in I*orcsceabic luture. 
X. THE DIFFERENCE OF PERCEPTION IN THE NEW SYSTEM 
A. Institutions and Institutionalisation: 
The I lungarian political systcm, due to the changes that took place in tile 
period beginning with the National Roundtable discussions has adopted .1 new 
course and a new Ilrammork of operation. Tile new political order emerged in 
relation %%ith a new econonlic order. Tile change in the electoral procedures 
enabled tile previously disconnected parts of society to at least indirectly 
contribute to tile decision-making process. The involvement of previously non- 
political persona in tile legislative process by becoming candidates in tile 
Municipal and parliamentary elections due to their social status has contributed 
to tile image ol'public participation. 
In gcneral. public interaction with the parliament and the political parties has 
contributed to (lie establishment of legitimacy of the new political order by 
creating, a difficrentiation 1rorn tile ancien i-egime. As tile new reginle was 
based oil the constitution and the laws which arc either agreed upon during tile 
National Roundtable negotiations or during tile first parliamentary term's 
Icgislative %vork. the legal legitimacy of tile regime. strengthened by tile 
popular support, was established. 
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As to legitimacy by public approval, the re-enicrgence of tile parliament as the 
centre ol' immediate pUblic attention and the cmcrgence of the political parties 
its the means of' political and ideological reprcsentation helped case this 
process as well. The introdLICtion of new ranks, e. g. or tiie local notables. into 
the parliament strengthened the tics between the public and tile political 
rcliresctitatives within the parlianicnt. The parliamentary structure remains 
solid despite the emergence of parliamentary factionalism. This helps the 
systemic legitimisation all the more so as this legitimisation is not bascd oil 
charismatic leadership or on tradition. 
I lowex-cr. the transition in Hungary firorn a total itarian-social ist. systern to a 
democratic-capitalist systcm has rar greater implications for tile Hungarian 
pcople and their puception of the new political and economic order and its 
institutions. The transition is a nuýjor one in that there are spectacular 
differcrices bet", ccii the old regime and tile new one. However, one needs to 
rcmeniber that there are differences between tile old Hungarian regime and the 
general communist state structure. To begin with. Richard Rose observes, 
"In power. Communist parties were nio'bilisation regimes. 
They sought to indoctrinate the'niass of the population in 
Nx , Iat. ist-Leninist belicEs and to recruit millions of members to 
the party. The intent was to make each nation's Communist 
Party a broad church or believers. In consequence, there are 
now tens ormillions of former members or the Communist 
Part), - in Central and Eastern Europe today'-'-205 
III I ILIngary. the I ISWI, lost its mobilisation motive in mid-1950s, near tile end 
01' IZ, 'Ik-OSi*S RIIC. The cnIects of the communist regimes principle ot I mass 
mobi I isation has in away backfircd oil post-1956 I lungary. 'File social contract 
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beh%cen K-, Wrist administration and tile Hungarian public was based on all 
exchange oreconomic prorit with political obedience. 
The 01'ects ol'the KAdAr cra are still detectable in that area. Richard Rose's 
claim over the existence of many ex-coninlunists in a post-communist 
cnvi ronment is true as there is a great number or card-carrying ex-mcnibers of 
I 11.111g, 111,111 SoCi-aliSt Workers' Party integrated into tile new system. I lowcver, 
the ideological alliliation or these people with the communist ideology is 
(jucstionable beyond the argument that in tile new political order. sonle 
rellormist parties Nvere based oil the communist parties of tile old regime, such 
'is (lie IISP %%hich was an ofrspring of tile IISWP as was tile Hungarian 
Workers' Party %%hich flashions itself' upon the old IISWII*s ideological 
principles. 
I ImNe% er. the tendency ormass mobilisation oil the grounds orideology may 
be 11mind in tile 1990 elections in Hungary. However, the mass mobilisation 
WIIS 110t in Support of tile communists but against them. Tile POPUlar will to 
discomicct the ex-conimunists from the positions of power led tile Hungarian 
public to vole anti-communist. This resulted in the appearance of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum as tile largest party and tile head or tile 
governing coalition in the country. As tile Hungarians wished to remove tile 
communists From power positions, they have voted For an anti-conlillunist, 
middle-class, non-intelligentsia political group which was represented by the 
I lungarian Democratic Forurn. 
2"5 Richard Rose. 'Lx-Communims in Ilost-communist Societies. ' The Polilical Quarterly, vol. 67(l), 
Jantlary-March 1996 (pp. 14-215). p. IS. 
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Tlie ell'ects or popular mobilisation, albeit not in conjunction with tile 
remnants or tile old ideological affiliations, may be seen in tile 1994 and 1998 
elections. Once it was apparent that the communists would not return to power 
and t1i, at the democratic systern was permanent, the importance of tile concept 
orcxperience gained increasing support leading to tile IISP victory in tile 1998 
elections. 'I lie 1998 elections witnessed tile rise or tile urban, educated, young 
grotip, not easily associated With tile COMMUlliSt past and factor behind tile 
victory orthe FIDII-Sz in the elections. 
Public response during tile ballots in 1990.1994. and 1998 elections are solid 
proor that tile initial anticommunist hysteria has faded and the political system 
'IS a \%IIOIC is aCCCptCLl by the people. With the nation-wide orgailisation and 
nemorking orpolitical parties and with the construction orexperience within 
political party cadres. prorcssional party politics are becoming a part of tile 
I WIlgariall system and ail important part oreveryday lille. That tile system as a 
\\ hole is Supported by the I lungarian public ilicans that tile legitimacy or tile 
regime is. in legal and institutional terms has been achieved in the first eight 
)-cars orthe post-communist period. 
I lo%%-c%-ct-. general pUblic approval of tile syste"i is not enough by itself to 
create a solid ground of legitimacy. 'File existence of a. lively civil socIety. as 
well as the pi-cservation and reduction or economic discrepancies between 
difTerent social classes, the improvements in tile field of ecoilonly are also 
required ir the ncxv political order is to be legitimised. When tile entire systern 
-social and economic as Nvell as political is'well-establislied, one may then 
talk about a sound legitimate order. 
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XI. PERCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY IN POST-COMMUNIST HUNGARY 
A. The Remains of Yesterday: 
Although the MdArist administration was incapable to kcep with the 
requirements ol' the social contract from late 1970s onwards, the KAddrist 
social contract remains an important factor in the political transformation of 
I ILIngarian lille in the post-communist era. The KAdArist social contract itself is 
not the issue that constitutes a t1ircat to the cxistence of the actual I lungarian 
political order. but it inspires a fccling of nostalgia that appcars in the common 
Social Consciousness. 
Ewn in a situation where there is a fundamental change in the nature of a 
political systcm. in this case Crom a single-party to a multi-party systclil, thcre 
rcmains (lie possibility that sonle segments of'society will associate themselves 
with ccrtain values of' tile previous regime. 'riiis is all tile more likely in tile 
case N%Iici-e economic hardship accornpanics political change. The main reason 
I'm that sort of' nostalgia is not that tile (mcien regime was better, but it is tile 
i that people are disillusioned in relation to Ilicir expectations tinder the new 
order. 
Prior to the transition from communism, there was a fecling or longing 
to%vards tile fi-cer. much more democratic I lungary. Tile flact that I lungary was 
virttially an authoritarian dictatorship and' had only one free multi-party 
c1cction bc1lore the communist takc-over did not change tile flecling of longing. 
It was a desire towards a regime which was not Stalinist in its essence. Pcople 
, 
ime in vdiich they were able to own property r. atlier, than a regime wanted a reg 
in %khich all was owned by the statc. Such reelings wcre rcinflorced by the 
Rilikosi regime. The lorced relocation plans Linder tile leadership of RIkosi and 
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the way (lie 1956 uprising was suppressed created a feeling or nostalgia 
to%%ards aI Itingary which did in fact not exist. Imilicrmore. flic state socialist 
SN Isle'll %%as imposed from above by the Soviet Union and its troops which 
liberatcd the COL111try. 
A similar expectation gap can be found among those who promoted (lie 
de%clopinent of a capitalist - liberal democratic system. The expectations oil 
the systemic change were based on the observations on the living standards of 
(lie West Europeans and North Americans who cither came as tourists or were 
%katched or listened thrOLIgh SOIlic satellite dishes and radio waves, or by the 
limiled existence of Westcrii-produced manufactured goods for coninion 
comumptimi. by the I lungarian public. That those visiting the country had 
better cars. better living standards and that the non-conimunist countries were 
abler in the production or manuractured goods, were enough to create an 
illusion about a more prosperous, happier, more dcveloped standard of' living 
under a democratic system. 'mis illusion about the other polc of tlic bipolar 
world political SIRICtUrc creatcd high expcctations and thercforc illusions about 
thC I'LltIll-C 01*111C I ILIngarian State arter the establishment of a liberal democratic 
S)'Steln- The MLISion towards capitalist systcrn - and towards the functioning or 
democracy never included, and would not, by definition ol'tlic word 'illusion, 
include Ilic lacts that there would be income gaps. ' not enough work, housing, 
not- schooling For evcryonc, and that there WOLIld'be Iligh rates of' inflation, 
tinemploynictit and market Iluctuations and the introduction or market priccs. 
For there was an illusion towards flic efilects ol'systcrriic change and flor there 
%%ere high and immediate expectations towards a better quality of life for 
ever)one. (lie disillusionment caused by the socio-econornic changes that took 
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place during and in tile wake of tile transition had strong effects ill the 
perccplioti ol'both (lie new and previOLIS political orders. When all tile negative 
el'I'ects of* (lie lie%%- polifico-economic system cmerged and these began to create 
a negative impact oil the income levels, expenditure levels, and on tile second 
tile disillusionment process began. As the rents went lip, many 
I)I'OLIIICtS ceased to be subsidised by the state, real wages diminished in parallel 
%%ith tile J)Urchasing power, and as unemployment and other econoillic 
problems caused instability within households. a longing for the sl(iffis quo 
(mle einci-ged. What tile people were looking for were not the political 
conditions of* the K-, id. ir era, but the basically economic social contract that 
K6dAr offercd in one way or another. 
When 11101.1ght in conjiunction with the data presented at table 4.5 above, tile 
iSSUC 01' HILISiOn bccomes more intriguing. Table 4.5 shows clearly that there 
has becil I considerable downturn in relation with the household income levels 
in 111.111"MA' It the smic period. While one may observe a considerable 
development in ternis of' household inconle levels in all other countries 
Surveyed. it can be seen that about 2/3 of* tile I lungarians who participated in 
the survc), claimed their household finances becarne worse and only Five to 
eight permit declared ail improvement in household income. This outcome, 
repeated three ), cars in a row, shows that Mdirist Hungary was capable of 
offering more to the people in ternis of inconle and hencc transition hurt a 
great percentage of* tile population. There is certainly a strong correlation 
between the government intervention and welfare and that relation makes 
Eastern I. Lirqpe. but I lungary in partiCLIlar, difficrent from the Western styie or 
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government and income i-clatioilS206. Considering this relationship, that peopic 
%%OLIId loilt, Ilor the previous regime should be understandable. 
Flie existence ol'such a longing for the slalus quo ante or the illusion or it is 
the main problem I'acing the Icgitimisation of tile new political order. JAnos 
Sinion oliserves that by the end or 1993. there was a clear distinction between 
(lie concepts ol' political lclI and right and the general publiC Undustood 
is not l, el*t. * and on the other hand, 'the Right is worse than the 
I. Cl*t*. "2(17 JýJjjcjj S 
. illjoll links to the poor perl'brillance of the I IDF-Ied coalition. 
The CITCCt Of diSilIUSiOIII1ICI1t OVCr the public perception of political right and 
Political 101 is important as it is this disilILISiOlIMCIlt that created a lack of 
interest 1(mards politics ill tile public at the end. The shift in tile meaning of 
tile %Nord of* 'clemocracy* fior the people during the 1989-1993 period gives 
cities towards %%hat sort or a reality shock was experienced during the 
transitory phase. 
Table 4.11. Classifications of the meaning of the word "democracy" in 
lwrcent. wes of those who answered208: 
Sur% ey I eiir-i- 
Democracy Nlcansl: 
1989-1 
I ISWI, elite 
1989-2 national 
sample 
1990 not. 
sample 
1993 not. 
sample 
Social %-. 01-11ving 3 32 32 26 
Frecdoin 6 31 28 35 
Parlicipatio9i 53 23 15 10 
Hedifons 4 1 4 6 
Rights 7 2 6 8 
V14110 5 4 4 7 
eniotionshempers 3 6 7 
Other 3 4 2 
No. of respondents: 110 976 1299 1505 
2"" For a detailed analysis ol'the subject, see Richard Rose and T. Makkai, 'Consensus or Dissensus 
About Welfare in Post-Communist Societies?, ' Ew-opean Jowwal (fPofiflcal Resew-ch, v. 28, pp. 203- 
224. and Christine S. Lipsme)-cr. 'Welfare and the Discriminating Public: Evaluating Entitlement 
Allitudes in Post-Communist Europe. ' Policy, 51udies. Jouýiial, v. 3 (4), pp. 545-56 1, November 2003. 
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. 
1j, 11jos cinjon. '\Vhat does democracy mem lor I lungarians?, ' Coexistem-e, vol. 32 (pp. 325-340), p. 
3 )27. 
321. ) 
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When lhe results ol' this survey arc analysed, the first point is to note flic 
difference between the ordinary people's and the IJSWP clite's approaches to 
the perception oNcinocracy in the reform year of' 1989. While only 3% of the 
I ISIAT elite saw democracy in terms or social well-being, 32% of tile national 
sample identified the concepts of democracy and social well-being. Tile 
emphasis on representation that the elite had madc was never shared by the 
gcneral public %, N hich valued the importance or freedom in democracy flar illore 
than the I ISWP elite surveyed. Therefore, the distinction I try to make between 
(lie intelligentsia's and tile general public's perceptions of politics, statc-citizen 
relations and the dill1crence between their comparative perceptions ol'tlic new 
political order is once more apparent in this survey. While the clite had a 
di 111CIVIlt le%'cl or expectation than the ordinary people, both segments or (lie 
socicty craved [Ior reflorni. The difTcrence is that tile latter's ,, ie%v ol'rellonli was 
not Imused oil personal liberties but econornic improvement. 
The decline in tile -answers linking dcniocracy to well-being and with 
participation between the First survey in 1989 and the last one in 1993 is 
remarkable. Thesc two results indicate that democracy as a medium or 
participation in the policy-making has created a negative effect in public illind. 
The expectations 1roin participation to policy-illaking were as intangible as 
were those expectations ol'becorning financially be iter-off under a dcrilocratic 
regime. I lowever. that there is a decline in tile linkage between participation 
and democracy is a sign of' problem in the public perception of' democratic 
process. The considerably low turnouts in tile general and municipal elections 
(in all three elections, there has been a consistent ratio ofbet", ccn 54% to 60% 
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ol'cligible voters attending the ballots, and an even lesser number showed up 
in local c1cctions. while in (lie 2002 elections the figure is round 70% of all 
votcrs) and the low numbers or membership or political parties indicate a 
decline in interest in tile political process. I'lle lack or interest in civil sociely 
illStitLitiOll. 1; Oil the one liand and the lack of interest in direct political action oil 
tile other hand indicate a disillusionment with tile political process. 
In addition to the above conclusions, one should take public satisraction with 
the development or democracy into consideration. As can be seen Froill table 
4.12 below, throughout tile mid-1990s about 80% Of Hungarians were 
1.111S. HiStICLI %%ith the developnicilt of democracy in their country. This level 
[alls (o 6211/o ill the year 2003, %NIicn the country was close to European Union 
0: 11) membership. 'nie levels of satisfaction with democracy in Hungary, 
therel'ore. impi-mcd %Nith a possibility or a better lire within the E-uropean 
UniOll and aS the correlation between well-being and dcniocracy was not as 
often established as berore. These two ractors contribute greatly to the 
percclilions or denlocracy and or democracy's development in Hungarian 
public. The EIJ membership issue, which also'arlectcd the 2002 election 
rcstilts. has also contributed to the 
ilungarians' confidcnce in their country, 
their COUntry's denlocracy. and the fact that they now see th6iiselm 
considered as parts ora larger, Crcer, and richcr I'Airope. When one analyses the 
CII, 1119CS ill tile Country in rclation with the EU rnernbcrship, tile revisions made 
to the I lungarian legal systern so that it would beCorric compatible with tile EU 
C0111111LIllit)' Law. it may be understood that, the public perception has also 
positivcly changed towards the working or tile system. When the public 
generally belicves that tile institutions which once only existed in name and 
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I'ailed to I'miction are now truly working due to tlic EU connection, dctnocracy, 
as a rcginic ol'institutions and rights would be seen strongcr2()(). 
Year 
1994 
4)96 
2003 
'rable 4.12.: Salisfiction with the development of democracy210: 
llungitry Poland Belarus Czecls Bulgaria Romania 
Republic 
s 20 S: 35 S: 13 S: 48 S: 20 S: 30 
It: 74 11: 49 If: 68 U: 48 11: 69 U: 56 
23 S: 23 S: II S: 44 S: 4 S: 31 
P: 66 Il: 6.1 If: 73 1.1: 5.3 Il: 91 if: 67 
S-20 S: 50 S: 14 S: 46 S: 13 S: 37 
U- 77 U: 38 11: 67 th 50 If: 80 If: 58 
S: 33 S: 23 S: - S: 41 S: 22 S: 21 
11: 62 11: 72 11: - If: 55 If: 75 U: 77 
The main cause of' the problem is flic decline in inconic lcvcls and living 
standards Ilor the majority ol'the pOpUlation. The UdArist social contract and 
expectations linked to this social contract, the remains of the political 
yesterday ofII ungary, are the main causes of the current problems in II Ungary. 
B. The Problems of Today: 
1. Economic Problems: 
Currently. the post-communist political order is troubled as there arc few 
options to of , f1cr to (lie society to reduce the level of post-conlillunist 
disillusionment. me inisperception about the working of the capitalist system 
and its consequences are as important as* the niNperccived nostalgia about the S 
good old days' of' the MdArist past. The aura of' cxpcctations of' rapid p 
improvement in living standards combined with tile loss or darnage or a 
secondary income rrorn the second econolnj-lor many industrial workers 
causes a general feeling ohiiistrust and isolation in the gcneral public. 
21"' l'or (fie impact ofthe legal issues, see Jimmy 0. Milanese, 'The Road to EU Membership: 
1`111,01-cing Competition Policy in I lun-gary, ' Liverlmol Luiv Review, v. 25,2004, pp. 79-106. 
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The llollowhig table vvhich shows the difTerence between 1993 and 1995 in 
tcrins of* (lie perception of free inarkct conditions is of great import in 
identi 1ý, ing, the current problem which may create a greater crisis or legitimacy 
I'm the current political order than it is expected: 
Table 4.13.: Changes in the judgement of free market economy, 1993- 
1995: Do you agree with the following? ('Yo of respondents saying they 
"I believe that the rolloi%ing should happen": 1 / 
Siir%-c%- Ycar-4: 
1993 
(%-yes) 
1995 
(%-yes) 
Wage% to be determined by market conditions 68 61 
1hose %iho aren't fully competent should be 
Inatle redundant 
49 40 
Big companies need to be privatised 50 39 
Ilig real estates need be privatised 41 35 
Succe%sful businessmen should become very rich 36 27 
Companies need to be purchased by foreign 
invesiors 
30 23 
Large private lands/property's appearance 
needs to be permitted 
23 20 
foreigners should be allowed to purchase real 
r%fales 
20 15 
foreigners should be allowed to 
; 
urchase 
__L 
ihricultural land 
16 5 
As the rcsponse figures show. there is a shift Ilrom a positive attitude towards 
copitalism as an economic system as a Nvliole towards a more cautious 
approach to the application of capitalism per se in the country. The poll 
suggests that foreign involvenicilt which nicant optimisation or resoýirccs in 
the organisations acquired and managed through foreign direct investment has 
not been inct with popular sympathy. The fact that about 60% of those 
surveyed preflerred incompetent workers to remain at tlleirjobs is not a sign for 
the Hungarian indifference to low ell'iciency and productivity levcls, but is 
21 () 1), 11,1 leathered 
from I . -a,, l European Eurobarometcr and 
Candidate Countries EUrobaromclcr. 1994 to 
200 1. ,I. 
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more ol* a sign of a Ilear ol' capitalist system. Tile fear stenis rrom 
understanding that tile system that they hoped would improve tile standard of 
living is also capable of' creating redundancies. The rairly low to very low 
support in regard to foreign ownership of businesses and of land has two main 
roots: Firstly, it relates to the growth of redundancies under foreign ownership 
and the lack ol'access to the production facilities vhich were available under 
the KA(Uirist seconif ccononij,. Secondly, the nationalist tendencies were 
ascendant near the end ol' the communist rule with the fear that tile country 
%N ill I`all into 11oreign hands. This came at a time or Soviet withdrawal and the 
regaining ol'political independence. Tile growing concern about privatisation 
may lie linked with these two niaýfor fears as well. 
As to the issue ol'the implementation of the free market economy, Hungarian 
public remained suspicious of the new economic order. In a survey conducted 
in 1993.761,11o of the respondents thought that free market conditions should be 
in Hungary. %%, hile 15% did not approve with the proposition. In 1995, the 
sanle question Nvas resulted in a decline in public confidence towards tllc 
elite's idea ol"I'ree market environment: 'rile ratio ol'those in favour of the rrce 
market showcd a decline of 21% to 5'5% while those who did not think a free 
market economy was aimed to be established, after all the privaiisation, 
economic and legal ref'ornis, has increased to 31% from 15%212. That more 
people (141,110 in 1995 as opposed to 9% in 1993) responded that they did not 
know demonstrates th'at the public trust towards capitalist market system is in 
(Icclinc. 
"I ll. aszlo Beck. A Magyprors7ga"'POlilikai Evkonvve-1996 cgy MUetenek kezirata, Mcdian Mcdia 
Research Lld. Budapot: 1996. p. 2. 
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Public suspicion towards tile new econornic order and hence tile new political 
order shaping (lie economy. has its bases in tile particular manifestation tile 
economic system takes in Hungary. 111 1980,90% of the official gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the country was produced by the state. In the sarne 
year. 101,14 of I lungarian GDP was produced by domestic private sector and 
there was no roreign ownership. Allcr the transition, in 1990 tile state share in 
the 61)11 declined to 76%. tile domestic private sector's share rose to 23%, and 
V! '(', ol'the OD11 was produced by foreign direct investment projects. 111 1993, 
the ratios ý%cre 371. ', o flor state's share, 50% for private sector and 13% flor 
l'oreign o%% ned companies. I lowevcr. %vith tile inclusion orthe seconct econon1j, 
activities. tile ligures Ilor state, domestic private owncrship, and foreign 
investment owned parts of tile economy become 83%, 17%, and 0% 
respectively in 1980, and. 3711/0,50% and 13% respectively in 1993213. 
The shill in tile balance between state-owned and private sectors in the 
conduct orthe economy indicated a shill in the balance between job security 
and the threat of sudden unemployment. Tile ratio of econornically inactive 
young and old household depending oil wage carners has arisen from 117/100 ID 
in 1987 to 167/100 in 1993214, creating a further economic burden oil tile 
lower-earning groups. Despite government attempts to cUSIlion tl i ýpact of IC III 
cconomic changes by spending 26% to 28% orthe budget on social security, 
the number or (lie people living under tile poverty line have grown 
dramatically. While there wcrc one million people living at or below tile 
212 
213 Rtidolf RiW%. Tolitical Transition and sociai 'rransformation in 11ungary, ' Sumarios Afers 
Internocitinals. no. 34-35 (17 pa-Cs), downloaded from the %yebsitc addrcss %vww. cidob. es/Caste11ano/ 
11ag 7.1 
1-Iý 11 !I. -. 
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rnininitim living standards in 1987, the number rose to one million and a hair 
ill 1990 and to three to three and a half million people in 1994215. Ill a country 
ofa population of 10.8 million and in which gross domestic production (GDP) 
has decreased 18.5% between 1988 and 1993216. the decrease in living 
st ., andardsand file rise in unemployment are remarkable. 
W'hile a Keynesian approach to political economy might help improve the 
economic and social situation, national governments lack tile power to provide 
the necesNary soltitions to the economic problems and their social 
consequences. This is primarily due to the high rates of foreign debts and tile 
giiidelines set by INIF stand-by agreements which in theory exist to case tile 
transilion it) capitalism and to provide 111C Country with monetary support as 
%%ell as technical and economic know-how. As the state sector continues to 
decrease ill size and to provide secure but low-wage employment, tile private 
sector Wlich increases in size offiers higher wages with no guarantee or 
continuous employment. With no direct government control over the economy, 
due to (lie declining size orthe state sector within tile economy,, and tile stand- 
1)), agreelilelits witil tile INIF, the implementation of Keynesian measures are 
impossible. The immediate consequences or these appear, to be growing 
unemployment and poverly which have res'tilted in'thc groWth of' nostalgia 
towards the MidArist social contract on tile one hand. and has created a 
215 1 bkL 1). 9. Crom R. Andorka and Z. Spcder, 'A magyar (arsadalom szerkezete', 1994' (, me structure 
of' Ilun-arian society. 1994), in S. Kurtan et al. (ed. s), Magvarorszag Politikai Erkonvye. 1996 1 
(I lim-armn Politicil ý'carbook. 1996) Budapest: DKMPA: 1996, p. 325. C, 
Geolfre) Evans and S(cphen Whitelield, 'The Politics and Ec(-)'noýlnics of Denio6cratic Commitment: 
Siipporl 11or Democracy in Transition Societies. ' flrilish. hmi-nal if PolificalSvience, 'vol. 25 (pp. 485- 
51 -1). P. 492.4 1 
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legilimacy crisis ror the new political order in the political sphere on tile other 
hand. 
Another important element in econonlic relations is tile role of the trade 
unions. Labour representation has experienced a great transformation in 
II ungary. The emergence of competition within trade unions, thcir struggle for 
survi-val and Ilien problems they face due to the state the Hungarian economy 
was in. The Antall government which introduced iic%v measures to deal With 
the economic problems ol' the country, has turned Hungary into a 
"antidevelopmentil state 1whichl siplions resources out Of tile eColloilly. 11217 A 
new economie systcin. based on the East Asian principles, which led to the 
establishment of' the tripartite negotiations in terms of' labour relations. The 
resulting system turned out to be a system or bargaining among tile 
i-cilresentatives or the state. or the entreprelleUrs. and ofthe labour. From one 
perslicctive. as (lie transition period requires a certain type ol'arrangenient in 
industrial relations and permits an interventionist state. Within the institutional 
anarch), (if' tile transition period, the emergoice oF tile tripartite negotiations 
Ims even been a positive intervention for the I lungarian ecollonly. Yet, ir one 
thinks orthe situation within tile boundaries or civil society and legitimacy of 
the s)stem. then (lie tripartite systern and continuous state intervention into the 
cconom), cannot be seen as positive aspects218. Also, such interventions From 
the government towards creating more income 1`6 r the state but which also 
reduced capabilities (if' (lie public, especially of tile YOLIth, such as the 
217 Brus/I and Stark quoted in Laszlo Andor, I Itingary on the Road to the European Union, Transition 
in Blue. llraqgwr. Woport, 2000, p. 103. 
218 For a more dctailed discussion of the tripartite negotiations and their impact on civil society, see, 
Mi%zlivel/. Verene. I'arOcipation and Transition: Can the Civil Society Project SUrvive in Hungary, ' 
Journill (! / ( '(11111mmism shufivs mul Tronsiflon Politics, vol. 13(l). March 1997, pp. 2740. 
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introduction ol' juitioll fees within the framework of the Bokros econonlic 
illyrovement package. havc not contributed to the development or a mutual 
understanding between the socicly and the post-communist regime in 
I Iuntarv21". 
Such economic problems led to political problerns and a loss of trust in tile key 
instiltitions ofthe country. 
2. Political Problems: 
The immediate political consequcnecs -or, reflections- of the above-citcd 
economic problems appear as a loss of interest in political participation and an 
cro%ion ol* trust towards the agencics of the post-communist reginic. The 
11611mving table. based on the rcsults of a 1995 survcy, shows that the POPLIlar 
support Im (lie key institutions or the transition era has diminished while those 
%%hich are either neutral or which seem to protect the public good are lield in a 
flavourable posilion in public comption. 
()I' the institutions cited in the survey, the office or. presid. ency has no active 
participatory role in the policy-making process apart from representing the 
nation as its symbolic leader. I lowever, with tile 'image or president' created 
by Umos KAdAr as the nation's flather figure, the presidency Ila-, a Iligh regard. 
Fhe role ol' presidency is strcngthencd by the odd rcmark made by the 
prc%idcnt about (lie conduct orall'airs in the country, although the president has 
no impact on policy-making process. The political comments lidip preserve the 
kidier-president image created and exploited by Mddr. The Constitutional 
Court. regarded as highly as the presidency is. on the other hand, a safeguard 
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of the rule of law principle in the country and hence has a politically active 
role. That flic Constitutional Court had invalidated the Gyula Horn 
government's austerity nicasures declaring these unconstitutional in the carlicr 
parts orthe year of tile survey has helped improve the public perception or tile 
Court's role. *me high rating it receives may therefore be linked to the 
popularity ol'that carlier dccision which increased its image as 'the dcrender 
ol'the people against savage capitalism'. 
Table 4.15.: Support for the key institutions of the post-communist 
politic, 11 sl, stel, 1220: 
Ins(itution Name Approval Rate 
Presidency 65 
Consfitutional Court 64' 
Political Parties II 
I'lic Parliment 22 
The 1(-.. llornj 
Gmernivient 
21 
Uourts 46 
'I lie Army 44 
The I%Isi%s Media 32 
., DiIIIIIII (III COII%tiltItiOlll] Court froin Rudolf' TOWS. 'Political Transition and Social 
Trall"I'01-111,11ioll ill I lumml), % 
I- 
According to data shown in tile table above based oil 1994 findings, the 
lowest-ranked in terms of public approval are tllcýpolitical parties. Their 
approval rate is nearly one fiffil of the two institutions which have the highest 
ninking. 
Interestingly. as can be seen in the table below, 'within 9 years of change, not 
IIILICII improvement can be seen in terms or tile'-, trust towards the 
key 
institutions. In a survey madc in 2003, tile following results were obtained: -- 
21" Andor. loc. cit ". 1). 
111. 
-communist 22"Data From klatilim Wyman, Slepliell Wilitc, et al., 'Thc Placc of 'Party' in Post 
Mirll- l'olifics. vol. 1 (4). 1995 (pp. 535-548), p. 538. 
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Table 4.16.: Trust towards key political organisations in different 
Cf) , III riCS221: 
(. 'I) it it t ry / 
institution 
Political 
parties 
I Civil service National National 
government parliament 
_J! 
un REY 
. --g- - 
15 40 38 36 
Sim-enil 11) 27 33 31 
(Well It. 13 30 30 20 
Turkel, 17 18 63 06 
I foist nfi_ 
t7777w__ 
24 1.4 13 
The table 4.16 shows that the political parties rate fiar behind the civil service 
and tile -overnment and the parliament. Tile main reason for tile continuous 
national alienation Crom the political parties is the continuous stalemate in the 
political system mhich stenis From the negotiations and mutual agreement 
%%hich ahn at creating a pacific political environment. The same political 
COIISCIISLIS however. restricts direct public influence over the political system. 
As all the parliamentary political parties are supportive of privatisation, or free 
mark-ct mcclianism, multi-party liberal democracy, Hungarian membership to 
NATO and to the EU Ax. to the Hungarian participation into the capitalist 
%wrld structure once reflerred to as the West-. and as tile econorny is mainly 
1-1111 ill COllCOl-d With tile IMF, tile Political parties are ill no position to deliver 
%kIMt tile IlLiblic wants, namely better living standards, better education, better 
housing. less working hours Ilor better, wages. As the illusions of the pUblic 
delli, ind clashes Nvith tile realities of what can and what cannot be d9ne in 
I tile Popular 1rustration reflects itself* as a loss of' trust in political 
parties. a lack of' intercst in political life, and therefore a public suspicion 
towards the political parties. Tile parliament. which has been tile rocus of all 
institutional change in I lungary during the transition. has also lost its status as 
flic 1`6cal point of all the iniprovcnients. It was rated in 1994 above tile Gyula 
221 candi(hite Countries Eur"baromeler. 2003.4, Full Report, p. 26. 
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llorn-led 11SP-Al-D coalition government (22% to 21% respectively) which 
had lost its popularity due to the economic austerity measures it tried to 
implement. That the anny and tile churclics are rated Car above tile political 
institutions like the parliament. the government, the political parties and even 
the mass media has to do with public affinity with its apolitical role. 
The solution to the confidence problem the nliýjor iliStitUtiOllS WhiCh COIlStitUtC 
and represent the current political order is in the creation of a stable middle 
class %%hich could all-iliate fliciliselves with the benclits of tile new system and 
there6ore associate themselves with the new political order and its institutions. 
'I lie KIdArist middle class of' party members and bLII-eaUCMtS is partly flading 
away and as the state sector is unable to sustain better wages, it will continue 
to rmie away. 'ro balanee the situation, the state needs to invest heavily in 
1111dOilIg tllC income gap created between tile new rich and the new poor. 
increasing the social security network and subsidisc prices of mainstream 
goods in the market. I lowever, tile main problem steninled from the state's and 
the governments' inability to realise that aim. The sudden capitalisation or the 
economy created its bourgeois class, yet. oil the other hand, resulted ill 
hardship flor the ni, ýIority or the people in Hungary. Old age pensioners, 
StUdentS, N%OlllCll. University teachers, unskilled workers do suffier arid are 
likely to continue to sull*cr under the new savage capitalism which has no 
infrastructural concerns at tile moment and is struggling to survive in tile 
I lungarian setting. 
On the other hand, Nflien the Hungarian public is questioned about the top 
three most Irustcd (-) rgan i sati oils in 2003, the results %N, crc as follows: 
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Table 4.17.: The three most trusted organisationS222: 
Country / Ifungary Poland I Czech Republic I 
imlihitioes 
Most United Voluntat), United Nations 
(rusted 
- 
Nations 56% organisations 59% 471, o T 2" Illost European The Arrný 59", ý Volummy 
trusted Union 56% organisations 46% 
Y; Flmo.; t Ille Police United Nations 540, o I Eluropean Union 
frij-ded . 18% 
1 
430,4 
As can be scen from the table above, tile I lungarian public sees tile United 
Nations and the FU as the niost trustworthy ol' all organisations and then 
mentions the police florce, whereas in Poland voluntaiy and charity-oriented 
organisations top the list Nvith equal trust, flollowed by tile UN. In tile Czech 
Republic. the UN leads over the voluntary and charity-oriented organisations 
N%hile the 1: 1) comes third. This shows the degree of mistrust towards tile 
institutions ol' the new order even aller 13 years and a similar result may be 
clainied to exist Im the Czech nation. The lack ol'the voluntary organisations 
1*1'()Ill IIIC IiSt ill I ILIngary may indicate a problem with the dcvelopment or tile 
civil socicly and its gcncral conditions by the general public. That the police is 
menfloned right ailer two non-national organisations. one symbolising the idea 
of international legitimacy and the second symbolising the greater idea of 
Europeanness I Itingary has now become a part or. both strong international 
organisations with clear-cut rules and solid traditions, shows that in the 
national level there nlay be problems concerning the institutionalisation, ir not 
cstablishment . vithin the public mind, ol'the key institutions. 
3. The Gender Problem: 
The issue ol'gender dillerentiation, although not an issue during the KAdArist 
cra. ha., i become a problem for post-communist I luilgarian society as well as 
222 Candidale Counlries Euroba"olneler. 2003.4. Full Report, 1). 32. 
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other Fast European countries. After the systemic change. and especially when 
uncniployment is discussed, one must not underestimate the rise of 
discrimination against women in tanis of employment in the rcgion. In the 
post-communist Second World, being a wornan appears to be a cause for 
dismissal Ilrom "ork. 
Stie Hridger and Rebecca Kay conclude that it is "generally recognised that in I 
, -1 C11,10tiC JICHOLI of* change which has followcd the dernise or the USSR, 
%%omen have been the major losers. " They argue that women had flormed the 
absolute nui. jority of those left unemployed. They observe that at sonic regions 
Nkithin Russia. the ratio ol'womcn within the offlicially registered tinciliploycd 
goes as high as 85 to 90 percent although they USUally make up around 70 to 
75 permil. They blame the 'protective' poiicies or tiie USSR as the main 
reason lor the high rate of* unemployment aniong Russian women as well as 
the post-communist inedia campaigns cniphasising the place of women is at 
home and beside their childrcn223. Tatyana Kotzeva has similar observations 
on the place and perception or womcn in the post-coilinlunist Esat E. uropean. 
and particularly Bulgarian. society. Kotzcva claims that there are 
--coninionalifics between the 'Second' and the `rhird World' which makes it 
I 
possible of* East Furopean cases to be Subsumed under Studies of' 'post- 
colonialil). *. -22-1 Kotzcva clainis that while Nvomen are represented as a symbol 
of* technological progress and the incarnation of revolutionary energy, this 
restiltcd in the creation of' a 'transgressive flcrnininity. * while the post- 
223 Sue Brido r and Rebecca Kay, 'Gender and Generation in the New Russian Labour Market. ' in C-c -a! y Russia, London: Routledge, (cd. ). ation and Identity in Contempoi 
1996. pp. 21-22 pas%im. 
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communist. nationalistic rhetoric has become to be perceived as an allegory of 
interiorily. innerness. home, and purity225. Thus, discrimination towards 
fieniale cinployces. both in redundancies and new employment have becorne 
the mainstream in both Russia and Bulgaria. In post-comillunist Poland, 
Nvomen*s rights %vere restricted with the revoking ofthe right to abortion. with 
the decline in the num, ber of kindergartens and nursery schools, and 
Illoilledlood, with tile influence of the Catholic Church has been emphasised as 
no%%hcre else in tile 11ormcr Second World226. 
In the case of I lungary. the situation is similar to these two countries and the 
rest orl'astern Furope. EvA Fodor points out that in 1980, almost 50 percent of 
financial executives and chier accountants were women and female CEOs 
made 16 percent or the whole, yet after 1989. their number ill executive 
positions flell sharply. Fodor relates this to the rise or tile niale-dorninant 
capimlist ideologies. lack of party membership and sell'-employment anlongst 
N%ollIC11.1111d Concludes that -with the discrinlination women surfer as mothers, 
they were summarily relegated to tile position of"reserve' and expected to be 
tile first to lose theirjobs when in economic recession occurred. "227 However, 
N% ilile thc situation is similar to tile other countries of the region, one may also 
, -cc that rcdundancies faced by 1'emale workers are far lower ill I lungary than 
those flaccd by their flellow East E-uropean post-communist counterparts. The 
11ollowing table vhicll shows the redundancy ratios in Hungary, Poland, and 
221 lat), ina Ki)tzc%, a. *Re-Imagining Bulgarian Womcn: The Marxist Lcgacy and Wonicn's Self- 
Identily. ' in Chris Corrin (ed. ), Gcnder and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Frank 
cas%. 1999.11.84. 
2,15 lbid.. pp. 83-86 pas, ýim. 
220 I'Mi l'odor. 'Gender in Transition: Unemployment in I lungary, Poland, and Slovakia. ' Ecul 
European hPlifics andSociefies. v. 11(5). Fall 1997, p. 479. 
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Slovakia shows that even in the most nationalistic era of post-cornmunist lil'e. 
that is. during the rule of tile I lungarian Democratic Forum between 1990 and 
1994. Ille fleniale unemployment has not become as marginal in Hungary as in 
these lx%o ollicr countries. 
Table 4.18. Unemployment Rates in llungaiT, Poland and Slovakia228: 
1993 
Immary 
Male 
lloogary 
I-emale 
Ilungary 
Total 
Poland 
NINIC 
Poland 
Female 
Poland 
Total 
Slo% Mkin 
NIMIC 
slo%uhin 
Feloule 
Slovakia 
To(al 
1 14 1.7 32 3.8 3.5 
9.2 7.6 9.5 7.9 1 I. X 9.7 6.3 6.9 6.6 
II () 10.5 12 1 1 I. X 14.9 13.3 11.1 11.7 114 
1 1.2___ 0.1 12.1 14.3.,. 173 15.7 12.5 12.9 
As the Table 4.18 shows. the number of feniale redundancies overweighs tile 
number ol'male redundancies in both Poland and Slovakia, but the number or 
redundancies in I lungary flavour fiernale workers. It is partly because of tile 
K, lidiltrist second economy and its impact in ternis of employment as well as 
individualism oil the I lungarian society. and partly because orthe industries hit 
by 1'CdU1lLk111CiCS. In I lungary. in tile period examined above, tile service sector 
boomed %%hile agriculture. construction, and industrial labour markets shrank, 
hence , ()I 111'ecting women as much as their counterparts in Poland and 
Slovakia22". I lo%ve%-cr, there is a tendency orjob losses flor women in I Itingary 
in managerial positions. L- 
Yel. Job losses are not the only gender-related issue in I Itingarian soci, ýl lille. 
The place of' women in the Hungarian society and tile way wonlen are 
perceived was tried to be changed as well. Wring the I lungarian Democratic 
Fortim government. the*role or womcil as mothers was cilipliasised while no 
227 Ibid.. pp. 470 and 479 passim. Fodor bases her argument on 'reserve' status to Chris Corrin's 
MagNar Women: I lyn-arian Women's Lives 1960s - 1990s (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
22NI'rom IN& 1). 474. taken from the Yearbook or Labor Statistics. International Labor Office, 1993. 
22" Ibid.. p. 485. 
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new arcas of* cmploymcnt were opened for women, except for the 
pornographic industry. Chris Corrin observed that during the IIDF 
govel-11111clit: 
"The governing coalition proposes outlooks for Hungarian 
women %khich revolve pivotally around family relations. The 
t,. %-o views orwomen -good and bad, Madonna and Whore- 
are starkly apparent within Hungarian society at present. 
'ionic %%, onlen mill remain classified as 'bad* and as such not 
%%orthy or detailed attention, while those 'good' I lungarian 
%%onlen who wish to be married, have children, and abide by 
Christian (and nationalist? ) values will be 'cared for* by tile 
government. 
As has been noted, that the present government cannot 
live up to its promises for these 'good' I ILIngarian women, is 
cm-rcntly being I'aced within I lungarian society. Even 'good' 
%miien are. and will become, poor in flungary. .... Given the lack of*choice about whether or not to be in paid work. many 
mimen in I lungary do want choice to care for their flarnilics 
I'Lill-time. U'qually. though. many women still %vish to work in 
paid %Nork. either full- or part-time. Current economic 
cliant, Cs and consequent policy decisions ... will nican that 
%%omcn lose out on all fronts. Many women may 'be returned' 
to their homes to sunler poverty. 41230 
After three changes or government. the problem with gender-rclatcd 
unemployment is still a problem in need or being solved by the Hungarian 
'ILI(horities. There is less pressure on wornen to stay home since the fall ol'tile 
I IDF-Ied coalition government, but there is not much change ill tile perception 
of'%mmeWs place within the society. That bef'ore 1989. there were no 
ýVonlcll's 
movements ill Hungary with the exception of' tile Party-Icd Hungarian 
\Vomcn*s Council. and that in the post-cornmunist era, there are not many 
1'eminist organisations echoing the Western ferninist organisations. COIlStitUtC a 
230 ClIri,; Col, rin. Ma, -, yar 
Women: I Itme, rian Womcn's I-A es. 1960s - 1990s, McMillan / St. Martin's 
Press: I loundsmill ani'London. 1994, p. 250. 
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problem of'niobilisation flor I lungarian women as well as other East European 
NN10111C112,31 
Bel'ore the problem is faced and any attempts are made to tackle and solve it, 
the issue ol'gender-related problems. the most important among thein being 
unemployment or biased employment, Nvill be a maýjor cause of disruption 
within the newly-lorming I lungarian civil society. As is truc with any other 
FAISt European soeiety. without a solution to the gender issue. formation or tic 
I IL111gariall CiVil society and the I lungarian transf'orniation to liberal democracy 
cannot lie considered as complete. With tile strengthening of tile emphasis of 
wonien as wage-carners and workers in addition to or instead or their role as 
'mothcrs. ' the social balances in I lungary will remain weak and this will result 
oil the lack ol' active participation of* wonlen to tile political, econornic, and 
ill(Cliectual processcs withill tile society, making tile issue orregime legitimacy 
-a harder problem to be dealt with. 
C. Tile Problem with Legitimacy: 
Such comcnis led to an incrcase in the popular longing flor the KddArist era. As 
soon aller dic transition as 1993, tile general perception or ure tinder Mnos 
K, 'i(l, 'tr*s RIIC Nvas clearly different from NvIlat people thought Linder tile Kdddr 
administration itsell'. The 1101lowing table shows the opinions orthe IlLingarian 
people towards the KAdArist I lungary and as can be seen, the results ol'the poll 
are not overlapping with tile actual public diseontent felt especially from mid- 
1970s onwards in I lungary. 
2.11 Scc Ibid.. pp. 259-2633 fora detailed discussion. 
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Table 4.19.: Public opinion on the KAdAr regime according to 
respondents' parly preferences (percentage of those who agree with the 
proposit ions), 1993232: 
Party supported-+ IIDF- AFD ISP IISP FIDESz CDPP National 
Chararleristics or 
I 
Simple' 
KAdAr Fral I 
'I here Was 53.6 72.3 78.4 90.1 74.3 77.2 76.1 
economic 
development 
People 1hed better 76.8 83.0 89.0 92.5 86.1 89.7 85.9 
There N1.8% 51.5 69.6 68.9 82.6 70.1 63.2 68.3 
significaid social 
development 
'I here %-. a% Lm and . 58.8 72.3 76.7 83.5 73.4 68.4 73.6 order I 
There was great 63.8 46.4 48.6 24.2 34.3 38.6 37.4 
oppl-mion 
Thc. ý railed (4) soh-C 37.7 32.1 32.4 15.7 25.3 24.6 25.5 
social problems 
Freedom %, #, as 66.7 61.6 66.2 30.0 48.8 59.6 49.1 
nvisýing I I I I II 
HIM. Hung rian Democratic Forum; AFD = Alliance of Free Democrats; ISP Lýa Indcpendent Smallholders' Party, IISP = Hungarian Socialist Party; Fidesz = Fidesz- 
lking-arian Civic Party. MIT -- Christian Democratic People's Party, those who did 
c,, pres,; parly prellerence. 
The Table 4.19 shows that people agreed that they lived in better conditions, 
there was law and order. and surprisingly there was a successFul social policy. 
The bUlk- ol'the legitinlicy problem faced at contemporary Hungary is that the 
misperception of* the past is accompanied and sustained by a flecling of 
nostalgia. The main reason For the I lungarian public demanding change was 
the lack ol' solutions to the mounting social problems encountered during tlic 
Ud6r era. 11'. flour ycars after the Call of tile communist regime by popular will, 
7-1.5ý/o ol' (lie people agrees that Uddrist. regime was able to solvý social 
problems. this result indicates to great aniount of dissatisilaction and 
disillusiomimit with the new political order. 
I'o obtain a legitimate status within such circumstances is flic main challenge 
Cor the new politieal order. That the regime is legally, legitimate and is 
232 Rtidorl'bkds. loc.. Cit. P. 13. 
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perceivcd as legitimate by tile intelligentsia and other parts or tile elite does not 
nccessarily make the reginic a legitimate order for the general public. 
On the one hand. one has to be cautious while dealing with data such as that 
noted above. One important Factor working within the systcni and which 
makes pcople show possibly greater affiection to tile KMdr era than they 
should show. is the common knowledge that tile post-conimunist regime is 
now an established systern. that neither tile Russian Federation nor other parts 
ol' the 11ornier Eastern Bloc are in any position to implement a return to tile 
communist rule and hence there is no way back flor a communist Hungary 
unless there is a popular revolution or a referendum, both unlikely cases. 
The responses to the survey questions, therellore, may not reveal tile truthiul 
fleelings ol' the I lungarian people. Yet, these are also to be perceived as signs 
ol* public disillusionment and mistrust vis-A-vis the new political order and its 
ecollonlic consequences. The main problem flacing the new political order is 
that no public-approved Icgitinlacy is possible as long as tile ecollonlic dccline 
continues. The loss oreconornic benefits undermines civil socioy as well as 
the wish to participate in the policy-making process either by party or lobby 
group membership or by attending tile process at the most basic level, i. e. by 
casting votes in tile ballots. 'rhe low participation ratios in tile parliahientary 
and municipal elections. which sees one third to the halrof tile population not 
turning up to vote, decreases the popular support flor the acting national and 
local governnictits and flor the parliamentary political parties. The low ratio of 
Noting results in an even lower support flor tile ruling party and hence 
extinguishes tile popular trust in the system. 
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The table below shows that the Hungarian public opinion is confused about 
tile idea ol' participation. While tile respondents to the survey think tile 
government controls lire too much, in a far greater arnount than their fellow 
Fast H'itropeans. they also believe in the effect they have on their parliamentary 
dcputies. The latter issue is supported by a firm belief in the multiparty system 
as long as it contains no marginal parties, as Nvell. The Hungarians are also 
conflused about the role bl'the state as they want. less state intervention to lille, 
but look towards, the state flor socio-economic assistance. In addition. perhaps 
the most important Finding of all the questions is that although there is a lack 
of' approval towards the government policies, there is a strong belief in tile 
s)-stclil. The support flor the prinic minister's administration is shadowcd by the 
trust in the multiparty political systern and the belicf in the bona fidc work of 
the NI I's Im the people. 
Table 4.20. Opinions about the political system in different countries 
(approval /agreement ra(CS)233: 
Counfrics-->/ USA 11K France Ilungiry Poland Bulgaria flussia Ukraine Lithu 
1%%IIC'4 ý 
ania 
shic %hould 34 9 10 20 11 12 15 17 14 
provide food 
and housing 
to e% er) one 
State conlrols 62 44 69 57 24 -16 49 49 45 
lire Ino Inuch 
Alost 44 35 27 32 23 21 18 22 30 
deptifics care 
abou( %fliat 
people Re 
nmeirthink 
Llections 73 55 76 49 41 76 47 47 74 
afred 
I 
governmental 
policy 
We Should 55 56 37 30 47 53 42 36 39 
fight ror our 
country 
m het her righ I 
oi- ý%rong 
ParPt or 20 12 68 60 152 
122 1 24 1 46 
, 31 Klaus %on Beyme. 'I'ransition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. Macmillan, Basingstokc, England: 
1996. pp. 154-155. dala taken Rom the. Times -A firrot-Surrtys. 
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neighbouring 
roinitrim 
shollid be 
otirs. 
%N c Should 79 80 68 58 38 45 31 54 
Stop 
inionigratioit 
I 01-ongki 
-- --- 
73 06 75 60 72 74 
nceept 
multiparly 
a 57 47 07 33 54 48 32 40 51 
41conocrary all 
parlic4 
shollid he 
Allolvell 
I H:,, ree %%it h 56 51 34 42 69 22 19 12 
President's/ 
P. NI's 
sidminkiralio 
n 
Therellore. it III-IY be C011CIUded From the survey presented in the above table 
that the system has been better established in Hungary than other East 
European countries. In that respect, one may claim that the main problem of 
leg it imacy in II ungary I ies in the problem ol'participation. The agencies or the 
POSt-COIIIIIILIlliSt political order need to incorporate greater segments or tile 
JILlbIiC ill the illdirect decision-making process. This can bc achieved cither by 
increasing political party membership or by increasing participation in tile 
clectoral process. A solution tý) thiý problem lies in increasing economic 
justice in the country. One way to achieve economic justice is to introduce new 
I 
legiskition %%hich would artificially create tipper and lower finlits For all tile 
wages. Another way is to introduce rel'ornis on the legal and practical 
mechanisms with regards to taxation and tax collection. increasing the state 
revenues which can be directed to tile destitute and deprived areas or tile 
economy so that a regeneration may take place. 
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By these means or by the use of other political procedures, popular support for 
the institutions of' the new political order and for tile general political order 
itscl rilecds be maintained in I lungary. The establishment of liberal democracy 
based on multi-party competition in the field or politics and the establishment 
ora capitalist rree market system in the field or ecollornics do not surfice to 
provide continuity flor tile reginle. The economic crisis that the Russian 
Federation iS C1.11-1-ClItly experiencing and the rise of popular support for the 
COIIIIIIIIIIiSIS in that Country and the Popular disenchantment with tile leading 
political order are clear signs of danger flor the post-communist Russian 
system. Although public discontent in Russia and in Hungary is incomparable 
-it the moment. (lie Russian example remains a good reminder or tile 
insufficiency of the legal and structural legitimacy in guaranteeing the 
continuity of a political order which had also received the approval of tile 
intelligentsia. The public affcction for and approval or tile government is as 
jillportalit as. if' not more important than. these two incans of legitimisation. 
The rull-scale establishment of tile Hungarian post-communist liberal systern 
is only possible with widespread Popular support and not by legal or structural 
means of* legitimisation, nor with tile elite's approval of the systern. Tile 
solution to tile economic problems and inequalities in the country Will also 
contribute to resolving tile question of' legitimisation. When the population 
11cels greater financial and economic security. then it will be more willing to 
participate in civil sociel. ), and in the political decision-making process. When 
this participation is secured, then, it will be possible For-the Hungarians to 
dominate the political lille of their country more directly. 
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Moreover. the impact tile EU menibcrship will have on tile Hungarian political 
s)stcm cannot be ignored2-14. That tile EU is tile second most-trusted institution 
,, try also suggests that the regime and the public would 
have a more in I lung, 
sccurer relationship and hence the stability oF the regime, once again 
stivngthcned by the l', U membership from May 2004 onwards, would bring a 
more stronger approval rate For the parliament. tile government, and the 
political parties. This would create stronger bases lor the clainis of legitimacy 
of the govannients to conic and for the reginic in general. ir tiie I lungarian 
political changes and public perception of the new regime can be strengthened 
with the F. U membership. then legitimacy of the reginic nlay become 
undisputable flor it would depend on both domestic and international valLIC SCtS 
and domestic and intcrilational grounds Ilor the country's administration. 
"I-, For discussions on the issue. sec. for instance: Laszlo Prager, 11 lungary on the Road to the European 
I inion. ' in Las/lo Andor. LrimitiLon hLBluc (London. 2000), Zoltan Bara, -Lilialill 
tEcO1101"IcS, 
A(ýtqslmcn( to M)bal ChaLleno, -es (Budapest, 2000), Gabor Lakatos, 
'The Last Round of Bargaining 
_t Bellore EU Accession. ' 111"Wol: l' Quarterly (2000. pp. 79-86). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SYSTEM LEGITIMACY IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARY 
1. THE POLITICAL CHANGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A. Three Dimensions of Legitimacy: 
From the 1990 elections onwards, the question of legitimacy continued to be 
central to the democratisation process. The different meaning attributed to 
legitimacy in diffewnt fields of social sciences. as in politics and law, first of 
all. gave rise to some conrusion over the meaning of* the term. SecondlY. the 
understanding and implications of the concept of' legitimacy within diffiercilt 
layers ol' the Hungarian social strucillre235. and even within the different 
layers ofthe state structUrc, created alternative perceptions of legitimacy. 
SUCII iliSCI'CplllCiCS ill Understanding can be rcdticcd if one considers there are 
dilTerent but co-existent definitions of legitimacy. There arc three main 
substi-Lictures to legitimise a given political systern Im all different layers or 
social sciences and or tiie society: Legal support or the claim to legitimacy. 
support ol' the intelligentsia; and [lie support ol* ordinary people'22.16. -1,11C 
'" The divi, ions of tile social structure mentioned here refcrs to two different social scgrnentat i oils, 
either in lerms of' inconic or in terms of political awarcness/cducation. Society may be divided 
accordin- to their income level. and this led to the development of the lower-carning or working class, 
tile illid(lie cla"", and tile upper class. It may as well be divided in terms of education into two, namely 
tile intelligentsia and tile Common people, (lie ordinary people. In this second division, one may sub- 
divide the intelli'ventsia into tile three important parts of political power elite, with economic power clitc 
and file bureaucracy. The former two would be active in tile decision-making process either by direct or 
by indilect influence ill tile political parties and tile parliament, %khile tile bureaucratic elite will, despite 
their influence oil tile decision-making process, be peripheral compared to tile powcr-elite in economics 
and polilim 
"' See CIMP10- I for a lengilly di-scussi. on ofthe subject. 
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support ol* tile intelligentsia and tile ordinary people may be gained through 
different means. These nicans include legitimisation through the leader or 
Icaders ol' tile nc%v regime, Icgitimisation thrOLIgll tmdition and legitinlisation 
through the recognition of' the systern as legitimate with its inStitUtions and 
infi-astructure and superstRICtUre. 
Legitimisation by legality, on tile other hand, depends oil the new political 
ordei's acceptance ol'the i-ide oflaw principle and hence its attempts to prove 
its legitimacy by lavvs. regulations and by-laws. ol' an international and 
domestic nature. 
1. Legal Aspect of Legitimacy: 
As previously stated. when the post-communist I lungarian systern is analysed, 
its chim to legitimacy through the support of law is not radically difTerent 
111-om its communist predecessor. It accepts the i-ide qflaw principle, then, this 
limits its space of' action in tile boundaries or the constitution of the country 
-Ind ensures that its actions will be scrutinised. The acceptance of tile United 
Nations charter and the promise to honour bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with othcr states. and tile wish to become part of tile European 
t Inion and lience tlie acceptance - of tlie autliority of a supranational 
organisation are also signs ol'the new regime's attempts to gain legitimacy in 
terms ol'international law and international politics. 
Fhe main characteristic of' the I lungarian post-communist liberal democratic 
systcm in terms M* legal legitimacy is that it depends on a constitution which 
%VaS aIIICIIded during (lie National Roundtable discussions of 1989 attended by 
representatives of' almost all political views in the country. This speciality 
givcs the post-communist constitution or Hungary greater credibility and 
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public support as it is prepared by the representatives of the people. Thcrcrore, 
in legal terms. llor it abides by international law. and for it is based on tile 
eonstitution which was amended by the representatives of a great mqjjority of 
I IL111ý1., iri, 111 people. Therefore, in thc domestic scale. flic new Hungarian 
political order is legally legitimate. 
On the other hand, obtaining Icgitimacy by public approval is harder to 
preserve Ilian obtaining legitimacy by legal terms. Any cliange in the ruling - 
ruled relationship in a given country may result in serious consequences flor tile 
rcginie*s legitimacy. 
2. Legitimacy by Elite Support: 
I'lic I lungarian elite. Formed by the intelligentsia, students and teachers, 
111-01'eSSiOlialS, bMinessmen, politicians, and the members of the bureaticracy, 
has changing perceptions ol' tile new regime. I lowever. oil tile whole. as tile 
new regime provides the intelligentsia with greater freedom of speccli and 
action. this ensuring their SLIpport. Tile role or tile intelligentsia in ternis or 
supporting or opposing the system is a crucial one as tile mcnibers of tile 
intelligentsia are part ol'the elite and hence while they may not, be the ruling 
cliie. the)- may one day become a part of' it, and hence influence policy- 
making. 
In the making ol*the new system, as during the reflorin stages of the communist 
Rile. rel'orm Crom above has been the main criterion ol'cliange in I lungary. The 
role that the ruling and non-ruling intellectual elite played during the reform 
process which %Ncilt oil for over a decade afTects the support or tiie ente 
towards the new order. 'rhe role of the intelligentsia which was outside the 
administrative circle increased in time, and became paramount during tile 
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Roundtable negotiations. The intelligentsia which was perceived as a threat to 
tile conlillunist system finally found a platform to express their views a nd was 
hailed as the deflenders or tile public will within the negotiations. As most 
nienibers ol'the First post-coniniunist parliament ývcre either local notables or 
the members orthe intelligentsia with a history ordissent, they also had access 
to political power by means ortlicirinnuctice over tile legislative process. 
The intelligentsia's approval or tile new regime was based oil their perception 
of' the new political system as a political whole. Under communist rule, their 
main concern was the implementation or rundanictital human rights and 
political Creedonis. The ability to act within tile new political system with a rar 
greater rreedoni and with rar less constraints than beflore has improved tile 
Popularity orthe new regime within the elite. The positive change in tile living 
StWIL1,11-LIS or tile ruling elite ortlic ancien reghne affected the perception or tile 
new reginie by the intelligentsia as they realised the rinalicial opportunities 
awahing them in tile ncw system. 
The political system, tile number of political parties that served within tile 
three governments in the 1990-1998 period. and the disillusion within the elite 
towards (lie tincien i-eghne and its representatives disabled tile emergence of a 
popular, nation-leading leader. 'rhis obstructed tile legitimisation of tliý system 
on (lie grounds orcharisnia/leadership. The lack or a tradition ordeniocracy in 
the country -despite tile anti-communist and pro-democratic work or tile 
dissident intelligentsia during tile communist rule and the revolutionary nature 
ofthe change-. has obstructed tile legitimisation orthe new system oil the basis 
ortradition. 
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On the other hand, tile intelligentsia's role in tile transition process and their 
omai desire flor political power ensured the new reginle*s acceptance by tile 
intelligentsia. The intelligentsia created the parameters that the new regime 
I'LlIlCtiO11CLI within. thus legitimising the system. 
The Democratic Charter movement (sec Chaptcr 5 Im a discussion) is the 
maJor example lor the intelligentsia's acceptance of the new reginic as 
legitimate. As the new rcginic was considered as Icgitiniate at the systemic 
level, the signatories or the charter acted to preserve the core oi* the new 
regime against the danger of an authoritarian administration. 'rhe movement 
and later political involvcmcnt by the mcnibers of the Hungarian intelligentsia 
show do the liberal democratic system is considered as legitimate and 
ti-LIStW01-tily b)' tile I ILIngarian intelligentsia. 
3. Legitimacy By the Ordinary People's Support: 
Although (lie support or tile elite ror tile continuity or a political order is all 
ifidispensable need, the lack ol'support from tile people who are not members 
or intelligentsia may end its reign with or without the support or tiic elite. The 
legitimacy of' a regime, thercrore. depends more on its approval as legitimate 
by ordinary people than by tile intelligentsia or by law. 
The I lungarian general public (hereinafter ordinary people) which constitutes 
the majority of the population was the significant part of the K6ddrist social 
contract. 'I lie social contract was a hypothetical agreenictit betwcen the Kdddr 
administration and the people. It was perceived by the dissident intelligentsia 
perceive it as a social contract but as a mcre act ol'social bribery. The contract 
was based on the cqUation or cconomic prof-it in excliangc ror political 
indillicrence. Such concepts as the New Economic Mechanism, second society 
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and second economy wcre tile outcomcs of such a social contract. The 
transaction permitted UdAr to stay in officc with relative peace and for longer 
in comparison with other [last ELiropean leaders. It also enabled people to 
benefit from the economic and political outcomes especially due to the absence 
of* laxes on the second economy activities. Moreover. the reginic refrained 
From ideological pressure on the issue or mass niobilisation campaigns which 
%%ere in use in other East European states, and From major social confrontation. 
Aller the austerity of the 1948 -1961 period. I ILIngarians were able to bencilit 
From Kildhist policies which gave them greater economic benefits and a better 
living standard than other communist states. Thcrerore, although it created a 
system operating on the basis ol' oppression and censorship and has thus an 
anathema to the I Itingarian intellectuals, the Udir achninistration has been an 
cr, t tWeconomic and social rccovery for the pcopic in general. 
In late 1980s and carly 1990s, the situation changed for both flic ititclligentsia 
-111LI tile people. While the former gained from the change as it meant greater 
1'recdom of expression. greater ability to earn recognition and money, and 
achieve ol'fice, for the latter. the changes nicant tile loss of nially ecollonlic: 
rights and benclits, a new political and economic environment, and a loss of 
theabilit), to negotiate with the administration. I; 
While the intelligentsia was ignored and suppressed by the communist 
administration. (lie Hungarian public was politically wooed to prevent a 
reCLII*I*CllCC ol' 1956. Therefore, the population had some power under KAddr's 
rule. I lowever. as the new system is a multi-party liberal demOCracy, every 
individual has theoretically equal rights and equal opportunity to participate in 
(lie decision-making process. However, as tile main drive of tile elite is 
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political and that ortiie ordinary people is economic in the first place, the elite 
has a greater say in tile policy-making process than any layman under tile 
normal working of liberal democracy. This results in the creation of a disparity 
bet%%cen the elite and the ordinary pcople in raVOLir of the elite for the latter has 
casier and more ample access to the places or influence and high-rank 
bureaucratic posts or membership of civil society organisations such as lobby 
groups. 
Consequently. where a memba of the elite perceives an improvement due to 
his! her position. tile ordinary person illay perceive a decline due to Ilis or her 
lowered income and loss of state protection either by social security services or 
by social bribery. 
The legilimisation of the new order, in ternis or tile people, therefore depends 
on dic economic perl'ormance in tile trans rormation period. On tile one hand, 
the I lungarian people perceive tile new political order as better than tile 
previous one llor it enables them greater r1rcedom and greater rights. but Oil tile 
other liand. they also see it as a liability because it gave rise to great social 
inJustices and a general decrease in the living standard of the Hungarian 
people. 
All these create an inner dilemma within the society. First of all, the sýstcm is 
approved as legitimate on a systemic basis. Sccondly, the system is also 
perceived a. ý indiffercilt to people's needs and therefore there is a feeling of 
apathy in people towards the new political order which manifests itself by non- 
participation. Political party membership rigures are extremely low, the people 
are apolitical. there is a constantly very low turnout in the elections and there is 
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an aura ol' indifference about anything political. It is this indiffcrcnce that the 
great problem in I lungiry lies for both Icgitimacy and democratisation. 
B. The Current Hungarian Situation: 
The situation in the post-communist, Hungary operates within the boundaries 
of this dilemma of lost influence of flic gencral public and the ncwly gained 
inIltience ol'the intelligentsia. As a majority of dissidents proceeded to beconle 
members ol' the ruling elite in the post-communist system increasing their 
i1111LIC11CC and Conning the bulk or the newly-forming middle class, the general 
public's political bargaining power has ditilinished. 
The main problem for the political power holders in the country is to provide 
means (o ensure mass participation in the democratic process. Unless the 
people are integrated into the political process, citlicr through an 
administration-led civil society revival, or by finding new means or improving 
Ihe living standard of the majority of people. there will be problems facing tlic 
post-communist political ordcr in ternis of legitimacy and hence continuity. 
The civil iildill'crcncc to the regime may end tip in a series of mass protest 
movements like the taxi drivers' blockade and florce an elite versus ordinary 
people conf'rontation which would endanger both the social peace and the 
position or the regime. To prevent the development or such a scenario, there 
gruse are [%%o major steps to be taken: Firstly. the intelligentsia needs to reeo i 
that the ncw system is a composite or both political and economic spheres. 
Secondly. the rulers of the country need to convince tile people that their 
economic situation is likely to improve. 
The first step is crucially important as many members of tile Hungarian 
intelligentsia claim the process of transition is a purely political process. For 
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inslance. Bela Greskovits claims in his cssay of 1996 that most Wcstcrn 
observers or oic E-ast European transition predicted a failure for the post- 
communist liberal democratic system in that part or the World and blames 
man), political scientists for spending too much time and emphasis on the field 
t)j- ect)jjt)jjjics237. This approach perccives economics and politics as two 
dilTerctit lields. The main point in this scparation is to opposc the Marxist 
prineiples. It argues that proposing ccononlic solutions to political problems 
equates %%ith being a Marxist, and therefore. is unacceptable in the post- 
communist I lungarian sctting. The proposition or political SOILItions to 
political problems is also an ideological rejection of the Uddrist social 
contract by ignoring the 'economic bencrit in exchange for political obedience' 
axis of' the K,, Id, irist social contract. I lowever, the situation in Hungary and 
other Fast Furopean countries is beyond mere political - ideological 
orientation: The greater part of society does not receive what. it needs. In tile 
case or Hungary. %Nhat is needed is an end to the impoverishment or tiie 
majority of the people, improved nicans of social security, housing, and 
schooling flor everyone. 
'riic acceptance or tile economic dimension oftlic situation 
by tile intelligentsia 
will improve the handling of the situation by the govcrilments as the political 
parties depend on the intelligentsia's guidance. Unless a prudent approach is 
adopted by the elite. social indifference may transform into social unrest which 
may be shomi cithcr by total isolation from the sphere orpolitics or by protests 
%khich may range Crom a dramatic increase in the votes cast for such marginal 
217 Ile1j, (; j-C. %koý. jjs. (; q. ()Lj B Breakdown Pnq)hecies. llcl/, p Poor Democrticies: On Faile .- -we- Dwitsforination Reglilies. ' paper prescriledat the lo"' International Colrcrciicc 
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p,, irlies as Csurka's nationalist cxtrernist Hungarian Justicc and Lifc Party to 
public acts of mass protest. even rebellion. The economic situation in tllc 
RUSSiall Federation where the rich-poor divide is extreme endangers tile 
continuity and legitimacy of the Russian system. Although Hungary is not as 
diVided. unorganised, centrifugal and poor as the Russian Fcderation. in time, 
a similar late may take place in I lungary as well. 
C. The Causes of Social Differences on Legitimacy: 
The difIlerence in approaching the issue of legitimacy between tile 
intclligentsia and tile ordinary people may be attributed to the lack of 
communication between the two layers of the I lungarian society. The lack of 
communication between the intelligentsia and the ordinary people is the reason 
Ilor the creation ora I%vo-licr process orcognition and evaluation in respect or 
legitimacy as well as other socially important issues. The two segments of 
sociely developed differellt sets of value and dil'ferent priorities under Uddrist 
rtilt:. \VItile ilie intelligentsia adopted a purely political stand vis-ä-vis tlie 
ruling political order, tile ordinary people focused on economic conditions. 
This resulted in the intelligentsia's suffiering under Kdddr while ordinary 
people ignored the political situation. The ncw reginic has dilTerent modes of 
relationship between the rulcrs or the country. This new relationship focuses 
(in political interaction rather than cconornic interaction and most or oic 
IMIL!, 11-iall people cannot understand the change. This leads I lungarian society 
into a mo-lier formation: tile intelligentsia which can relate to this new 
political environment and ordinary people who cannot. 
of Europeanim. Council For European Studics. Chicago, Illinois, 14-17 March 1996, pp. 7-9 passim.. 
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On (lie other hand. the I lungarian political and economic systems arc still in a 
Irmisilory phase. Therdore. whilc post-communist Hungarian socicty is 
dilTerent From I lungarian society tinder communism, it is also different from 
post-industrial society of thc First World in ternis of institutional stability and 
Continuity. 
1. Different Sets of Interaction: 
In tile post-industrial society. there arc two sets or interaction, onc in tile macro 
level and tile other in tile nlicro levcl. The macro-level interaction comprise the 
interactimi in the itistittilimial, organisational level while the micro-levei 
intcradion comprise tile interaction aniong the individual IlUrnan beings. 
The I lungarian intelligentsia focused in the last decade, mainly oil the issues 
concerning civil society. political institution-building and similar sutýjccts oil LI 
the macro level. on the other hand. as the institutional changes afTected tile 
everyday lives ofordinary people. tile focus of interaction in the lesser-earning 
and less-educatcd strata or tile Hungarian society increasingly became tile 
micro-level transactions. "Both sets of demands, inicro individual and niacro 
organisational. are satisfied on the nicso level ol*role relationships and network 
interconuctions. where people work collaboratively, pool human capital, and 
redesign relationships to maximisc creativity and improve problern-solving 
potellti, 11. -238 The lack or a nicso-level interconnection network in tile post- 
communist. transitory Ilungarian society caused a rupture of contact in 
lictween the I%vo layers- of' tile socicty. For the communist era's meso-level 
organisations were inadequate in the post-communist state and social structure, 
238 Jerald I hge and Chirles 11. Powers, Post-Industrial Lives: Roles and Relationships in Me 21" 
ý. 'ýCqyg. Sage Publications. Ne%vbtiry Park. California: 1992, p. 211. 
304 
no new institutions replaced the defunct communist institutions, causing the 
rupture between the different parts or tile society. and creating the dichotomy 
ol'cognition and interpretation now present in the I lungarian society. 
2. The Failed Civil Society Conception: 
I lo%%ever. to solely blame the transition for the lack of coni mun i cation and 
ineso-level transnctions bctwccii the intelligciitsia and the non-intclligcntsia 
would lie erroneous. The problem's roots can be secti in the dissidcnt 
mmements in 1960s. but especially in the 1980s. During the last decade of tile 
communist rule in tile Eastern Bloc, tile dissident intellectuals focused on 
prornoting the idea of civil society, lience creating a framework for 
democratisation %%hile trying to avoid an upsurge in the ctlinoccntric fcclings in 
the society. With the cvents of 1989 and espccially after thc1990 elections, it 
became clear that therc were no more two political camps consisting or uie 
communists and all others. This was the first problem the post-communist era 
paused I'or the dissidoit intelligmtsia ol' the ancien reginle. While the pro- 
democracy Cront 1ractured into a widc spcctrum ol'political institutions ranging 
in terms ol' ideology from the ultra-national right to the reform-socialist left, 
the intra-elite conflict (in power took precedence over the rebuilding of the 
society. In order Ihat the nieso-level transactions that the new elite and the 
ordinary people necdcd to inicract could be implanted. The intra-clite power 
struggle and the task of creating or rearranging political and econornic 
instittitions that the post-communist liberal democratic order required in order 
to funetion florced the intelligentsia as it becanic the new power-elite to a loss 
of* interaction with the other segments of tile society. At the end, the 
intc1ligelitsia began to lose contact with ordinary people. This led to its making 
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assumptions about the behaviour and thoughts of tile majority of the society 
withotil in. %, considerable traimiction with it. As a I-CSLIlt or these assumptions, 
the concept of civil society formed the bulk of tile intelligentsia's interest in 
social contribution to tile nc%v system. Ilowevcr, as Alexander Sniolar 
observes. %%hile the concept of civil society was never something beyond a 
concept iii reality: 
'I lie greatest shock for civil society activists, however. 
%%as their discovery or society's real condition. 'File 
"revol tit ions- of 1989 happened not bccaLISC Civil society was 
Iremendously strong. but because Gorbachev's policies of 
ghtmost and 1wi-esiroik(i had created a deepening 
internalional crisis Ilor the Soviet Union's satellite rcgimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It soon became clear that the 
l'ormer oppositionists could command only limited social 
support. even %%here there was prolOUnd social discontent 
x% ith the old ordcr. -239 
Members ol'the intelligentsia who were thoroughly cnthusiastic about the rise 
()I* ci%'il socict), and who Avere writing in tile carly 1990s about popular 
aspirations orindependence. the strength or popular values. tile signs or active 
and passive resistance became advocates of tile idea that tile post-communist 
society %%cre at the brink of self-destruction for the communist regime had 
created a Sort (W cynical. aloilliscd, StUnted subject generally rellereed to as the 
Although the observation about the homo sovielicus l, ias a 
depree oftruth in it. the lack of communication between tile intelligentsia and 
tile ordinary people. even under tile communist rule, and the suppositions 
rather thaii one-to-one observations of the intelligentsia about tllcý thoughts and 
'" Alexindcr Smolar. 'From Opposition to Atomization, ' Atimal (? f Democracy. vol. 7(l), January 
1996 (pp. 24-38). p, i(). 
2441 11. 
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priorities ol'the ordinary people created the gap between tile two strata or tile 
s0clety. 
The lack ol* interaction between the intelligentsia and the ordinary peopic was 
and is the primary cause in the absence of a national approach on tiic issue or 
legitil"acY -is well as other concepts of political and economic life. llo-wcver, 
there are oflier flactors %%hich contribute to this dichotomy of' Weltansclititing 
be(%Neen the highly-educated and less-educated sectors or uic, society. i, iie 
absence or the Concept of CollectivC activity in the mind or homo sorieficus is 
also to blame Ilor the intelligentsia's ill-dellined vision of what flic priorities in 
the new regime should be. and for the absencc of civil socicty. Social 
interaction sets that were developed Lindcr four decades of communist rule are 
hard Io change within the space or a nicre decade and tlicrerore one should not 
C. Xpect great achicvements vis-A-vis the 11ormation oF political consciousness 
and more active participation in the dccision-tilaking process. Tile state of 
economic hardships %%hicli engulfed tlic region, including Hungary, from early 
1990s to date contributes to the public adoption of tile 'econonlics-berbre- 
polilics' approach as well as those factors cited above. 
3. The Influence of Economy: 
The most important economic outcome of' the political and economic 
(ransIlorniation in (lie I Imigarian society may be cited as the rise of the gap 
between the rich and the poor. tile elite and the ordinary people. Tile widening 
of' poverty aniong greater segments or the socicty, incorporating the old-age 
pensioners. (lie unqualified labour force and those inade redundant under the 
new 111,111agrial systems. has created a segment within tile society which is 
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theoretically and practically inaccessible and therefore ignored by the 
infelligoll"i'l, 
According to I legel. the basic structure of civil society gives rise to a class 
%%hich is excluded 1rom the benelits civil socicty creatcs, such as work and 
personal dignity. This would actually be a segment of the society which 
perl'orms no duty to%vardi the whole of* the society, but is an clement within 
civil society %%hich negates its universal principle, a kind of what is branded in 
the conlemporary %%orld as the underclass241. Such an underclass is in 
flormation %%ithin the Conner E-astern Bloc and its representatives become a 
sharper indicator or ti, e differencc between the dissident intelligentsia and the 
ordinary pcople aller the change or regime. While tile mcnibers of' tile 
intelligentsia transibrined themselves into nicnibers of tile power-clite, the C, 
members ol' the least educated. labour-intensive part of' the society Nvere 
transl'ormed into (lie equivalent ol'the Western underclass. 
I lie Cormation (if' an underclass in I lungary is the main reason behind the 
theories concerning system legitimacy. Therd'ore, cconomics contribute to tile 
polilical milieWs defillition ill the country both Nvith the introduction or the 
liberal cconomic system and with the consequences this transition to the liberal 
capilalist economics create in the socio-political sphere. 
ll.. DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY: 
A. Democracy, Social Differentiation and Legitimacy: 
Hie inwraction (if' the -fields or economics and politics -as Nvell as tile 
interaction or the lack or interaction aniongst diffiercilt segments or the 
I lungarian society. as discussed above, had a draniatic cffect. on the events that 
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I'llape the I lungarian political scCllC ill tile post-coninlunist em. Within this 
transaclion hetween difTerent sets or institutions. fields ot'interest, and various 
segments of* society. a crucially significant clement. ill the post-coninlUnist. 
legitimisalion process ill I lungary is democi-alisation. The success of the new 
regime and it.; public Cognition aS legitimate depend oil tile growth of tile 
concept oftlemoeracy in public cognisance. This process requires more than 
insfiltilion-building as tile understanding of democracy and of' tile liberal 
democratic system. including its value sets, is tile key issue to lCgitillliSC tile 
sYslem in the long run. 
Although the instittition-building process is over in Hungary, tile legitimacy 
problem is still present not because the transition was wrongly conducted but 
because the It"ino sot-it-fictis of the cincien i-egime did not transform himself 
into a holno (tenloc-1-alicils. Basically. tile main reason for this is that most of' 
tile I)COpIC %%110 liVe ill I ILIngary at the moment were born under the communist 
rule and therellore were raised in accordance with tile systemic boundaries or 
tile C0111 Ill Lill iSt system. 'rhe (incien i-egime was operating under tile set or 
values of KAXii-ist communism. and tile KAdArist social contract. The current 
public insistence oil economic improvement Owes its Popularity to tile fact that 
it was basically the only type of' bargaining the Hungarian non-clite had 
encounlered under UdArist rule, from 1961 till 1989. For the length or these 
38 years. the KOWArist social contract based oil tile exchange of political 
obedience with economic prosperity has been tile main political element 
al1lecling tile I lungarians* lives. If and when a new generation's lilletinie is 
Slavoi Zink. 7ho Verso, London: 1997, p. 127. 
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collipleted without Ilie common knowledge of such a political arrangement. the 
political aspects orthe new order may best be perceived. 
In order Io perceive (lie importance or (lie role played by economic change, one 
should Ilocus on dic society's rormation. I believe the Parsonsian - 
I label-111.1siall approach to social classirication is the right one to adopt in the 
ca. w ol'(he I Itingarian situation: Mirgen I labermas, developing Talcott Parsons' 
ideas mi modernisation -that modernisation is basically a process or 
dill'crentiation-. claims that differentiation actUalised by modernisation creatcs 
I'our social subsystems: the econonly, tile state/the polity, a public societal 
community. and a private spi, erc or donlesticity242. The public societal 
community is akin to civil society and the private sphere or domesticity is 
lxlsicallý [lie interaction within households and among individuals. In the way I 
adopf Ilabermas' classilication. the main agency oF difTerentiation is not 
modernisation but systemic transformation. which may be perceived as a 
certain type ol' modernisation it' one considers the transition as a movement 
11-0111 the periphery to tile senli-peripliery in terms of tile Dependency Theory. 
Within this division. the suile and the economy. or rather the bureaucratic- 
instittitional settings ol'the state and the markct mechanism, respectively, are 
the key realms orinteraction which permit the adoption and implementation or 
key political and economie decisions. Civil socicty is a cliccks and balances 
Illechaili sill NvIlich is outside the Centre of tile system and thus has a secondary 
role in lerms ol' the working of the system. Instead. tile interaction aniong 
individual human beings at lionie or at work create the subsystem that fleeds 
212 Stelipen Crook. Malcolm Walers, and Jan Pakulski. Lo LinodernL: ( ., 
V oderiLj 
3"' Cdilioll. S; 11! c hiblicalions. London: 1993 (first published 1992), p. 27. 
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this mechanism. In I Itingary. the major probicin of tile systern sterns From the 
filcl 1hat the bureaucracy and the economy are tinder the control or 
internalional conditions such as international agreements or tile condition or 
World markets. The control or tile political sphere rails on tile once-dissident 
intelligentsia. and Ilor this group. the achicvement of such goals as free 
elmions. i-cpresentation ora diversified political spectrum in the legislature, 
and the establishment of basic rights and Freedoms or a liberal democratic 
order constitutes a source or salisraction ir not pride. 'rhe sphere or economics 
is dominated by the flortune ol'the international capitalist market, and the bulk 
of post-communist I lungarian economic policies follow the framework set by 
the sland-by agreements concluded with the International Monetary Fund 
ONIFI. Therellore. for the intelligentsia, there are no great tasks to accomplish 
in the political I. C. 11111 and no possible intervention to be made in the economic 
realm. As discussed above. civil society is not a part oruic 1 lungarian political 
and economic lille compared to what it should be. The lack orarrangernent or 
interest representation in the country in the form or widespread civil society 
institutions may be one reason why the dissident intelligentsia or the (Incien 
i-eghne %%hich became the nc%v power clite after the transformation may 
. ýsess Icelings ol%accomplishilicrit and scIr-confidence. 
In addition to tile lack ol'organised. instittitionalised protest rrorn the general 
publie. tile lack- ol'conimunication between tile intelligentsia and tile ordinary 
people create tile dilTerentiation of' opinions in respect of legitimacy. The 
household-level opinion-exchange mechanism. tile micro-level interaction 
aniong individuals in the I laberniasian stratification of* tile society, operates 
diffewntly in (lie elite and tile ordinary people grOLIpingS. While tile micro- 
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level 1ransactions or the intc1ligentsia rocus on the issues of political essence. 
(lie ordinan II III . people's micro-level 
interaction flocuses n1ainlY 01 ccO1O ic 
issties as economic survival which takes precedence over political frccdom. As 
-I restill. on the one hand. due to the absence or a proper civil society, the 
power elite ol* the post-communist era and the ordinary people do not 
communicate at the macro-level. On the other hand, (lie micro-lcvcl 
Iransactions suffer from the dill*crcnce of' perceived problems and priorities 
assigned to these problems in the two dillerent segments ofthe society. 
Stich at social structure, as a result. gives rise to a dichotonly of opinion 
concerning 1he issue ol'Ic9itimacy: While the intclligcn(sia opinc that political 
developments since 1989 provides a strong basis Ilor systemie legitimacy, the 
'cconomy-first* approach of the KAd5rist era still preserves its i,,, portance for 
the greater segments or (lie socicty. rliercrore. lor the intelligentsia, the 
queslion (if' regime legitimacy is barely a political issue which was solved in 
the democratisation process and which will reqUire some more familiarisation. 
I lo%%e%, er. I'm tile ordinary pcople, it still centres around tile issue of economic 
I III provellielit. 
0. The Rise of Political Consciousness: 
Although it is seen by the Hungarian intelligentsia as a fully complctcd 
process. denloeratisation of' tile SYS(CIII iS Still Ullfinislled. AlthOLIgh tile 
institutional mainCrame of Hungarian denlocracy is completely constructed 
NNith the establishnicnt and maturation of tnýjor political agencies, there is still 
the lask ol'ci-caling social awareness and consciousness with regard to liberal 
democratic System. 
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The %%ave ol'global liberalisation which affects the World in general allcr thc 
I'all ol* the 114ir-right authoritarian and rar-lell totalitarian state models from 
carly 1980s onwards dictates that within the international political 
environment. the new I lungarian political order is seen as legitimate. Besides, 
the international political criviroilment also dictates that there is no return to 
the Old System of government for the I lungarian state at least ror the conling 
decade as there is no USSR-typc second superpower claiming to be ail 
alternative to the liberal deniocratic-capitalist. system. Therefore, the 
I [Ungariall political structure ideologically has to continue to exist as a liberal 
democracy. This is due to Ilic lack of any other alternatives in (lie international 
political environment. 
In the realin of domestic politics, though, even in consideration of 
hilermilional political pressurcs and the intelligentsia*s adoption or the liberal- 
democratic system, the acceptance or tiic new regime as legitimate by the 
general public is still required. The acceptance or ttic political order as 
legitimale because there is no possible alternative due to international and 
domestic balances of power will not make the 11LIngarian liberal democracy 
last Imig. The situation will be a repetition or uic communist era with a 
differew ideological setting. The agencies of the systern will dirler, ý but the 
Imal outcome will not: It* people do not want the political order. it will Fail. 
There are two alternatives to enrorcc the systcm by force243 to people: First, 
2.11 Use offorce does not always mein coercion. As used in here, the tcmi 'force' refers to something 
11orced upon people without their consent. It needs not be forced upon people by the threat of using 
physical force or by physical or mental punishment. The lack of a viable alternative to the ruling 
political order meam the people or the country are forced to adopt a system orgovernment they cannot 
as, mme as dicir own. The fear of' anarchy or the fear or the unknown can prevent any direct and 
%% idespread opposition. Whether the system is imposed on them by a communist dictatorship or by the 
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by tile development of a political consciousness in the Hungarian people's 
minds. and second. by development or better economic policies which would 
undo tile widening ortlic gap between tile rich and tile poor in tile country. 
In the realm orpolitics, there arc signs pointing at tile creation of such a post- 
COIIIIIILIIIiS( political consciousness in Hungary. The 11LIngarians, as well as 
other Fast Europeans. have "relatively stablc and well-fornied implicit 
cognitke representations about political parties cvcn in an amorphous and ill- 
(IC1,11c(l pt)litical colltcxt,, 244 that was the transition period to liberal 
democratic system. Although participation in the activitics of civil socicty and 
in elections is considerably low. the Hungarian public has c1carly defined 
political party 1)1. elcrellccs. This enables the continuous reprcsciitatioil of fivc 
out ol' six political parties in the parliament for the length or three elections 
.; 
24 5. . 111cl cil', 11, The stability in the voting pattcrils and hence the 
liniiiation on the number of political parties represented in tile parliament 
enables the system to work more efficictitly. This is due to the ability of these 
parties to organise on a nation-wide basis and receive better recognition and 
greater loans 1rom tile state as well as the increasing a voter's identification 
%%ith a specific political party. There nlay be hostilities and mistrust against 
political parties. however there also is no scarch Im alternative to replace them 
-is political represcillatives. Civil society is still considerably %veak and is 
liberal democratic-minded intclligcntsia does not change the situation to a great ext ent because in either 
case. people aic %trawled with a system they dislike. 
241 Jowph 11. l'orgas. J. LaS710.1. Siklaki, S. J. Moylan, liniages of Politics: a Multidimensional 
Analýsis of' Implicit Representations of Political Parties in a Newly Emerging Democracy, ' Ew-qj)eaii 
dournal i! fStwial N. Vchologv, vol. 25 (pp. 481-496), p. 493. 
2,15 Fight %cars is the duration between the first elections and Ilic actual writing time of this study. 
I er. %%hen one considers the third elections were conducted to enable a parliament till the year 
2002, the po%sible , pan that covers the length of representation for these rive parties is actually 12 
ý cars. un less carly c lect ions are lield. 
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pci-ceived as a 'hobby. ' something taken in one's spare time. Consequently, 
political parties are tile nicans of'repmentation in the new I lungarian political 
systeiii. 
The limited amount ol'partieipation to elections may also be interprcted as a 
sign ol' inereased sensitivity about political matters in the society. It may be 
scen as a maJority ol'the people using their right not to vote as a protest. or as a 
sign that shows that they do not believe the victory ora political party over the 
others will change the conduct of' afflairs in their daily, routine lives. Even 
IIIOLIL(-111 this attitude may also be interpreted as political apathy, by being 
apathetic the I lungarian people are making a political statement concerning tile 
legitimacy ol'the ruling political order in the country. L- 
As to tile issue of' the devclopincilt of a real tradition or denlocracy in tile 
country. it is actually vcry carly to expect SLICII a development in tile current 
level ol' experience with democracy. However, in tinie, with a couple more 
parliamentary terms. the Hungarians will become more familiar with the 
requirements ol'the liberal democratic system. Then. xvith tile development of 
a common democratic consciousness, the level of those approving of the 
I lungarian political ordcr as legitimate on the grounds of its political and not. 
economic deeds xvill greatly increase. This will thercfore provide a kronger 
ridson it'&rc flor the post-communist liberal democratic system in Hungary. 
C. Legitimacy, Democracy and Economy: 
I'o stini tip. the 111.1tigarian problem concerning legitimacy has two nl, ýIor 
elements: Oil (lie one hand, tile development of' a continuous systeillic 
lC9iIiIIIUC%' %%hiCh I-VOUld be approved by all segments of the society requires 
thC LICN*CIOPIIICllt of' a denlocratically-minded public. This would require at 
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Icast one generation's lifetime so that today's post-communist youth can raise 
their own children within a libeml democratic environnicnt. In such an 
cm ironment. the socially improving caects or the democratic system may be 
'ILIOI)tCLI by a vvhole new generation. The members or this new generation will 
be unaware or oic type or social contract that existed between their 
grandparents and the KIdArist administration and act in accordance with a new 
set ()I* vailies. 
I lie developnicnt ol'such a generation will logically give way to an increase in 
the pcople's perception of their civic rights and therefore increase 
participation in the organs or civil society while decreasing emphasis on the 
economic interaction betwcen the statc and the citizcns. As the pcople will 
recogiiise the difference between being a sulýjcct of a totalitarian party-state 
being a citizen ol'a democracy, tile current problems surrounding the issue 
oi'legitimacy %%ill either diminish or dissolve. 
On tile other liand. (lie development or a continuous Icgitimacy, and this is ror 
a shorter-term guarantee flor tile system. depends on economic rellorm. The 
Jack ol't-el-orms may in the short -to- rnediurn run arrect tile voting preferences 
ol'the general public and may lead to increase in power orsuch parties like tile 
I itingarian Justice and Lille Party which made no contribution towýrds the 
establishment of* democracy. In tile long rL111, llowevcr. a great divide between 
the rich and the poor may caLISC gravcr social consequenccs such as mass 
proicst mectings. a series ol'indUstrial -, ICtiOll tlllt WOUld worscii the cconomy's 
COMILICt. and cven CiVil Unrest. 
I'llerellore. tile Future of' the 11LIngarian post-communist. liberal dcniocratic 
system depends on its relationship wid, uic peopic or 1 luilgary. Although it has 
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'I sound systemic legitimacy, it lacks tile strong leader figure. Such a leader 
Illight save [Ile %y-steni in case orstrong public opposition and slliil tile focus or 
the sys(em Crom systemic legitimacy to charismatic legitimacy. However, in 
the absence o I'such a leader, the system is to be judged as a whole and oil tile 
Sý'StCnflC level. The filikil-CS and tile contributions of the post-comillunist 
go% ernmenis %Q11 either endanger the future of the ruling political order as a 
legitimate system or result in public adoption orthe system as legitimate. -ro, 
secure tile backing of the society as a whole. the ruling elite or tile country 
must avoid the 'Sovict-type selr-legitimisation. 'rhat is. tile leaders of tile 
country should not see the intelligentsia or tile West for sole legitinlisation. 
The state soeialist systein's major mistake was to do just that: To receive tile 
approval of' the bureaucracy and the apparatchiks in the domestic sphere and to 
I-eceive tile Ipproval of the USSR administration in the international sphere 
%%Iiilc alienating tile Illasses brought the KAddr and other administrations. The 
pl-olilen, 1', Icillg the new I fungarian political order is to manage to look beyond 4 
tile needs and wishes of tile rornier dissident intelligentsia who are now the 
po%\er elite of the country. By interacting with tile greater segments of tile 
society 111(i by lddrcssing to the priority needs or tile ordinary people, tile new 
political order \%ill dilTerentiate between the political satisfaction' or tile 
intelligentsia and tile economic satisfaction ortlic common people reaching an 
equilibrium between the two sides of tile society. 'File intelligentsia still needs 
to preserve its avant-garde position in leading the nation, however it also 
needs to see the connections between tile superstructures of polity and 
economy. It has to accept that the intelligentsia and the ordinary people act 
\%ithin dif]'ercnt realms ill their niicro-levcl intcr-individual intera ction. If this 
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distinction can be clearly made and tile social injIustices can be reduced, tile 
I lungarian political system will survive as a legitimate political order which 
has tile alvroval ol'evcry segillent or tile society. 
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